HISTORY PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 17

THE GHAZNAVIDS

THEIR EMPIRE IN AFGHANISTAN AND EASTERN IRAN

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PREFACE

The genesis of this book was in a doctoral thesis, *The transition from Ghaznavid to Seljuq power in the Islamic East*, submitted to Edinburgh University in 1961. I must acknowledge with deep gratitude much help and encouragement over a period of several years from the Rev Dr W. Montgomery Watt and Mr J. R. Walsh of Edinburgh. It was from the latter that I first acquired a specific interest in the eastern Iranian world, a field whose study I have since found highly rewarding. Dr J. A. Boyle of Manchester has kindly made certain suggestions, in particular, on the correct forms of some Turkish names. The libraries of the Universities of St Andrews, Edinburgh and Durham, and that of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, have been most helpful over the lending and procuring of books, and the Süleymaniye Umumî Kütübhane in Istanbul and the India Office Library in London have provided microfilms of manuscripts in their possession. Finally, my thanks are due to the Edinburgh University Press for their publication of the book and to the printers for their skilful handling of a fairly difficult manuscript.

C.E.BOSWORTH *St Andrews, March 1963*

TO MY WIFE ANNETTE

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The system employed for Arabic and Persian is that recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society. In regard to Persian, *wāw* is rendered by *w* or *v* and the *majhūl* vowels ignored. The transliteration of Turkish names presents some difficulty. The attempt to fit the sounds of Turkish to the Procrustean bed of the Arabic alphabet has in the sources resulted in outlandish perversions of many Turkish names. I have tried to render the true form, where this is ascertainable; and I have used the vowel system of modern romanised Turkish orthography, with the minor exception that *ä* has occasionally been used as well as *e* for the mid-front vowel sound. Also, I have in many cases indicated the Arabic orthography of the texts by placing this in brackets after the first occurrence of the name; thus, Bilgetigin (Bilkātigīn), Sübashï (Sūbāshī), Toghrïl (Ṭughril).

NOTE ON REFERENCES

The notes and references are printed at the end of the book (p. 269 ff.) and the page on which any given note appears is printed in square brackets on the inner margin of the headline of the appropriate text page. E.g.

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means that the notes to page 9 appear on page 269.

ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED

TEXTS AND AUTHORS

Baih.	Baihaqī, *Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī*
Gard.	Gardīzī, *Zain al-akhbār*
Guzīda	Ḥamdallāh Mustaufī, *Ta'rīkh-i guzīda*
IA	Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī't-ta'rīkh*
I Baṭṭ.	Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Riḥla*
I Ḥauq.	Ibn Ḥauqal, *Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ*[2]
I Khall.	Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*
Iṣṭ.	Iṣṭakhrī, *Kitāb masālik al-mamālik*
Jurb.	Jurbādhqānī, *Tarjuma-yi ta'rīkh-i Yamīnī*
Mīrkhw.	Mīrkhwānd, *Rauḍat aṣ-ṣafā'*
Muntaẓam	Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaẓam*
Murūj	Mas'ūdī, *Murūj adh-dhahab*
Narsh.	Narshakhī, *Ta'rīkh-i Bukhārā*
QN	Kai Kā'ūs, *Qābūs-nāma*
SN	Niẓām al-Mulk, *Siyāsat-nāma*
TB	Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rīkh-i Baihaq*
ṬN	Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*
TS	*Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*

PERIODICALS, SERIES, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

AGGW	*Abhandlungen der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Berlin)
APAW	*Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Berlin)
BGA	*Bibliotheca Geographicorum Arabicorum* (Leiden)
BSO[A]S	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental [and African] Studies* (London)
EI	*Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden)

GAL	Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur* (Leiden)
GMS	*E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series* (London)
IC	*Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad)
JA	*Journal Asiatique* (Paris)
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society* (New Haven, Conn.)
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London)
JRASB	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal* (Calcutta)
KCsA	*Körösi Csoma Archivum* (Budapest)
RO	*Rocznik Orientalistycny* (Cracow)
SBWAW	*Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Vienna)
TP	*T'oung-Pao* (Leiden)
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (Vienna)
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, Berlin)

INTRODUCTION
AND NOTE ON THE SOURCES

INTRODUCTION

In an article on the ethnic origins of the Turkish troops of the Ghaznavids, the doyen of Turkish historians, Fuad Köprülü, protested against the prevalent, one-sided view of the Ghaznavids and their empire. He complained that the Ghaznavids were always treated from the standpoint of Indian history, and it is true that the first mass Muslim invasions of the northern Indian plain took place under their leadership. Nevertheless, Köprülü was right in drawing attention to the fundamental fact of the Turkishness of the Sultans and of a large part of their military following, for this has undoubtedly been neglected by those who have in the past written on the dynasty. This neglect is in large measure a reflection of the attitude and emphasis of the primary written sources for the Ghaznavids, which are all in Arabic or Persian, although even in these there are occasional indications that the Turkish aspect of Ghaznavid life was not unimportant.

However, at this present time not only do we lack an overall treatment of the dynasty, but the bases for this, monographs on the reigns of individual Sultans or on specific problems, are also very sparse. It is mainly Indian and Pakistani scholars who have concerned themselves with the Ghaznavids, but the basic premise of many of them, that the historical mission of the Sultans was the introduction of Islam to India, has not always made for dispassionate and scholarly attitudes. In the sphere of political and dynastic history, the only extended studies of which I know are the account of Masʿūd's reign, in effect a résumé of Baihaqī, which A. de Biberstein-Kazimirsky prefaced to his edition of the *dīwān* of Manūchihrī, M. Nāẓim's *The life and times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, and a recent thesis by R. Gelpke, *Sulṭān Masʿūd I. von Ġazna. Die drei ersten Jahre seiner Herrschaft* (421/1030-424/1033); whilst Shafi, Köprülü, Zakhoder and Gulam Mustafa Khan have contributed useful articles on aspects of Ghaznavid history. On the whole, the interest of western orientalists in the dynasty has been only moderate, although valuable work has been done in the spheres of archaeology, epigraphy, art history and numismatics. Indeed, the recent researches of the French Archaeological Delegation and

the Italian Archaeological Mission, working in the almost virgin field of Afghanistan, have revealed many exciting new facts about the Ghaznavids. The results of these ancillary disciplines are supplementing the written sources for the early Sultans. I have endeavoured to utilise the finds of these French and Italian field workers, so far as they are now available in print, as further evidence to fill out the picture deducible from the three great contemporary literary sources of 'Utbī's *Yamīnī*, Gardīzī's *Zain al-akhbār* and Baihaqī's *Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī*.

In this book I have discussed the Ghaznavids as a Turkish dynasty, of slave origin, who established themselves on the eastern margin of the Iranian world at a time when older dynasties in the region, such as the Sāmānids, the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs, the Ziyārids and the Būyids, were either collapsing or else entering into a period of contraction and decline. Under the dynamic leadership of Sebüktigin and his son Maḥmūd, these Turkish condottieri became rulers of what was, at Maḥmūd's death in 1030, the most extensive empire known in the eastern Islamic world since the dismemberment of the Abbasid Caliphate. I have not concerned myself, except in passing, with India or with the rôle of the Sultans as standard-bearers of Muslim culture and religion there. That the Sultans did in fact fulfil such a rôle in India is problematical, and an examination of Ghaznavid activity in India would necessitate a knowledge not merely of eastern Islamic history, but also one of Indian history, and a familiarity with a culture-region very different from the Islamic one. It is one of the merits of Nāẓim's exposition of Maḥmūd's Indian campaigns that he brought to these a first-hand acquaintance with the topography and local history of the northern Indian plain and was thus able to illuminate many points in the Islamic sources hitherto obscure.

The establishment of the racially-Turkish Ghaznavids (the evidence seems to suggest that Sebüktigin probably came from the Qarluq tribal group) in the eastern Islamic world meant that these barbarians from the Central Asian steppes had to adapt themselves, with the aid of members of the indigenous, Persian official bureaucracy, to Persian ways of administration, military organisation and personal life. The same problem had to be faced by the Ghaznavids' supplanters in Khurasan, the Oghuz leaders, and in many ways, the Seljuq Sultans were less successful than the Ghaznavid ones in assimilating themselves

to new ways. Although Mas'ūd of Ghazna lost Khurasan and Khwārizm, his descendants were yet able to survive in eastern Afghanistan and northern India for a further century and a quarter; and the Ghaznavids were never troubled, as were the Seljuqs, with the problem of controlling a resentful and irreconcilable Turkmen following. The historical process by which the early Ghaznavids became in large measure typical monarchs of the Perso-Islamic tradition is an intriguing one. I have tried to throw light on it by an examination of such Ghaznavid institutions as the administrative machine, whose techniques and personnel were largely taken over from the Sāmānids, the army and the court, whilst not forgetting that the early Sultans were still Turks in race and speech and that the steppe background and heritage, though little-documented for us, can never have been negligible.

I have not aimed at a continuous, chronological account of the events of the period. This has been done for Maḥmūd's reign by Nāẓim, and, more briefly, for the whole early Ghaznavid period by Spuler in the historical section of his *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*. Instead, I have concentrated in the first four chapters of the book on administrative, military and social institutions, with emphasis, where the information in the sources allows, on their operation in the central and western provinces of the Ghaznavid empire, in particular, in Khurasan and its administrative capital Nishapur.[1] Khurasan was the richest, materially and culturally, of the provinces under permanent rule by the early Sultans, and the fifth and sixth chapters are devoted to a survey of the economic, social, religious and cultural life of Khurasan, with special reference to Nishapur. Under the Sāmānid predecessors of the Ghaznavids, Khurasan had enjoyed considerable material prosperity and had been the cradle for the renaissance of New Persian language and literature. When it passed to the Ghaznavid Sultans, there began for the landowning and commercial classes of the province a gradual process of alienation from their rulers. The basic reasons for this were the continuous financial demands of the Sultans and, in Mas'ūd's reign, the Sultan's inability adequately to protect Khurasan from Turkmen incursions, for Ghazna was distant

[1] Chapter III, on the Ghaznavid army, is based on the present author's rather more extended study, 'Ghaznevid military organisation', *Der Islam*, XXXVI (1960), 37-77.

and the counter-pull of India strong. A discussion of the origins of the Oghuz, the military failure of the Ghaznavid armies sent against them and the final assumption of power in Nishapur by the Seljuqs, therefore forms the last three chapters of the book.

NOTE ON THE SOURCES

The survey of the sources which follows is not a full-scale one. It aims at providing a minimum of background information on the sources used in this book and at obviating continual reference to the detailed bibliographical works of Brockelmann and Storey, which remain, of course, indispensable for deeper study. The sources for early Ghaznavid history have, in fact, already been reviewed in some detail; this fact is somewhat surprising when one recalls how little orientalists have on the whole utilised this existing documentation as a starting-point for direct work on the Ghaznavid period.

The pioneer conspectus of the sources is in Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, Vol. II, *The Muhammadan period.* Elliot introduces his translated extracts from 'Utbī, Baihaqī, Bīrūnī, 'Aufī, Jūzjānī, etc., with some comments on the authors and their works. With the elapse of a century, these comments are quite outdated and contain many factual errors; Elliot's critical judgements are often aberrant, although it is fair to point out that he did recognise the judiciousness and value of Baihaqī as a historian. In contrast, the long bibliographical introduction to Barthold's *Turkestan*, 1-63, will remain for ever a model of its kind in its extensiveness, attesting to the author's unrivalled knowledge of the field, and in the acuteness of its critical estimates. Barthold covered the sources bearing on the history and geography of eastern Persia and Central Asia, and on pp. 18-24 he deals specifically with the Ghaznavid sources. The chapter on 'Authorities' prefaced to Nāẓim's *The life and times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, 1-17, is almost exhaustive for Maḥmūd's reign and for the early Ghaznavid period. He does not discuss his authors with such profundity or critical detail as does Barthold, but he is especially full and valuable in listing works no longer extant or known only through citations and in describing the later, largely derivative sources. There is an excellent bibliography, containing over 600 items, in Spuler's *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 532-94; Spuler's list contains some critical annotations, and he has also prefaced to his book a brief analysis of the sources for the early history of Muslim Persia (pp. xv-xxxii). Many useful references, especially to Rus-

sian works little known in the West, will be found in Frye's notes to his translation of Narshakhī's *History of Bukhārā*. Other bibliographies which contain information relevant to the study of the early Ghaznavids exist in Muhammad Akram's *Bibliographie analytique de l'Afghanistan. I: Ouvrages parus hors de l'Afghanistan* (Paris 1947), cf. 226-30; in Z. V. Togan's *Tarihde usul* (Istanbul 1950), 203-4; and in the *Iranische Literaturgeschichte* of J. Rypka and others, 565-641. A detailed, critical examination of several of the sources is given in the present writer's article 'Early sources for the history of the first four Ghaznavid Sultans (977-1041)', *Islamic Quarterly*, VII/1-2 (1963). I have dealt at length here with the four great contemporary writers 'Utbī, Gardīzī, Baihaqī and Bīrūnī, and with certain non-contemporary works which incorporate early material, such as that from the *Maqāmāt*, records of official life, kept by Baihaqī's chief in the Ghaznavid Correspondence Department, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān. These include four important works still in manuscript, Ibn Bābā's *Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm*, Shabānkāra'ī's *Majma' al-ansāb*, the anonymous *Nasā'im al-aṣhār* and Saif ad-Dīn Faḍlī's *Āthār al-wuzarā'*. For a full treatment of these sources, reference may therefore be made to this article.

For the period of the Seljuq invasions of Khurasan, there exists an Oxford thesis (unpublished) by V. A. Hamdani on the sources for early Seljuq history (see *O.U. Abstract of dissertations*, 1939). Professor A. K. S. Lambton used the sources which bear on Seljuq administration in her London thesis, *Contribution to the history of Seljuq institutions* (1939, unpublished). Mention should certainly be made of the important article of Cl. Cahen, 'Le Malik-Nameh et l'histoire des origines Seljukides', *Oriens*, II (1949), 31-65, in which he examines the Seljuq invasions in the light of the various groups of sources, with special emphasis on those works which incorporate material from the lost *Malik-nāma* (see below, p. 12). In utilising Cahen's work, note should be taken of the fact that Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī's *Seljūq-nāma*, the basis of one group of these sources, has since 1953 been available in print.[1]

I propose to deal with the sources used in this book under six headings:

1 General and dynastic histories and chronicles
2 Local histories

3 Biographical works
4 Works on *adab*, the 'Mirrors for Princes', etc.
5 Geographical and travel literature
6 Poetical and philological works

It will be noted that there is no special heading here for official documents, *inshā'* collections, etc. Although we possess at least three collections of correspondence from Būyid Viziers and officials, and although there are extant collections of official documents from the Seljuq period and after (see Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, xv-xvii), the letters of Ghaznavid officials like Maimandī and Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān have not come down to us in collected form. However, Baihaqī made copies for his own purposes of many official documents, and he quotes the texts of several such documents. Other, later works quote from the *Maqāmāt* of Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān (see above), and the texts of certain of Maḥmūd's *fatḥ-nāmas* are preserved in such sources as Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi' and Ibn al-Jauzī.[2]

1 *General and dynastic histories and chronicles*

The history of the Būyids in western and central Persia is to a large extent interwoven with that of the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids in eastern Persia. Much of the rich historiography in Arabic of the Būyids has perished, although we do possess the general history of Abū 'Abdallāh Miskawaih (d. 421/1030), the *Tajārib al-umam wa ta'āqib al-humam*. Only an exiguous section, covering the years 389-93/999-1003, remains of the continuation which Hilāl b. al-Muḥassin aṣ-Ṣābi' (d. 448/1056) wrote to the history of his uncle Thābit b. Sinān, but this fragment contains information on Maḥmūd of Ghazna's accession to power in Khurasan. The anonymous author of the Persian *Mujmal at-tawārīkh wa'l-qiṣaṣ* (written 520/1126) cites for his account of Maḥmūd's conquest of Ray from Majd ad-Daula, the historical work of the Būyid ruler's last Vizier, Abū Sa'īd Manṣūr al-Ābī.

Of the Ghaznavid sources, the earliest is the eulogy of the exploits of Sebüktigin and Maḥmūd, *at-Ta'rīkh al-Yamīnī*, which the official Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbār al-'Utbī (d. 427/1036 or 431/1039-40) wrote in an exaggerated style of Arabic. As a historical text, its vagueness about dates and places

reduces its value and the author was more interested in the western parts of the Ghaznavid empire than in India, but the *Yamīnī* is not wholly full of servile flattery and we learn a certain amount about the condition of the masses outside the court circle and army. A simplified Persian version of the work was made as early as c. 602/1206 by Jurbādhqānī, and it was this version which many later writers used extensively; Rashīd ad-Dīn's section on the Ghaznavids in the *Jāmi' at-tawārīkh* is lifted almost word-for-word from it.

The *Zain al-akhbār* of Abū Sa'īd 'Abd al-Ḥayy b. aḍ-Daḥḥāk Gardīzī, a general history of Persia from legendary times onwards, was written in Persian and dedicated to Sultan 'Abd ar-Rashīd (441-4/1050-3). Not all of it is extant, but it is a valuable source on the history of Khurasan, for which Gardīzī used the work of Sallāmī (see below, pp. 12-13), and on the Ghaznavids down to Maudūd's accession (432/1041).

The third and most important source here is the *Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī* of Abū'l-Faḍl Baihaqī (385-470/995-1077), which gives us a unique insight, almost a day-to-day account, of the working of the Persian bureaucracy which ran the Ghaznavid empire. Baihaqī recorded the experiences and memories of his long career as an official in the Correspondence Department in a series of over 30 volumes in Persian called collectively the *Mujalladāt*. He aimed to produce a history of the whole Ghaznavid dynasty down to the accession in 451/1059 of Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd, but at least 25 volumes of the *Mujalladāt* have been lost, and we now possess only the part dealing with Mas'ūd's reign, and even that is not entirely complete. Baihaqī's approach reveals his superiority as a historian to the turgidity of 'Utbī and the jejuneness of Gardīzī; his mind was balanced and judicious, he was able critically to weigh up conflicting evidence, and his narrative is fresh because he was a personal witness of many of the events he describes. In the course of his career, he took copious notes and often made copies for his own use of diplomatic and official documents; he laments in one place that many of these were taken from him on his final fall from grace, but he nevertheless managed in his *Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī* to give several official texts verbatim.

Minhāj ad-Dīn b. Sirāj Jūzjānī (d. in the second half of the 7th/13th century) came from a family connected by marriage to the Ghaznavids, and he served the Ghūrids' successors, the

Slave Kings of Delhi. A disproportionate part of his general history in Persian, the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, is devoted to the Ghūrids, and it thereby becomes a dynastic history, all the more precious in that it is the only one we possess for the Ghūrids. His section on the Ghaznavids is valuable for the account it gives of Sebüktigin's predecessors in Ghazna, for many sources ignore the existence of these governors. Jūzjānī used the lost part of Baihaqī which covered Sebüktigin's reign, the equally lost *Ta'rīkh-i mujadwal* of Abū'l-Qāsim ʿImādī (wrote early 6th/12th century?) and probably, the *Qiṣaṣ-i thānī* of Ibn Haiṣam.

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Shabānkāra'ī (d. 759/1358) wrote under the Il-Khanids. His *Majmaʿ al-ansāb fī't-tawārīkh* is a general history in Persian, but from the prominence given to the history of the author's homeland of southern Persia it is also a special history of Fārs and the Shabānkāra'ī Kurds. The section on the Ghaznavids contains information not found elsewhere; the author names no sources here, and it is likely that he took material from the lost parts of Baihaqī or from some intermediate source. Moreover, Shabānkāra'ī is the only writer who gives the text *in extenso* of Sebüktigin's alleged *Pand-nāma* (see below, p. 39).[3]

The general history in Arabic of ʿIzz ad-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (555-630/1160-1234), *al-Kāmil fī't-ta'rīkh*, emanates from Iraq and the central lands of the Caliphate, but is nevertheless rich in information about the east, including the history of the Ghaznavids and the Seljuq conquest of Khurasan. Ibn al-Athīr used the *Yamīnī* and Ibn Funduq's *Mashārib at-tajārib* (see below, p. 15), and as well as dealing separately with events in the years in which they occurred, he inserted a connected account of the origins and early history of the Seljuqs. He does not specifically name it, but it is clear from a comparison with other sources that he drew here indirectly on the *Malik-nāma*. Abū'l-Faraj Ibn al-Jauzī (510-97/1116-1200) in his general history in Arabic, *al-Muntaẓam fī ta'rīkh al-mulūk wa'l-umam*, was more narrowly concerned with events in Iraq than was Ibn al-Athīr, but in treating of the relations of Maḥmūd of Ghazna and the Caliphate, he gives the texts of some of the Sultan's *fatḥ-nāmas*. Written by a Christian in Syriac, the *Chronography* of Gregory Abū'l-Faraj Barhebraeus (1225-86) is a general history which pays considerable attention to Islamic events, and in his passage on Seljuq origins he quotes by name the *Malik-*

nāma. It is also thus quoted in the Persian general history of Mīrkhwānd (837-903/1433-98), the *Rauḍat aṣ-ṣafā'*; he used it, together with the parallel account of Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, for his account of Seljuq history up to the battle of Dandānqān. The significance of this material from the *Malik-nāma* was missed by Barthold, who considered Mīrkhwānd to be purely derivative, and so did not consult him in detail for his *Turkestan*.

Amongst the sources which are specific histories of the Seljuqs, the Arabic *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya* or *Zubdat at-tawārīkh* of Ṣadr ad-Dīn 'Alī al-Ḥusainī, who wrote his book some time after 622/1225[4], also uses the *Malik-nāma*. This last seems to have been written in Persian for Alp Arslan, according to the historian of Aleppo Ibn al-'Adīm, and to have been something in the nature of an official Seljuq account of their origins. Another group of sources in Persian on the early Seljuqs derives from the *Seljūq-nāma* of Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī (d. c. 582/1186), who wrote on the origins and subsequent history of the dynasty. The *Rāḥat aṣ-ṣudūr wa āyat as-sūrur* of Muḥammad b. 'Alī Rāwandī, begun in 599/1202, depends very closely on the *Seljūq-nāma*, as do Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Ḥusainī's *al-'Urāḍa fī'l-ḥikāya as-Saljūqiyya* (written 711/1311), the *Ta'rīkh-i guzīda* of Ḥamdallāh Mustaufī (written 730/1330) and Ḥāfiẓ-i Ābrū's *Majma' at-tawārīkh* (begun 826/1423). Finally, there is a group of sources, 'Irāqī in origin, represented by Ibn al-Jauzī and 'Imād ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 597/1201), who added his own *dhail* to the memoirs of the Seljuq Vizier Anūshīrvān b. Khālid to form a history in Arabic of the Seljuqs, later abridged by Bundārī as the *Zubdat an-nuṣra wa nukhbat al-'uṣra*. According to Cahen, the source for early Seljuq history drawn upon by these is almost certainly Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi' 's history (see above, p. 9) and the continuation of his son Ghars an-Ni'ma.

2 *Local Histories*

The genre of local history flourished particularly strongly in the eastern Islamic world; Cahen has seen in this activity a sign of the vitality and independent life of the towns there. There existed what might be termed provincial histories and histories of individual towns. The latter were so numerous that it seems as if every town of any note produced one or more local historians.

We would like to possess now the *Ta'rīkh wulāt Khurāsān* of Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusain as-Sallāmī, a historian and poet of Baihaq who flourished in the middle years of the 4th/10th century and whose fortunes were connected with the governors of Khurasan Abū Bakr Chaghānī and his son Abū 'Alī. At the present, we possess only extracts in such works as those of Gardīzī, Ibn al-Athīr and Manīnī in his commentary on 'Utbī's *Yamīnī*.[5] The *Taḥqiq mā li'l-Hind* of Abū Raiḥān Muḥammad al-Bīrūnī (362-c. 442/973-c. 1050), also written in Arabic, may be considered as a provincial history if one reduces for this purpose the sub-continent of India to the status of a province. The *India* is a vast compendium of information on the culture, sciences, beliefs and customs of the Indians, attesting to Bīrūnī's interest in all the creations and manifestations of the human mind. It was the outcome of his visits to India in the wake of Maḥmūd's armies, although Bīrūnī was never hypnotised by the Sultan's exploits, and explicitly denounces the ruin brought upon India by the campaigns (tr. Sachau, I, 22). The section on the Hindūshāhī kings of Kabul is a source for the history of the region on the eve of its annexation by the Ghaznavids, and has been much used to elucidate the history of the important Hindūshāhī dynasty. Bīrūnī was also the author of a history of his native province, the *Kitāb al-musāmara fī akhbār Khwārizm*, listed by Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 311, and used extensively by Baihaqī for his account of Maḥmūd's conquest of Khwārizm (*Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī*, 665-80).

The coastal provinces on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea were geographically well defined and had ancient cultural traditions of their own different in many ways from those of the adjacent plateau and mountain regions of Persia. They produced several local historians, some of which were edited by B. Dorn in his series *Muhammedanische Quellen zur Geschichte der südlichen Küstenländer des Kaspischen Meeres*, I-IV (St. Petersburg 1850-8). Some of these works provide information on the relations of the later Ziyārids and their Ghaznavid suzerains. The *Ta'rīkh Jurjān* or *Kitāb ma'rifat 'ulamā' ahl Jurjān* of Ḥamza b. Yūsuf as-Sahmī (d. 427/1036) is, as its alternative name implies, primarily a biographical dictionary in Arabic.[6] The *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān* of Ibn Isfandiyār (written in Persian c. 613/1216-17) is, however, a history proper, dealing with Ṭabaristān from legendary times up to the author's own day; Ibn Isfandiyār was a protégé of the local Bāwandid dynasty. The Gīlānī Ẓahīr ad-

Dīn Mar'ashī (d. after 894/1489) wrote histories in Persian both of Gīlān and Dailam and of the provinces further east; this latter work, the *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān u Rūyān u Māzandarān* follows Ibn Isfandiyār closely for its account of Ziyārid-Ghaznavid relations.

The *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān* is of great significance for early Ghaznavid history, for it deals with a province which was annexed at an early date by the Sultans. An unknown author wrote it in Persian (? perhaps originally in Arabic), apparently in the time of the Seljuq Toghrïl Beg, for the detailed narrative of events ends in 448/1056, after which a very sketchy *dhail* takes the chronicle down to the end of the 7th/13th century. The Sagazī local patriotism of the author comes over very strongly. His praise of Ya'qūb and 'Amr b. Laith shows us what the anti-Ṣaffārid attitude of the outside historians conceals, that the Ṣaffārids were in Sīstān a popular dynasty, expressing local feeling. The author is strongly anti-Ghaznavid, and regards the deposition of the native Amīr Khalaf and the coming of the 'Turks' (sc. the Ghaznavids) as an unmitigated disaster for Sīstān (cf. text, 354).

The histories of the towns always expatiate on the *faḍā'il*, merits, of the places in question. They are also frequently woven round the lives of the eminent scholars or literary men who lived there, expressing local pride in their achievements; they thus partake of the nature of biographical dictionaries. Ibn Funduq (see below) devotes a section of his *Ta'rīkh-i Baihaq*, 20-1, to the local histories of Khurasan and Transoxania. He mentions two for Nishapur, those of Abū'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī and al-Ḥākim b. al-Bayyi', and since the originals of both are now lost, we cannot but agree with Ritter that we are less well provided for in regard to Nishapur than in regard to other Persian cities.

The *Ta'rīkh Naishābūr* of the traditionist al-Ḥākim Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad an-Naishābūrī, known as Ibn al-Bayyi' (321-405/933-1014), comprised eight or twelve volumes. It gave biographies in Arabic of the local ulema down to 380/990, and ended with a section on the history and topography of the city. Later authors like Sam'ānī, Yāqūt, Ibn al-Jauzī and Subkī used it extensively, and it was still available to Ḥājjī Khalīfa; but today we possess only three continuations and/or abridgements of the *Ta'rīkh Naishābūr*. Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī

(d. 529/1135) wrote an Arabic *dhail*, carrying the entries down to 518/1124, and called it *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, and an epitome, *muntakhab*, was made a century later by Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣarīfīnī (d. 641/1243). Finally, an epitome was made, this time from Ibn al-Bayyi''s original, by one Muḥammad b. Ḥusain (lived in the 7th/13th century or thereafter); this is partly in Arabic and partly in Persian.[7]

The only history of Bukhārā now surviving was originally written in Arabic by Abū Bakr Muḥammad Narshakhī (286-348/899-959) for the Sāmānid Amīr Nūḥ b. Naṣr. However, the form in which we now possess it is basically that of a 12th century Persian epitome, although there are continuatory details which date from as late as the Mongol invasions. The historical narrative goes down to the fall of the Sāmānids. It thus provides documentation on the Sāmānids, a dynasty in whose history there are still many obscure passages, and on the period shortly before the Ghaznavid assumption of power in Khurasan.

Ẓahīr ad-Dīn 'Alī b. Zaid al-Baihaqī, called Ibn Funduq (490-565/1097-1170), was a prolific writer on a wide range of subjects, as the long list of his works in *Irshād*, V, 208-18, shows; all but four or five of these are now lost. One of his historical works was a continuation of the *Yamīnī*, the *Mashārib at-tajārib wa ghawārib al-gharā'ib*, which included histories of the Ghaznavids, Seljuqs and early Khwārizmshāhs of Atsïz's line; it is cited by Yāqūt, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Abī Uṣaibi'a, Juwainī and Mustaufī. One of his few surviving works is the local history in Persian of his home town, the *Ta'rīkh-i Baihaq*, completed in 563/1168. This book has sections on other towns of Khurasan and Transoxania, and contains several passages on local Khurasanian history not found elsewhere. In his biographical section on the Ghaznavid historian Abū'l-Faḍl Baihaqī, Ibn Funduq quotes from what may well be Baihaqī's lost work on the secretary's art, the *Zīnat al-kuttāb* (see below, pp. 64-5).

Amongst several histories of Herat, only two of which have survived, the Timurid littérateur Mu'īn ad-Dīn Zamchī Isfizārī wrote in 897/1492 his Persian *Rauḍāt al-jannāt fī auṣāf Harāt*. As well as being a history of Herat itself, in which there is much information on the capitulation of the city to the Seljuqs, the book also deals with many aspects of general Khurasanian history in the Ghaznavid and Ghūrid periods.

3 *Biographical works*

The historian of Islam is often confronted by a failing of his sources: their impersonalness. In part, determinist theological attitudes were to blame for this comparative lack of interest in human character and its development. Much of Islamic biographical material falls into two categories. On the one hand we have the biographical dictionary, giving a *curriculum vitae* of the subject and a list of his compositions. Sometimes the compiler limited himself to a particular region or place, as did Ibn al-Bayyiʿ in his *Taʾrīkh Naishābūr* or al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in his *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*; sometimes the compiler treated of a group of scholars from the standpoint of doctrine or legal practice, as did Subkī and Ibn al-Jauzī with the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs respectively. On the other hand, we have eulogistic or hagiographical treatment of a single person, and here, the real man is often hidden by extravagant praise or by the incredible feats of valour or charismatic power attributed to him.

As an example of the second type, we have a detailed biography in Persian of an important personage of Ghaznavid Khurasan, the *Asrār at-tauḥīd fī maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Saʿīd* of Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, who wrote in the 6th/12th century. He composed a work on 'the mystical states and sayings' of his great-great-grandfather, the Ṣūfī Shaikh Abū Saʿīd b. Abī'l-Khair Maihanī (357-440/967-1049), and then later incorporated this into a full-scale biography. The *Asrār at-tauḥīd* is in effect a contemporary document, for it is based on family traditions and stories handed down by the participants in the events; the Shaikh lived in Nishapur for a decade, and the book contains much information on religious and social life there. We also discern the importance of the Ghaznavid and early Seljuq periods in the development of Ṣūfism in Khurasan from the pioneer work in Persian on the lives of famous Ṣūfīs, the *Kashf al-maḥjūb* of ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān Hujwīrī (d. 465/1072-3).[8]

On a more general scale than the *Asrār at-tauḥīd* is the literary biographical work of Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ath-Thaʿālibī (350-429/961-1038), the *Yatīmat ad-dahr fī maḥāsin ahl al-ʿaṣr*, a survey in Arabic of the poets of his own and the preceding generation. The fourth *qism* is devoted to the poets of Khurasan and Transoxania.[9] As well as containing much biographical material on poets and their patrons in Sāmānid and Ghaznavid

times, the poetry itself contains many social and political allusions. The fame of the work ensured that continuations were not lacking; Tha'ālibī himself in his *Tatimma* took it down almost to the end of his own life, and Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Bākharzī (d. 467/1075) continued it for the early Seljuq period in his *Dumyat al-qaṣr wa 'uṣrat ahl al-'aṣr.*[10]

A work especially significant for Khurasanian and Transoxanian matters is the *Kitāb al-ansāb* of Tāj ad-Dīn Abū Sa'īd as-Sam'ānī (506-62/1112-66). The titles of 49 of Sam'ānī's works are known, including a history of his native city of Merv. His *Ansāb* is a dictionary in Arabic of *nisbas*, with their origins and correct forms carefully explained. Sam'ānī's primary interest was in traditionists and theologians, but there are also entries for names of political interest, such as those of governors of Khurasan under the Sāmānids and of the leading families of notables in Ghaznavid Khurasan.

Abū 'Abdallāh Ya'qūb al-Ḥamawī, called Yāqūt ar-Rūmī (575-626/1179-1229), spent much of the latter part of his life browsing in libraries and copying manuscripts. He had the mind of a bibliographer and cataloguer, and two encyclopaedic compilations stand to his credit, the *Mu'jam al-buldān* (see below) and the *Irshād al-arīb li-ma'rifat al-adīb*. The latter is a biographical dictionary in Arabic of Muslim scholars, theologians, poets, etc., and contains *inter alia* lives of men prominent in Ghaznavid Khurasan, such as members of the Mīkālī and Ṣābūnī families of Nishapur, and a long section on Bīrūnī.

In his biographical dictionary in Arabic, the *Wafāyāt al-a'yān*, Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Irbilī, called Ibn Khallikān (608-81/1211-82), cast his net wider than earlier biographers and included rulers, statesmen and soldiers as well as scholars. Coming as he did from the Jazīra, he was most interested in the heartlands of the Caliphate, but he did not exclude outstanding figures from the extremities of the Islamic world. His long and valuable article on Ya'qūb and 'Amr b. Laith (tr. de Slane, IV, 301-33) uses sources now lost, and he also wrote on Maḥmūd of Ghazna (tr. III, 337-44), touching here on Sebüktigin's origins and giving especial prominence to Maḥmūd's alleged change from the Ḥanafī to the Shāfi'ī rite (see below, p. 291, n. 27).

Tāj ad-Dīn Abū Naṣr as-Subkī (727-71/1327-70) wrote in Arabic a bibliographical dictionary of the scholars and traditionists of his own *madhhab* arranged in 'classes' according to

the century of their death, the *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā*. As well as containing lives of many important Khurasanian scholars from our period, Subkī has a biography of the founder of the Karāmiyya, Muḥammad b. Karām (II, 53-4) and a section on 'the virtues of Sultan Maḥmūd' (IV, 16-17), possibly inserted because of the Sultan's reputed change to Shafiʿism mentioned by Ibn Khallikān.

The Persian *tadhkirat ash-shuʿarā'* literature contains a certain amount of information on the poets of the Ghaznavid period, many of whom are not otherwise known except through citations such as these, and on other prominent men of the period. Thus the *Lubāb al-albāb* of Sadīd ad-Din Muḥammad ʿAufī (d. c. 630/1232) gives verses allegedly by Sultan Maḥmūd, and more plausibly, by Sultan Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd and by Maimandī (ed. Browne and Qazwīnī [London 1903-6], I, 23-7, 63-4). The *Tadhkirat ash-shuʿarā'* of Daulatshāh Samarqandī (d. c. 900/1495) quotes from the *Tāj al-futūḥ* (a poetic romance by ʿUnṣurī, woven around Maḥmūd's conquests?) a story about Maḥmūd's acquisition of honorific titles from the Caliph (ed. Browne [London 1901], 34).

It is convenient to consider together two Persian works on the lives of Viziers, the anonymous *Nasā'im al-aṣḥār* and the better-known *Āthār al-wuzarā'* of the Timurid official Saif ad-Dīn Faḍlī, both of them sources of prime importance for Ghaznavid history. The first was written in 725/1325 and deals with the Viziers of rulers down to the Abbasid Caliph an-Nāṣir. The section on the Ghaznavid Viziers treats at length of Isfarā'inī, Maimandī and Ḥasanak, and more cursorily, of their successors in the office; no sources are mentioned here, but correspondences with Baihaqī's work suggest that the author of the *Nasā'im* borrowed from there or from a common source. We have explicit information in the *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, which was written in 883/1478, of a connection with early Ghaznavid sources. Faḍlī drew on the *Nasā'im*, but added much fresh material, apparently from contemporary sources still available to him; in his section on Maimandī, he quotes specifically from the *Maqāmāt-i Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān*.[11]

4 *Works on* adab, *the 'Mirrors for Princes', etc.*

The genre of *adab* literature still has value for the modern orientalist in that it indicates to him the ethics and norms of

behaviour then prevalent among educated Muslims. As the demand for polite education increased and the machinery of government became more complex, numerous manuals appeared. One such work, meant as a reference-book for secretaries, was the *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm* of Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Khwārizmī, who lived in the second half of the 4th/10th century; it is justly famed as a very early Arabic encyclopaedia of the sciences. In his section on *kitāba* (pp. 53-79), Khwārizmī explains many of the technical terms used in the *dīwāns*; his model here is the Sāmānid administration in which he probably worked, and many of the procedures he describes were later taken over by the Ghaznavids. At the same time as Khwārizmī was writing, the anthologist Thaʿālibī dedicated his *Laṭā'if al-maʿārif*, also written in Arabic, to the great Būyid Vizier, the Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād. It aims to give the reader a stock of interesting stories and items of information, *nawādir* and *gharā'ib*, but the last section is a survey of the lands of Islam and describes the towns of Khurasan and Transoxania and their products.

A special class of *adab* literature is the 'Mirrors for Princes', manuals of guidance for rulers. The 5th/11th century witnesses a flowering of this literature, seen in such works as the Persian *Qābūs-nāma* and *Siyāsat-nāma* and the Turkish *Qutadghu bilig*, and it is notable that this development was in the eastern lands of Islam, where Iranian ethical influences were strongest. Although much of the contents of the 'Mirrors for Princes' seems to us today idealistic and divorced from reality, we must not think that this necessarily appeared so to contemporary Muslims; and for the historian today, the numerous anecdotes contained in these works are frequently of historical value.

The *Qābūs-nāma* was begun in 475/1082-3 by Kai Kā'ūs, penultimate ruler of the Ziyārids of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān, a dynasty which in the earlier part of the century had been tributary to the Ghaznavids. The family was also related by marriage to the Ghaznavids, and Kai Kā'ūs himself spent some years at the court of Maudūd b. Masʿūd. He quotes the Sultans and their policies with approval; it is possible that the example of the Ghaznavid state exercised an influence on the structures of neighbouring, smaller states, whose rulers welcomed the access of power which the Ghaznavid system gave to the head of state. Certainly, Maḥmūd is one of the heroes of the *Siyāsat-nāma* by

the Seljuq Sultan Malikshāh's Vizier Abū 'Alī Ḥasan Ṭūsī, called Niẓām al-Mulk (408-85/1018-92), described by Barthold (*Turkestan*, 25) as 'incontestably the chief source for the study of the political structure of the Eastern Muslim states'. Niẓām al-Mulk's formative years in Khurasan were spent under Ghaznavid rule, and the type of centralised state which he recommended in the *Siyāsat-nāma* to his politically naïve and inexperienced Turkish masters was based essentially on that of Maḥmūd, who figures in many of the anecdotes. Thus, used critically, it is a valuable document for the student of Ghaznavid history, especially for its administrative and military aspects.[12]

Aḥmad b. 'Umar Samarqandī, called Niẓāmī 'Arūḍī, seems to have spent much of his life in the service of the Ghūrids. He wrote in Persian c. 551-2/1156-8 his *Chahār maqāla* on the arts of the secretary, poet, astrologer and physician. The anecdotes in it treat largely of the dynasties of eastern Islam, from the Ṣaffārids to the Qarakhanids, and contain historical information not found elsewhere. He quotes from such lost works as that of Sallāmī, and in the second discourse gives a list of the poets who extolled the Ghaznavid dynasty. Very little is known about Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Qāshānī, known as Ibn Bābā, except that he wrote his book in Arabic, the *Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm* 'the boon-companion's stock-in-trade', during the reign of the Caliph al-Muqtafī (530-55/1136-60). As we would expect from the title, his book is a work containing useful knowledge for *nadīms* and story-tellers, but the last part is a history of the Caliphate and the provincial histories of Islam down to the 5th/11th century. He closes by saying that he intends to devote a special work to the Seljuqs, but no trace of this is known. Ibn Bābā's pages on the Ghaznavids contain much unique information; the only source he mentions is Baihaqī, so that it is possible that material from the lost parts of the *Mujalladāt* was still available to him.[13]

In the second quarter of the next century, 'Aufī collected together over 2000 anecdotes in Persian to form his *Jawāmi' al-ḥikāyāt wa lawāmi' ar-riwāyāt*. Eighty-one of these concern the Ghaznavids. Several deal with Sebüktigin and the establishment of Ghaznavid rule in Zābulistān, and are taken from lost parts of the *Mujalladāt*; he also mentions a manual for Viziers, the *Dastūr al-wuzarā'*, allegedly written by Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd. Fakhr ad-Dīn Mubārakshāh, called Fakhr-i Mudab-

bir, was a contemporary of 'Aufī's and claimed descent from Bilgetigin, one of Sebüktigin's predecessors in the governorship of Ghazna. He wrote in Persian his *Ādāb al-mulūk wa kifāyat al-mamlūk* (also called in two of the MSS., *Ādāb al-ḥarb wa'sh-shajā'a*). This is in part a 'Mirror for Princes' with a military emphasis, in part a treatise on the art of war in eastern Islam. As well as many historical anecdotes on the Ghaznavids,[14] there are detailed descriptions of the weapons and tactics of the Sultans, and it seems reasonable to use the *Ādāb al-mulūk*, where it accords with the historical sources, as a source for Ghaznavid military organisation.[15]

5 *Geographical and travel literature*

We do not possess any works of this type emanating specifically from the empire of the early Ghaznavids, although important works date from the decades just before and after and from the adjoining lands. The geographers' information on such matters as topography, communications, economic life and local customs and beliefs, fills out the background to the political and military events of the period. The Arabic geographers of the 4th/10th century, such as Iṣṭakhrī (wrote c. 340/951), Ibn Ḥauqal (wrote c. 366/976) and Maqdisī (wrote c. 375/985), were keen observers of almost all aspects of life; although they were natives of lands further west, they visited personally the eastern Iranian lands. The vast amount of information which Maqdisī put into his *Aḥsan at-taqāsīm* makes it one of the greatest geographical works of all time; we may note as of particular value his details on the sectarian beliefs and *'aṣabiyyāt* of each region (see below, Ch. VI, § 1). Geographical literature flourished under the Sāmānids, although the original works of such writers as Abū Zaid Aḥmad al-Balkhī (d. 322/934) and his patron, the Vizier Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad al-Jaihānī, have not survived. In distinction from all these Arabic works, the anonymous author of the *Ḥudūd al-'ālam* wrote in Persian, beginning his book in 372/982-3 and dedicating it to one of the Sāmānids' vassals, the Farīghūnids of Gūzgān.[16] The author was not himself a traveller, but a compiler of reports. His work is notable for the importance accorded to the still largely-pagan Turkish peoples of Central Asia, and writing as he did in what

is now northern Afghanistan, his book is the nearest we possess to a contemporary geography of the heartlands of the Ghaznavid empire. Later geographical works like Yāqūt's *Muʿjam al-buldān* (completed in 625/1228), a dictionary of place-names, and the *Nuzhat al-qulūb* of Ḥamdallāh Mustaufī (written 740/1340) regurgitate earlier sources, often with little regard for the contemporary applicability of the information (thus Yāqūt in his entry on Sīstān, III, 42, describes the Khawārij as still flourishing there), but the compilers also themselves contributed more recent and personal information. Barthold used all these sources to exhaustive effect in the geographical survey of Transoxania which he included in his *Turkestan*; for Khurasan, one may consult the chapters of Marquart in his *Ērānšahr*, those of Le Strange in his *Lands of the eastern Caliphate*, and those of Minorsky in his commentary to the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam.*

Amongst the travellers' narratives, as distinct from the geographies proper, two are of relevance for the history of the Turks of Central Asia in the 4th/10th century and two for the history of Persia in the 10th and early 5th/11th centuries. The narrative of Ibn Faḍlān, long known from citations by Yāqūt, is now available in a fuller text. The author accompanied in 309-10/922 an embassy from the Caliph to the recently-converted Muslims of Bulghār, and his accounts of these people and of the Oghuz are rich in ethnological detail. The same reliability cannot be attached to the two *risālas* of Abū Dulaf Misʿar b. Muhalhil, for he had a reputation among contemporaries for romancing and exaggeration. The second *risāla* describes a journey through northern and western Persia and is comparatively sober and realistic.[17] The first one describes a journey made shortly after 331/943 from the Sāmānid capital of Bukhārā through Central Asia to the borders of China; Abū Dulaf's itinerary here has many inconsistencies, but the *risāla*, used with due care, does count as a source on the Turkish peoples of the region.[18] A century later, in 437/1045, the poet, philosopher and Ismāʿīlī sympathiser Nāṣir-i Khusrau (d. between 465/1072 and 470/1077) threw up his post in the Seljuq administration at Merv and set out on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places; the account of his seven years' journeyings, the *Safar-nāma*, contains much topographical and economic information on the provinces of Persia through which he passed.

6 *Poetical and philological works*

The early Ghaznavid period was one in which poetic writing in both Arabic and Persian flourished. Maḥmūd and Masʿūd consciously adopted the rôle of Maecenases at their court (see below, Ch. IV, § 2), and we have citations from a large number of contemporary poets in the lexical work of Asadī Ṭūsī, the *Lughat-i Furs* (written after 458/1066); in the *Yatīma* and *Tatimma* of Thaʿālibī; in contemporary historical sources such as Baihaqī, who cites by name over thirty poets; and in the later *tadhkirāt ash-shuʿarā'*. Apart from scattered verses, many of these poets remain mere names to us, although we can discern that such writers as ʿAsjadī, Ghaḍā'irī, Abū Ḥanīfa-yi Iskāfī and Zainabī ʿAlawī were poets of no mean skill. Only the verses of Maḥmūd's eulogists ʿUnṣurī (d. 431/1039-40) and Farrukhī (d. 429/1037-8), and those of Masʿūd's court poet Manūchihrī (d. c. 432/1040-1), have survived in any quantity. This poetry has significance for the historian in that it contains many details descriptive of the luxurious living of the Sultan and the great men of state, and in this way it re-creates the social atmosphere of these circles. Furthermore, specific historical information may be gleaned from it. Nāẓim used the *dīwāns* of Farrukhī and ʿUnṣurī in his biography of Maḥmūd; the present writer has used these two *dīwāns* and that of Manūchihrī for his article on early Ghaznavid titulature (*Oriens* [1962]); Köprülü used the later poets Masʿūd-i Saʿd-i Sālmān and Sanā'ī for his article on the ethnic origins of the Ghaznavids' Turkish troops (*Belleten* [1944]); and Gulam Mustafa Khan has used the court poet of Bahrāmshāh b. Masʿūd b. Ibrāhīm, Sayyid Ḥasan, for his article on that Sultan (*IC* [1949]). The appearance in Tehran of printed texts of most of the extant Ghaznavid poetry now makes neglect of this source inexcusable for the historian.

Since the re-discovery half a century ago of Maḥmūd Kāshgharī's *Dīwān lughāt at-turk* (completed 466/1074) and its publication in Istanbul, historians and Turcologists alike have dipped into this rich quarry, which, as well as being the pioneer lexicon in Arabic, or in any other language, of Turkish, contains much historical and ethnological information. In regard to our period, it supplies data on the tribal organisation and on the Turkish dialect of the Oghuz peoples who were at this time penetrating into the Islamic world. Kāshgharī's father was a

native of the Semirechye, the region of the Qarluq, and he himself was careful to differentiate between the linguistic usages of his own eastern Turkish dialect and those of the south-western Turkish Oghuz ones.

PART I
THE GHAZNAVID EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH UNDER MAḤMŪD

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE GHAZNAVID EMPIRE

1 *The Sāmānid background*

In the 10th century, Transoxania and Khurasan were ruled from Bukhārā by the Sāmānids, a dynasty of local, Soghdian origin, who traced their descent from the Sāsānid hero Bahrām Chōbēn and who had risen in the previous century as protégés and then successors of the Ṭāhirid governors of Khurasan. The Muslim historians are very favourable to the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids. Barthold pointed out that this bias is attributable to the fact that these dynasties stood for law and order, orthodoxy in religion and the preservation of the traditional, hierarchical society; whereas their rivals, the Ṣaffārids of Sīstān, were regarded as base-born brigands.[1]

The same bias is visible in the accounts of the contemporary Arabic geographers, but with perhaps more solid justification, for as travellers within the Sāmānid empire, they were able to see things for themselves. Ibn Ḥauqal visited Transoxania in the reign of Manṣūr b. Nūḥ (350-66/961-76) and wrote:

> In all the eastern lands there is no kingdom whose borders are better-defended, whose population is more numerous, whose material possessions are more extensive, whose internal affairs are better-regulated, whose resources are more plentiful, where foodstuffs are more easily obtainable and where official salaries are more regularly paid. All this despite the mildness of taxation there, the lightness of their imposts and the small reserves they maintain in their treasuries.

In reality, taxation within the Sāmānid dominions was not always so idyllically light, especially latterly (see below), and in regard to the small reserves, Baihaqī records that when in 380/990 the Qarakhanid Bughra Khan Hārūn entered Bukhārā, he found 'limitless wealth and rich treasuries'. Nevertheless, the geographer Maqdisī wrote a few years after Ibn Ḥauqal that the Sāmānid Amīrs 'are amongst the most praiseworthy and exemplary of monarchs in their conduct and outlook and in the respect they give to learning and scholars'. He goes on to describe how the Amīrs cultivated the company of the orthodox

ulema, exempting them from the humiliation of the *taqbīl* or *proskynēsis*, presiding over theological disputations with them, consulting them in state matters and constantly associating them with their executive decisions.[2] Indeed, the royal ghulāms or slave guards who in 301/914 murdered Aḥmad b. Ismāʿīl are said to have become alienated from him by his excessive frequenting of scholars and theologians, and Nūḥ b. Naṣr (331-43/943-54) employed the Imām of the Ḥanafīs Abū'l-Faḍl Muḥammad as-Sulamī, 'the most learned faqīh of his age', as his Vizier.[3] Both the Amīrs and the ulema had a common interest in checking the progress in the east of Ismāʿīlī Shīʿism, which was attracting many converts there in the 10th century. At one point, the Ismāʿīlī *dāʿīs* or propagandists are even said to have converted the Amīr Naṣr b. Aḥmad (301-31/913-43) and many of his courtiers, although only the *Fihrist* of Ibn an-Nadīm and the much later *Siyāsat-nāma* of Niẓām al-Mulk, and none of the historical sources proper, mention this; if this conversion did take place, then Naṣr's adhesion to the Shīʿa was an exception to the staunchly Sunnī and Ḥanafī beliefs of the other Amīrs.[4]

When at the end of the 9th century and in the early decades of the 10th century the Sāmānids had been consolidating their position, the moral support of the Abbasid Caliphate had been valuable against enemies like the Ṣaffārids and the various Dailamī adventurers who coveted Khurasan; hence Narshakhī praises Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad (279-95/892-907), the vanquisher of ʿAmr b. Laith, for his faithfulness to the Caliph's commands. Later, the Abbasid Caliphate fell under the tutelage of the Sāmānids' enemies, the Būyids, and in the second half of the 10th century the Amīrs sometimes found themselves at odds with Baghdad. In 357/968 the Sāmānids sheltered an Abbasid claimant to the Caliphate, Muḥammad b. al-Mustakfī, and they refused to recognise the succession in 381/991 of al-Qādir, continuing to recognise his deposed predecessor, aṭ-Ṭāʾiʿ. After his great victory in 389/999 over the combined forces of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Malik b. Nūḥ and his generals Abū'l-Qāsim Sīmjūrī, Fāʾiq Khāṣṣa and Begtuzun (Begtūzūn), Maḥmūd b. Sebüktigin of Ghazna became master of Khurasan, and in his *fatḥ-nāma* to the Caliph claimed that it had only been the Sāmānids' refusal to recognise al-Qādir that had caused the war in the first place. (Despite these arguments, Maḥmūd had in fact been quite content to follow the Sāmānids in acknow-

ledging at-Ṭā'iʿ and not al-Qādir; the coins minted by him at Nishapur before 389 all bear aṭ-Ṭā'iʿ's name at the side of his own and that of the Sāmānid Amīr.) However, the Sāmānids contented themselves right to the end with the modest designation of 'Amīr', and did not arrogate to themselves Caliphal titles, as some dynasties in the western Islamic world had done by the end of the 10th century.[5]

Naṣr b. Aḥmad built himself a fine palace in Bukhārā, together with an adjacent building to house the various government departments. He could thereby keep in touch with day-to-day affairs. According to the historian of Bukhārā, Narshakhī, nine *dīwāns* were located there: they were those of the Vizier, of the Treasurer (*Mustaufī*), of the Chief of the Correspondence Department (*ʿAmīd al-Mulk*), of the Captain of Police (*Ṣāḥib-Shuraṭ*), of the Postmaster (*Ṣāḥib-Barīd*), of the internal espionage system (*Sharaf*, probably to be read as *Ishrāf*), of the Amīrs' personal domains (*mamlaka-yi khāṣṣ*), of the *Muḥtasib* and of the Qāḍī. This proliferation of offices, and their nomenclature, is clearly based on the system at Baghdad, with the Vizier as chief executive officer. Already under the Sāmānids there were local families like those of Balʿamī and ʿUtbī who were professional bureaucrats and who held the Vizierate for long periods, just as the Abbasids had their Barmakīs, Naubakhtīs and Furātīs. Al-Khwārizmī's encyclopaedia of technical terms, the *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, was written in the Sāmānid dominions and dedicated to Nūḥ b. Manṣūr's Vizier Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿUbaidallāh ʿUtbī. In his chapter on *kitāba* it is Sāmānid practice upon which he draws for his explanations of administrative organisation and techniques. We can deduce from this chapter the advanced state and complexity of the Sāmānid bureaucracy, in particular, of the *Dīwān al-kharāj* (finance, the Vizier's department) and the *Dīwān al-jaish* (military affairs); al-Khwārizmī states that the Sāmānids had twenty-six different types of *daftar*, official register, for recording financial and military transactions.[6]

The Sāmānids ruled directly over Transoxania, comprising the valleys of the middle Oxus, the Zarafshān and the middle Syr Darya, with Khurasan in close dependence. However, Khurasan tended latterly to fall under the control of powerful military leaders. Some of these were of Turkish slave origin, like Tash (Tāsh), Begtuzun and the eunuch Fā'iq. Others came from local landowning families, like Abū ʿAlī Chaghānī and the

Sīmjūrīs. The founder of the Sīmjūrī line, Abū ʿImrān Sīmjūr, was actually a Turkish ghulām of the Sāmānids, and governed Sīstān for them; but his son Ibrāhīm already held Qūhistān, and the family became hereditary lords of the region.[7] The ascendancy of over-mighty subjects like these in the second half of the 10th century was symptomatic of the enfeeblement of the Sāmānids. The Sāmānids also regarded as their tributaries adjacent rulers like the Ṣaffārids in Sīstān, the Farīghūnids in Gūzgān, the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs and the rulers of Iranian or Arab origin in the upper Oxus principalities of Chaghāniyān and Khuttal. On none of these rulers was the Sāmānid hand a heavy one.

As a centre for controlling Soghd and for speedy access to the Oxus crossing at Āmul-i Shaṭṭ, the Sāmānid capital of Bukhārā was well sited. Iṣṭakhrī stresses this strategic aspect:

> The Sāmānid governors of Khurasan established themselves at Bukhārā because it was the nearest of the Transoxanian cities to Khurasan. When someone fixes himself there, he has Khurasan in front of him and Transoxania behind him. Their [sc. the people of Bukhārā's] good behaviour towards their governors and the infrequency of their rebelling brought about the Sāmānids' decision to settle among them.

The Arab governors of Mā warā' an-nahr had established themselves further up the Zarafshān valley at Samarqand, but Bukhārā had ancient traditions as a capital; Naṣr b. Aḥmad's new palace and government offices in the Rīgistān of Bukhārā were on the site of the pre-Islamic Bukhār-Khudāhs' palace.[8] Before the Sāmānids, Transoxania had always been a politically fragmented region. Its broken topography of mountain ranges, fertile valleys and irrigated oases had encouraged the growth there, from Hellenistic times onwards, of city-states. Into this region, the Sāmānids, whose early fortunes had owed something to the Caliph al-Ma'mūn's patronage, placed an administration modelled on that of Baghdad, thereby introducing a new element of centralisation there.

On the other hand, the social system of Transoxania and Khurasan was in many respects different from that prevailing in the heart of the Caliphate. This region formed the north-eastern bastion of the Iranian world against the barbarians of

Central Asia, and the historic rôle of defending it was taken over by the Sāmānids. It was also the transition area connecting the Islamic Near East with the Eurasian steppes and the routes to the Far East, and played an important part in conveying trans-Asiatic commerce. The landed and trading interests of the region demanded a well-protected frontier against the Turks and a political and military authority which could command respect inside the steppes and so secure the safe passage of caravans. In their heyday, the Sāmānids provided this authority, but when they eventually declined, the local landed and commercial interests were obliged to come to terms with the Qarakhanid invaders.

In general, Sāmānid policy in Central Asia during the 10th century was not an aggressive one; the possession of rich cities in Persia like Ray was a more lucrative prize than that of bare steppeland. Normally, activity along the northern frontiers of Transoxania was the minimum consonant with defence needs and the maintenance of the dynasty's prestige within the steppes. Slaves were the chief reward of warfare, for without this compensation, all raids would have been unremunerative; the nomad has no towns or valuables to pillage and can quickly send his herds back into the deep steppe. As it was, the slave trade was an important element in the economy of Transoxania (see below, Ch. VII, § 1). Only in their earlier, expansionist phase did the Amīrs adopt a forward policy. Farghāna was definitely conquered for Islam in the middle of the 9th century, possibly by Nūḥ b. Asad; more certainly, he conquered Isfījāb in 227/840 and in the next century it was ruled by a tributary Turkish dynasty. In 280/893 Ismā'īl b. Aḥmad dethroned the local dynasty of Afshīns in Ushrūsana, brought the area under direct rule and then pushed on to capture Talas, sacking the capital of the Qarluq and taking an immense booty of men and beasts.[9]

As distinct from formal military campaigns like these, there was a more continuous, smaller-scale activity along the frontiers by the ghāzīs, volunteer fighters for the faith, in the ribāṭs or strong-points. In the Isfījāb province, towns like Binkāth and Saurān bristled with ribāṭs against the Oghuz and Kimäk (Kīmāk); the 1700 or so ribāṭs of Isfījāb were manned in part by volunteers from Nakhshab, Bukhārā and Samarqand. In Iṣṭakhrī's time, Isfījāb paid no *kharāj* because of its frontier position.

Ushrūsana is likewise described as having many ribāṭs; those at Dīzak were manned by ghāzīs from Samarqand, and the famous ribāṭ of Khudaisir had been built by the Afshīn Ḥaidar and endowed by him with *auqāf*. The defence of Baikand, a vital point on the Bukhārā-Āmul road, guarding communications with Khurasan against the Oghuz of the Qara Qum, was a communal obligation of the villages of the Bukhārā oasis, who manned the ribāṭs of Baikand in winter when the attacks of the hungry infidels were intensified. Life in these frontier regions bred tough, self-reliant communities lacking the graces of more settled existence; Maqdisī describes the inhabitants of the town of Isfījāb as wild beasts, churlish, violent and self-satisfied.[10]

This fundamental fact of the frontier meant that in Transoxania the landed, military class was prominent in the social hierarchy, whilst in Khurasan the dihqān class of small landowners was numerous and influential to an extent unknown in parts of the Islamic world further west, where many of the rulers had succeeded in curbing the power of local, feudal elements and reducing them to the general level of subjects below the throne. In the north-east of the Persian world, the agrarian, feudal society of earlier Iran survived and was combined with the keen, mercantile spirit of the urban traders and manufacturers. This may be in part ascribable to geographical and economic factors, but also to the fact that Transoxania and to some extent Khurasan, being distant from the centres of Sāsānid power in western Persia and Iraq, escaped the Sāsānid social reaction in which it seems that a conscious attempt was made to model the state on the pre-Parthian past. Sāsānid political, and above all, cultural and religious influence was certainly strong beyond the Oxus, even though direct political control did not extend there. Local rulers in Soghd and Chāch (but not in Khwārizm, which had its own independent cultural tradition) minted coins on the Sāsānid pattern.[11] The landowning and dihqān classes persisted longer and were more powerful socially in the north-east than in western Persia. Large personal retinues were kept up by these classes, and they practised the heroic virtues of hospitality and entertaining on a scale which drew enthusiastic praise from travellers. Maqdisī calls the people of Khwārizm *ahl ḍiyāfa wa-nahma fī'l-akl*. Iṣṭakhrī expatiates on the intense hospitality of the people of Transoxania, and mentions the house of a landowner of Soghd whose door had

not been closed for a century or more and who fed and lodged a hundred or two hundred travellers each night. Four centuries later Ibn Baṭṭūṭa declared in similar vein that he had never met a people who had nobler and more praiseworthy characters or who were more pleased to receive strangers than the people of Khwārizm. The military virtues were similarly cultivated. At the very end of the Sāmānid period, the common people in the towns retained their personal arms and were ready to defend their homes or to sally forth as ghāzīs. The Sālār of the Bukhārā ghāzīs was an important military and political figure at this time; and Maḥmūd of Ghazna was able to attract thousands of ghāzīs from Transoxania for his Indian campaigns. Many Transoxanian dihqāns found their way to Baghdad as soldiers of fortune and were made officers in the Turkish slave armies of the Caliphs.[12]

Such was the social and military framework within which the Sāmānids had to work. Their administrative model was essentially that of the Baghdad Caliphate, and it can hardly be doubted that they aimed at increasing the element of centralisation in their dominions and at raising their own status as rulers. In the end, the counter-balancing elements of the landowners and merchants, hostile to the fresh taxation which any increase in the central power would inevitably bring, frustrated these aims. Moreover, from the reign of Nūḥ b. Naṣr onwards, the cost of dealing with rebellious governors and generals in Khurasan began to cause periodic deficits. Attempts to tap new sources of revenue, such as the inheritance tax introduced in the Baihaq district in the last years of the Sāmānids by the local governor, the Amīr Abū'l-Faḍl Ziyād, were felt to be tyrannical; even the Ghaznavids did not retain this particular tax.[13] Since the landed class was also that of the military leaders and cavalrymen, the Sāmānid Amīrs had to rely heavily upon it for their armies. They tried to break away from over-dependence here by following the example of the Abbasid Caliphs and recruiting Turkish ghulāms; indeed, Turks already settled within the borders of Transoxania had been employed long before this by local Soghdian rulers. From the Sāmānid ghulāms arose great commanders like Alptigin and Sebüktigin, and in this way, the concept of a slave army passed from Baghdad via the Sāmānids to the Ghaznavids on the easternmost fringes of Islam. Unfortunately for the Sāmānid Amīrs, their hope that the Turks

would be a counter-balance to the military power of the Iranian landed classes proved false; the royal ghulāms were often a turbulent element in the state and acted as king-makers in succession disputes.

Following the Abbasids, the Sāmānids aimed to make their court a centre of culture and gracious living, and the Amīrs' part in encouraging the renaissance of New Persian literature was considerable. There is a fine description of the splendour of Naṣr b. Aḥmad's court in one of Rūdakī's poems. Nevertheless, because of the social and military factors outlined above, the Sāmānids' absorption of Abbasid ideas on administration and court ceremonial could not proceed beyond a certain point, and the Amīrs could never make themselves into absolute rulers. In the first half of the 10th century at least, the Amīr was not permanently resident in the administrative capital of Bukhārā; Naṣr b. Aḥmad used to take his army and spend the summer in Samarqand, Herat or some other of the cities of Khurasan.[14] Maqdisī's information on how the Amīrs frequented the company of the ulema shows that the Amīrs were not wholly withdrawn from immediate contact with their subjects.

Yet despite this deference, the Sāmānids failed to conciliate all the religious classes and draw them to their side. In particular, they failed with the lower and more popular strata of the religious classes, those who were less dependent on royal favour and who were traditionally suspicious of the secular power. In the increasingly frequent succession troubles, the religious elements often aligned themselves with the anti-dynastic forces of the landowners and military leaders. Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi' gives the account of a merchant, one Abū'l-Ḥasan b. Ilyasa' al-Fārisī, who witnessed the entry of the Qarakhanid Ilig Naṣr into Bukhārā in 389/999. The *khaṭībs* of Bukhārā, being salaried servants of the Sāmānids, tried to raise the population on behalf of the Amīrs, saying, 'You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial have been the relations between us. The enemy now menaces us, and it is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our behalf. So ask God's grace in succouring our cause.' But the people consulted the representatives of popular religious feeling, the faqīhs, who dissuaded the people from taking up their arms and risking their lives against other good Muslims, as were the Qarakhanids: 'it is better to stand aside from the struggle' (*i'tizāl al-fitna aulā*).[15]

2 *The establishment of Sebüktigin in Ghazna*

The regions of ar-Rukhkhaj and Zamīndāwar, what are now the south-east of Afghanistan, had first been invaded by the Muslims as early as 33/653-4 when the governor of Sīstān, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Samura, led an expedition. At the end of the 9th century, the Ṣaffārids had expanded eastwards to Bust, ar-Rukhkhaj, Zābulistān, Ghazna and Kabul. On his first expedition, Yaʿqūb b. Laith captured the Zunbīl of Zābulistān, identified by Marquart with the ruler of an extensive kingdom in the Helmand basin, the Fīrūz b. Kabk mentioned by Masʿūdī and Ibn Khallikān, who was probably subordinate to the Kābul-shāhs. On a second expedition in 256/870, Yaʿqūb and his brother ʿAmr reached Bāmiyān and Kabul and again captured the Zunbīl, who had fled to Kabul.[16] In 287/900 Khurasan, Sīstān and these regions of eastern Afghanistan passed to the Sāmānid Amīr Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad and henceforth became part of the Sāmānid empire. In practice, these last regions were too distant to be controlled from Bukhārā. They probably reverted to their original, local rulers, who may have received some sort of investiture from the Amīrs and who may have paid some tribute; but this can only be surmised. Amongst the local rulers, the Shērs of Bāmiyān were Iranian in race, but Kabul was ruled first by the Hinduised Turk-Shāhīs and then after c. 850 by the purely Indian Hindū-Shāhīs. The racial origins of the Zunbīls and of the mysterious Lawīk or Anūk who ruled in Ghazna (see below) are unknown, but their close links with Kabul point, at the least, to strong Indian influences.[17]

However, Turkish ethnic elements had been established in eastern Afghanistan for some time, perhaps for several centuries. Marquart visualised the whole of this region as once held by first the Kushans and then by the Ephthalites or White Huns, the Sveta Hūṇa of the Hindus and the Haiṭal (more correctly, *Habṭal) or Hayāṭila of the Arab historians. He believed that it retained in the early Islamic period a strong Ephthalite ethnic flavour, and connected the very name 'Zābulistān' with an Ephthalite tribe, the *Jaüvla*, *Jabūla* or *Jabuvlah*, known from northern Indian inscriptions. The Oghuz and Khalaj Turks, who in the early Islamic period nomadised from Ṭukhāristān and Badakhshān in the north down to Bust, would thus be the remnants of Turkish peoples brought from north of the Oxus as

part of the Ephthalite confederation and then left behind in eastern Afghanistan. Marquart's theory is by no means certain, although Frye and Sayïlï have recently followed him.[18] Yet there is no doubt about their existence there in pre-Ghaznavid times. At the opening of the 9th century, the Kābulshāh had to send an annual tribute of 2000 Oghuz slaves to the governor of Khurasan, 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir. In the Caliphate of al-Manṣūr, Ma'n b. Zā'ida as-Sulamī was governor of Sīstān, and he received from the Zunbīl at his winter capital of ar-Rukhkhaj the customary tribute of camels and Turkish felt tents and slaves. The Zunbīl is said to have had a bodyguard from the local Turks, *at-Turk ad-Dāwarī*. Iṣṭakhrī says that up to his own time, the Khalaj of Zamīndāwar had kept their Turkish customs, external appearance and (?) language.[19] The Khalaj survived as an ethnic unity for several more centuries; they were subdued by Sebüktigin and recruited into his army; they formed an important element in the armies of the Ghaznavids, Ghūrids and Khwārizmshāhs; they were the progenitors of the Lōdī Kings of Delhi (1451-1526); and their name probably survives today in that of the modern Ghilzā'ī Afghans. Some form of authority was exercised over these nomads in the 10th century by the Sāmānid central government; the youthful Sebüktigin was once sent by his master Alptigin in a military force to collect the customary taxes from the 'Khalaj and Turkmens'.

The petty town of Ghazna in eastern Afghanistan, which became the centre of Sebüktigin's power, had been theoretically a Sāmānid possession, but in practice, control from distant Bukhārā had been tenuous. Although the geographers of the 10th century describe Ghazna as one of the entrepôts (*furaḍ*) of the transit trade connecting Khurasan and Transoxania with India, its economic rôle was never as important in this respect as that of Kabul. It was really the Ghaznavid Sultans who erected Ghazna, previously a small town on the margin of the Indian political and cultural world, into the centre of an empire, and Bābur, visiting it when it was again insignificant, wondered at this: 'Ghazna is a very humble place; strange indeed it is that rulers in whose hands were Hindustan and Khurasan should have chosen it for their capital!'[20] The Ghaznavids used the town as a spring-board for their winter campaigns into India, and their empire inevitably acquired a bias towards India; in Sultan Mas'ūd's time this was to prove a source of

strategic weakness in dealing with the Turkmen and other threats in the west (see below, Ch. IX, § 1). On the other hand, despite territorial losses in the west to the Seljuqs, the Ghaznavids were able to survive as a considerable power in eastern Afghanistan and northern India for another 130 years.

Before Sebüktigin achieved power in Ghazna and Zābulistān, a series of Turkish slave governors had ruled there on behalf of the Sāmānids. The commander-in-chief of the Sāmānid forces in Khurasan, Alptigin, had together with the Vizier Abū 'Alī Muḥammad Bal'amī staged a *putsch* on the death in 350/961 of the Amīr 'Abd al-Malik b. Nūḥ. But they failed to place their candidate on the throne, and the triumph of the rival party made Alptigin's position uneasy. So he decided to withdraw to the eastern fringes of the empire. The sources state that he made for India to avoid his enemies at court and to earn divine merit by raiding the Hindus; he had no intention of capturing Ghazna, and was only forced to take it when the local ruler denied him transit. In reality, Alptigin probably had in mind the example of a group of Turkish ghulāms of the Sāmānids who had already become largely independent on the southern borders of the empire. The general Qaratigin (Qarātigīn) of Isfījāb had set himself up at Bust and ar-Rukhkhaj before his death in 317/929, and a line of his own ghulāms succeeded him at Bust as governors. They were frequently involved in the affairs of their Ṣaffārid neighbours. It was a dispute between two of these ghulāms, Toghan (Ṭughān) and Baytuz (Bāytūz), which in 367/977-8 gave Sebüktigin a pretext to intervene and add Bust to his own existing territories.[21]

Alptigin proceeded with a small force of his own ghulāms and of ghāzīs (according to the *Siyāsat-nāma*, 119, with 200 ghulāms and 800 ghāzīs; according to Shabānkāra'ī's *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 164a, with 700 ghulāms and 2500 Tājīk followers), subduing en route the Iranian Shēr of Bāmiyān and the Hindū-Shāhī king of Kabul. After besieging the citadel of Ghazna for four months, Alptigin wrested the town from its ruler, Abū 'Alī or Abū Bakr Lawīk or Anūk (? Turkish *Änük* 'cub of a lion, hyena, wolf or dog', in the surmise of A. Bombaci, *East and West*, X [1959], 4). Despite the Islamic *kunyas*, and *pace* Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 298, who considered him to be certainly a Muslim and perhaps a descendant of the Zunbīl whom Ya'qūb b. Laith took prisoner (see above), this Lawīk or Anūk was not necessarily a Muslim;

the whole form of his name is very dubious, and he is described as the brother-in-law of the ruler of Kabul's son. It was from Kabul that Lawīk sought aid in an attempt to regain Ghazna during the governorship of one of Alptigin's successors.[22]

Alptigin had his position in Ghazna regularised by a patent of investiture (*manshūr*) from the Amīr Manṣūr b. Nūḥ, according to Jūzjānī; but the *Siyāsat-nāma* mentions an expedition sent against Alptigin from Bukhārā under one Abū Ja'far, which was defeated outside the gates of Ghazna. Alptigin's ambiguous, semi-rebel status seems to be reflected on his coins. On the evidence of two of his coins minted at Parwān near Kabul, his authority from the Sāmānids to mint coins is stated only in an indirect way.[23] On his death in 352/963, he designated his son Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm (or perhaps, Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm) as his successor. For the next three years, Abū Isḥāq held the governorship of Ghazna, travelling to Bukhārā, apologising for his father's errors, and securing investiture from the Amīr. It was to Bukhārā that he fled for the year in 353-4/964-5 when Lawīk temporarily re-occupied Ghazna, and he returned with Sāmānid military help.

On Abū Isḥāq's death in 355/966, the Turkish troops in Ghazna chose one of their commanders, Bilgetigin (Bilkātigīn), a former ghulām of Alptigin's, as their leader; like his predecessor, he sent to Bukhārā, offering his allegiance and explaining that he had been elected by popular acclamation of the Turks. Shabānkāra'ī records that in Bukhārā the general Fā'iq was bitterly opposed to the 'Turkish rabble' (*mushtī Atrāk*) being left in Ghazna in virtual independence, and that he sent an army to assert direct control over them. Bilgetigin defeated it, and no army was ever sent out from Bukhārā again. After governing Ghazna for ten years, Bilgetigin died in 364/975, and another of Alptigin's ghulāms, Pīrī or Pīrītigīn (? Böri, Böritigin), held power for two years. He too regarded himself as governor for the Sāmānids, for he had the Persian-type insignia of office, a pointed hat (*kulāh*), cloak (*qabā*) and girdle (*kamar*), which were to be the standard outfit of a governor under the Ghaznavids (cf. Baihaqī, 50, 430, 492 and *passim*).[24] Indeed, after Abū Isḥāq had had to apply to Bukhārā for help to recover Ghazna, the money coined at Ghazna began clearly and unambiguously to include the name of the Sāmānid Amīr as well as that of the local governor. Two coins struck by Bilgetigin

(the mint of only one of them, Ghazna, is legible) acknowledge Manṣūr b. Nūḥ; no coins by Böritigin seem to be extant.[25]

Böritigin's misrule caused the people of Ghazna to invite Lawīk back again, and it was by Sebüktigin's skill that he was repulsed. In 366/977 the Turkish soldiery in Ghazna deposed Böritigin, and Sebüktigin took his place, beginning a twenty years' reign. He had had the substance of power during Böritigin's governorship, and so was able to impose his terms on the soldiery. During Sebüktigin's reign, the main lines of Ghaznavid expansion, which Maḥmūd was to follow, were laid down: south-westwards to Bust and Quṣdār; eastwards into India, against the Hindū-Shāhī Rājās of Waihand; and latterly, Sebüktigin intervened decisively in Khurasan. Sebüktigin was again one of Alptigin's ghulāms. His Turkish origins and early life are known from three main sources. Firstly, there is the preface to his own *Pand-nāma*, given in Shabānkāra'ī's *Majma' al-ansāb*. Secondly, there is Jūzjānī, who in his *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, 6-8, tr. 67-75, quotes a lost part of Baihaqī's history which dealt with Sebüktigin's reign under the title *Ta'rīkh-i Nāṣirī* (*Nāṣir ad-Dīn wa'd-Daula* was the *laqab* given to Sebüktigin by the Sāmānid Amīr in 384/995 for his victory over the rebellious generals in Khurasan), and also a general history, now lost, the *Ta'rīkh-i mujadwal* of Abū'l-Qāsim Muḥammad b. 'Alī 'Imādī. Thirdly, there is the not very reliable account of Sebüktigin's rise as Alptigin's protégé given in the *Siyāsat-nāma*, 111-26, written at least a century after most of the events described there.

According to the *Pand-nāma*, Sebüktigin came from the Barskhān tribe of Turks.[26] [Upper] Barskhān, or as Maḥmūd Kāshgharī spells it in the *Dīwān lughāt at-Turk*, ed. Kilisli Rif'at Bey, III, 312, Barsghān, was a place rather than a people, situated on the shores of the Issiq-Göl; Kāshgharī's father came from there. Since the *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 98, says that the ruler of Barskhān was from the Qarluq, it is a curious point that both the Ghaznavids and their rivals the Qarakhanids may have sprung from the same Turkish people. Obsequious genealogists of the Ghaznavids were unable to get round this fact of Sebüktigin's pagan Turkish birth, but they did manage to connect his people with Yezdegird III, the last Sāsānid emperor. It is noteworthy that the Persian culture which the Sultans acquired eventually led their court genealogists to attach them to the

Iranian past, just as the genealogists of the Sāmānids, Būyids and Ziyārids had done for their masters, and not to some ancient princely family of the Turks, which would have been more plausible. The alleged Persian connection of the Barskhān people is inserted in the *Pand-nāma's* preface, and may have been elaborated during the course of the 11th century. A complete genealogy connecting Sebüktigin with Yezdegird appears in the *Ta'rikh-i mujadwal*, whose date is, however, unknown; Barthold found an indication that its author might have flourished in the early 12th century. On the other hand, Maḥmūd of Ghazna was praised for his Turkish lineage; some oft-quoted verses of Badī' az-Zamān al-Hamadhānī say that 'The house of Bahrām [sc. the Sāmānids] has become subject to the son of the Khāqān [sc. Maḥmūd]', but it is true that this emphasis on the Sultan's Turkishness comes from the early years of the dynasty.[27]

Sebüktigin's enslavement was typical of what often happened in the internecine warfare of Turkish peoples in Central Asia. He was captured by a neighbouring tribe, the Bakhtiyān (read 'Tukhsiyān' = Tukhs). The Tukhs or Tukhsī are described by Marvazī as one of the divisions of the Qarluq confederation; they lived in the Chu valley to the north-west of the Issiq-Göl.[28] Sebüktigin was sold to a slave-dealer of Chāch, who took him with other slaves to a depôt at Nakhshab. After a period of training in the military and equestrian arts, he was bought at Nishapur by the Ḥājib Alptigin for service in his guard. Thereafter, according to Niẓām al-Mulk's narrative, he climbed rapidly under Alptigin's patronage, at a rate much quicker than the normal *cursus honorum* for Sāmānid ghulāms allowed, for Alptigin had early discerned in him the marks of future greatness. At the age of only eighteen, he commanded 200 ghulāms. On Alptigin's withdrawal to Ghazna, he accompanied his master and played a prominent part in defeating in Ṭukhār-istān the pursuing Sāmānid army. On Alptigin's death, he passed to Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm as part of his father's bequest to him. 'Utbī, and following him, Ibn al-Athīr, begin Sebüktigin's career only as a ghulam of Abū Isḥāq, whom Ibn al-Athīr calls 'Commander of the army of Ghazna for the Sāmānids'; they relate that he accompanied Abū Isḥāq to Bukhārā during his temporary expulsion by Lawīk, and became known at court for his intelligence, judgement and piety. The *Pand-nāma*

merely records briefly Sebüktigin's passing into Alptigin's hands and subsequent rise to favour. It is likely that Niẓām al-Mulk's elaborate story of his gradual rise in his master's esteem is largely invention, and that Sebüktigin, although originally bought by Alptigin, did not achieve prominence until Alptigin and his son settled at Ghazna.[29]

During the governorships in Ghazna of Bilgetigin and Böritigin, Sebüktigin's prestige grew among the Turkish troops, and on Böritigin's deposition he was, as we have seen, chosen by the army as their head. Sebüktigin had for some time been winning over other army leaders to his side by giving lavish twice-weekly feasts for them, and now this work of conciliation bore fruit. He also acquired local connections outside the ranks of his Turkish fellow-soldiers; the future Sultan Maḥmūd was born in 362/971 of the daughter of a chief (*ra'īs*) of Zābulistān whom Sebüktigin had married. Like his predecessors in Ghazna, Sebüktigin continued to regard himself as governor there for the Sāmānids. The names of the Amīrs appear on his coins before his own name, and the title on his tomb at Ghazna, *al-Ḥājib al-Ajall*, shows that he clung to this status till his death.[30] Hence in 383/993 the Amīr Nūḥ b. Naṣr, faced with Fā'iq and Abū 'Alī Sīmjūrī united against him in rebellion, summoned the faithful Sebüktigin to Transoxania. His oath of allegiance to the Amīr was renewed, and for the next few years, the attentions of Sebüktigin and his son Maḥmūd were focussed on Khurasan. As Sāmānid power weakened, they found themselves well placed to share in the spoils and, in the end, to partition the Sāmānid dominions with the Qarakhanids.[31]

When Sebüktigin became governor of Ghazna and Zābulistān, the Turkish soldiery who had originally accompanied Alptigin thither had been established there some fifteen years. They had introduced a system of fiefs, and later in the Ghaznavid period four agricultural areas round Ghazna, (?) Nūgh, (?) Khimār, Lamghān and Shāh-Bahār, are mentioned as fiefs of the Turks and their descendants.[32] The system of military fiefs was already known in the Sāmānid empire. Alptigin himself had accumulated an immense number of estates and properties all over Khurasan and Transoxania: 500 villages in outright ownership (*dīh-i milk*); palaces, gardens, caravanserais and baths in every town of note; revenues assigned to him from estates (*mustaghall*); a million sheep and 100,000 horses, mules

and camels. By the time Sebüktigin came to power, the system in Zābulistān had become disordered. Apparently, *mustaghall*-type fiefs were being converted into outright ownership (*tamlīk*), and the warriors were settling down as cultivators, with a consequent disinclination from taking up their arms. On the other hand, the central administration in Ghazna was tending to appropriate lands allotted to the soldiers and turn them into state lands (*dīh'hā-yi dīwānī*). At some point early in his reign Sebüktigin reformed the system, insisting that all fiefs should be of the *mustaghall* type, that the revenues from these should be paid out to the army by the central *Dīwān*, and that those soldiers whose incomes had declined through appropriation of fiefs should have them made up to the amount originally allotted.[33]

We know nothing of the genesis of an administrative organisation in Ghazna, whether Sebüktigin himself set one up, or whether one existed earlier. Basically, three *dīwāns* were necessary: one to administer and tax the territories which gradually became added to the nucleus around Ghazna; a second to deal with correspondence and diplomatic relations with Bukhārā; and a third to see to the mustering, payment and provisioning of the army. Thus there emerged at some point the three administrative branches of the *Dīwān-i Wazīr*, the *Dīwān-i Rasā'il* and the *Dīwān-i 'Arḍ*, under the Vizier, the Chief Secretary and the *'Āriḍ* respectively, and presumably with a wholly Persian personnel. The contacts which Alptigin and his successors kept up with the court of Bukhārā must have entailed some coming-and-going of financial and administrative personnel, with the resultant transfer of Sāmānid techniques to Ghazna. There may have been a few representatives in Zābulistān of Sāmānid authority before Alptigin's arrival. We cannot trace a definite series of Viziers of Sebüktigin, as can be done for later Sultans, but there seems to have been a nucleus of Persian secretaries in Ghazna whom Sebüktigin could call upon for duty. When in 367/977-8 he left for his Bust expedition (see above, p. 37), he appointed the boy Maḥmūd as his lieutenant in Ghazna and left as his Vizier the official Abū 'Alī Kirmānī, whose *nisba* suggests the possibility that he had once been in the Būyids' service. Through the Bust expedition, Sebüktigin acquired the services of the noted scholar and rhetorician, Abū'l-Fatḥ Bustī, a fact which 'Utbī accounts one of the chief results

of the campaign. Abū'l-Fatḥ had been secretary to the Turkish ghulām ruler of Bust, Baytuz. Now he became chief of Sebüktigin's *Dīwān-i Rasā'il*, with the duty, among other things, of composing his master's *fatḥ-nāmas*, and he remained in this post until early in Maḥmūd's reign.[34]

It has just been suggested that Sebüktigin must have drawn on the Sāmānid model in setting up his administration in Ghazna. It must be remembered, however, that institutions and practices can rarely be transplanted *en bloc* from their homeland to a strange environment, and Ghazna and Zābulistān were on the far periphery of the Sāmānid empire. The Ghazna region itself had no strong local traditions of governmental procedure, but it is likely that there were influences from the adjacent Indian world, especially from the Kabul valley, where a Hindu dynasty had ruled until Alptigin had begun his campaigns there. The chief innovation which the Turkish ghulām commanders introduced into the village organisation of the Ghazna region lay in the system of military fiefs for their followers; but beyond this, there cannot have been any question of imposing from outside a completely new system in local affairs.

In one direction, the early Ghaznavids did in part adapt themselves to local conditions, that is, in their system of minting coins. No attempt was made here to set up a uniform, centralised system. Their coins show the distinctive traits of various local mints. Sebüktigin's main mint was at Parwān; these coins from the Bāmiyān-Kabul area vary considerably from those of his Sāmānid suzerains, but approximate in size and weight to those of the Hindū-Shāhī kings of Kabul. (Comparatively speaking, the silver coinage of the Ghaznavids was considered by Thomas to be heavier than that of the Sāmānids, with an average of 50-55 grains compared with 45 grains, and nearer to that of the Indian Kabul kings, which averaged 50 grains. On the other hand, Ghaznavid gold coinage seems to be modelled on that minted by Maḥmūd at Nishapur when he was military commander there for the Sāmānids.) The silver coins minted by Maḥmūd at Ghazna when he became Sultan differ perceptibly from those he was simultaneously minting at Nishapur. The products of mints at Balkh and in Sīstān can likewise be distinguished from those of elsewhere.[35] Thus the policy was to retain existing provincial patterns and to change them as little as possible. This applied especially to the conquered terri-

tories of India, which had their own patterns of economic and social life entirely different from those of the Islamic world. Sebüktigin struck coins for Indian circulation, and in Maḥmūd's reign are first attested the well-known bilingual coins with legends in both Arabic and Devanāgarī characters; Thomas mentions one from 412/1023 and Lane Poole catalogues two minted at Maḥmūdpūr in 418/1027. On these coins, the Ghaznavids combined Islamic titles and professions of faith with Hindu motifs, the recumbent Bull of Siva, Nandī, and the Sanskrit superscription 'Srī Samanta Deva'.[36] Outside the sphere of numismatics, it is difficult to estimate what the fabric of the Ghaznavid empire in its full florescence owed to local foundations; but if the highly-developed superstructure was Persian and Sāmānid in inspiration, there must nevertheless have been a certain substratum of local practices to build upon.

3 *The succession of Maḥmūd*

We have seen that the Sāmānid Amīr had invited Sebüktigin to intervene in Khurasan against Abū 'Alī and Fā'iq. After his victory in 384/994, Sebüktigin had been rewarded with the governorship of Balkh, Ṭukhāristān, Bāmiyān, Ghūr and Gharchistān and the *laqab* of *Nāṣir ad-Dīn wa'd-Daula*, and Maḥmūd with Abū 'Alī's old job as commander of the army in Khurasan and the *laqab* of *Saif ad-Daula*. Maḥmūd had then made Nishapur his headquarters, and because of the pressure on the Sāmānids from the Qarakhanids, by then in possession of the whole upper and middle Syr Darya basin, Maḥmūd had been able to strengthen his hold on Khurasan.

Judging by Sebüktigin's last wishes, he did not envisage that his family should set up as an independent dynasty, despite the evident decay of the Sāmānids. When he died in 387/997, he did not leave his territories as an undivided inheritance, but as governorships to be held by various members of his family, continuing the practice prevalent during the last years of his life. His brother Bughrachuq (Bughrājūq) was to remain as governor of Herat and Pūshang. Of the six sons whom Jūzjānī attributes to Sebüktigin, only three, Maḥmūd, Naṣr and Ismā'īl, seem to have been alive at this point or of adult years, so that Ismā'īl was in effect the youngest adult son. Abū'l-Qāsim Maḥmūd was to command the army in Khurasan, for Sebük-

tigin did not claim any right to nominate the governor there; Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naṣr was to remain governor of Bust; and Ismā'īl was to have Ghazna and Balkh. In allotting Ghazna to Ismā'īl, Sebüktigin may have been influenced by the fact that Ismā'īl was his son by a daughter of Alptigin's, and may have felt it more fitting that a descendant of Alptigin should rule there; the apparent preference of the weak Ismā'īl over the forceful and experienced Maḥmūd puzzled Muslim historians of the Ghaznavids.[37] In fact, no specific overlordship was given to Ismā'īl. The possession of the ancestral lands in northern and eastern Afghanistan perhaps implied this, but it is arguable that Maḥmūd's hold over the rich province of Khurasan was a more desirable inheritance than Ghazna, whose chief value was as a springboard for Indian conquests.

In face of Maḥmūd's superior military skill and prestige, Ismā'īl was unable to retain the territories he had inherited, and by 388/998 Maḥmūd had made himself ruler of all the lands his father had held. The succession struggle had forced him temporarily to abandon Khurasan, and in the interim the Sāmānid government had sent out the general Begtuzun to govern the province. However, once Maḥmūd was free of the struggle with his brother, Begtuzun could not stand up to his power. All Maḥmūd's earlier life had been spent aiding his father, and Sebüktigin had always acted as a faithful vassal of the Sāmānids. Maḥmūd felt this connection less strongly, but the idea of making himself completely independent did not apparently occur to him immediately on his father's death. On receiving his inheritance from his father, Ismā'īl had come straightway to Balkh, the nearest point in his newly-acquired dominions to Bukhārā, and had done homage to the Amīr Abū'l-Ḥārith Manṣūr b. Nūḥ (387-9/997-9); likewise, when Maḥmūd deposed his brother, he came from Ghazna to Balkh and did homage to the Amīr, who confirmed him in the provinces of Ghazna, Balkh, Bust, Herat and Tirmidh.

But now, a weakening of Maḥmūd's respect for the Amīrs is discernible. His stay in Nishapur had shown him the richness and desirability of Khurasan, and theoretical loyalty towards an increasingly impotent suzerain now yielded to personal ambition. In the event, circumstances saved him from unambiguous hostility to the Sāmānids. In 389/999 Fā'iq and Begtuzun deposed Abū'l-Ḥārith and set up his brother Abū'l-Fawāris

'Abd al-Malik b. Nūḥ. Maḥmūd was able to pose as the avenger of the blinded Amīr, even though he had previously taken up arms to seize Khurasan whilst Abū'l-Ḥārith was still on the throne, and to clear all his rivals from Khurasan. Maḥmūd now restored the *khuṭba* in Khurasan to the Caliph al-Qādir (see above, pp. 28-9), and was rewarded by a grant from Baghdad of a *manshūr* for Khurasan and the titles *Walī Amīr al-Mu'minīn* and *Yamīn ad-Daula wa-Amīn al-Milla*. The attempts of the last Sāmānid, Abū Ibrāhīm Ismā'īl al-Muntaṣir (d. 395/1005) to retrieve his dynasty's fortunes came to naught, but Maḥmūd was involved for nearly a decade in disputes with the Qarakhanids, who coveted Khurasan and refused to accept the Oxus as the frontier between themselves and the Ghaznavids. However, Maḥmūd's great victory near Balkh over the Ilig Naṣr and his second cousin Qadïr Khan Yūsuf in 398/1008 brought the threat from this quarter to an end.[38]

Thus Maḥmūd was now master of Khurasan, with its rich commerce, its fertile agricultural oases and its populous towns. Undoubtedly, it was the financial richness of the province which appealed to Maḥmūd, with his insatiable demands for money, the sinews of war. Over the next years, he pursued a systematic policy of bringing under closer control the outlying dynasties which had been in loose tributary status to the Sāmānids, sc. those in Sīstān, Gharchistān, Gūzgān, Chaghāniyān, Khuttal and Khwārizm. In Sīstān, Maḥmūd's suzerainty was first acknowledged, on the evidence of coins, in 392/1002. In the following year, the Ṣaffārid Amīr Khalaf b. Aḥmad was deposed, and the Sultan's brother Naṣr eventually installed as governor; but scions of the Ṣaffārid family continued to head '*ayyār* bands and lead them against the Ghaznavids, and up to the time when the Seljuqs reached Sīstān, the land was rarely quiet.[39] The upper Oxus principalities were strategically important as outposts against the Turks, and so Chaghāniyān and Khuttal were left in the hands of their old rulers; but these considerations were less cogent in the case of the principalities to the south of the Oxus, and here, Maḥmūd did not hesitate to intervene. On the pretext that the Shēr of Gharchistān, Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr Muḥammad, had encouraged the Ilig Naṣr's ambitions in Khurasan, the Sultan invaded the province in 403/1012-13, deposed its dynasty and annexed their lands. Two years previously, the Farīghūnids of Gūzgān had failed to

provide an heir of suitable age, so Maḥmūd had stepped in and installed his son Muḥammad as governor. By a combination of ruthless diplomacy and military force, the local Ma'mūnid dynasty of Khwārizm was in 408/1017 overthrown and the province brought under direct control; for the next twenty-four years it was ruled by a former ghulām of Sebüktigin's, Abū Sa'īd Altuntash (Altūntāsh) and his sons.[40]

CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE

1 *The spirit of the age: authoritarianism and orthodoxy within the Ghaznavid empire*

By the 11th century, the Persian governmental tradition was dominant in the eastern Islamic world. In this tradition, the ancient Near Eastern concept of the Divine Ruler was combined with the Islamic one which, although in theory giving some right of resistance, in practice regarded even a tyrant as better than anarchy. The orientalisation of the Abbasid Caliphate was an important factor here. From the civil aspect, we may note the dominance of *adab* in education and the influence of the secretary class, who used Sāsānid techniques for coping with the growing complexity of the business of administration. From the military aspect, there was the reliance of the Abbasids first on their Khurasanian guards, the *Abnā' ad-daula*, and then, from the 9th century onwards, on a mercenary and slave army recruited from all parts of the Caliphate and beyond. Such an army had no ethnic or territorial ties with the rest of the Caliphs' subjects, so that the Abbasids no longer had to depend on a *levée en masse* of their free subjects, as had been the military system of the early Arab Caliphate, or on a tribal following, as did many later Turkish and Mongol dynasties. The Caliph could now demand unquestioning obedience from his soldiers and be sure that there was no bond of sympathy between them and his subjects (see further, below, Ch. III, § 1).

From the social aspect, there arose a rigid, dual division of society within the state. This differed from the hierarchisation of previous social groups in the Middle East. In the early Caliphate, the community of freemen (we must always remember the substratum of slaves and *mawālī*) had its aristocracy of noble Arab blood, but there was also by the side of this a feeling that moral and intellectual factors in part determined whether one belonged to the *ʿawāmm* or *khawāṣṣ*; and in ancient Iran, as in India, class divisions were rigid and determined by birth. But in the Islamic 'power state' of the later Abbasid age (to use E.I.J.Rosenthal's term), there was only one division,

that between rulers and ruled (in the later terminology of the Ottomans, that between *'Askerīs*, comprising both civil and military ruling elements, and *Re'āyā*). In the 10th and 11th centuries, there was nothing predestined about which of the two divisions a man might belong to. The opening of the *Siyāsat-nāma* expatiates on how God designates certain outstanding men to be kings, but in practice, royal power was often gained through military force, political shrewdness or merely through favourable circumstances, as the maxim *ad-daula ittifāqāt ḥasana* implies. Whatever exalted genealogies might later be supplied, most Islamic dynasties of this period arose from lowly or even slave elements (Ṣaffārids, Ghaznavids, Khwārizmshāhs of Atsïz's line); from invading tribal groups (Seljuqs, Qarakhanids); or from local chieftains or dihqāns of middling status (Sāmānids, Būyids, Ziyārids, Ma'mūnid Khwārizmshāhs). Dynasties that could genuinely trace their ancestry back to a long line of kings, like the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs, were very much the exception.

The political theorists of the power state were always concerned with laying down moral bases for the supreme secular authority, Ibn Khaldūn's *wāzi'*, the institution which curbs the individualist and anarchic instincts of mankind and guarantees an ordered form of society.[1] The 11th century sees the development of the 'Mirror for Princes' genre in Persian literature, and these writers say much about the relationship between king and subjects. In the *Siyāsat-nāma*, Niẓām al-Mulk stresses how, since kings are divinely-appointed, 'they must always keep them [sc. the subjects] in such a position that they know their stations and never remove the ring of servitude from their ears'. Even more characteristic is the credo attributed by Niẓām al-Mulk to Bahrām Gūr's Vizier Rāst Ravish:

> The subjects have grown insolent because of our extremely equitable rule and have become impudent. If they are not punished, I fear ruin will appear [in the state]. . . . Be severe on them, before ruin becomes visible. For know that severity is of two kinds: destroying evil-doers and confiscating the wealth of the good.

Here the relationship of ruler and ruled is conceived of as always in tension; any latitude given to subjects diminishes the majesty of the ruler and will lead inevitably to rebelliousness,

for if they are given an inch, they will always take a mile. The views of the Ghaznavid historian Baihaqī, representing as he does the secretary class who put the commands of the Sultans into action, are of special interest in considering the governmental ethos within the Ghaznavid state. He employs the analogy, familiar from the political theory of so many cultures, of the human body. In the body he distinguishes three forces: (1) that of the guiding intellect and the faculties which serve it (*khirad u sukhan*, *nafs-i gūyanda*); (2) that of anger, revenge and self-defence (*nafs-i khashm-i gīranda*); and (3) that of passion and desire (*nafs-i arzū*). These he compares with the ruler, the army and the subjects:

> You must realise very clearly that the *nafs-i gūyanda* is the king—commanding, masterful and overbearing. He must administer justice and punishment as whole-heartedly and firmly as possible, and not in an ineffective manner; and when he shows kindness, it must not be so as to leave an impression of weakness. Furthermore, *khashm* is the army of this king, by means of which he uncovers [the enemy's] weak points, makes secure [his own] vital points, frustrates the enemy and protects the people (*ra'iyyat*). The army must be fully-prepared; when it is thus ready, it is able to carry out the ruler's command. The *nafs-i arzū* is the subject population of this king; it is vital that they should be in complete fear and trembling of the king and the army, and give [them] obedience.[2]

In the Ghaznavid empire under Maḥmūd and his son Mas'ūd, we see these attitudes of mind on the part of the ruler made the mainspring of political action. The darker side of these Sultans' rule has been well brought out by Barthold, *Turkestan*, 291-3, and must be borne in mind as the background to Nāẓim's rather eulogistic biography of Maḥmūd. Especially notable is the discouragement of what might be called local solidarity and self-help. Concepts like 'patriotism' and 'national feeling' are of very recent appearance in the Islamic world, and can certainly not be used here; what we can legitimately speak of are regional and local solidarities of feeling and interest, and the *'aṣabiyyāt*, factional groupings, of one town or province against another.[3] For most people at this time, the rural district of the peasant or

the town of the artisan and shopkeeper was the limit of their world. Protection of their homes and freedom to pursue their avocations in peace were what these people essentially expected from the government to which they paid taxes.

It would have been an abdication of this responsibility if the ruler had left the subjects to defend themselves. Yet the Ghaznavid Sultans denied their subjects a limited right of self-defence, even when the Sultan was unable to bring help in time against external attackers; arms which were used to repel invaders might be turned against the Sultan himself. As the Sultans saw it, the great cleavage was between all rulers on one side and all subjects on the other, not between the ruler and the ruled of one kingdom as against the ruler and ruled of another. This is especially clear in Maḥmūd's reprimand to the people of Balkh when in 396/1006 they resisted the Qarakhanid general Ja'fartigin. In a determined resistance against the attacker, royal property was damaged, and this attracted the Sultan's wrath. He told the townspeople that they had no right to resist the enemy and so place his own property in jeopardy; subjects must resign themselves to whichever ruler shows himself the strongest.[4] There was some logic in the Sultan's words. The army did the fighting, and subjects should not arrogate this function to themselves; conversely, if the ruler was impotent to protect them, they should not let any feelings of loyalty prevent them from getting the best possible terms from the incoming power. This explains Mas'ūd's attitude when, towards the end of his reign, the Seljuqs were thought to be about to attack Ghazna itself. He resolved to leave for India, but gave his officials full permission to stay behind in Ghazna and make terms with the incomers, in whose service they could expect to find employment.[5]

What might further be called an ideological aspect of the Sultans' power was the buttressing of their secular authority by the cachet of Sunnī orthodoxy and by the encouragement of cordial relations with the Abbasid Caliphs.[6]

The 10th century had seen the triumph of political Shī'ism over many areas of the Islamic world: in the west, through the foundation of the Fāṭimid Caliphate; in the central lands, through the adhesion to the Shī'a of the majority of the Arab Amīrates in the Arabian peninsula, Syria and Iraq; and in the Iranian world, through the sympathy of the Būyids and other

Dailamī dynasties for the Shīʿa, although in this case, Shīʿism was probably as much an expression of Persian national feeling as an intellectual or emotional assent to the claims of the house of ʿAlī. Sebüktigin and Maḥmūd followed the Sāmānids in being strongly Sunnī. It seems to have been this example of the Sāmānids, together with a consciousness of the benefits which a nascent power such as their own could derive from a close identification with the interests of Baghdad, which determined the Ghaznavids' support for Sunnī Islam, rather than any innate preference of Turkish rulers and peoples for orthodoxy. On one or two occasions, rulers from the Sāmānid and Qarakhanid dynasties, such as the Amīr Naṣr b. Aḥmad, who was forced to abdicate in 331/942, and Aḥmad b. Khiḍr Khan, who was executed in 488/1095 through the efforts of the orthodox ulema, were attracted by extremist Shīʿī ideas, but no such breath of scandal was ever linked with any of the early Ghaznavids.

We have seen, above, p. 46, that in 389/999 Maḥmūd restored al-Qādir to the *khuṭba* in Khurasan and received as a reward the titles *Walī Amīr al-Muʾminīn* and *Yamīn ad-Daula wa-Amīn al-Milla*, expressing his loyalty to the Caliph and his rôle as champion of the Caliph's secular interests and of the faith.[7] During his reign, Maḥmūd felt the need for legal and moral confirmation by the Caliph of the accomplished fact of his empire. The connection with Baghdad also gave a moral backing for such expeditions as the one of 396/1005-6 against the ruler of Multan in northern India, Abū'l-Futūḥ Dā'ūd b. Naṣr, who despite his Ismāʿīlī beliefs, was friendly towards Maḥmūd. ʿUtbī says that 'he [sc. the Sultan] was unable, in the interests of religion, to endure that he should remain in power, seeing the vileness of his evildoing and the abomination of his affair', but the real reasons for the attack seem to have been financial: Multan was a very rich city.[8] The purge of Ismāʿīlīs in the Ghaznavid territories was particularly calculated to please the Abbasid Caliphs, who were at this time in many ways overshadowed by the wealth and splendour of their Fāṭimid rivals in Cairo. In Khurasan, therefore, Maḥmūd encouraged the Karāmiyya sect to persecute the Ismāʿīlīs; he ostentatiously had the Fāṭimid *dāʿī* Tāhartī executed; and he satisfied the Caliph over his Vizier Ḥasanak's dealing with the Fāṭimids (see below, p. 182). For the execution of Tāhartī, Maḥmūd received the

further titles of *Niẓām ad-Dīn* and *Nāṣir al-Ḥaqq* from al-Qādir, and after the Somnath expedition of 417/1026, a deed which fired the imagination of the Islamic world, that of *Kahf ad-Daula wa'l-Islām*.[9] The poetry of the period is full of references to the Sultans' zeal for the Sunna and of eulogies of their harrying of the *Qarāmiṭa*, as the Ismāʿīlīs are usually called in contemporary Ghaznavid sources; and the epithet 'Ghāzī', although not a formal title of the Sultans at this time, is frequently used by the poets in these connections. Farrukhī remarks, in a *marthiya* on the death of Maḥmūd, that the heretics can now sleep peacefully:

> O woe and misery! The *Qarmaṭiyān* must be rejoicing, for they are safe now from stoning and the gallows!

In the fancies of the poets, these heretics lurked everywhere. Even Maḥmūd's expedition of 408/1017 to Khwārizm, the reasons for which were purely military and political, is given a religious motive by ʿUnṣurī: Gurgānj and its neighbourhood had become 'a centre for the *Qarmaṭiyān* and a mine of unbelievers'.[10]

Maḥmūd was always careful to include the Caliph's name on his coins, to send to Baghdad presents from the plunder of his campaigns and to depict himself in his *fatḥ-nāmas* as a warrior for the faith. The rôle of defender of orthodoxy against the Būyids enabled him to justify what was an act of pure aggression, the deposition of Majd ad-Daula Rustam b. Fakhr ad-Daula of Ray in 420/1029. Whereas the Sultan had latterly grown dilatory in sending *fatḥ-nāmas* to the Caliph after his Indian campaigns, one now came straight from the army camp outside Ray. In it, Maḥmūd boasted that through him, 'God has swept away from this region the hand of the oppressors and has cleansed it of the activity of the infidel Bāṭiniyya and the evil-doing innovators'. He went on to detail Majd ad-Daula's uncanonical practices and the ascendancy of heretics within his territories, and ended by boasting that 'this region has been cleared of the Ismāʿīlī *dāʿīs* and the Muʿtazilī and extremist Shīʿī leaders, and the cause of the Sunna has been helped to victory. The slave has carefully set forth exactly what God gave him the power to do, in making the cause of the conquering dynasty (sc. the Abbasid Caliphate] victorious.' Actions like

these all contributed to the picture which grew up in later ages of Maḥmūd as the fanatic for religious orthodoxy, so that Shabānkāra'ī can say in the Sultan's praise that he allegedly executed over 50,000 heretics and dissidents.[10a]

Under Mas'ud b. Maḥmūd, loyalty to the dynasty continued to be identified with religious orthodoxy. The honorific titles *Nāṣir Dīn Allāh*, *Ḥāfiẓ 'Ibād Allāh*, *al-Muntaqim min A'dā' Allāh* and *Ẓahīr Khalīfat Allāh Amīr al-Mu'minīn* and the investiture patent, which Mas'ūd received at Nishapur in 421/1030 from the Caliph's envoy, were important weapons in the succession struggle with his brother Muḥammad; he ordered that copies of the *manshūr* and details of the *laqabs* should be sent to the cities of Khurasan and Bādghīs and publicised there, so that the people might rally to his side. When in the next year al-Qādir died and his son al-Qā'im succeeded in Baghdad, Mas'ūd demanded and received a patent of investiture for 'Khurasan, Khwārizm, Nīmrūz, Zābulistān, the whole of India, Sind, Chaghāniyān, Khuttalān, Qubādhiyān, Tirmidh, Quṣdār, Makrān, Wālishtān, Kīkānān, Ray, Jibāl, Iṣfahān, the whole of the territory as far as the upland of Ḥulwān, Gurgān and Ṭabaristān'. Rich presents of indigo, cloth, jewels and aromatics were sent for the Caliph and his retinue. When the new Caliph's envoy appeared in 424/1033, bringing this *manshūr*, Mas'ūd made a public declaration of policy emphasising his rôle as defender of the faith and hammer of heretics:

> They brought forward the turban and sword, and the Sultan declared, 'This turban which I am about to put on with my hand must be wound on by the Supporter of Religion (*Nāṣir-i Dīn*)'. He put it on his head after the crown. He drew the sword and said, 'The *Ẓanādiqa* and *Qarāmiṭa* must be uprooted, and the *sunnat* of my father Yamīn ad-Daula wa'd-Dīn thereby observed; moreover, other regions which are in the hands of enemies must be seized by the might of this sword'.[11]

It is clear from episodes like these that the Ghaznavids regarded religious orthodoxy as a cement for the fabric of their empire; and even though the Caliphate could provide no physical or material aid to the Sultans, they were very conscious of the moral benefits accruing from Caliphal support.

2 *The Sultans and their servants*

In Part III of his book *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 126-50, Nāẓim surveys the administrative system of Maḥmūd of Ghazna. From a patient winnowing of Baihaqī's history and of the excerpts from the *Maqāmāt* of his master Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān incorporated in Saif ad-Dīn Faḍlī's *Āthār al-wuzarā'* (see Note on the Sources, above, p. 18), together with details from the later source of the *Siyāsat-nāma*, he has built up a straightforward account of the Sultan presiding over his administration, with its *dīwāns* and officials. Minorsky has rightly called this 'a valuable reconstruction of the administrative machinery under Mahmud' (*BSOS*, VI [1930-2], 1024).

In the subsequent pages of this chapter, an attempt will be made to fill out this picture and to examine the machinery of government in the reign of Mas'ud as well as in that of his father. Mas'ūd's reign is in many ways the critical one for an understanding of how the Ghaznavid empire was run; it was in this period that the inadequacies of the system began to show up under the pressure of external enemies. This last point is linked up with a further consideration. Nāẓim's reconstruction only takes us up to a certain point; we know what the bare bones are, but we are still ignorant about what made the system really work. What ethos guided the Sultan and his chief officials and what was their attitude towards the subjects? In what ways did these subjects, townsmen and peasants alike, feel the hand of the state? How did the state exact the taxes and services due to it, and what limits, if any, were recognised to these demands? Nāẓim is silent here, and the imperfect state of the sources does not allow us wholly to fill out the picture; but there is enough information for us to assess in broad outline what principles and assumptions guided the men who ran the empire and, to a much less extent, how the subjects themselves reacted. Such questions are relevant in considering how the Seljuqs were able to conquer Khurasan, for the purely military and strategic factors (described below, Ch. IX, §§ 1 and 2) are insufficient to explain the failure of Ghaznavid power there. We must look further back into the forty or so years of Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan; and if our specific material on that province is not so abundant as could be desired, we can tentatively apply

the more general deductions which can be made from conditions in the Ghaznavid empire as a whole.

Such men as Alptigin and Sebüktigin are classic examples of the transformation of the Turkish military slave, brought into the Islamic world at a young and impressionable age, plunged into the sophisticated environment of Muslim civilisation, rising to high command within it and having to deal with the complexities of political and administrative life there. Very soon, religion as well as culture became a barrier between such men and the steppe past. Although Islam was spreading through the steppes in the 10th century, there was still much paganism there, and in any case, it is not to be supposed that there was much in common between the subtle Ḥanafī *mutakallimūn*, whose company Maḥmūd affected to enjoy, such as the Tabānīs, the Ṣā'idīs and the Nāṣiḥīs, and the Ṣūfīs and itinerant preachers who carried the faith from Transoxania and Khwārizm into the steppes. Men like Alptigin and Sebüktigin were initially *déracinés* in the Sāmānid empire, but speedily integrated themselves into the Persian world around them. We shall, therefore, be almost exclusively concerned in the rest of this chapter with institutions of Persian origin and with officials of Persian blood and outlook. Maḥmūd and his sons were educated in the Perso-Islamic tradition (see below, Ch. IV, § 1); and they inherited a large part of the former Sāmānid empire, together with much of its official personnel and many of its customs and practices. The Perso-Islamic bias of their upbringing was undoubtedly the predominant factor in their attitude to the exercise of power. The Turkish steppe background, into which Sebüktigin had been born, became overshadowed by the influence of the Islamic milieu in which the Sultans had to rule and of the Persian officials with whom they had to work.

Nevertheless, the fact that the early Ghaznavids were racially Turkish and, at least down to Mas'ūd's time, Turkish-speaking, with only a generation or two separating them from Central Asia, cannot be ignored. We hear little about this Turkish side from the written historical sources, for these are all Arabic and Persian Muslim ones, but it is unsafe to assume from this that its influence was negligible. The Ghaznavid army was a great stronghold of Turkish nationality and feeling, for a considerable proportion of it was Turkish. Those Turkish mercenaries who had passed into the Ghaznavid empire via the Sāmānid service

had had some opportunity to adapt themselves to the Perso-Islamic world, but there were always fresh elements arriving from Central Asia with only a brief transit through the Islamic lands along the Oxus. New arrivals such as these kept up the proportion of comparatively barbarian and unsophisticated Turks within the army's ranks. The inability of two Turks, Asïghtigin (spelt in Baihaqī 'Āsaftigīn') Ghāzī and Eryaruq (Aryāruq), whose fighting qualities had raised them to high military rank, to find their way about in the complexities of life at the capital Ghazna, is remarked upon by Baihaqī:

> . . . These two prominent men, Eryaruq and Ghāzī, had no reliable person to advise them. These two generals lacked a pair of adjutants (*katkhudās*) who were efficient, competent in official procedure and with wide experience of the world. Obviously, what could one expect from Sa'īd the Money-changer and other lackeys like him, of obscure position and little worth? The Turks just acted according to the guidance of men like these, without regard to what the final outcome and disastrous effect might be. They had no experience, and although they were perfectly ready to expend their efforts and their lives, and possessed extensive wealth and belongings, they lacked judgement and had no familiarity with official routine (*dabīrī*). They lacked any foresight [lit. 'could not distinguish between today and tomorrow'], so were inevitably powerless against misfortunes.[12]

Because the Ghaznavids inherited much of the former Sāmānid empire, they acquired many members of the old Sāmānid bureaucracy. Some of these merely remained at their posts in the *Dīwān* of Khurasan when Maḥmūd took over there, others were attracted to Ghazna when the Qarakhanids occupied Transoxania. These trained men were welcomed into the Ghaznavid bureaucracy, for the expansion of the empire under Maḥmūd enlarged its sphere of operation and the volume of work with which it had to cope. These former Sāmānid officials strengthened the continuity in traditions and techniques between the Sāmānid and Ghaznavid administrations.

The first Vizier of Maḥmūd, Abū'l-'Abbās Faḍl b. Aḥmad Isfarā'inī, was a Khurāsānī. Shabānkāra'ī errs in describing him as a former Vizier of the Sāmānids, but he had been a secretary in Fā'iq's employ. On the defeat of Fā'iq and Abū

'Alī Sīmjūrī, he went over to Sebüktigin, and when Maḥmūd gained the throne, became the new Sultan's Vizier.[13] From the evidence of his *nisba*, the family of Mas'ūd's second Vizier, Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad Shīrāzī, came originally from Fārs, but according to 'Utbī, his father Abū Ṭāhir had served the Sāmānids' ghulām general Ḥusām ad-Daula Abū'l-'Abbās Tash as his confidential secretary (*'alā dīwān asrārihi*). Aḥmad himself began his career as *katkhudā* of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash, and ended up as Vizier (see below, p. 61).[14] The Ghaznavid official Abū'l-Qāsim-i Kathīr, whose name appears frequently in Baihaqī and who had been head of the *Dīwān* of Khurasan, came from a family which had long served successive masters of Khurasan; his grandfather Kathīr had been such a talented *katkhudā* of Abū'l-Ḥasan Sīmjūrī that the Sāmānid Amīrs had frequently tried to get him directly into their own service. An experienced treasury official (*dabīr-i khizāna*) of the Ghaznavids, Abū'l-Ḥasan-i Quraish, had been formerly a secretary in the Sāmānid treasury at Bukhārā, but had been brought back to Ghazna by the Vizier Isfarā'inī. The Amīr Abū'l-Faḍl Ziyād b. Aḥmad, who came from the prominent Baihaq family of the Ziyādīs, had been governor of Baihaq under the Sīmjūrīs, and although he suffered temporary imprisonment when they fell, he soon found favour with Maḥmūd and was appointed the latter's deputy in Khurasan when Maḥmūd had to hurry eastwards in 387/997 and deal with his brother and rival Ismā'īl. The Sultan was less successful with another civil servant from Baihaq, Abū'l-'Abbās Ismā'īl 'Anbarī; Abū'l-'Abbās had acted as Vizier for the Qarakhanid Ilig Naṣr, but refused to accept the same office from the Ghaznavids, and was imprisoned for his recalcitrance until he died.[15]

Shortly before his death, Maḥmūd annexed Ray and Jibāl and so became the possessor of lands formerly ruled by a branch of the Būyid dynasty. Hence there is, perhaps, a subordinate strand in the formative factors shaping the Ghaznavid administrative system, the influence of Būyid practice. Yet this contribution can only have been small compared with that from the Sāmānids, for Ghaznavid rule in western and central Persia lasted for less than a decade. We learn from such sources as Miskawaih and the official correspondences of certain Būyid officials which have been preserved, that the administration of the Būyid territories was based on the procedures of the

Abbasid Caliphate, although the Dailamī origins of the Būyids and their dependence in part on a tribal following brought about changes in the systems of land tenure and taxation in western and central Persia.[16] Thus Baghdad was the ultimate parent of the administrative systems of both the Sāmānids and the Būyids.

In an anecdote of the *Siyāsat-nāma*, 169-73, a group of unemployed Būyid *dabīrs* and *mutaṣarrifs* in Ray contemplate emigration to Khurasan, where they believe that Maḥmūd's well-known munificence to scholars and appreciation of talent will surely bring them recognition and employment. As Qazwīnī notes, the anachronisms in this tale make its authenticity dubious, but we do hear of instances where men passed from Būyid to Ghaznavid employment. Baihaqī mentions a Ghaznavid commander who had previously been a *sipahsālār-i Shāhanshāhān*, and the Dailamī element in the Ghaznavid army was an important one (see below, Ch. III, § 2).[17] The Qāḍī Shīrāzī, to whom Maḥmūd gave an important post in India (see below, pp. 76-7), came into the Sultan's service from that of the Būyids. When Maḥmūd dethroned Majd ad-Daula of Ray, the Būyid administration there continued to function as a provincial *dīwān* of the Ghaznavids, with a sphere of operation embracing the recent acquisitions in Ray, Jibāl and Dailam. As with the take-over in Khurasan, much of the old personnel must have stayed on. This was certainly the case with Abū'l-'Alā' Muḥammad b. Ḥassūl (d. 450/1058), who later became known as the author of an anti-Būyid propaganda tract for the Seljuqs, the *Tafḍīl al-Atrāk 'alā sā'ir al-ajnād*. He had previously been Vizier to Majd ad-Daula, and then after the capture of Ray, was given a secretarial job by Maḥmūd; by the time of the Seljuq invasions he was heading the *Dīwān-i Rasā'il* in Ray, and finally passed into the service of yet another master, Toghrïl (Ṭughril) Beg.[18]

The Ghaznavid Sultans were despots who held their empire together by force of arms and fear. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 128-9, mentions as an institution of the administrative system the so-called Council of civil and military leaders which the Sultan convened for opinions and advice on important issues. But as he admits, '. . . the council was nothing more than a deliberative and consultative body at best, and the Sulṭān was not bound either to ask or accept its advice'. A body so nebulous and so gelded of real power hardly deserves to be accorded an indepen-

dent existence. For in the monarchical theory of the time, to acknowledge the circumscribing influence of ministers could only be viewed as a relinquishment of kingly power. Maḥmūd could only be made to accept advice indirectly. The quotation from Baihaqī given below, (p. 230) shows how he was enraged by any contradiction; but on mature reflection, he might quietly heed the advice. By this means, the appearance of unfettered personal control of decisions was kept. Mas'ūd was amenable to the suggestions of certain of his ministers, but this was usually when the ministers in question were his own creatures and favourites and could therefore be relied upon to give congenial advice.

This explains the ascendancy in the early part of Mas'ūd's reign of the '*Āriḍ* Abū Sahl Zauzanī, whom Baihaqī (admittedly Abū Sahl's enemy) regards as the evil genius of much of the Sultan's reign.[19] It was he who instigated Mas'ūd to bring to trial and execute the former Vizier Ḥasanak on pretext of his being an Ismā'īlī sympathiser. This course of action accorded with the Sultan's desire to uproot the men of the old régime, the *Maḥmūdiyān*, who had either offended him in the past or who had supported his brother Muḥammad during his short Sultanate (see below, Ch. VIII, § 2); but Abū Sahl was primarily actuated by the motive of revenge for a slight he had once received from one of Ḥasanak's servants. He so ill-treated the captive Ḥasanak that the people began to murmur against him for his cruelty (for the whole episode, see below, Ch. VI, § 2). Similarly, it was Abū Sahl's stimulation of the Sultan's avarice which led Mas'ūd in 422/1031 to try to recover the *māl-i bai'at*, the seventy to eighty million dirhams which Muḥammad had paid out to the military leaders, officials and courtiers on his accession in an effort to secure their loyalty. He even hoped to recover the presents given to the court poets, musicians and buffoons. The Vizier Maimandī and the Chief Secretary Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān considered the scheme unprecedented in the annals of the kings of 'Ajam and Islam; the attempt to collect the money failed in the end and served only to show up the Sultan's avarice and arbitrary behaviour.[20]

At last Abū Sahl overreached himself. In 422/1031 he tried to procure the assassination of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash, but the plot was revealed by one of Abū Sahl's enemies at court and so misfired. Unfortunately, the Sultan himself had been privy

to the scheme, although his ministers Maimandī and Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān had known nothing about it. The revelation of the plot meant that all the officials' tact and diplomacy had to be employed to cover up their masters' blunder; Altuntash's strategic position as a shield against the Qarakhanids and Turkmens made him too important a personage to be alienated. The Vizier feared that the Khwārizmshāh might be driven to ally with the Qarakhanid ruler of Bukhārā and Samarqand, 'Alī b. Bughra Khan Hārūn, known as 'Alītigin, against Mas'ūd. Hence he insisted that Abū Sahl should be sacrificed, and he was dismissed from the *'Arḍ*, imprisoned in the citadel of Ghazna and stripped of his estates and properties in Merv, Zauzan, Nishapur, Ghūr, Herat, Bādghīs and Ghazna. The Sultan vowed that henceforth he would do nothing behind the Vizier's back or without his advice: 'Let the Khwāja know that after this, whatever is done in regard to matters of kingly power, finance or statesmanship, it shall always be done on his advice and after consultation with him.' Abū Sahl was restored to favour in 425/1034, and after Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān's death, was appointed in 431/1039 to head the *Dīwān-i Risālat*; but his influence was never again allowed to become preponderant in the state.[21]

Whether, if Maimandī had lived, the Sultan would have followed his advice more closely, we cannot know, The probability is that Mas'ūd's high opinion of his kingly office, his arbitrariness and his obstinacy, would not long have allowed him to work in complete harmony with the wise old Vizier. Certainly, he was soon on bad terms with his new Vizier, Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad. The latter had been *katkhudā* to the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash. The Sultan had been so impressed at his skill in extricating the Ghaznavid forces after the battle of Dabūsiyya in 423/1032, in which Altuntash had been fatally wounded fighting against 'Alītigin, that he made him Maimandī's successor. He thus exchanged a quasi-military post for a civil one.[22] Despite the new Vizier's excellent conduct and reliable advice, Mas'ūd soon grew suspicious, to the point that he automatically opposed whatever good counsels the Vizier put forward. Thus when in 428/1037 a council was summoned to discuss where the Sultan should campaign next, the Vizier and the Chief Secretary were the only ones to oppose the projected Indian expedition; they both held that the threatening

situation in Khurasan demanded the concentration of effort there, but their opinion was unheeded.[23] After this, the Sultan and his Vizier remained on cold terms. Like the rest of the civilian officials, the Vizier complained of his master's capriciousness, his growing addiction to drinking and his neglect of personal attention to the menace of the Turkmens.

The Sultan was well aware that he could ill afford to dispense with an experienced servant like the Vizier, and Aḥmad b. ʿAbd aṣ-Ṣamad survived Masʿūd and after his murder served the new Sultan Maudūd b. Masʿūd for two years.[24] The uneasy relationship between the Sultan and his Vizier is seen in the care with which the latter secured specific conditions of duty when in the autumn of 432/1040 Masʿūd appointed him to accompany the Prince Maudūd to Balkh and Ṭukhāristān with a military force. It was usual for an official to have a contract or *muwāḍaʿa* explaining the conditions under which he was taking office. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd aṣ-Ṣamad had no doubt already obtained a *muwāḍaʿa* on accepting the Vizierate, and this was an additional one. It shows that the Vizier was especially anxious to maintain his rights *vis-à-vis* the Department of the *ʿArḍ*. Clauses of it dealt with his relationship to the palace ghulāms and their commander and to the Commander-in-Chief of the army and other generals. He also claimed some control over the army's pay arrangements and the right to appoint and dismiss the *ʿĀriḍ's* deputy. The text of a further *muwāḍaʿa*, that made by Maimandī when in 422/1031 the Sultan released him from imprisonment in India and restored him to the Vizierate, is known from the *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 107a-110a (summarised in Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 130-1). It was clearly advisable for officials to have a statement of duties down in black and white, in order to avert criticism for omissions and shortcomings and to avoid encroachments by other departments. The importance attached to the *muwāaḍʿa* of 1040 between the Sultan and Aḥmad b. ʿAbd aṣ-Ṣamad is shown by Masʿūd's order that the copies for each party should be engrossed in code, a procedure reserved only for documents of prime importance.[25]

The atmosphere of suspicion generally prevailing between the Sultan and his ministers may be inferred from what has been said above. We have the explicit words of Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān that 'kings often harbour fancies, and no one can be sure, as he ought to be able, of what is in their minds or their hearts, nor

can he discern what they really intend'. Elsewhere he warns against the immediate execution of an order to put someone to death, for kings often change their minds and repent of their decisions.[26] The insistence on *muwāḍa'as* shows that the bureaucracy felt that something with greater legal sanction than the undefined, paternal relationship of master and servant was necessary.

We are fortunate in possessing from a Ghaznavid official of this time a critique of the relationships between Sultan and officials on one hand and between officials and subjects on the other. This comes from the historian Abū'l-Faḍl Baihaqī, who worked in the Correspondence Department and was also the author of a work on the secretary's craft, the *Zīnat al-kuttāb*, which Ibn Funduq calls 'unparalleled of its kind'. As a typical representative of the Persian secretarial class, it is unlikely that Baihaqī's views on kingship and the divine ordering of events were much different from the accepted Perso-Islamic tradition. In his own words:

> Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets and another power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God.[27]

However, there are some indications that the education in the Muslim religious sciences undergone by all literate persons at this time had made Baihaqī and his fellow-officials conscious of the claims of justice and morality in official life and had disinclined them from wholly accepting the most ruthless aspects of the theory of the power state. The all-presence within the Ghaznavid empire of spies and informers will be discussed below in § 5 of this chapter. Baihaqī is very disapproving of the fact that the *mushrif* or spy whom Sultan Mas'ūd secretly set over his uncle 'Aḍud ad-Daula Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin was one of Yūsuf's own ghulāms, a ghulām whom Yūsuf had cared for and treated as his own son; to Baihaqī, this was the ultimate in cynicism and ingratitude. Likewise, when Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān was eventually told by the Sultan that during Maḥmūd's lifetime, when his son Mas'ūd had been governor of Herat, the latter had employed one of the officials in Abū Naṣr's own *Dīwān-i Risālat* as a spy for his own interests, he was deeply

shocked at this deceit. He expostulated that, if he had known, he would have thrown the official in question out of the *Dīwān*, for 'a treacherous *dabīr* is no use'.[28]

These attitudes seem to be evidence of a feeling amongst the *Dīwān* officials that there were moral limits to the application of the internal spy system and that the atmosphere of mistrust which it engendered would, if unchecked, make honest administration impossible. Baihaqī was a man who served several Sultans in turn, who recorded events carefully and who had much occasion to observe the harsh effects of government on the Sultans' subjects, and his philosophisings on the position and duties of his own class, that of the secretaries, have a rather more practical cast than much of the material in the 'Mirrors for Princes' literature. Ibn Funduq gives them in his biography of Abū'l-Faḍl Baihaqī, but without stating from which of his works they are taken. It is possible that they come not from a lost part of the *Mujalladāt*, the complete thirty volumes of which were not apparently extant in Khurasan even when Ibn Funduq wrote in 563/1168,[29] but from the *Zīnat al-kuttāb*; if this surmise is true, it is unfortunate that a work of the *Zīnat al-kuttāb*'s interest has not survived. Baihaqī says:

> The Sultan's officials should not accumulate treasure hoards, since this would mean attempting to share in the Sultan's power; for the accumulation of wealth and treasures is one of the prerogatives and procedures of kings. Nor should they pile up estates and mansions, for that is what subjects (*ra'āyā*) do. The Sultan's officials have a rank and position midway between that of the subjects and the Sultan, superior to the one but inferior to the other; they must not try to emulate the Sultan in amassing treasure hoards, nor the subjects in acquiring estates and incomes from landed property. They should be content with their official salaries. From this income, they can enjoy affluence, esteem and influence. They should not desire greedily a higher salary than this moderate one which they derive from the service of rulers. Purely temporal benefits should not be sought through the exercise of this rank in the state; for if they seek after rank, and work for purely temporal ends, both rank and wealth will slip through their fingers and they will lay themselves open to bringing down perdition on their souls.

Then he passes on to consider some of the moral obligations which the Sultan's servants ought to observe towards the subjects. Baihaqī himself had noted the trail of deprivation which the Sultan's court and accompanying forces not infrequently left behind. When the commissariat, which was organised by the *'Āriḍ*, was inadequate to feed and house all the Sultan's train, living off the land or the imposition of irregular levies on the population was often resorted to. Baihaqī goes on to say:

> Wherever the royal court (*dār al-mulk*) may be, it is necessary that this person [sc. the official] should have properly equipped quarters (*sarāy-i ma'mūr*) so that it is unnecessary for him to be billeted on the subjects. It is preferable for the ruler to take with him herds of sheep, wherever he establishes himself, because otherwise it means that someone without herds, who comes to greet the ruler, is unable to show the virtues of hospitality and liberality. If the official is able, he arranges it so that his [sc. the host's] expenditure is made up out of official funds (or perhaps, 'comes out of supplementary official funds'); this is only just and it avoids a [financial] catastrophe [for the host]. Also, it gives him [sc. the official] security from punishment or dismissal in whatever he says or writes. And if he uses his high position to succour the distressed and needy, he will have built for himself one of the pillars of felicity in the next world. In this way, he will avoid calamity in this world, and will secure for himself an abundant entitlement to God Most High's mercy in the next world.[30]

3 *The central financial system*

The Ghaznavid empire was expensive to run. The efficient functioning of the administration and the financing of the military campaigns which were required to keep going the momentum of expansion meant that a regular and extensive inflow of taxation and treasure was needed. This broad consideration may be particularised as follows.

In the first place, the bias of the Ghaznavid state was essentially a military and imperialist one. As is explained in the next chapter, the military machine of the Ghaznavids included features from earlier military practice. Amongst these was the

nucleus of slave soldiers, ghulāms, who gave personal loyalty to the Sultans and who came from several nationalities. The purchase and payment of soldiers for professional forces such as this entailed great expenditure. Previously, armies of free citizens or tribesmen had usually been obliged to equip and feed themselves, and when the campaign for which they had been called out was over, they had returned to their peacetime vocations. The evolution in human society of armies from a feudal or tribal basis to a paid, professional basis has generally meant an increase in state expenditure. Fresh taxation and a more numerous administration to collect it have then been required, so that the power of the ruler and the state *vis-à-vis* the subjects has grown. This growth of state power can be seen amongst the Ghaznavids, but they were fortunate in the financial resources which they could tap, i.e. the rich provinces in the Iranian world over which they ruled and the plunder obtained from the Indian campaigns. A corollary of this was that the Sultans could pay their armies mainly in cash and did not, like the Būyids and Seljuqs, have to resort generally to a system of military feudalism and landgrants (see below, Ch. III, § 5).

In the second place, the immediate needs of finance for the Sultan's campaigns were great. Mounting an army for a campaign meant expenditure on the preliminary organisation of ancillary services, provisioning arrangements, the transportation of special equipment, etc. Maḥmūd's campaigns have been classified and carefully elucidated by Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 42-122; see also, Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 434-78 (the pioneer attempt at classification, much used by later authors), Sir Wolseley Haig in *Cambridge History of India*, III, *Turks and Afghans* (Cambridge 1928), Ch. 2, and M. Habib, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin*^{2} (Delhi 1951), 23-59. Those of Mas'ūd were less far-reaching, for the peak of expansion was reached by Maḥmūd's death, and Mas'ūd made no significant territorial additions to the empire left by his father. In the latter part of his reign, the fabric of the empire began to crack under the Turkmens' attacks, but even then, the liquidation of Ghaznavid assets in the west was an expensive business. The warfare between the less mobile professional forces of the Ghaznavids and the Turkmen skirmishers and raiders was often indecisive, yet swallowed up whole armies. There was no compensatory booty to be taken from these miserably-equipped nomads;

moreover, their ravages disrupted the economy of Khurasan and thereby cut down the flow of revenue to the Ghaznavid treasury.

In the third place, there was the luxurious court life and the heavy superstructure of the bureaucracy, which was not flexible enough to be cut back as the momentum of the empire ground to a standstill and then began to lose ground. The Sultans lived opulently, and habits of extravagance contracted in times of affluence cannot easily be curbed in times of ill fortune, when there is always the hope that prosperity is once more round the corner if only one can hold on long enough. The bureaucracy had grown in numbers and its work had become more complex as the empire had expanded. During Maḥmūd's reign, the officials of the bureaucracy acquired a corporate feeling of their own, and the machinery of state now went forward of its own weight, so that expenditure on it remained at a high level. At the opening of Mas'ūd's reign the monthly wage bill for the secretaries of the *Dīwān-i Risālat* alone came to 70,000 dirhams, and there were other, newly-recruited officials who were unpaid during their training period.[31]

We propose to look now at the sources of the revenue which fed the Ghaznavid treasuries and at the methods by which it was collected. It is only rarely that the historical sources give us glimpses of the tax-payers' point of view, for this class was often inarticulate; but there are enough indications to show that the burden of taxation was oppressive and that taxes were often collected brutally. It is hoped that a certain picture of the financial burdens on the long-suffering population will emerge from the following two sections of this chapter.

The sources of revenue will be examined under five headings:

1. Crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans
2. Escheats to the crown and confiscations
3. Tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, etc.
4. War plunder
5. Normal taxation, i.e. the *kharāj*, and extraordinary levies.

Of these five, the money involved in the first four usually came directly to the Sultan at his court, and passed immediately

through the machinery of such government departments as the *Dīwān-i Wazīr*, the *Dīwān-i Istīfā'* and the *Dīwān-i Wikālat*; they are examined in this present section. The fifth heading represents the Sultan's agents in direct touch with the people in the provinces, and will be dealt with separately in the following section.

Firstly, crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans. In the Islamic world at this time there was in practice little distinction with regard to the ultimate disposal of the monies a ruler had, i.e. there was no water-tight division between the Privy Purse and the Public Treasury. Certainly, within the Abbasid Caliphate there were two separate financial organs, the *Bait al-māl* and the *Bait māl al-khāṣṣa*, and in his survey of financial practice as it was in the last days of the Baghdad Caliphate, Nāṣir ad-Dīn Ṭūsī distinguishes very carefully between the *māl-i maṣāliḥ-i pādishāhī* and the *khaṣṣa*; but as Mez has pointed out in his survey of 10th century financial practice, the Caliph could draw on either of the two without having to account to anybody, and this was probably true for later times. Often, when the Public Treasury was exhausted, the Private one was used. This procedure resembles the one which Niẓām al-Mulk recommends: that the ruler should have a *khazīna-yi kharj* for everyday expenses and payments, and a *khazīna-yi aṣl* for capital deposits. The latter should only be tapped in emergencies, and money taken from it regarded as a loan therefrom.[32]

In the Ghaznavid state, there was some duality of organisation in that there was a *Dīwān-i Wikālat* which administered the crown lands and supervised the financial side of the running of the Royal Household.[33] However, its operations did not extend outside this limited sphere, and in this respect the Ghaznavid system was not so developed as that of the Abbasids. Under the Sultans, the *Dīwān-i Wazīr* was the premier financial department. It received and disbursed the monies, whilst its ancillary, the accounts office (*Dīwān-i Istīfā'*), registered the transactions in its ledgers and accounted for them. Income from the Sultans' private possessions, apart from that specifically expended on the Household, seems to have been utilised through the departments of the Vizier and *Mustaufī*.

It was the *Wakīl-i khāṣṣ* who administered the personal estates of the Ghaznavid family as a whole, but particular groups of properties might be granted out to subordinates.

One Bū Sa'īd-i Sahl, an old retainer of Maḥmūd's brother Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naṣr, held the overseership of the crown lands at Ghazna until he further acquired the *Dīwān-i Ghaznī*, thereafter combining the two functions. It seems from this citation that the *Dīwān-i Ghaznī* was the local administrative office there, permanently located in the capital, whereas the chief *dīwāns* of state were peregrinatory and accompanied the Sultan on his campaigns and progresses; the supervision of the Ghazna estates would, of course, require the overseer to be permanently resident there.[34] The royal family's lands were especially concentrated in the Ghazna area, where the *iqṭā's* originally granted to Sebüktigin formed their nucleus (see above, pp. 41-2). But they had many other lucrative properties, estates and markets scattered all over the empire (see below, Ch. IV, § 4). It is likely that the Ghaznavids succeeded to ownership of the former Sāmānid crown lands in Khurasan, which, towards the end of the latter dynasty's rule, had been appropriated by the Sīmjūrīs.[35] For the Ghaznavid family *auqāf* there was a special intendant or *katkhudā*. As well as lands and properties, the Sultans' private possessions also included herds of horses, sheep, camels, cattle and buffaloes, whose tending required numerous herdsmen and attendants. It was the practice in the spring of each year to put the royal horses to graze in lush meadows, whilst the camels were sent to the rich pastures at Ribāṭ-i Karwān, on the borders of Gūzgān and Ghūr (see *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 73, 106-7, 336). During his father's lifetime, Mas'ūd had his own flocks of sheep at Herat, where he was governor. Their numbers may be gauged from the fact that soon after his accession, Mas'ūd was able to bestow 16,000 sheep from his personal flocks on someone whose faithful service had pleased him. There were appreciable opportunities for personal profit for the custodians of these flocks. When after his fifteen years' oversight of the Ghazna flocks, the accounts of the Bū Sa'īd-i Sahl mentioned above were investigated, it was found that in this period he had made seventeen million dirhams pure profit (*ḥāṣil-i maḥḍ*), even though his personal allowance (*tankhwāh*) was only one million per annum.[36] Lastly, the Sultans' private possessions included their own treasure hoard, and this normally accompanied them in their journeyings. It came from such sources as paternal inheritance, personal savings and confiscations among the royal family. Mas'ūd

was very careful to see that the treasure of his deposed brother Muḥammad came safely into his own hands; in this case, the appearance of legality was preserved by Muḥammad's writing out a formal bond for the transfer of the money to his brother.[37]

Secondly, escheats to the crown and confiscations. The Sultan was *ultimus haeres* to those whose heirs could not be found, to those who were his personal slaves and to his eunuchs. We do not know whether the Ghaznavid administration had a special term for these escheats; Nāṣir ad-Dīn Ṭūsī includes them under the heading of *ṭayyārāt*, 'casual items of revenue'.[38] From the property and possessions thus gained, the Sultan often distributed movables and personal slaves among the royal family and granted out estates and military slaves to other commanders. When the Sultan freed any of his slaves, these freedmen still remained tied to their manumitter, according to the latter's right of *walā'*, and the Sultan was heir to their property. It was normal on the death of a high official that his accounts and personal affairs should be investigated by one of the Sultan's officials. When Baihaqī's master in the *Dīwān-i Risālat*, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, died in 431/1039, it was the Sultan, and not Abū Naṣr's children, who took over the only possessions he left, his personal slaves and herds of beasts.[39] The solution of this rather puzzling episode must be that these slaves and herds had been granted to Abū Naṣr as emoluments of his office, to be held during his lifetime, so that they reverted to the Sultan at his death.

The office of Vizier was traditionally a precarious one. The Vizier's far-reaching control over affairs and the sources of profit open to him often aroused the ruler's jealousy over encroachments on his own sovereign power and his cupidity at the Vizier's personal gains. Similar temptations and dangers beset other high officials, and many aphorisms were current in the Islamic world which contrasted the perils of office with the joys of a life free from responsibility. Hence men who thought the joys of position and power a poor exchange for the dangers inherent in high rank, refused offices like the Vizierate.[40] In the *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 94a, Maḥmūd asserts that Viziers are necessarily the enemies of kings, and his Chief Secretary agrees that the Vizier inevitably shares in his master's power, so that his interference becomes resented; therefore only the stupid and foolish seek to be Viziers.

The Abbasids had brought to a fine art the practice of *muṣādara*, the process by which officials retiring from their posts were made to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, and had set up a special department for this, the *Dīwān al-Muṣādara*. In their greed for money, the Ghaznavids in no way fell behind the Caliphs, although they lacked the refinements of torture which the *muṣādirūn* of Baghdad had developed over the years.[41] Even so, the Ghaznavid *mustakhrij* 'extractor of information, one who ferrets out hidden wealth '(he is the equivalent of the Abbasid *muṭālib* or *munāẓir*) had at his disposal the rods, the lash and the rack, and behind him stood the executioner as ultimate compeller. When Maḥmūd's Vizier Maimandī was being divested of his wealth, one of his bitterest enemies was specially brought from Sarakhs in northern Khurasan to Ghazna and Gardīz to act as *mustakhrij*.[42]

Of the six men who acted as chief minister during the reigns of Maḥmūd, Muḥammad and Mas'ūd, three were dismissed and died violently and another of them suffered disgrace and prolonged imprisonment. Isfarā'inī acted as Maḥmūd's Vizier for ten years, extorting large sums for his master from the luckless subjects. Yet the Sultan's avarice was unquenchable, and when the Vizier could squeeze the people of Herat no further and he refused to make up from his own pocket the deficiency in the revenue demanded, Maḥmūd tortured him to death.[43] The next Vizier, Abū'l-Qāsim Aḥmad b. Ḥasan Maimandī, called because of his outstandingness, *Shams al-Kufāt*, eventually fell from favour, suffered various torments and confiscations, escaped death very narrowly and was imprisoned in India. He nevertheless survived the Sultan and died a peaceful and honoured death in the service of his son Mas'ūd.[44] Maḥmūd's last Vizier, Abū 'Alī Ḥasan b. Muḥammad, called Ḥasanak, was executed by Mas'ūd shortly after his accession after he had 'voluntarily' sold all his possessions to the Sultan; in this way, an appearance of legality was preserved (see further, below, pp. 182-4).[45] Surprisingly, the man who acted as Vizier to Muḥammad during his short Sultanate, Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī or Ḥamdūnī, escaped Mas'ūd's vengeance and was honoured with further important offices.[46] Mas'ūd's first chief minister (it is not clear whether he was ever formally invested with the Vizierate) was Abū Sahl Zauzanī; he was moved to another office and was later dismissed under a cloud (see above, pp. 60-1). Mas'ūd

then brought out Maimandī from his imprisonment and made him his Vizier until the latter died in 424/beginning of 1033. The new Vizier, Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad, remained in office till Maudūd's reign, but after two years of service to the new Sultan, his enemies at court procured his downfall and he was jailed, dying of ill-treatment.[47] Other high officials were liable to suffer *muṣādara* on relinquishing any office which could have given opportunities for private gain, and they frequently suffered rough handling in the process. The rough treatment which Maḥmūd's former treasurer, Aḥmad Inaltigin, suffered on giving up that office is said to have been a contributory cause of his later rebellion in India.[48]

It was the Vizier who was ultimately responsible for safe collection of the taxes. Consequently, he kept as close a watch as was possible, by means of the *Barīd* system, over the collectors, *'ummāl*, and the forwarding of the sum assessed for each collector's district was strictly required. If the sum fell short, either the *'āmil* had to make up the sum from his own pocket or else the money which he was withholding was wrung from him by force. It was Isfarā'inī's reluctance or inability to make up the sum demanded by the Maḥmūd which led to his downfall. In one of his poems, Farrukhī describes what must have been a common occurrence:

> Tomorrow when he [sc. the Vizier] demands an account from the Sultan's *'āmils*, their extortions will become manifest.
> The money which they have embezzled, he will recover from them to the last *dāng*, and will send them to prison.[49]

It was because of considerations like these that Maimandī, when he became Vizier for the second time, insisted in his contract or *muwāḍa'a* with Mas'ūd that the traditional practice in the appointment of the deputies of the *Ṣāḥib-Barīds* and *Mushrifs* should continue to be observed. Whereas the Sultan personally appointed the chief officers in these police and espionage services, the Vizier had the right to appoint their deputies. The relevant clause of the contract explains that the Vizier must be sure of the subordinate officials' probity and must be able to prevent any collusion between them and the *'āmils* in the provinces; otherwise, there will arise irregularities in the collection of taxes and officials will take from the taxes a

greater share than their monthly salary (*mushāhara*) allows.[50] The recalcitrant or deceitful *'āmil* could expect at the least the bastinado, and if he still held out, the rack or mutilation of the hands and feet. If execution had to be resorted to, trampling by elephants was one of the methods used. Maimandī's father had been *nā'ib* and *'āmil* of Bust, but because of his defalcations and confiscations of property, he had been denounced to Sebüktigin and crucified on a tree. A further method of control over *'āmils* was to take hostages from their families. In Maḥmūd's reign, the *'āmil* of Sīstān, Muḥammad-i Bā Ḥafṣ, had to send one of his four sons in turn to Ghazna each year, where they were kept as sureties for his honest behaviour.[51]

Finally, in this section on escheats and confiscations, we may note the extraordinary act of expropriation planned by Mas'ūd when he tried to get back the *māl-i bai'at* which his brother Muḥammad had paid out (see above, p. 60), and a lesser but more constant stream of income from pecuniary mulcts and fines for ordinary criminal offences.[52]

Thirdly, tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, etc. We have seen above that Maḥmūd expanded his empire by annexing territories outright, wherever possible. In other cases it was not possible to bring territories under direct rule, but the local rulers were made to recognise the suzerainty of Ghazna. In India, for instance, it would have needed immense forces in closely-spaced garrisons to have held down the native princes. The Caspian provinces, where the Ziyārid dynasty ruled as tributaries of the Ghaznavids, were too damp and unhealthy for troops accustomed to the bracing plateaux of Khurasan and Afghanistan to endure for long. Sometimes it was strategically expedient to leave local rulers in possession; those of the trans-Oxus principalities of Khuttal and Chaghāniyān were left to hold their provinces as buffers against the Qarakhanids, Kumējīs and other marauders from Central Asia (see below, pp. 236-7, 239). Above all, there was the simple factor of distance: it was administratively impossible for the central bureaucracy to keep a regular control over such distant regions as western Persia or Khwārizm. In the outlying areas ruled by tributary princes, the Sultan had to be content with the precedence of his own name after that of the Abbasid Caliph in the local *minbars*, the occasional requiring of troop contingents for his armies and the exaction of an annual tribute. This is

called in contemporary sources *māl-i ḍamān* or *māl-i muwāḍaʿa*, 'tribute stipulated according to a covenant or agreement'.

Maḥmūd's conquests in western and central Persia in the last year of his life brought him into contact with the Būyids and with several minor Dailamī and Kurdish dynasties. He forced the Musāfirids or Kangarids of Ṭārom and Dailam and the Rawwādids of Azerbaijan to pay tribute for a time, but this north-western region of Persia did not remain subject to the Ghaznavids for long. A Dailamī rebellion at Qazwīn and Qum was suppressed in 424/1033, but the maintenance of Ghaznavid influence here was hampered by the great distance from the centre of the empire and by Turkmen pressure on the line of communication through northern Persia.[53] A further result of Maḥmūd's Ray expedition was the overawing of the Kākūyids of Iṣfahān. The Kākūyids were a Dailamī dynasty who, although they falsely claimed descent from the Bāwandid Ispahbads of Ṭabaristān, began as obscure local chiefs and rose to power under Būyid patronage.[54] However, the founder of the dynasty's son, ʿAlā' ad-Daula Muḥammad b. Dushmanziyār, known as Ibn Kākūya (reigned 398-433/1008-42), cannot be classed as just another barbarian chief from the backward Caspian highlands. The possession of such rich towns as Iṣfahān, Hamadān, Dīnawar and Shāpūr-Khwāst gave him the finance to buy Turkish mercenaries and to make himself a power in central Persia. His court was a flourishing centre of learning and culture, and Ibn Sīnā eventually found refuge there from Ghaznavid pursuit, acting as ʿAlā' ad-Daula's Vizier till his death in 428/1037. Masʿūd always regarded 'Pisar-i Kākū', as he appears in Baihaqī, as a powerful and dangerous opponent. At the outset of his reign, he had to content himself with exacting tribute from ʿAlā' ad-Daula; on the Caliph's intercession, the latter promised to pay each year 20,000 dinars and 10,000 pieces of cloth from the local workshops, besides sending the usual Naurūz and Mihrgān presents. But in the succeeding years, Ghaznavid armies had frequently to be sent against him, and the tribute remained generally in arrears (see further, below, pp. 234-5).[55]

The Ghaznavids had especially close relations with the Dailamī Ziyārids of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān. In the second half of the 10th century, the Amīrs Wushmagīr and Shams al-Maʿālī Qābūs had been an important force in the struggles for power

in Ray and Khurasan between the Sāmānids and Būyids. In the next century, the Ziyārids lost an appreciable part of their independence of action, and tended to fall under Ghaznavid influence. Qābūs's son Falak al-Ma'ālī Manūchihr (403-20/1012 or 1013-29) married one of Maḥmūd's daughters, but derived no special privileges from this relationship. The Sultan's financial demands on him were exorbitant and continuous. He had to buy off Maḥmūd's support of a rival to his succession, his own brother Dārā, by an annual tribute of 50,000 dinars. Shortly afterwards, in 404/1013-14, Maḥmūd marched against Nārdīn in India, and Manūchihr had to send a contingent of Dailamī troops. When the Sultan marched westwards to Ray, he was compelled to give a subvention of 400,000 dinars and supply provisions to the Ghaznavid army. Manūchihr then feared that the Sultan might direct this army against his own kingdom, and he assumed a hostile attitude; for this, he had to pay a further 500,000 dinars. On his death a few months later, his son Anūshirwān had to pay another levy of 500,000 dinars in order to secure recognition from Ghazna.[56] For much of Mas'ūd's reign, however, the holder of effective power in Gurgān and Ṭabaristān was one Abū Kālījār, a man whose antecedents are extremely obscure; he was Anūshirwān's uncle and probably one of the Bāwandid family, who were western neighbours of the Ziyārids. The Sultan tried to attach Abū Kālījār to himself by a marriage alliance, but was nevertheless most careful that the *māl-i ḍamān* should still be forwarded to the provincial *dīwān* at Nishapur. Despite these precautions, by 426/1035 Abū Kālījār was two years behind with his tribute, and this was one of the reasons behind the Sultan's decision then to undertake a punitive expedition to the Caspian shores (see further, below, pp. 90-1).[57]

In dealing with India, it is not easy to distinguish regular tribute payments by the Indian princes from plunder brought back by expeditions. Since for most of the early Ghaznavid period there was no special *dīwān* or permanent civil administration in northern India, income came in irregularly. Military force was often the only means of collecting tribute. Its payment was usually stipulated in the peace treaties between the Sultan and the princes. Sometimes part of it was payable in elephants instead of cash. Thus at some time after 399/1009, the Rājā of Narāyanpūr (in modern Alwar state) made peace on the basis

of an annual tribute, which included 50 elephants, and he promised to send a contingent of men for the Ghaznavid army. After the winter campaign of 413/1022-3, Ganda, the Rājā of Kālinjār (near the modern Allahabad), promised a spot payment of 300 elephants and an annual tribute.[58] The city of Multan had been since the Arab invasions of Sind in the 7th century an outpost of Islam in India, but during the course of the 10th century it had been won over by Ismā'īlī *dā'īs*. Maḥmūd captured Multan in 395/1005-6, and the inhabitants are said to have been forced to pay a fine of twenty million dirhams to keep the city from being sacked.[59] Multan remained quiet for over thirty years, and it is probable that the Sultans were able to collect regular tribute from it, since it lay closer to Ghazna than did much of northern India. One valuable commodity taken from India as tribute was the dyestuff indigo (*nīl*). The Sultans often reserved part of this for their own usage, and often sent it as part of presents for the Caliph or for other rulers.[60]

Towards the end of his reign, Maḥmūd tried to establish a more permanent form of control over the Panjab, with a division of responsibility there. The military command remained in the hands of Turkish ghulām generals, based on Lahore, centre of the Muslim ghāzīs in India; but at their side was set up a civil administration under a Persian official, the Qāḍī Bū'l-Ḥasan Shīrāzī, of whom the Sultan thought so highly that he had considered him for the Vizierate. A *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* was deputed to watch over both the civil and military heads. The intended division of functions is clearly laid down in the instructions sent out early in Mas'ūd's reign from Ghazna to the Qāḍī: 'Your job is management of the finances there (*katkhudā'ī mālī*) and you have nothing to do with the military command or the army. [The new Commander-in-Chief] Aḥmad [Inaltigin] will himself carry out the duties required of him; he will exact the stipulated taxation and tribute from the native princes (*mālhā-yi takkurān basitānad az kharāj u muwāḍa'at*) and then go out on plunder raids and bring back large sums to the treasury.' It seems that this was an attempt to set up a civil administration in the Panjab with a regular system of taxation, as was the normal arrangement in the heartlands of the Ghaznavid empire. In the event, northern India was not pacified enough for this scheme to work, nor were there adequate means of controlling officials there. Personal animosity poisoned the relations of the

Qāḍī Shīrāzī and Aḥmad Inaltigin, for they were unable to agree about the demarcation of their respective spheres. In the time of the previous Commander-in-Chief, the Qāḍī had gone round in military dress and had claimed to give orders to him; but Aḥmad Inaltigin had the backing of the Vizier Maimandī in Ghazna and, above all, of the troops and ghāzīs of Lahore. He used these forces and the money which he had kept back from the princes' tribute and from the plunder of his raid on Benares, to rebel against the Sultan in 424/1033. The rebellion was suppressed, but northern India remained in a turbulent state, and the experiment of dual administration seems to have been dropped.[61]

Provincial governors and tributary rulers brought presents to the Sultan's court on the traditional Iranian festivals of Naurūz in the spring and Mihrgān in the autumn, and in return, the Sultan dispensed hospitality on a munificent scale. At the Mihrgān celebrations of 422/1031, presents were received from the civil governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, from the Khwārizm-shāh Altuntash, from the Amīrs of Chaghāniyān and Gurgān, from the governors (*wulāt*) of Quṣdār and Makrān, etc. On another occasion, the ruler of Chaghāniyān brought to Masʿūd specialities of his country—powerfully-built horses, Turkish slaves, hawks, panthers for hunting, etc. Diplomatic relations with outside powers like the Caliphate or the Qarakhanids, with whom the Sultans had to treat on an equal footing, normally entailed the exchange of presents. Those exchanged in 416/1025 between Maḥmūd and Qadïr Khan Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan were especially luxurious; they are described in detail by Gardīzī. Many of the fresh Turkish slaves for the Ghaznavid armies came in the form of tribute or presents from the Turkish lands to the north (see below, p. 101). At the local level, the Sultans benefited from presents given by their subjects; it was the annual custom of one rich landowner of Ghazna to present the Sultan with pickles, savouries, dried meats and fine clothes.[62]

Fourthly, war plunder. The rich spoils of regions like the northern Indian plain and western Persia were an important factor in making the Ghaznavid empire the most dynamic power known in eastern Islam since the Arab conquests. The Ghaznavids' professional army was a salaried one that had to be kept permanently in existence and could not be stood down

between campaigns. In paying it, the regular income from taxation was most important, but it was also supplemented by the spoils of war. Moreover, specific articles like weapons, valuables or slaves could be divided up amongst the soldiers in addition to their regular pay. Hopes of booty and religious zeal made ghāzīs flock to the Sultans' standards from all parts of eastern Islam; these irregulars did not qualify for regular pay, but could rely on rich pickings from the Indian campaigns. The ghāzīs also performed much of the work of garrisoning Lahore and other Ghaznavid strong points in India (see below, p. 114).

It is unnecessary to cite more than two or three sets of figures to show the extent of the booty falling to the Ghaznavid armies; despite the penchant of Muslim historians for round numbers and their tendency to exaggerate, its great size is apparent. From the temple in the fort of Nagarkot in the upper Indus valley, Maḥmūd is alleged to have taken in 399/1008-9 seventy million dirhams in coined money, 70,000 *mans* of gold and silver ingots and rich clothing, a folding house made of silver and a richly-decorated throne. From the temple of Somnath, he is said to have got over twenty million dinars' worth of spoil. When Ray was captured, the army carried off about 500,000 dinars' worth of jewels, 260,000 dinars in coined money, over 30,000 dinars' worth of gold and silver vessels, 5300 garments, suits of woven and regal (? *khusrawānī*) clothes valued at 20,000 dinars and fifty loads of books, excluding those of the Muʿtazila, philosophers and Shīʿa, which were burnt forthwith.[63]

Part of the bullion and precious stones taken from the temple treasures of India was converted into negotiable form by skilled valuers and assayers (*nuqqād*) at Ghazna. Another part of it was used for ornamenting and enriching the Sultans' palaces and their furnishings, in which precious metals and jewels were lavishly used (see below, pp. 135-6, 140). A further part of it was given away as gifts, *ṣilāt*, for the Sultans' favourites, courtiers, poets, etc. To the pious, wealth brought back from pagan India was *mal-i ḥalāl*, lawfully gained from the idolaters, whereas money taken from taxpaying Muslim subjects had almost certainly the taint of violence and oppression on it.

Perhaps the most important use of all for the bullion was for minting purposes. As might be expected, the Ghaznavids' gold coinage maintained a high standard. Their early dinars,

modelled on those minted at Nishapur by Maḥmūd when he was governor there, were probably of an average of 65-66 grains, but a considerable number of specimens are known which reach 76 or 77 grains.[64] We have seen above that the silver coinage of the early Ghaznavids seems to be of a higher standard than that of the Sāmānids. There are extant dirhams of Maḥmūd, Muḥammad and Mas'ūd (in all cases with mint and date illegible) with weights as high as 60, 64 and 66 grains, and one large silver coin from Maḥmūd (? Nishapur, 399/1008-9) of 76 grains.[65] Having such a strong backing of bullion in their treasuries, the Ghaznavids could have issued a trustworthy copper currency; in practice there seems to have been so much silver available for minting that copper currency was not widely used. The exception was that in the Panjab a mixed silver-copper currency continued to be minted on the old Hindu models.[66] There are some signs of a decline in the quality of the silver coinage in the second half of the 11th century, although there are some heavy gold coins of Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd extant, and there are some heavy silver coins known from the reigns of Bahrāmshāh and Khusrau Malik in the next century.[67] The high standard of the coinage in the reigns of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd facilitated trade between the Islamic east and India and across the Ghaznavid empire. Whereas for centuries India had swallowed up precious metals, both from the mineral resources of Tibet and Central Asia and from trade with the Islamic world, this process was now for a time halted and the terms of trade reversed to favour the lands to the west and north-west of India. The flow of bullion stimulated trade and industry within eastern Islam; it was in part because of this that provinces like Khurasan and Transoxania, though racked by warfare and other disturbances, remained remarkably prosperous in the 11th century. Finally, the Indian campaigns yielded large numbers of slaves and the influx of cheap slave labour into Ghazna and its economic hinterland attracted slave traders and further stimulated trade (see below, p. 102).

4 *The financial system in the provinces*

We pass now to consider the *fifth* heading, normal taxation, mainly comprising the *kharāj*, and extraordinary levies. The tax on land and agricultural produce, the *kharāj*, was regularly

levied in those parts of the Ghaznavid empire under direct rule, and for its collection, the agents of the Sultans came into direct contact with the people. There was probably also a multiplicity of minor local taxes and tolls, such as those on food (*as'ār*), about which we are very ill-informed. In addition to this regular taxation, the appearance of the Sultan and his army in a part of the empire where there had been some unrest or some delay in paying the taxes, usually meant the imposition of irregular levies and exactions (generically termed *'awāriḍ* in the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm* of al-Khwārizmī) as a punitive measure. But even without these extraordinary impositions, there is evidence enough to show that the Ghaznavid fiscal machinery bore heavily enough on the population.

There are two preliminary points to note here about the relationship between the tax-collectors and the tax-payers.

The first concerns the harshness of the tax-collector (Arabic *'āmil*, pl. *'ummāl*, Persian *bundār*; the latter term may be taken from pre-Islamic Persian terminology, cf. Bahār in *TS*, 303 n. 2) towards the people. Whilst many of them regarded their tenure of office as an opportunity for lining their own pockets, it is clear that others were forced into oppressive measures by the relentless pressure of the Sultan, for he showed no mercy towards *'āmils* whose quotas fell short of the stipulated amounts. The life of a tax-collector could never be a happy one. Some verses of one Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain al-Qummī, who had been an *'āmil* at Nishapur, express well the trials and tribulations of these officials:

> I see that the *'ummāl* of Nishapur are condemned to perpetual ill-fortune;
>
> He who acts as an *'āmil* there for a single day ends up with two months in jail.
>
> Even the most wealthy people get beaten with ropes there![68]

The problem of exacting arrears of taxation (*baqāyā:* but al-Khwārizmī, *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 60, seems to differentiate between *al-baqāyā* = the sum which has not yet been collected and which the subjects still have to pay, and *al-bāqī* = the arrears of taxation from previous years) must have been a fearful one for *'āmils* conscious of the Sultan's wrath towards his unprofitable servants. In these circumstances, the *'āmil* had to press the subjects, however unseasonable the time:

> May God bless each day the secretaries of the *Dīwān al-Kharāj*!
> They ask for the arrears (*al-baqāyā*) at a time when we haven't got enough money to pay the current taxation demanded (*māl ar-rawāj*)![69]

The second point concerns the attitude of the subjects themselves towards their masters and towards authority in general. Gibb and Bowen have commented on this in regard to the Arab world in the 18th century, but their judgement has validity for other regions and periods in Islamic history:

> The conception of authority implied in the minds of the subjects themselves an assertion of power accompanied by a certain measure of harshness and violence.... The prevalence of such a conception of authority may, at first sight, be put to the account of long centuries of misrule and oppression, supplemented by the tradition of quietism which was inculcated by the religious authorities and by an acquired habit of stoicism, passing into fatalism. But this explanation by no means covers all the facts. It seems rather to be a development of the basic idea that authority confers privilege. . . . Yet public opinion recognised certain limits to tyranny and exploitation. One may even speak of 'permissible extortions' or 'recognised abuses' as we shall see later, in the sense that they had become traditional usages.[70]

Equitable treatment of the tax-payers is advised in the 'Mirrors for Princes' as being both morally just and practically expedient, an indication that in actual practice exploitation often went too far. Niẓām al-Mulk warns against pressing the peasants too harshly and against demanding taxes before the harvest is ready, so that peasants are driven into debt or have to sell their possessions to find the money. Such a policy, he says, drives peasants away from the land and into foreign parts. The number of technical terms explained in his section on *kitāba* by al-Khwārizmī which relate to the arrears of taxation, the inability to exact this money or to find the defaulting tax-payers, and the writing-off of this uncollected taxation, shows that failure to get the money was frequent and that peasants often did abscond.[71] Flight to the city or to another province gave the peasant an ultimate weapon if conditions grew intoler-

able. Before the Great Seljuq period, Khurasan and the east were less familiar with the system of fiefs or *iqṭā's* as developed in western Persia, Iraq, al-Jazīra and Syria by the Būyids and Ḥamdānids, and the peasants there were *adscripti glebae* to a much less extent.[72] In the decade 1030-40 the people of Khurasan were still being heavily taxed by the Ghaznavids, but were not receiving proper protection against the Turkmen raiders. Hence peasants fled to the comparative safety of the towns, rural depopulation took place and there was a catastrophic fall in land values (see below, pp. 260-1). Another not uncommon reaction of exasperated peasants was to break out in jacqueries against the authorities; in the course of these, *'āmils* might be murdered and tax-registers destroyed.[73]

The *kharāj* was collected by the *'amils* who brought in their yields to the provincial *Dīwāns*, where their accounts were audited. We can piece together something about the process of assessment from the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*. The information here relates to Sāmānid practice in Transoxania and Khurasan in the second half of the 10th century, but in the absence of any similar, specific information on Ghaznavid practice, we may tentatively assume that similar arrangements prevailed, at least in Khurasan, under the Ghaznavids. The amount sought by the *'āmils* was based either on a valuation before harvesting (*takhmīn*, from an Arabic denominative verb apparently based on Persian *gumān* 'conjecture, doubt') of the growing crops, or else on previously prepared registers, where the figure was computed on an average (*'ibra*) of the yield of the land in question over a period of years.[74] The timing of tax collecting must have presented considerable problems, for the different crops on which taxation in cash or kind was to be levied ripened or could be sold at different times of the year. Storage facilities at the provincial *Dīwāns* were not always adequate, and the collected revenues, in cash or kind, were often temporarily stored in local strongholds and castles; when the Turkmens were threatening Nishapur in 429/1038, the cash part of the revenues of Nishapur and other light and transportable items were removed for safety to a castle belonging to the Mīkālī family on the Nishapur-Sīstān road. The taxes collected in kind comprised the obvious cereal and vegetable crops and domestic beasts, but the sources also mention such products as cotton, oak-galls, pomegranate husks, eggs and straw being taken.[75] In

these cases, either the *'āmil* converted them into cash locally (obviously necessary where the product was perishable) or else the professional valuers in the *Dīwān* at Ghazna appraised them and produced a cash equivalent. The crops and similar products were then placed in the royal granaries or storehouses, whilst beasts were kept in special enclosures or added to the Sultans' personal flocks.

It was the usual practice for tax-collectors and financial officials in the provinces to subtract their own salary from the taxation collected and then to send the balance to the provincial or central *Dīwān* (cf. the clause in Maimandī's *muwāḍa'a*, above, p. 62, which provided against collusion by *'āmils* and officials to take more than their salary allowed). However, in an anecdote in the *Siyāsat-nāma*, the Vizier Maimandī demands that all the revenues from Khwārizm should be sent to the central *Dīwān* at Ghazna, where the gold can be assayed and weighed and the revenues accounted for. Only after this is the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash to be given his allowance for the expenses of himself, his troops and his administration. The date of this incident is 409/1018, one year after Altuntash's appointment as governor of Khwārizm, and this is significant. Khwārizm had only been annexed the previous year, and the central administration had no idea how much this remote province was yielding. Lest Altuntash take advantage of this lack of knowledge and divert an unknown proportion of the taxes to his own pocket, the Vizier was endeavouring at the outset to obtain an accurate picture of the fiscal yield of Khwārizm. Where the revenues of one region were insufficient to maintain the army and administration required there, supplementary assignments might be made on the revenues of another province. This same anecdote of the *Siyāsat-nāma* also says that the estimated revenue (*'ibra*) of Khwārizm was 60,000 dinars, whereas Altuntash's allowance (*jāmagī*) was 120,000 dinars. As we have just seen, Altuntash wanted to keep back the revenues of his province as part of this allowance; presumably he would then seek the other 60,000 dinars from the central *Dīwān*. But Maimandī insisted on receiving all the revenues of Khwārizm, after which he assigned to Altuntash the whole 120,000 dinars from the revenues of Sīstān and Bust. When Altuntash was issued with authorisations (*barāts*) from the *Dīwān*, his agents had to go to Sīstān and collect the money.[76] This aspect of the story is very reminiscent

of the well-known incident in which Niẓām al-Mulk is said to have paid the boatmen who ferried Malikshāh's army across the Oxus into Transoxania in 471/1078-9 with drafts on Antioch, and one wonders whether there is not some connection between the two accounts.

Collection of the revenues by local *'āmils* under the direction of the *'Amīd* or civil governor applied to those provinces under regular civil government, such as Zābulistān, Sīstān, Ṭukhāristān, Khurasan and, for a brief period, Ray and Jibāl. In a less pacified area like northern India, where a civil administration did not normally function (see above, pp. 75-7), the military collected such taxation as it was possible to collect. Since the collecting methods of the army were more violent than those of the civilian *'āmils*, the Sultan occasionally resorted to the issue of *barāts*, assignments of revenue to be collected personally by the troops in lieu of salaries paid by the *Dīwān*, as a punitive measure in the lands of settled government. Mas'ūd did this at Āmul in Gurgān in 426/1035 (see below), and four years later against the people of Herat and the surrounding regions of Bādghīs and Ganj Rustāq, on the pretext that they had been helping the Turkmen invaders (see below, p. 266).[77]

The Persian provinces of Khurasan, and after 430/1029 of Ray and Jibāl, were distant from Ghazna and were governed from local *Dīwāns* at Nishapur and Ray respectively. Each was presided over by a civilian *'Amīd*, who was a Persian secretary, and at his side was the commander of the army of the province, usually a Turkish ghulām general. The civilian and military heads were equal in status and independent of each other, although they had naturally to work in co-operation. Liaison had to be particularly close in Khurasan during Mas'ūd's reign when military forces were operating there almost continuously against the Turkmens. Along the projected routes of the Sultan's armies, the *'Amīd* of Khurasan, Sūrī, and the local *ru'asā'* and *'ummāl* were required to prepare provisions and fodder.[78] Taxation collected in kind was used for eventualities like this; not all of it was forwarded to Ghazna, but part of it was laid up in local warehouses, ribāṭs and castles for the army to draw upon. The *Siyāsat-nāma* recommends the general adoption of this system: since requisitions on the peasantry by passing armies are both unlawful and impolitic, the ruler should have storehouses, filled up by local officials, in each

village or ribāṭ. Dumps of provisions and stores such as these were further used in Ghaznavid Khurasan in times of natural disaster such as famine, when food and seeds were dispensed from them.[79]

Maḥmūd had handed over the governorship of Ray, Jibāl and the west to Mas'ūd. On his father's death, Mas'ūd had to march eastwards and claim the throne, so it was necessary to leave there a strong army and administration for fear of a revanche by the Būyids or an attack by Ibn Kākūya of Iṣfahān. The city of Ray was a great prize; its industrial production and its commercial position along the highway connecting Iraq with Khurasan and Transoxania made it the richest city of northern Persia. In 422/1031 the Sultan sent a ghulām general, Tash-Farrāsh, to Ray. A force of ghulāms and Turkmen auxiliaries were to accompany him, and these were to be provisioned and paid in the first place by the *Dīwān* in Nishapur. Eight months later a secretary, Abū Ṭayyib Ṭāhir, was sent to take charge of civil affairs, but only with the designation of *katkhudā* to Tash-Farrāsh, i.e. in a subordinate status to the military arm. A treasurer and a *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* were also sent out. This arrangement lasted till the beginning of 424/1033, but was not satisfactory, so Muḥammad's old Vizier, Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī, was sent out as civil governor with full powers and with the title *ash-Shaikh al-'Amīd*, and a completely-equipped civil *Dīwān* was set up in Ray.[80]

But Ghaznavid rule in Ray was now approaching its term. During their few years there, the Ghaznavids failed to retain local support. At the outset, their entry into Ray had been welcomed by some sections of the population, exasperated by the turbulence and excesses of the undisciplined Dailamī troops of Majd ad-Daula and his mother Sayyida. Mas'ūd made an initial effort to win over the notables by giving robes of honour to prominent personages like the *Qāḍī*, the *Ra'īs*, the *Khaṭīb*, the *Naqīb* of the 'Alids and the Sālār of the Ghāzīs, and they in their turn expressed gratitude at deliverance from 'the oppression and tyranny of the *Qarāmiṭa* [sc. the Shī'ī Dailamīs]'. This fund of goodwill was based on the hope of firm, just government from the Ghaznavids, and shortly afterwards, when an attempt to regain Ray was made by Abū Kālījār Fanā Khusrau b. Majd ad-Daula, the local people turned out in force with their own arms to help the Ghaznavids defend the city. Unfortunately for

the Rāzīs, their new masters turned out to be as intolerable as the old. Financial demands caused a revulsion of feeling. On arriving in Ray, Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī had to abolish the levies and illegal exactions (*al-aqsāṭ wa'l-muṣādarāt*) which Tash-Farrāsh and Ṭāhir had imposed and which had reached such a pitch that many Rāzīs had fled the city: 'Tash-Farrāsh had filled the land with injustice and tyranny, until the people prayed for deliverance from them and their rule [sc. of the Ghaznavids]. The land became ruined and the population dispersed.'[81]

Likewise, financial exploitation was the root of the Ghaznavids' inability to secure the loyalty of the people of Khurasan for their rule there. Although governors and officials were to some extent active in the public works and charities which were expected of men in their position—the good works in Nishapur of Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naṣr are particularly praised by 'Utbī[82]—the Sultans regarded Khurasan and its rich resources as a milch-cow. Furthermore, it was distant from Ghazna, and there was always a strong counter-pull from the direction of India. In their comparative lack of concern for the well-being and defence of Khurasan, the Ghaznavids differed from earlier Persian rulers of the region, such as the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids, who had identified themselves more fully with its interests.

In the first part of Maḥmūd's Sultanate, Khurasan suffered much from the financial policies of the Vizier Isfarā'inī, although, as we have seen, he was always being driven on by the insistent demands of his master for more money. Of the Vizier's *Raubwirtschaft* policy 'Utbī records that he extracted continuously and put nothing back: '[Affairs in Khurasan] were characterised by nothing but tax-levies, sucking dry (*istidrār*) and the lust for increased revenue, without any constructive measures (*isti'mār*)'. After some years of this, there was nothing to be got, 'since in Khurasan, after water had been thrown on her udders, not a trickle of milk could be extracted, nor any traces of fat'. Land went out of cultivation, peasants fled and the '*āmils* were unable to collect the required amount of taxation. During the Ilig Naṣr's invasion of Khurasan in 396/1006, Nishapur remained quite passive, and a large group amongst the notables of the province openly supported the Qarakhanids.[83] Natural disaster added to the ravages of tramp-

ling armies and tax-collectors. Earthquakes occurred periodically. Khurasan was badly hit by the famine of 401/1011, when the corn failed to ripen because of early frosts and people were in the end reduced to cannibalism. Pestilence followed and spread all over Persia; at Ḥulwān in the west, the Kurdish ruler Abū'l-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. 'Annāz died of it.[84]

When Isfarā'inī was arrested and jailed, Maḥmūd appointed Maimandī, then heading the Department of the *'Arḍ*, to act temporarily as civil governor and collector of revenue in Khurasan. A poem by Farrukhī which is dedicated to him seems to come from the time of his appointment to Khurasan, on the evidence of the following two verses:

> However much Khurasan may be ruinous at this moment, however few people may remain there,
> The next year, it will become like a garden blossoming with roses in the month of Ādhār, because of the skilful and auspicious rule of the Khwāja.

It is said of Maimandī's rule in Khurasan that he paid such attention to affairs that nothing was ever in disorder, and that when Maḥmūd returned from his Indian campaign, Maimandī brought him 'extensive quantities of cash and numerous presents', 'whilst the *ra'āyā* of Khurasan were universally enthusiastic for him and attached to him, and their tongues were united in thanks and praise towards him'. One wonders how Maimandī was able to please both Sultan and subjects. It is hard to imagine that Maḥmūd would have kept him in power if he had not been able to satisfy the latter's financial demands, and a verse by Manūchihrī suggests that he had in fact the share of acquisitive zeal and firmness which his office required:

> His eagerness for money and possessions is only because of his liberality; when this is the reason, avarice and covetousness become praiseworthy.[85]

During Mas'ūd's reign, the *'Amīd* of Khurasan was Abū'l-Faḍl Sūrī b. Mu'izz or Mu'tazz. Just as Maḥmūd had allowed Isfarā'inī a free hand in Khurasan provided that the money came in, so did Mas'ūd leave Sūrī to drain the province dry. In 422/1031 Sūrī's Mihrgān presents were 'limitless'; two years later he sent a magnificent array of presents valued at four

million dirhams, comprising cloth, gold and silver vessels, slave boys and girls, musk, camphor, rare fruits, pearls, striped carpets and fine linen. Baihaqī records that the Sultan exclaimed in delight, 'What an excellent servant is this Sūrī! If I had a few more like him, it would be extremely profitable!' but Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān denounced Sūrī as a tyrant, who only sent the Sultan half of what he took from the people. The *a'yān* or notables in Khurasan, he said, were being destroyed and were sending envoys and letters to 'the leaders of the Turks' (sc. the Qarakhanids) in Transoxania inviting them to direct the Turkmens into Khurasan. Baihaqī himself voices the opinion of the high officials in Ghazna when he insists that Sūrī's policies were a direct cause of Khurasan's loss. The Vizier Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad distrusted Sūrī intensely and employed the *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* of Nishapur as his personal *mushrif* or spy over him. This *Ṣāḥib-Barīd*, Abū'l-Muẓaffar 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Ḥasan Jumaḥī, came from a prominent family of Baihaq, and his class of notables and landowners was suffering particularly from Sūrī's exactions. Abū'l Muẓaffar was a fine poet and wrote many savage satires in both Arabic and Persian against Sūrī, which the Vizier passed on to the Sultan in an attempt to rouse him against Sūrī. Scraps of these verses are extant, including the following:

> Mas'ūd's power collapsed through Sūrī's tyranny and misdeeds;
> He alighted on the people for hospitality, and left not one timber on another in their houses.

and

> Amīr! Pay heed to Khurasan, for Sūrī is denuding it of wealth and possessions;
> If his tyrannical hand is allowed to stay extended, your interests there will be gravely affected;
> For that flock which you have entrusted to Sūrī, he will bring back to you like a shepherd who is clumsy at branding.[86]

Abū'l-Ḥasan, the father of Niẓām al-Mulk, had Sūrī as his taskmaster, and suffered under him. He was *'āmil* and *bundār* at Ṭūs for many years, but as Seljuq depredations grew, the land suffered, the processes of agriculture were interrupted, beasts

were carried off and the *'amal* of Ṭūs inevitably decreased. Finally, Abū'l-Ḥasan was unable to find the 50,000 dirhams demanded of him, so Sūrī confiscated his property and valuables to the amount of 30,000 dirhams and took out a bond for the rest.[87] When the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in the spring of 429/1038 was imminent, Sūrī fled with the local garrison, the movable part of the state treasury and his own money to a nearby stronghold and then to Gurgān. Thus to the people of Nishapur, the appearance of the Seljuqs was in one sense a liberation. By now, Mas'ūd must have realised how much Sūrī's unpopularity had contributed to his difficulties in Khurasan; when Nishapur was re-occupied in Rabī' II 431/New Year 1039-40, he decided not to re-appoint Sūrī, but to appoint his brother instead. After the battle of Dandānqān, Sūrī retired to Ghazna; later, he became Maudūd's *Ṣāḥib-Dīwān*, but returned to his old ways of extortion, fell from favour and died in the fortress of Ghazna. He had tried to salve his conscience by public works and charities in Khurasan. He added to the improvements made by Fā'iq's old master, Abū Bakr Shāhmard, at the shrine of the Imām 'Alī ar-Riḍā in Mashhad, building a minaret and giving a village in *waqf* for its upkeep; he built a fine *muṣallā* at Nishapur and embanked a stream which flowed through the Nishapur oasis with a stone and brick barrage against the floods caused by melting snows, again endowing them with *auqāf*; and did other things at Farāwa and Nasā. But it was the humane Baihaqī's opinion that these benefactions in no way compensated for the misery Sūrī had caused.[88]

The province of Sīstān passed into Ghaznavid hands after Maḥmūd had invaded it in 393/1002 and finally dethroned the Ṣaffārid ruler Khalaf b. Aḥmad. After the suppression of a revolt in the next year, during which Maḥmūd's pagan Hindu troops behaved extremely savagely, sacking the Friday mosque of Zarang and massacring the Muslims in it, and killing the Christians in their church, an administration was set up in Sīstān with the Amīr Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naṣr b. Sebüktigin as governor and with a civilian *'āmil* to collect the taxes.[89] The first of these *'āmils*, Muḥammad-i Bā Ḥafṣ, made the province ruinous by his exactions, and as in Khurasan, the distress caused by financial spoliation was aggravated by the famine and plague of 401/1011. Because of the Sagazīs' hatred of the Ghaznavid

yoke, the province was never at peace over the following decades. Khwāja Bū Manṣūr-i Khwāfī became *'āmil* in 400/1010, and 'during his term of office there were always a thousand men in Sīstān engaged in revolt'. In Mas'ūd's reign, the *'āmil* had to take draconian measures against these *'ayyārs*, brigands who were carrying on a guerrilla warfare against the representatives of Ghaznavid authority, and heavy fines (*muṣādarahā*) were levied on the urban leaders and the rural gentry (*sarhangān-i qaṣaba u mihtarān-i rūstā*). When the Turkmens began to appear in Sīstān in 427/1036, local leaders sought to use them to throw off Ghaznavid control.[90]

Enough has perhaps been said about Ghaznavid financial methods in such provinces as Ray and Jibāl, Khurasan and Sīstān to show that they were often very harsh. Hence it is not surprising that the rulers and peoples of neighbouring India were anxious to keep the Sultans' financial agents from direct interference in internal administration, even though they might have to pay tribute to the Sultans. We have seen how the people of Ray speedily became disillusioned with the Ghaznavids. The experience of another province of the Būyids, Kirmān, was similar. Early in his reign, Mas'ūd sent an army there and conquered it from the representatives of Abū Kālījār 'Imād ad-Dīn b. Sulṭān ad-Daula of Fārs. The Ghaznavids set up a civil administration there and began to collect taxes, but the exactions of the governor Abū'l-Faraj Fārisī were so intolerable that the *a'yān* of Kirmān sent secretly to Abū Kālījār's Vizier Ibn Māfinna and in 425/1034 a Būyid force ignominiously ejected the Ghaznavid garrison.[91]

The Ziyārid kingdom of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān was tributary to the Ghaznavids (see above, pp. 74-5). By the winter of 426/1034-5 its effective ruler Abū Kālījār b. Surkhāb was two years behind with his tribute. Mas'ūd decided on a punitive expedition to the Caspian shore, hoping to give his army a break from the climatic rigours of the Khurasan plateau, where provisions and fodder were in short supply. Moreover, the cost of warfare against the Turkmens was causing serious financial difficulties, and the Sultan aimed not only at getting the arrears of tribute but also at levying a dinar per head on the population of Āmul, whose numbers, he believed, amounted to a million.[92] Abū Kālījār and his retinue withdrew westwards into the unhealthy and impenetrable *jangal* of Ṭabaristān and Rūyān, and

the Sultan vented his anger on the unfortunate people of Āmul. Whereas on arrival in Gurgān he had forgiven them a year's taxes, he now decided to mulct them to the tune of a million Nīshāpūrī dinars, 1000 sets of Rūmī and other clothes, 1000 carpets and rugs and 5000 pieces of linen. He threatened that if this were not paid promptly, it would be extracted forcibly by a *mustakhrij* and by the army, to whom *barāts* would be assigned for collecting the money. Mas'ūd's Vizier exclaimed that the whole of Khurasan would not yield such a sum, but he had nevertheless to pass on the Sultan's commands to the *a'yān* of Āmul and their head, an 'Alid. 'Know', he began, 'that your master the Sultan has incurred great expense in sending an army here and in clearing out these oppressors. These provinces must give him a fitting subsidy.' The *a'yān* pointed out that the traditional rate, the 'permissible extortion', from Gurgān and Ṭabaristān had always been 100,000 dirhams and some carpets and cloth.

Faced with the Sultan's demands, a large number of the citizens fled. These fugitives were rounded up from the surrounding countryside by the military. A *Dīwān* for extracting the money was set up and the soldiers got to work. After four days' sacking, when 160,000 dinars had been collected, Āmul was set on fire. Baihaqī expresses his shame at having to record the affair; the Ghaznavids had made the paradise of Āmul into a hell. They also brought much discredit on themselves; from Āmul, a stream of people went to Baghdad to complain of the Sultan's tyranny, and the news travelled as far as Mecca.[93]

5 *The chancery and the intelligence system*

The *Dīwān-i Risālat* or Correspondence Department acted as a chancery and a secretariat for the Sultan. Like the rest of the *dīwāns*, the treasury, the wardrobe and the harem, it normally accompanied the Sultan on his campaigns and on his progresses round the realm. The official papers and registers were loaded on pack-animals, and when the Sultan halted, tents were set up to accommodate the clerks and their equipment. On such occasions, the tent of the *Dīwān-i Risālat* was set up as close as possible to the tent where the Sultan himself held court.[94]

The office of Chief Secretary or head of the *Dīwān* was com-

mensurate in importance with that of Vizier. For much of Maḥmūd's reign and for almost all Masʿūd's one, the office was held by Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān. The wisdom, moderation and judiciousness of this man emerge very clearly from Baihaqī's picture of his old master. From his age and experience, Abū Naṣr ranked as one of Masʿūd's closest advisers, and the Sultan had in fact been very solicitous at the opening of his reign to win him over. Baihaqī himself was devoted to Abū Naṣr, and when the latter died in 431/1039, he commended Baihaqī as his successor in the *Dīwān*; but despite his forty-five years of age and his nineteen years' service at Abū Naṣr's side, Baihaqī was considered too young for so responsible a post. It was only in ʿAbd ar-Rashīd's reign, over a decade later, that Baihaqī finally achieved the Chief Secretaryship.[95]

The workings of the *Dīwān-i Risālat* are amply documented by Baihaqī. The Chief Secretary's emblem of office was a large silver ink-stand, and he had under him a numerous and well-paid body of clerks (for the wage-bill of the Department, see above, p. 67), one of whom was always on duty (the *dabīr-i naubat*).[96] As the Sultan's chancery, the *Dīwān* received correspondence from external powers and in turn sent out letters. Thus facility in epistolary style and a thorough command of both Persian and Arabic were *sine qua nons* for the secretaries there. Masʿūd himself is praised by Baihaqī as a fluent stylist in Persian, and sometimes he dictated diplomatic documents, but normally it was the Chief Secretary who composed the documents, employing whichever language was considered most appropriate to the addressee: when letters were written announcing Masʿūd's accession, that to the Caliph was set down in Arabic, whereas that to Qadïr Khan Yūsuf of Kāshghar was in Persian. When diplomatic communications written in Arabic were received, translations into Persian were made, often by the Chief Secretary in person, for the benefit of the courtiers and other interested persons who were not literate in Arabic. This was done when in 423/end of 1031 a letter from Baghdad announcing the accession of the new Caliph al-Qā'im was received, and when Masʿūd accordingly sent back a document pledging his allegiance; Persian versions were read out to the assembled crowd at court, and Baihaqī gives both the Arabic and Persian texts of the Caliph's letter and Masʿūd's *baiʿat-nāma*.[97]

As well as being concerned with diplomatic contacts, the *Dīwān-i Risālat* was continually fed by reports and despatches brought in by couriers (*askudārān*, *munhiyān*) from all parts of the empire. These reports covered such matters as the conduct of local officials; famines, gluts and the prices of provisions; natural catastrophes; incursions by external enemies; and activities by bandits and other questions of public order. The gathering of this information was done by a network of local intelligence officers and spies; they then sent off their reports to the central administration by means of the *Barīd* or postal relay service. This last was, of course, organised for the benefit of the state and not for the use of private individuals. It was used for the conveyance of diplomatic envoys and other important people to the capital, and occasionally, rare or perishable goods and foodstuffs were conveyed by it to the court.

The use of such a communications network dates back in the Middle East well beyond Islamic times; Herodotus and Xenophon admired the Achaemenid postal system, and the Sāsānids perpetuated it. The Arab Caliphs found the institution equally useful, although they relied more on swift mounts than on well-constructed roads for speedy movement. We may therefore regard the Ghaznavid use of a *Barīd* and *Ishrāf* system as deriving from earlier practice in the Iranian world, kept up by the Caliphs and by their successor-dynasties in the east.[98] Such a system was a governmental necessity for dynasties whose territories were disparate and sprawling, and the Ghaznavids had in their empire both great distances and very difficult terrains to cope with. In such circumstances, military commanders on the fringes of the empire might be tempted to rebel and tax-collectors tempted to divert revenues to their own pockets. It was taken as axiomatic that governors were insubordinate and *'āmils* dishonest. The *Mushrifs* and *Ṣāḥib-Barīds* were the sole means by which such activities could be reported and the vengeance of the Sultan made to fall on the miscreants. Hence, to a certain extent, they acted as checks on oppression and arbitrary behaviour.

Karl Wittfogel has drawn attention to the care with which rulers in his 'hydraulic' and 'agro-managerial' societies organised communications and the conveyance of information, and it is undoubtedly true that an effective spy system buttressed a despotic ruler's power and enabled him to exert more pressure

on the periphery of his territories.[99] Consequently, the Islamic 'Mirrors for Princes' stress the value of an efficient system here. The *Pand-nāma* of Sebüktigin recommends the use of spies and honest *Ṣāḥib-Barīds* and points out that provincial *'āmils* should always be watched. Niẓām al-Mulk devotes four chapters of the *Siyāsat-nāma* to the topics of internal and external security and the use of spies and secret observers (Chs. VII, IX, X, XIII). The aim of the system of postmasters, he says, is to keep subjects in a state of obedience and fear of punishment; in this way, revolts will be discouraged. Spies must continually travel up and down the roads of the kingdom disguised as merchants, travellers, Ṣūfīs, quacks and dervishes, reporting everything of note, for governors, fief-holders, officials and commanders have a propensity towards rebelling.[100] He deals as well with the two men who were the mainstay of the system of internal control, the *Mushrif* and the *Ṣāḥib-Khabar* or *Ṣāḥib-Barīd*, emphasising that they, and indeed all officials, should be paid adequate and regular salaries which will put them above being bought or corrupted, for the advantage of having trusty *Mushrifs* amply compensates for the expenditure on their salaries. Moreover, their pay should come from the central treasury, and not from provincial funds or from levies on the people; in this way, their direct dependence on the ruler will be maintained.[101] The Ghaznavids made extensive use of these two officials, but the Seljuqs let the internal espionage system lapse in the lands which they took over. Hence it is likely that Niẓām al-Mulk is drawing here upon Ghaznavid practice in his advocacy of the system.

The *Ādāb al-mulūk* devotes chapters to the *Mushrif dar umūr-i mamlakat* and to the *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* respectively. The *Mushrif* emerges from this as an official with a varied number of inspectoral duties, mainly in connection with the running of the Sultan's household and the administration of his private property. Fakhr-i Mudabbir echoes Niẓām al-Mulk in advising that the *Mushrif* should be of good birth as well as cautious and discreet. His duties included the inspection of all royal workshops (*kārkhānahā*), where the *ṭirāz* and other items like cordials, herbs and aromatics were manufactured or processed for the Sultan's consumption or bestowal, and the planting of agents in the royal kitchens to watch that the food was properly prepared and that none of it was stolen. He looked after the supply of fodder for the royal stables and saw that the falcons and hounds were

being cared for. Especially important was his oversight of the Sultan's herds of camels, sheep, cattle and buffaloes; he had to check that new births were recorded and that the beasts were branded with the Sultan's *tamgha*. Finally, he had to be present in battle to take the Sultan's fifth of the spoil.[102] Fakhr-i Mudabbir emphasises in this way the *Mushrif's* inspectoral and regulatory duties, and it is possible that this reflects the development of the office in the later Ghaznavid period. In Baihaqī, the *Mushrif* is essentially a member of the internal spy system, although it does seem that they had other, subordinate, duties concerning the enforcement of the Sultan's commands and of other legal requirements. When an official fell from grace, *Mushrifs* carried out his arrest and sequestered his property, and a *Mushrif* was often sent with a messenger to see that the latter delivered his charge properly. An office of *Mushrif-i khizāna* existed in Mas'ūd's reign; his task was doubtless to keep an eye on the activities of officials and guards at the treasury.[103]

The Sultan appointed the chief *Ṣāḥib-Barīds* and *Mushrifs* himself. They had to be thoroughly trustworthy, for the central government depended on them exclusively for news of happenings in such extremities of the empire as Khwārizm and Ray, and it had to form its policy on the basis of their reports.[104] The office of *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* was not infrequently a stepping-stone to offices as high as that of Vizier; and according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Ṣāḥib-Barīds* were as a profession always scholars and learned men, writing many books.[105] The reports of all these agents were sent to the *Dīwān-i Risālat* for sifting and interpretation, after which they were submitted to the Sultan. Messages were often written in code (*mu'ammā*) which the secretaries had to decode. For extra safety, messages and despatches might be concealed on the person or mount of the courier bringing them, especially when he had to pass along the edge of hostile territory, as did the envoys passing to and from Khwārizm; we read of messages being concealed in hollow staffs, in hollowed-out shoemakers' tools, in the lining of boots, in the lining of water-bottle holders and in saddle-cloths.[106] To complete the communications and espionage network, the Sultan had watchmen (*ṭalā'i'*) along the important roads of the kingdom, and he had at his disposal pursuivants and bailiffs (*muwakkalān*) who made arrests and carried out distraints; and in case of need, local officials and notables looking after crown

property in the provinces could be alerted to apprehend fugitives.[107]

The police and spy system in the provinces was organised from a special government department, the *Dīwān-i Shughl-i Ishrāf-i Mamlakat*. Its importance to the ruler in an authoritarian state is attested by the words of Sultan Mas'ūd himself, who regarded it as more important than the *Dīwān-i 'Arḍ*; and at the outset of his reign he appointed as Chief *Mushrif* the man who had held the supreme office of Vizier in Muḥammad's reign.[108] It was the ideal of the Sultans that the tentacles of the *Ishrāf* system should connect them with every important official and commander within the empire. Thus during Mas'ūd's reign the Sultan had a special *Mushrif* planted among the palace ghulāms; this man hung about the ghulāms' living quarters and gathered gossip and intelligence from their purveyors and victuallers (*ḥawā'ij-kashān-i withāqhā*), and then reported to the Sultan. It was felt as especially necessary to have someone watching over the great military commanders, and Mas'ūd suborned the *katkhudās*, Persian secretaries acting as personal advisers, of the two Turkish generals Eryaruq and Asïghtigin Ghāzī. He often had spies over the higher civilian officials too, although these men were less likely to be taken in than the slower-witted Turkish soldiery. Towards the end of his reign, Mas'ūd grew to be on bad terms with his Vizier, Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad, and when the latter went out with an army to Balkh, Ṭukhāristān and Khuttal, the Sultan secretly appointed one of the officers to be a *muwakkal* over the Vizier. Aḥmad was quite aware of this, but did not let it affect his loyalty to his master.[109] The royal family itself was not exempt from the workings of the spy system. Mas'ūd was intensely jealous of his uncle Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin, who was an experienced soldier and a former governor of Khurasan. Playing on Yūsuf's sexual inclinations, he commissioned Yūsuf's favourite slave-boy to act as a spy over him; in this way, he was able to catch his uncle out over a doubtful action and lead him to acknowledge his disloyalty. It was, indeed, normal for rival members of the royal family to plant spies on each other and in the government departments. When Maḥmūd appointed his son Mas'ūd as governor of Herat, he did not merely rely on the reports of his son's tutor, Raiḥān Khādim, but further employed ghulāms, valets, old women and musicians as spies in Herat. Conversely, Mas'ūd received news

of events at court through a Turkish ghulām commander, Anūshtigin Khāṣṣa, and through his own aunt Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī, who was a fervent supporter of Masʿūd's interests. More daringly, Masʿūd succeeded in installing two spies in the *Dīwān-i Risālat* itself, unknown to the Chief Secretary; their presence was only later made known to Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān when Masʿūd had become Sultan and the question of rewards for these two men arose.[110]

It need hardly be added that the spy system covered external enemies too. In the early Ghaznavid period, the Sultans were very anxious to keep informed about the plans of their enemies the Qarakhanids and about the movements of the Turkmen bands in Transoxania and Khwārizm, and spies were employed in the courts and military encampments of these groups. Something approaching psychological warfare was practised at times. Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd was involved with the Great Seljuqs. He used his official Mihtar Rashīd to create an atmosphere of distrust and treachery in the camp of Malikshāh. Mihtar Rashīd promised substantial payments to the Seljuq Amīrs and other officers if they would betray their master; incriminating documents from this correspondence were then placed in a sack which was ostentatiously dropped near Malikshāh's own tent in the camp, in the hope that the Sultan's confidence in his troops would be undermined.[111]

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY

1 *The slave troops*

Because of the Ghaznavid empire's militarist bias, the army may justly be characterised as an institution of supreme importance within the empire. Indeed, one is tempted to think of the empire, in Maḥmūd's reign at least, as something like 18th century Prussia—an army with a state. In the general context of the development of military organisation, the Ghaznavid army was a development within the eastern Islamic military tradition, previously exemplified in the armies of the Sāmānids and Būyids. However, modifications to this tradition were brought about by the particular features of the Ghaznavid empire, such as the militarist bias mentioned above and also its ethnic diversity, providing a wide range of races from which soldiers could be drawn.

The core of the Ghaznavid army was the slave force (*ghilmān, mamālīk*), and more than anything else, this institution marks off the armies of Muslim Persian dynasties from those of pre-Islamic Persia. It is true that in both Achaemenid and Sāsānid times there was an imperial bodyguard, the *pushtīghbān*, and a corps of cavalry, probably 10,000 in number, the 'corps of immortals'; such élite bodies grow up naturally round a ruler. But the Sāsānid court service was largely hereditary in a few great families, and all the cavalry, the only part of the army which counted, was drawn from the nobles, *vuzurgān*, and gentry, *āzādān*.[1] Apart from this divergence, there are certain parallels between Sāsānid and Ghaznavid military practice, e.g. in the Sāsānid reviews which resembled the Islamic *'arḍ*, in the tactical use of elephants and in the continuity of the type of personal arms used.

The value of slave troops lay in their lack of roots and local connections. Brought in, often at an early age, from outside the *Dār al-Islām*, their minds could be moulded by their masters and their bodies trained for warfare. Attached to the ruler by a personal bond of fealty, they could give single-minded loyalty; owing everything to their master, they were untrammelled by the material and personal interests which locally-raised troops

inevitably had. Well might a poet say, 'An obedient slave is better than a hundred children; the latter desire their father's death, the former his long life'. It was the ideal that all parts of the army should be linked to the ruler by a personal bond—in the words of Kai Kā'ūs, 'it is a matter of necessity that your troops should at all times be under an oath, sworn by your life and head, of loyalty to you'—but the relationship could be closest where a slave was concerned.[2]

The development of a slave institution within the Caliphate dates back to the time when the early Abbasids first reduced the pay of the free Arab *muqātila* and then let their summons lapse, using the money saved on their pensions for buying Turkish slaves. On his accession in 218/833, al-Mu'taṣim struck off the Arabs from the *Dīwān* in Egypt and bought ghulāms instead. Provincial dynasties, some of which, like the Ṭūlūnids and Ikhshīdids, were themselves of servile origin, followed suit. The Ṣaffārid Ya'qūb b. Laith had a corps of over 2000 ghulāms as his pages and bodyguard, fitted out with weapons captured from Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir's treasury at Nishapur, and he also employed a contingent of Indian soldiers in his army. His brother 'Amr used to buy slaves at an early age, rear them and give them to his commanders, where they acted as spies on the Amīr's behalf, an anticipation of what became regular practice under the Ghaznavids.[3] The Dailamī leaders, from Mardāwīj b. Ziyār onwards, all stiffened their Dailamī followings with Turkish ghulāms. This was in part a necessity of military organisation, for the Dailamī mountaineers were primarily infantrymen, and needed the Turks as cavalrymen. Soon the Turkish element became as important as that of the Dailamīs themselves: the majority of the ghulāms of Mu'izz ad-Daula (d. 356/967) were Turks, and in pay and the granting of *iqṭā's* were preferred above the Dailamīs.[4]

The Sāmānids could draw directly on the steppes beyond the Syr Darya for Turkish slaves. Already in the reign of Ismā'īl b. Aḥmad (279-95/892-907) the Commander-in-Chief of the army was a slave. It was the hope of the Amīrs that their palace ghulāms would form a counterbalance to the indigenous military elements of the Iranian dihqān class, which opposed their centralising policy. As early incidents like the murder by his ghulāms in 301/914 of Aḥmad b. Ismā'īl showed, this hope was not realised. But whilst the Amīrs were strong and able to

control their troops properly, an observer like Iṣṭakhrī could praise the Sāmānids' slave army for its discipline and boldness in battle. Naṣr b. Aḥmad (301-31/914-43) is said at one time to have had 10,000 ghulāms, his own together with those of his father, as well as the rest of the army.[5] Even Turkish rulers like the Qarakhanids, who ruled over a loose, semi-nomadic confederation rather than a settled state, early acquired military slaves. For his invasion of Khurasan, Maḥmūd of Ghazna's enemy the Ilig Naṣr had a force of some 1000 ghulāms, which on one occasion he deployed in the centre of his battle-line.[6]

Thus by the 11th century most eastern Islamic armies were built round a nucleus of slaves. Turkish ghulāms were famed for their loyalty and martial virtues, but even when a ruler disliked Turks, as did the Caliph al-Muqtafī (530-55/1136-60), the necessity for a slave guard was not questioned; the Caliph merely recruited Greeks and Armenians instead.[7] That any of the nations customarily supplying slaves were conspicuously superior to the rest is problematical; the criterion was that they should come from some region remote from the ruler's own seat of power. When ghulāms proved treacherous, it was usually either because they had acquired local, vested interests or else had been treated unduly harshly by their masters; this last was the reason for the murders of Mardāwīj b. Ziyār and the Atabeg Zangī by their slaves.[8]

Thus the institution of a slave army had its dangers. The career of Alptigin illustrates the potential dangers of an uncontrolled slave institution. Although legally a slave, he had amassed great possessions within the Sāmānid empire (see above, pp. 41-2); as governor of Khurasan he had 2700 Turkish slaves of his own. Since under the Sāmānids the mount, equipment and property of a dead ghulām reverted to his military superior and not necessarily to the Amīr, a man like Alptigin had ample resources and opportunity to attach men to himself. Private armies such as this easily became abstracted from the ruler's control and a nexus of intermediate loyalties could arise which might, on occasion, be turned against the ruler himself. The growth of private empires within the state was symptomatic of the later Sāmānids' enfeeblement; earlier, one of their generals, Qaratigin (d. 317/929), had deliberately avoided acquiring estates lest they interfere with his mobility: 'He used to say, "A soldier must be able to take all his possessions with

him wherever he goes, so that there is nothing to tie him down".'[9]

The slave element of the early Ghaznavid army was commanded by the *Sālār-i Ghulāmān*, whose office ranked next in importance only to that of the Commander-in-Chief, the *Ḥājib-i Buzurg*. Baihaqī also mentions a *Sālār-i Ghulāmān-i Sarāy*, Commander of the Palace Ghulāms, but in Mas'ūd's reign at least, this officer was the same as the *Sālār-i Ghulāmān*, and the two names seem to be different titles for the one office. The slaves comprised Turks, Indians and some Tājīks, probably Khurāsānīs.[10] The former predominated and normally held the highest commands in the army as a whole. Nevertheless, when in 424/1033 the Turkish commander of the army in India, Aḥmad Inaltigin, rebelled, Mas'ūd gave his post to a Hindu ghulām, one Tilak, who had formerly been an official translator in the administration; this appointment aroused considerable resentment at court. Within the general body of ghulāms there was a special group, the Sultan's personal bodyguard, the *ghulāmān-i sarāy*, *ghulāmān-i khāṣṣ* or *ghulāmān-i sulṭānī*. The proportion of these to the whole is uncertain, but their numbers were appreciable (see below, p. 105). The ghulāms remained an important element in the Ghaznavid forces down to the last years of the empire, even if the figure of 20,000 ghulāms which the poet Sanā'ī mentions for the army of Bahrāmshāh b. Mas'ūd III (512-47/1118-52) is clearly exaggerated.[11]

Until the annexation of Khwārizm, the Ghaznavids only had direct access to the steppes via the northern fringes of Khurasan. Hence they recruited many of their Turkish slaves from the markets of Transoxania. As well as from purchase, slaves also came as gifts and as war captives. In Maḥmūd's reign it was the custom of the wife of the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan Manṣūr b. 'Alī (406-15/1015-24) to send each year a male and a female slave as a present to the Sultan. The Khwārizm campaign is said to have yielded large numbers of slaves, and during his Transoxanian campaign of 416/1025 against 'Alītigin, Maḥmūd reached Samarqand and exacted from it a tribute of 1000 ghulāms; at the same time, his ally Qadïr Khan Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan gave him presents of Turkish horses and slaves.[12] Maḥmūd took over some slaves from his father, for from his early days in Ghazna, Sebüktigin had assiduously built up a following of retainers. On the other hand, continuity such

as this was often broken on the accession of a new ruler who desired to make a clean sweep of officers in the higher positions. The rivalry between the old-established *Maḥmūdiyān* or *Pidariyān* on the one hand, and the parvenu *Mas'ūdiyān* or *Nau-khwāstagān* on the other, runs through Baihaqī's pages very clearly (see below, Ch. VIII, § 2). It was even considered wise before one campaign of Mas'ūd's against the Turkmens to appoint both *Maḥmūdiyān* and *Bar-kashīdagān-i Khudāvand* to the top commands lest jealousy and dissension arise.[13] Sometimes ghulāms who had become masterless or who had deserted a previous, less successful leader, would enter the Sultan's service. The Indian ghulāms were continually replenished from the campaigns there; thus 53,000 captives were brought back from the Qanauj expedition of 409/1018, slave merchants converged on Ghazna from all parts of eastern Islam and slaves could be bought for two to ten dirhams.[14]

A well-known passage in the *Siyāsat-nāma* on the education and training of the Sāmānid palace ghulāms was accepted at its face value by such an authority as Barthold. According to this, there was a definite training programme spread over seven years, with a *cursus honorum*, so that a youngster began as a foot-groom and at the age of thirty-five became eligible for the rank of amīr. If we were to accept this account, we would expect to find at least traces of such a system amongst the Ghaznavids, themselves arisen from it. Niẓām al-Mulk is probably describing here an ideal rather than an actuality, for the Sāmānids cannot have possessed the administrative experience and skill to organise a training curriculum like this. The account of Sebüktigin's early training as given in the *Pand-nāma* is of a general one in handling weapons and in the equestrian arts, and not of a specific course. The most we can be sure of is that there was some hierarchy of offices among the Sāmānids, although the grades may not have been clear-cut; Alptigin reacted vigorously when in 349/960 the Amīr Abū'l-Fawāris 'Abd al-Malik b. Nūḥ tried to appoint him *'āmil* of Balkh, for he had previously held the supreme military dignity of *Ḥājib al-Ḥujjāb*.[15]

The training of the Ghaznavid ghulāms must have come primarily from experience in the field, and we have no information about a specific training programme. Its existence would imply fixed grades and ranks in the army, and here again, the evidence is uncertain. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 141-2, drew

inferences from the sources and tentatively sketched out the chain of command in the Ghaznavid army. His general picture rings true enough, but there are dubious points. For instance, Nāẓim suggested that the *khailtāsh* was an officer commanding ten cavalrymen, but it seems to be a function as much as a rank. A *naqīb-i khailtāshān* is mentioned; 500 *khailtāshān* formed the vanguard of the army which in 431/1039 left Merv for a last effort against the Seljuqs, and at Dandānqān they fought as a group on one of the wings; and in one passage, Baihaqī calls them one of the constituent groups, *aṣnāf*, of the army.[16]

But if there was no specific training programme, promising lads might be taken into the Sultan's entourage for education, often with the Sultan's own children. In Masʿūd's reign, the ruler of Gurgān, Abū Kālījār, had a son at the court of Ghazna. In this case, as often happened, there was a political reason: the child served as a pledge for his father's good behaviour. On appointing Aḥmad Inaltigin to command the Indian army, Masʿūd required that his son should be left at court as a hostage, where he would be brought up in the *sarāy-i ghulāmān-i khāṣṣ*; the rich resources of India and the numbers of turbulent troops there gave especial temptations to rebel. Indeed, Niẓām al-Mulk advises as a general principle that the sons of great commanders should be kept, according to a rota, at court.[17] For the sons of commanders and courtiers thus to be admitted to the Sultan's household for education gave an excellent start in life, but in considering the general question of how favour and promotion were obtained, the purely personal element should not be forgotten. In the strongly masculine world which Islam brings about, the beauty of 'moon-faced ones' was no small asset. Turkish youths were prized for their good physique and light colouring, and it was no accident that 'Ibn Khāqān' became a synonym for 'catamite' (see Dozy, *Supplément*, I, 346a). Later Muslim writers have often played down the physical aspect of Maḥmūd's relationship to his favourite, the Yimek slave Ayāz, but the ethical climate of the time hardly frowned on such connections. Baihaqī relates an episode where a palace ghulām's beauty saved him from execution for murder and set him on the road to becoming the Sultan's *dawāt-dār*. Even after his master's death, Ayāz was still able to play a political rôle in the setting up and then deposition of Maḥmūd's son Muḥammad.[18]

The palace ghulāms usually fought as a body, although groups of them might be detached for service on expeditions with the ordinary troops. In battle they usually had the key position of the centre. As a crack force, they could be despatched to retrieve a campaign where the regular troops had failed. When they were part of a larger military force, orders were not given directly to them by the commander of the army, but only through a liaison officer, one of their own *ḥājibs*, specially appointed to the force. They had their own set of officers, amongst whom the *sarhangān-i sarāy* are mentioned. Domestically, their corporate organisation was directed by a major-domo, the *mihtar-i sarāy*, and for their needs there was a special secretary, the *dabīr-i sarāy* or *dabīr-i ghulāmān*, who kept a nominal roll of the ghulāms (it is not clear whether this roll was merely of the palace ghulāms or of the ghulāms as a whole). They had their own standards with a lion device, and when they were dismounted for ceremonial occasions, they had the special weapons of the short spear (*ṭirād*, *miṭrād*), the bow and the mace (*gurz*, *'amūd*).[19]

The ceremonial occasions when the ghulāms lined the Sultan's audience chamber and surrounded the monarch enthroned on his dais, were an integral part of their duties. At these times, they wore splendid robes of the finest brocades of Iṣfahān, Baghdad and Shushtar, while their weapons were heavily bejewelled and had gold and silver mountings; see the passage from Baihaqī giving a detailed description of Mas'ūd's court, below, Ch. IV, § 3. The literary descriptions which we have in Baihaqī and Jūzjānī of these levées have in recent years received striking confirmation from the researches of the French Archaeological Delegation in Afghanistan in 1949-51 at the Ghaznavid palace of Lashkar-i Bāzār at Bust. They examined a remarkable series of mural paintings in the audience hall of the palace, depicting some forty-four of the Sultan's guards in three-quarter face views, and it seems probable that they date from the early Ghaznavid period. The full evaluation of these discoveries will undoubtedly throw much light on the costumes and external appearance of the palace guards.[20]

It is clear from all this evidence that the department of the Sultan's wardrobe was an important one, and the office of its keeper, the *Jāma-dār*, who was normally a slave, was a responsible one; the loss of the wardrobe in battle was considered to

be most serious. Besides this office, there were certain other highly-regarded offices to which ghulāms high in the Sultan's favour might attain, such as those of armour-bearer (*Silāḥ-dār*) to the Sultan, bearer of the Sultan's ceremonial parasol (*Chatr-dār*) and standard-bearer (*'Alam-dār*). Each palace ghulām had his own personal servant (*khādim*) and two were only allowed as a special concession.[21] As regards numbers, Baihaqī records that in 428/1037 at the annual military review, the palace ghulāms amounted to 4000 odd, and this tallies with the number he gives for them five years previously. But two years later in 430/1039, 6000 are mentioned as being employed in northern Khurasan against the Oghuz, and it is possible that this increase represents a fuller awareness of the seriousness of the Turkmen incursions and a supreme attempt to master them.[22]

The process whereby great commanders imitated the ruler in assembling a slave retinue round themselves does not seem to have gone so far under the Ghaznavids as under the later Sāmānids. The Sultans' extensive spy-system, organised from the central *Dīwān-i Shughl-i Ishrāf* (see above, Ch. II, § 5), helped to curb such a development. Only in the peripheral province of Khwārizm was Mas'ūd powerless to prevent his governor there, the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash's son Hārūn, from collecting a force of 2000 ghulāms and asserting his virtual independence.[23] Normally, the Sultans themselves gave out ghulāms to their commanders when these were detailed for governorships or for campaigns where strong support was necessary. On Aḥmad Inaltigin's appointment to India in 422/1031, the Sultan gave him 130 of his own palace ghulāms. Tash-Farrāsh was sent off to Ray two months later, and the Sultan added 100 ghulāms to Tash's own 150. When in 424/1033 Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī was sent as governor of Ray and Jibāl with a force of fresh troops, Mas'ūd gave him 200 ghulāms and their officers (for the backgrounds to these appointments, see above, pp. 76-7 and 85-6). In all these cases the ghulāms were released from their personal bond to the Sultan, and this was transferred to their new master. Notwithstanding this, ghulāms transferred like this would often be expected to act as *mushrifs* over their superiors. In fact, Aḥmad Inaltigin endeavoured to circumvent royal control and to gather a really trustworthy personal guard. He sent agents to buy ghulāms for him in Turkistan, and over 70 of these were secretly transported to

India via the upper Oxus and Panjhīr before his preparations for revolt were delated to the Sultan.[24]

Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd bestowed 400 Turkish ghulāms on his trusted chief minister, the Sharīf Abū'l-Faraj Ṣiddīqī, including a special group of 70 with golden belts like those of the palace ghulāms; but he continued himself to pay allowances to them all in cash and kind, and so kept up his personal bond with them.[25] When a ghulām commander died, his personal following of ghulāms was broken up, and the Sultan, as *maulā al-a'lā*, became the ultimate beneficiary. Anūshtigin Khāṣṣa, an old and trusted eunuch commander and military governor of Merv when he died in 428/1037, left an extensive household with its own intendant and secretary, property and estates, and a group of personal ghulāms. Anūshtigin requested and got his freedom just before he died, and expressed a desire that his ghulāms should not be split up. Mas'ūd agreed to this, and ordered that the civil governor of Merv should meanwhile pay their salaries and allowances from government funds; later, the ghulāms were taken into the royal household, the Sultan keeping the 30 best ones and distributing the remainder amongst his four sons. Thus the act of manumission does not seem to have affected the Sultan's position as beneficiary, for he still retained a right of *walā'* over his freedman. At times, it was politically expedient to break up slave retinues; when in 422/1031 the generals Eryaruq and Asïghtigin Ghāzī were removed from their posts of commander of the Indian army and Commander-in-Chief respectively, their personal ghulāms were confiscated and divided up, the Sultan taking the best and the remainder being given to his courtiers. Despite measures like this, the Sultan's efforts to prevent the formation of intermediate loyalties between ghulāms and their commanders were not wholly successful; a considerable proportion of the Ghaznavid ghulāms who deserted to the Seljuqs at Dandānqān in 431/1040 had formerly belonged to victims of Mas'ūd's jealousy and suspicion, the Amīr Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin, Muḥammad's old Commander-in-Chief 'Alī Qarīb, Eryaruq and Asïghtigin Ghāzī.[26] Ageing and superannuated ghulāms were probably found jobs around the palace or in the lower ranks of the administration; some may have retired to ribāṭs for less exacting defence duties.[27]

2 *Racial contingents, specialist troops and volunteers*

In his article in *EI*[1] on the Ghaznavids, M. Longworth Dames considered it a weakness that the Sultans had no strong nucleus of native troops for their armies. Such a view has little validity in the context of the age. Rulers who rose to power with the backing of their own people or tribesmen had often to dispense with this prop. The Būyids soon found Turkish troops more reliable than their Dailamī fellow-tribesmen; latterly, they depended almost wholly on Turkish troops. The instability of the Turkmen nomad element in the early Seljuq state was soon apparent from the numerous Turkmen rebellions. Most contemporary rulers would have recoiled from arming their own subjects, and in their eyes, the racial diversity of such armies as those of the Ghaznavids and Fatimids was a source of strength. Moreover, the absence of a strong local backing meant that the Ghaznavids were not faced with the problem of the Seljuqs, that of absorbing or keeping occupied a large nomadic following.

The two great 'Mirrors for Princes' of the 11th century both quote with approval Maḥmūd's racially-diverse army; they ascribe its formation to his great percipience rather than to the mere fact that troops from many races were conveniently available. Kai Kā'ūs praises his kinsman's use of Turks and Indians as palace guards whereby 'he constantly overawed the Hindus by means of the Turks and the Turks by means of the Hindus, with the result that both nations submitted to him through the fear of each for the other'. Whereas, 'if a prince's bodyguard is all from one race, he is ever the prisoner of his bodyguard and tamely submissive, for the reason that the members of one race will be in alliance together, making it impossible to use them in holding each other in check'. The variety of nationalities in the Ghaznavid army is praised by Niẓām al-Mulk in a chapter entitled 'The army should be composed of troops of all races'. Maḥmūd's army, he says, was always organised by nationalities, and these encamped separately under their own guards; a spirit of emulation in battle was thereby engendered. Consequently, he concludes, a mono-national army should be avoided, for it only leads to plots and émeutes; and there should always be 2000 Dailamīs and Khurāsānīs at the ruler's court together with an admixture of Shabānkāra'ī Kurds and Georgians, both races famed for their valour.[28]

The great Vizier's historical fact is substantially correct, although the Ghaznavid army was by no means the only multi-national one of its age. The Būyids had Dailamīs, Turks and Arabs in their service; the soldiers of the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Mustanṣir (427-87/1036-94) ranged from Berbers and Negroes to Bedouins and Turks; and contingents from tributary states, *symmachoi*, and regiments of foreign mercenaries had long been a feature of Byzantine military policy.[29] Provided that there was a strong ruler on the throne, national diversity within the army was a source of strength, especially as different races often had particular military skills. We do not know whether the Ghaznavids themselves had any consciously-formulated views on the virtues or otherwise of this racial diversity, apart from odd pointers in two anecdotes of Fakhr-i Mudabbir. In the first one, the homogeneity of the Qarakhanids' Turkish army seems to be favourably contrasted to Maḥmūd's mixed army of Turks, Indians and irregulars. But in the second, Sultan Ibrāhīm's envoy boasts to Malikshāh that the Ghaznavid army is of ten sorts compared with the Seljuqs' one only—hardly true, for the Seljuq forces also included troops from several races—and so he advises Malikshāh to give up his design of attacking Ghazna.[30]

The Sultans' own co-nationals inevitably formed a substantial part of the Ghaznavid army, and from them most of the top commanders were drawn. Contemporary Islamic opinion characterised the Turks as a hardy race from the steppes divinely endowed with the qualities of bravery and loyalty, if not of intelligence (see below, p. 209). War was the obvious field in which to employ the Turks, whereas the administration was a Persian preserve, and instances of Turks holding high office in it were exceptional; they tended to be in functions connected with the Sultan's household and person rather than in the bureaucracy proper. Aḥmad Inaltigin had been Maḥmūd's treasurer, and it was personal ties—Aḥmad claimed to be one of Maḥmūd's sons and was physically very like him—and not military experience which prompted Mas'ūd to give him the Indian command. But the fact that Mas'ūd on another occasion appointed a Persian *dabīr*, Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Irāqī, over the Arab and Kurdish troops in Khurasan shows that the personnel of the military and civil institutions were not always rigidly confined to their own spheres. On one occasion, the links of Turkish racial feeling were appealed to on a question of

policy; in 431/1040, the Vizier was trying to dissuade the Sultan from what he considered to be a disastrous decision, so he brought forward a simple, loyal Turkish general to reason with his master, hoping that he would succeed where the more sophisticated Persian advisers had failed.[31]

There was probably a steady stream of mercenaries from the north coming to swell the Ghaznavid armies. The 10th and 11th centuries were troubled ones within the steppes, and the migrations of tribes of the Oghuz and Qïpchaq groups caused pressure on the northern frontiers of the Ghaznavid empire. A section of the Oghuz, called by contemporaries the "Irāqī' Turkmens to distinguish them from the bands led by the Seljuq family, were admitted to Khurasan in 416/1025 by Maḥmūd, and enrolled under their own leaders as auxiliaries (see below, Ch. VII, § 3). The Ghaznavid poets frequently refer to the various Turkish tribes from which the Sultans' ghulāms and guards were recruited. In the early period, such poets as Farrukhī and Manūchihrī mention the Qarluq, Yaghma, Qay, (?) Tukhsï, Chigil and the men of Khotan. A century later, on the evidence of such poets as Mas'ūd-i Sa'd-i Salmān (d. 515/1121-2) and Sanā'ī (d. 525/1130-1), the Ghaznavid forces still included men from the Qay, Yaghma, Tatar and Kirghiz tribes and from Kāshghar, Khotan and Khitā.[32]

Provincial governors on their own initiative recruited tribesmen for local defence. Altuntash employed Küjet (thus in Kāshgharī; in Baihaqī, spelt 'Kujāt') and Chaghraq or Chaghrat (spelt by Baihaqī indifferently as 'Chaghrāq' or 'Chaghrāt'; Köprülü suggests that the true form is 'Chughrat') Turks, these being probably from the Qïpchaq-Qanghlï group, to defend the frontiers of Khwārizm against other nomads. The tribal chief of the Küjet, Monjuq ('M.njūq' in Baihaqi), was an influential figure in Altuntash's entourage. These auxiliaries were later used by his son Hārūn to throw off Ghaznavid control. It is likely, however, that many of the Turks in the Ghaznavid armies were recruited from within the empire's own borders, in particular, from nomads who had filtered into the upper Oxus region and across the Hindu Kush into eastern Afghanistan in earlier centuries (see above, pp. 35-6). When Maḥmūd hurried back from Multan to face the Qarakhanid invasion of Khurasan, he recruited Khalaj Turks en route, and so faced the Ilig in 398/1008 with a mixed army of Indians, Afghans, Oghuz, Khalaj

and local troops from Ghazna. In the same year, 'Utbī mentions that the commander who unsuccessfully defended Sarakhs against the Qarakhanids was one (?) Muḥsin b. Ṭāq, 'leader (*ra'īs*) of the Oghuz Turks'. Although at this date Oghuz tribesmen from the lower Syr Darya region were fighting as mercenaries in Transoxania, these Oghuz in Maḥmūd's service may well have been much earlier settlers from eastern Afghanistan.[33]

The Indians in the army resembled the Turks in their lack of home ties and of distracting interests which might have affected their loyalty. Below the *Ḥājib-i Buzurg*, the Indians had, like the Arabs and Kurds, their own commander, the *Sipahsālār-i Hindūyān*, and they had their own quarter in Ghazna. They formed a counterweight to the Turks, and seem to have been considered in many ways more reliable than them. When the brief reign in 421/1030 of Muḥammad was nearing its end, chiefly because of the defection of many of Muḥammad's troops, including the palace ghulāms and the Turkish *Ḥājib-i Buzurg*, 'Alī Qarīb, it was the Indians under their commander Suvendhrāy who alone remained loyal. The two Turkish generals Eryaruq and Asïghtigin were in 422/1031 overthrown by the Sultan as part of his vendetta against the *Maḥmūdiyān*. Asïghtigin tried unsuccessfully to flee to Khwārizm, but was captured and brought back to Ghazna, and for his escort the Sultan stipulated that 500 of the Indian cavalry and infantry were to accompany him; clearly, Indians were chosen here because the sympathies of Turkish troops would have been with the fallen general, their fellow-countryman. Likewise, Mas'ūd in the same year arrested his uncle Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin on the latter's return from an expedition to Quṣdār, and Yūsuf was sent away to a fortress with a guard of three *muqaddams*, three *naqībs* and 500 cavalry from the Indians, together with a body of infantry.[34] Indian troops were of good quality; the Ghaznavids always found the Rajput princes tenacious opponents, and the poor showing of an Indian contingent sent against the Būyids of Kirmān in 425/1034 seems to have been an isolated occurrence. Furthermore, religion was no bar to their employment by the ostentatiously orthodox Sultans, and the anonymous historian of Sīstān complains bitterly of the slaughter and violence done to the Muslims and Christians of Zarang in 393/1003 by Maḥmūd's pagan Indian troops.[35]

The Dailamīs, sturdy mountaineers from the backwards and

inaccessible Caspian provinces, spread into many parts of the Islamic world after their upsurge in the 10th century. It is possible that the poverty of their homeland forced them to seek military employment outside, much as it forced another mountain people, the Swiss, to do so in mediaeval and Renaissance Europe, but the ultimate stimuli of the Dailamī expansion are not yet clear. Even in Sāsānid times the Caspian mountain folk had been used as auxiliary troops, and by the 11th century they were to be found as far afield as Fāṭimid Egypt, where Nāṣir-i Khusrau saw a corps of Dailamī infantry escorting the Caliph as he made his ceremonial progress to the Nile, and learned that there was a special Dailamī quarter in Cairo. At the end of the previous century, Abū ʿAlī Sīmjūrī had used Dailamīs against Maḥmūd in Khurasan, and it is possible that the first Dailamīs in the Ghaznavid armies passed into them at this point from the defeated Abū ʿAlī's forces.[36] The original fame of the Dailamīs was as infantrymen, and their characteristic weapon the *zhūpīn*, a short, two-pronged spear which could be thrown at the enemy; it was as infantrymen that the Seljuqs of Kirmān were still using Dailamīs in the 12th century. It is uncertain whether the Ghaznavids' Dailamīs fought mounted or on foot, but we know that amongst them was an élite group of some fifty or sixty who acted as foot guards, carrying golden or bejewelled shields, when the Sultan held court with full ceremonial. The Dailamīs were undoubtedly an important group and their amīrs highly favoured by the Sultans.[37]

The Kurds and Arabs were often, though not always, grouped under a single commander, and as such were given prominent military rôles; on the march from Merv to Dandānqān in 431/1040 they formed the bulk of the key vanguard force. Successive Persian dynasties, from the Sāsānids to the Qājārs, have taken pastoralist Kurds from their mountain homes in Kurdistan and Luristan and have planted them in Khurasan to defend the north-eastern frontier. Because of dispersions like these, they came to be found as mercenaries in the armies of many Islamic dynasties, and from Kurdish military leaders sprang not a few independent dynasties in various parts of the central and eastern Islamic lands.[38] The Arabs formed some of the finest cavalry in the army, the so-called *dīvsuvārān* 'dare-devil riders'.[39] In Maḥmūd's reign, the commander of the Arabs was ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm aṭ-Ṭā'ī al-Aʿrābī, who, together with

the Sultan's brother Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naṣr, held the centre position in the great battle of 398/1008 with the Qarakhanids. Again under this commander, the Arabs were chosen as the advance guard when Khwārizm was invaded in 408/1017; it seems that their swift and dashing qualities made them especially favoured for skirmishing and raiding parties. In Khurasan and the east, the tribal colonisations in the first century or so of Islam had left behind many groups of Arabs. Some, like the Arabs who made Wadhār in the Samarqand oasis famous for textiles, fitted themselves into the settled economy of the land; but others remained at least semi-nomadic, finding frequent employment in the warfare which was endemic in the cockpit of Khurasan. The author of the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* mentions as many as 20,000 Arabs in his home province of Gūzgān who lived off their extensive herds of sheep and camels and were richer than all the other Arabs scattered about Khurasan. The last of the Sāmānids, Ismāʿīl al-Muntaṣir, was killed by a group of Arab nomads who lived in the Qara Qum steppe; their leader had the tribal *nisba* of *ʿIjlī*.[40] Some of these groups may have retained their tribal organisation and distinctive Arab dress. Just before Maḥmūd's death, the Ziyārid Manūchihr b. Qābūs sent envoys to Masʿūd disguised as Arabs, so Arab dress cannot at that time have been an unusual sight in Gurgān and Khurasan. We know, indeed, that the Ziyārids at this time relied substantially on Arabs for the defence of their lands. During Masʿūd's expedition of 426/1035 against the rebellious Abū Kālījār, the entire defence force of Gurgān, 4000 Arab cavalrymen, came over to the Sultan, then at the peak of his fame, and enrolled in his army as auxiliaries, *mustaʾmina*; the remnants of them were still living at Ghazna when Baihaqī was putting together his memoirs (1058-9).[41]

An extensive supply of mounts was necessary for the cavalry, especially as a considerable proportion of it was of two-horse troopers, the second horse carrying equipment and food and providing a fresh mount. The officer in charge of the royal stables, the *Ākhur-Sālār* or *Amīr-i Ākhur*, was of high rank; in an important engagement with the Qarakhanids, Maḥmūd chose this officer to lead the palace ghulāms in the main charge. The army's mounts were all branded with the Sultan's mark, as were the camels and other beasts of burden. It was a duty of the Department of the *Ishrāf* periodically to send out inspectors

to the royal horse and elephant stables and ensure that the animals were being properly fed and cared for. They also visited the royal herds in their pastures to see that they had been branded as a precaution against fraud (see above, p. 95).[42] The form of the *tamgha* is not known.

Many of the most famous breeding grounds for horses in eastern Islam fell within the Ghaznavid sphere of influence. The Sulaiman Mountains to the west of the Indus have a very long history as a horse-breeding area, and the name of the Afghans, mentioned by Bīrūnī as living in the western frontier mountains of India, has been linked with the *Aśvaka*, 'horse people', of Gandhara in the *Mahābhārata*.[43] On the upper Oxus, the lush valleys and upland pastures of Gūzgān, Gharchistān, Ṭukhāristān, Khuttal and Chaghāniyān were famous for their horses; *barādhīn Ṭukhāriyya* were much prized by the Umayyad Caliphs and horses from these regions were exported as far as China in the Mongol and Tīmūrid periods. In the Sāmānid and Ghaznavid empires, the men of Khuttal were known for their skill in veterinary science, and their province produced bridles, straps and other pieces of saddlery of high quality.[44] All these regions were either under Ghaznavid rule or held by tributary princes. In time of peace, the Oghuz of the Qara Qum and beyond supplied Khurasan with livestock such as sheep and goats and, no doubt, with horses. The 3000 horses sent in 407/1017 by the Khwārizmshāh Abū'l-ʿAbbās Ma'mūn to his brother-in-law Maḥmūd, and the further 4000 promised by Abū'l-ʿAbbās's killers as an indemnity, must have been obtained from Oghuz and Qïpchaq nomads around the borders of Khwārizm. On one occasion, the incoming Seljuqs offered the Ghaznavid *ʿAmīd* of Khurasan Khuttalī horses, Bactrian camels and sheep as presents. Camels were reared in most parts of northern Khurasan and in the Baluchistan and Makrān deserts by Baluchi and Brahui nomads, but in the Ghaznavid army they were used mainly as beasts of burden. Only at the time of Dandānqān, when the army's endurance had been sapped by famine and exhaustion, were the palace ghulāms reduced to camels for mounts, whilst protesting their inability to fight on such beasts.[45]

In the armies of the Sāsānids, the infantry was an ill-organised rabble of conscripted peasants who served without pay and were of dubious fighting value. In the Ghaznavid army, the

horsemen could be demoralising, especially as they were usually placed in front of the battle line, enraged, and then used to lead a charge. As Christensen says of their use in an earlier age, 'leur mugissements, leur odeur et leur aspect terrible faisaient peur aux chevaux des ennemis'. Sebüktigin had used 200 elephants captured in India against Fā'iq and Abū 'Alī Sīmjūrī, and Maḥmūd took a force of them with him when he went to repel the Ilig Naṣr's invasion of Khurasan; the Qarakhanid troops protested on this occasion that 'it was impossible for anyone to withstand these elephants, weapons, equipment and arms'. In 416/1025, Maḥmūd deployed 400 of them against 'Alītigin; before battle, drums and other instruments were beaten in the Sultan's camp and the elephants' ornaments and accoutrements shaken and jangled to excite them and to shatter the enemy's nerve.[53] One of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's anecdotes mentions Malikshāhs's alarm when he saw his first elephant, a present from the Ghaznavid Sultan. As late as 510/1116-17, during the battle outside Ghazna between Sanjar and Arslānshāh b. Mas'ūd III (509-12/1115-18), the Seljuq horses were initially thrown into a panic by the fifty elephants of the Ghaznavids, each having four mailed spearmen and archers mounted and fastened down on their backs. However, the Seljuq troops were able to stampede them into retreat by attacking the leading beast in the only part not covered by armour, the vulnerable under-belly.[54]

The Ghaznavids acquired their elephants as tribute from the Hindu princes and as war plunder. The sources usually list the number of beasts captured, and these frequently ran into hundreds, such as 350 from Qanauj and 185 from Mahāban in 409/1018-19, and 580 from the Rājā Ganda in 410/1019-20. 'Utbī records that the Thanesar expedition of 405/1014-15 was provoked by Maḥmūd's desire to get some of the special breed of *Ṣailamānī* elephants, excellent in war; and on another occasion the Sultan so coveted an elephant of proverbial excellence belonging to Chandar Rāy, ruler of Sharma, that he offered fifty ordinary ones in exchange.[55]

The numbers of elephants in the Ghaznavid army must therefore have been great. At the Shābahār review of 414/1023-4 Maḥmūd inspected 1300 of them, each one with equipment and armour. In 422/1031 Mas'ūd reviewed 1670 of them at Kabul, 'all plump and ready for action', and this number accords with that mentioned in a verse by Farrukhī:

> One may ask, 'What are those 1700 odd mountains?' I reply, 'They are the 1700 odd elephants of the Shāh'.

There was a *pīlkhāna* to accommodate 1000 elephants at Ghazna, and to tend them was a staff of Hindus under a *Muqaddam-i Pilbānān* who had the high rank of *Ḥājib*. The price of an elephant appears from Baihaqī as 100,000 dirhams, but the expense merely of feeding these beasts must have been prodigious.[56]

Elephants were at this time and for many centuries to come essentially royal beasts, and possession of them was jealously guarded by both Indian and Muslim princes. The unpermitted use of elephants by a private individual was tantamount to rebellion. Rulers bestowed them only as a great favour or when some commander was deputed for a particularly responsible post; thus the commander of Masʿūd's expedition against the Būyids of Kirmān was given the usual insignia of a governor—girdle, two-pointed hat, drum and standard—together with five elephants. ʿUtbī calls elephants the *ḥaṣṣ as-Sulṭān*, and when plunder from India was being divided out, they automatically fell within the Sultan's fifth. Because of their great value and regal status, elephants made fine presents for other rulers: in 391/1001 Maḥmūd sent the Ilig Naṣr female elephants; in 414/1023 some elephants were sent to the Caliph together with a *fatḥ-nāma* announcing successes in India; and two years later ten female ones were given to Qadïr Khan Yūsuf in an exchange of presents.[57]

As well as using them for fighting, the Sultans also used their elephants for mounts on state occasions, such as reviews of the army; and when in 402/1011-12 Maḥmūd wished especially to impress the Ilig Naṣr and his brother Toghan Khan, he had forty richly-caparisoned ones drawn up facing the assembly and a row of 700 war elephants behind them. The sources make reference to the *āyīna-yi pīl*, apparently a metal headpiece with dangling ornaments, which served as a protection in war for the elephants and could also be struck and clanged to give out a fearsome din and thus alarm the enemy. As Manūchihrī says:

> Out of the clouds, I will make elephants, out of the wind, elephant-keepers, and out of the claps of thunder, innumerable clanging elephants' ornaments (*āyīna-yi pīl*).[58]

The elephant was Mas'ūd's favourite mount for hunting, and for this purpose a protective iron plating was placed over the beast's head and face. Mas'ūd also had an elephant held ready for his use at any time—a Ghaznavid version of the well-known institution of the *faras an-nauba*—and it was a daring stroke of Chaghrī Beg's Turkmens to steal this 'big elephant kept at the door of the Sultan's palace'.[59]

Like other Islamic professional armies, the Ghaznavid army carried in its wake a considerable quantity of auxiliary equipment, such as armouries (*zarrādkhānas*) and, where necessary, siege machinery.[60] The elephants were useful both for hauling this heavy equipment and as weapons in the sieges themselves; amongst the reinforcements sent westwards in 424/1033 to defend Ray and to mount an offensive against Ibn Kākūya were five elephants fitted with rams and battering equipment for use against walls and buildings (*dīvār afgan u darvāza shikan*). On his expedition of 436/1035, Mas'ūd took several elephants to the Caspian shore *jangal*; the hot, humid conditions there would be most congenial to the beasts and they could be used for breaking through the dense vegetation. In India and the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, where stone for building was plentiful, the reduction of a fortified town or strong-point, rather than a pitched battle, was often the crux of a campaign. Here, specialists like engineers, sappers and pioneers were used to mine beneath walls and to work ballistas, mangonels, etc. When in 411/1020 Maḥmūd attacked the pagan Afghans of the Nūr and Qirāt valleys to the east of Kabul (the later Kafiristan), he took with him blacksmiths, carpenters and stonebreakers for making roads, felling trees and clearing away obstructions in this difficult terrain.[61] The campaigns of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd in Ghūr were merely strings of sieges, for this backward region had no towns but was essentially one of fortified villages and strongholds.

Other impedimenta which accompanied the army included the royal treasury and wardrobe, the kitchens and their provisions and the harem with its ladies. Furthermore, there were other members of the court circle such as physicians, astrologers and boon-companions. The *Dīwāns* of the administration were peripatetic and their personnel, together with the official records and registers, had to be housed. Thus the amount of tented accommodation required was great; Gardīzī records

that when Maḥmūd met Qadïr Khan Yūsuf near Samarqand, he had one tent big enough to hold 10,000 riders. When it was a question of moving an army to reduce a rebellious town or to engage another army in a pitched battle, the whole of this train normally accompanied the army. Even so, Maḥmūd had the reputation of being a dashing commander; it was only in Masʿūd's reign that the disadvantages of this heavily-encumbered type of army began to show up when contrasted with the mobility and agility of the Turkmen raiders.[62]

As well as taking along its own provisions, the army also drew on dumps of foodstuffs in the provinces, and if necessity arose, local requisitions of food were made. Niẓām al-Mulk recommends the establishment of granaries and storehouses all over the provinces so that unjust levies on the people can be avoided; furthermore, the ruler should be able to draw upon the resources of the *iqṭāʿs* in the provinces. The camp-followings of Muslim armies normally included traders who supplied the troops, the *bāzār-i lashkar*. Then when the campaign was over, the army returned to base or to garrisons in the provinces to rest and refit before it was next required.[63]

4 *Armaments and personal arms*

The personal weapons of the Ghaznavid soldiers were basically those which had always been used in the Iranian world. The regular infantry carried bows, and for close fighting, maces, short swords and spears. They wore mailed coats and carried leather-covered or metal shields so that, in the phrase of Fakhr-i Mudabbir, they could form a solid line in battle 'like a fortress'. The cavalry carried bows, battleaxes, maces, lances, sabres and long, curved swords (*qalāchūrs*). As the *Shāh-nāma* shows, these weapons were the traditional ones of Iranian cavalrymen. In particular, the mace is the weapon of heroes and princes in the *Shāh-nāma*; Bahrām Gūr is said to have excelled at its use. The murals of Lashkar-i Bāzār seem to depict the Ghaznavid palace guards with maces on their shoulders, although the heads of the weapons are unfortunately not discernible.[64] The Ghaznavids do not appear to have had horse-armour, but their elephants were certainly armoured (above, pp. 116-18).

The *Ādāb al-mulūk* has an interesting section on the favoured

personal weapons of the Ghaznavid Sultans. Sebüktigin fought with the spear, bow and *qalāchūr*; Maḥmūd excelled in the use of the spear and bow; Muḥammad used the spear; Mas'ūd favoured the mace, and at Dandānqān fought with this and with a sword and poison-tipped short spear; Maudūd was a fine archer and is said to have invented a new type of arrow-head; Farrukhzād used a battle-axe; Ibrāhīm a spear and bow; and so on. The Sultans' prowess with the mace seems especially to have impressed contemporaries and is frequently referred to in the sources. Manūchihrī mentions a mace used by Mas'ūd which was shaped like a bull's head (*'āmūd-i gāvsār*, with two horn-like spikes?); elsewhere he speaks of Mas'ūd's feats with his heavy mace and long lance:

> The mace (*gurz*) of 80 mans which you use for conquering fortresses will smash in the heads of seventy [?read 'eighty'] cavalrymen with one blow;
>
> The lance (*nīza*) of 20 *arashs* length which you wield will pierce the livers of twenty champions on the day of battle.

According to Shabānkāra'ī, Maḥmūd had a mace of 60 *mans* weight which he could whirl round his head and throw 20 *gaz*, whilst Mas'ūd excelled in fighting with the mace or club (*chumāq*).[65] Fakhr-i Mudabbir makes the long, curved sword or *qalāchūr* the weapon *par excellence* of the Turks, and it was certainly much used at this time by the Ghaznavids and Qarakhanids; 'Utbī records that the *qarāchūliyyāt* of Qarakhanid officers captured during the invasion of Khurasan were taken from them and beaten into fetters for them to be dragged away to Ghazna. But the bow was also a most typical weapon of nomads. Its use probably came to the ancient Iranians from the north, and the bow became therefore a weapon of both the Turkish and Iranian military traditions. Similarly, the lasso, characteristically used by pastoral herdsmen, was used in Persian armies as far back as Xerxes' time (Herodotus); we find Maḥmūd's troops employing it against the Indians, and Mas'ūd's against the Turkmens in Khurasan.[66]

We have little direct information about where the weapons and armaments of the Ghaznavid forces were made. The Indian booty often yielded weapons; like elephants, they fell within the Sultan's fifth (see below, p. 126), and India had long been

famous for its steel cuirasses and sword blades, according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, the sharpest and finest-damascened of all blades. But local centres within the Ghaznavid borders must have turned out many of these weapons and protective coats. Some areas had their own specialities; thus Khwārizm produced swords and a very strong type of bow.[67] The mountain massif of the Hindu Kush and the adjoining ranges are geologically new and highly metalliferous; Kabul was known for its iron mines, and Ghūr had both iron deposits and timber to supply the forges. Hence Ghūr was noted for its production of arms; the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* records that 'from this province come slaves [it was still a pagan enclave in early Ghaznavid times], armour, coats of mail and good arms'. The name of one of its chief strong points on the upper Heri Rud was Āhangarān or Pul-i Āhangarān 'blacksmiths' crossing-point'. Masʿūd, at that time governor of Khurasan, campaigned in Ghūr in 411/1020-1; during the course of this, one of the local chiefs came to him bringing a tribute of arms, shields and cuirasses, and when the main stronghold was taken, a tribute of arms was levied there. Masʿūd later utilised Ghūrī officers in his service as specialists in siege warfare; two of them in 426/1035 directed the defence of Tirmidh against the troops of ʿAlītigin's sons, for which the defenders had a ballista (*ʿarrāda*) operated by a Ghūrī soldier and firing stones weighing five or six *mans*. In the 12th century, the local ruler of Ghūr, ʿIzz ad-Dīn Ḥusain (493-540/1100-46), used to send to Sanjar as annual tribute armour, coats of mail, steel caps and other war material, together with some of the fierce dogs bred in Ghūr.[68]

As for the tactics employed by the Ghaznavid armies in warfare of conventional type with other powers, we have little specific information, but it is unlikely that they differed much from those customary in the Islamic east. According to ʿUtbī, when Sebüktigin fought against the Indians, he divided his ghulāms, who were armed with clubs and (?) maces (*qarātigīn-iyyāt*), into groups of 500 who were to attack successively. At a siege in Sīstān, Maḥmūd had sacks of serpents hurled into the stronghold by catapults in order to terrorise the defenders; and Baihaqī says that the Gurgānīs used the traditional tactics of *karr wa farr* against the Ghaznavids at Nātil in 426/1035.[69] There is much detail in Baihaqī on the warfare in Khurasan against the Turkmens, but the Ghaznavid armies were unable

here to deploy properly and to employ their normal tactics, and were unable to adapt themselves for the unconventional tactics necessary to deal with the nomads (see further, below, Ch. IX, §§ 1 and 2).

5 *The* ʿĀriḍ's *department: reviews and pay-arrangements*

The army's mustering, internal organisation, commissariat and pay-arrangements were directed from the *Dīwān-i ʿArḍ*, and the office of *ʿĀriḍ* was accounted second only to that of the Vizier. As well as the chief *ʿĀriḍ* at the centre, there were subordinate *ʿāriḍs* and *katkhudās*, adjutants or quartermasters, appointed for armies in the provinces and for the forces of great men such as Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Naṣr. Since administrative rather than military ability was the desideratum here, it was usually Persians of the bureaucracy, and not Turkish soldiers, who held these offices.[70]

The functions of the *ʿĀriḍ* have been concisely described by Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 137-8. To this survey may be added something on the annual review of the army (*ʿarḍ*) and on the army's pay arrangements. When the Sultan was at Ghazna, his forces (excluding, of course, those in provincial garrisons) were paraded on the plain of Shābahār, described as 'a green place' carpeted with anemones and half a farsakh outside the capital; the fertile region around it produced a famous variety of pears.[71] This convenient site was probably utilised at an early date; Masʿūd built a new palace there to replace a former one of his father's. The *Mujmal at-tawārīkh* considers the *ʿarḍ* to be a Sāsānid institution, in which the Mōbedh acted as *ʿĀriḍ* and inspected everyone from the Emperor downwards, passing them as fit for service. It is true that it was customary among the Sāsānids to hold a review before a battle, when the troops filed past the Emperor, and in the institution of the *ʿarḍ* we see one of the elements of continuity between the Ghaznavid army and the Iranian past. As we know was the case among the Sāmānids, it was the ruler himself who frequently carried out the inspection at the Ghaznavid *ʿarḍ*. The troops filed past him and were counted by his whip-end. They had their names checked against the general nominal roll, *jarīda-yi ʿarḍ*, of which the *ʿĀriḍ* had one copy and the other was kept in the *Dīwān-i Risālat*; there was a separate roll for the ghulāms. The immediate model for

this general nominal roll was probably the special military register of the Sāmānid administration, the so-called 'black register' (*al-jarīda as-saudā'*), wherein the names, genealogies, physical descriptions, pay entitlements, etc. of their soldiers were recorded.[72]

The evidence from the historical sources gives a ring of truth to the extended section in the *Ādāb al-mulūk* on the correct procedure for the *'arḍ*, where it claims to reflect the practice of the 'kings of Islam'. According to this, the *'Āriḍ* stood on an eminence. The order of inspection was that of the army's left (*maisara*), then the centre (*qalb*) and then the right (*maimana*). Cavalry and infantry filed past to have their weapons and kit inspected and their names and descriptions recorded in a document, a copy of which was given to the *Naqīb* of the army so that on the day of battle he could set out the forces in the same order. Then, beginning with the most senior, the commanders and officers were inspected and their names recorded. It was thus possible to bring detachments up to their required strength of officers before setting out for battle. At the end of the *'arḍ*, commanders returned to their detachments, got the men and horses ready, and made speeches of encouragement to the men. Then the *'Āriḍ* discreetly reported to the Sultan or Commander-in-Chief, taking care that no hostile spies were lurking near by to overhear information on the state of the army.[73]

The annual *'arḍ* was also the occasion for general festivities at the Sultan's expense. The *'arḍ* at Shābahār in 428/1037 took place at the end of Ramaḍān, coinciding with the 'Īd al-Fiṭr, and it ended with a feast in which large tables were laid out for the Sultan, his family, the commanders and the rest of the troops, whilst poets and musicians entertained the concourse. Such munificence was in the tradition of Turkish life, where the chief's hospitality was a potent factor in holding his following together, and the principle retained enough importance in the Seljuq period for Niẓām al-Mulk to insist on the importance of kings keeping a good table.[74]

Lastly, the *'arḍ* was one of the occasions for the payment of the *bīstagānī* (Arabic, *al-'ishrīniyya*), cash allowances to the troops. Normally, these were paid out in advance so that soldiers could equip themselves and their mounts for a forthcoming campaign (Fakhr-i Mudabbir nevertheless advises that a special issue of two days' rations should be made to all combatants on

the morning of battle). According to Ibn Ḥauqal, the Sāmānids had paid the salaries of their officials, both civil and military, quarterly, and Niẓām al-Mulk says that the Ghaznavids continued this practice.[75] Although it appears from several citations in Baihaqī that allowances to civil officials in the bureaucracy and pensions to people who had attracted the Sultan's favour were paid monthly (*mushāharāt*), it was no doubt preferable to pay the soldiers at longer intervals than this, seeing that they were often away in the field. Often it was in fact necessary for the *'Āriḍ* or his deputies to pay armies in the field with cash drawn from provincial treasuries; the armies campaigning against the Turkmens were in this way paid from Nishapur by the *'Amīd* of Khurasan.[76] In the more distant provinces, the duty of paying and equipping local troops was often left to the local commander or governor. Despite the anecdote in the *Siyāsat-nāma* about Maimandī's insistence on paying the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash and his troops through the central *Dīwān* at Ghazna (see above, pp. 83-4), the governor in Khwārizm must frequently have been left solely responsible for the troops there, for the tenuous line of communication with Ghazna along the Oxus was very vulnerable to Qarakhanid attack. There was, indeed, a danger in letting a provincial governor have full control over the troops there, for their loyalties went inevitably to the governor who paid them rather than to the distant Sultan; in Khwārizm, Altuntash's sons were able to throw off allegiance to the Ghaznavids once their father was dead.

Niẓām al-Mulk asserts that 'previous kings', i.e. the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids, did not pay their officials and soldiers in land grants, *iqṭā's*, but gave allowances of cash, food and clothing. Barthold pointed out (*Turkestan*, 238-9) that the hereditary lands of the Sīmjūrīs in Qūhistān were something like feudal franchises; and great men like Alptigin had amassed estates and properties all over the Sāmānid dominions. The fact that al-Khwārizmī gives definitions for such terms as *iqṭā'*, *īghār*, *ṭu'ma* and *talji'a* shows that the institution of the fief and its terminology were well known in the Sāmānid period. We have seen that the Turkish ghulām governors in Ghazna established a system of fiefs in the area for their troops, and that Sebüktigin had to reform the abuses which had crept into it (see above, pp. 41-2). Shabānkāra'ī describes his policy thus:

> The second affair which he attended to was that he regulated the army's organisation and their fiefs (*iqṭāʿ-īshān*). One day he gathered together the army and said, 'I perceive that the disordered state of the country has arisen from the army's fiefs being converted into state lands (*dīh'hā-yi dīwānī*). Consequently, the countryside has suffered and the army has lost its source of sustenance. The proper task of the army is warfare and wielding its weapons; when it turns to cultivation and agriculture, things come to no good.' Then he issued his decision. He resumed all those agricultural lands which were in the hands of the army, and said, 'I will pay the fiefs out as a cash payment from the treasury at the beginning of each year. Each soldier must have his fighting equipment in battle order at that time.' Next, he made some calculations; each person who had acquired something in excess of his allotted fief had to give it back, and those who had less than the allotted fief had the amount made up. In this way he set the army's affairs in order.[77]

It is clear from this passage that Sebüktigin's rule ended a period of weak government by Alptigin's successors, and that the central power in Ghazna was now strong enough to resume the fiefs and substitute a system of cash payments. In general, his successors for at least the next two or three generations maintained the system of paying the troops in cash, although it is just possible that a type of land-grant more closely supervised than the hereditary *iqṭāʿ* may have existed under the early Sultans in the form of the *ṭuʿma* or property assigned for life to an office-holder. But the silence of such sources as ʿUtbī and Baihaqī on all these matters is significant. Köprülü has surmised that the *iqṭāʿ* system may have eventually passed to the Ghaznavids from the Great Seljuqs, and has suggested that Bahrām-shāh's lengthy wars with Sanjar in the first half of the 12th century may have made the adoption of such a system necessary; all this, however, is speculation.[78]

The early Ghaznavids had an advantage over their rivals, the Būyids, in having the wealth of India and Khurasan to tap. They could therefore pay their soldiers regularly, whereas Miskawaih's narrative shows that the pay of the Būyid troops was frequently in arrears, making them tumultuous and unreliable. The practice of issuing *barāts* for the troops to collect their

salaries—and anything they could get—from hapless civilian populations was often the last resort of bankrupt rulers, but the early Ghaznavids do not seem to have practised this for purely financial reasons (see above, p. 84). Normally, the Sultans were in firm control of their forces; it was only after Masʿūd's demoralising defeat at Dandānqān and the decision to abandon the west for India, that he lost control of the army and was deposed by it. At the opening of his reign he had been strong enough to dispense with the accession largesses and pay increases with which weak rulers like the Būyid Amīrs and the Abbasid Caliphs had to win their armies' homage, the so-called *māl-i baiʿat*, corresponding to the *julūs aqchesi* of the Ottoman troops; indeed, he had felt secure enough to try and get back the money which his weaker brother Muḥammad had paid out (above, p. 60).[79]

On top of the allowances which a soldier received there was his share in the plunder. Immediately after a victory, the *ʿĀriḍ* or his representative supervised the valuing of the spoils. If the Sultan was not personally present, his rights would be watched over by an agent from the Department of the *Ishrāf*. The Sultan took a fifth from the slaves, animals and general booty, reserving to himself within this fifth all precious metals, arms and elephants; and he had a right of first pick, *ṣafiyya*, from other choice articles. The remaining four-fifths went to the troops in proportion to their ranks, and with cavalrymen getting two shares to the infantrymen's one. When the Sultan had had his pick from the arms and precious metals, he would often turn the rest over to be divided amongst the army. There were also special bonuses, *ṣilāt*, awarded in the field for outstanding valour or for a particularly striking achievement; Fakhr-i Mudabbir advises a definite scale of rewards proportionate to such feats as capturing horses or elephants or carrying off the enemy's standard or *chatr*.[80]

6 *Numbers*

There remains to see whether we can make any estimate of the total numbers of the Ghaznavid army. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 140, estimated that in peace-time Maḥmūd's army probably amounted to 100,000 cavalry and infantry, a figure which would be swollen in war-time by volunteers, tributary contingents,

etc. This is perhaps a generous estimate. An examination of the numbers of troops used in certain campaigns suggests that in Mas'ūd's day the total was less than this.

The sections in Ḥusainī's *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, Ibn al-Athīr, Barhebraeus and Mīrkhwānd on the Ghaznavid-Seljuq warfare in Khurasan all draw to a considerable extent on the *Malik-nāma*, which is no longer extant but which was probably written for Alp Arslan, i.e. it dates from only a generation or so after the events which it describes.[81] The *Akhbār* is the oldest of these later, derivatory sources, and the figures it gives for armies and combatants are generally reasonable; on the other hand, many of Ibn al-Athīr's figures need drastic pruning.[82] Of the Ghaznavid sources, 'Utbī is normally vague about figures, but certainly Baihaqī, and no doubt Gardīzī, accompanied armies in the field, and their estimates for numbers generally have a ring of authenticity.

According to Gardīzī, there were 54,000 cavalry and 1300 elephants at the Shābahār *'arḍ* of 414/1023, excluding those in the provinces and on garrison duties. Such a figure as this must be near the peak for Maḥmūd's reign. Baihaqī's figures for individual expeditions in Mas'ūd's reign are often quite modest. To place his protégé Abū'l-Mu'askar on the throne of Makrān, the Sultan sent 4000 cavalry, 3000 infantry and a force of "Irāqī' Turkmen auxiliaries. Also at the beginning of the reign, Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin was sent to Quṣdār in Baluchistan with 500 cavalry and his own ghulāms. The 4000 cavalry, 2500 infantry and five elephants sent in 425/1034 to Kirmān were beaten by a Būyid relieving force of 10,000. For the Gurgān and Ṭabaristān expedition of the following year, Mas'ūd took 3000 cavalry, but this figure was raised to 8000 when he reached Āmul and saw the difficulties of the terrain. These were all expeditions to peripheral regions, but the forces sent were deemed adequate, and the Sultan's prestige was in the early part of his reign at its height. Furthermore, Maḥmūd just before his death had considered a force of 8000 cavalry adequate for the important expedition against Ray.[83]

After 426/1035, however, the problem of Khurasan and the Oghuz incursions became central. The army of 15,000 cavalry and 2000 palace ghulāms sent in 426/1035 to Nasā was defeated by the Turkmens. At the end of the year, the Hindu general Tilak returned from suppressing Aḥmad Inaltigin's rebellion,

and at Merv ar-Rūdh handed over to the Sultan his force of Indian cavalry and infantry together with 55 elephants taken in tribute from the Indian princes. Mas'ūd was at this time able to leave an army at Sarakhs, send 1000 cavalry to supplement the governor of Khurasan's force at Nishapur, and leave garrisons at Herat and Qā'in. There must have been something over 20,000 Ghaznavid troops in Khurasan at this time, and the events of the next year, 427/1036, strengthen this impression. The Sultan's advisers then estimated that a strong army of 10,000 cavalry and 5000 infantry should be sent forward against the Oghuz, whilst the whole of the Arab and Kurdish troops should stand at Herat as a second line of defence. There was also at this time an army of 3000 at Ray. At the end of 429/1038, Baihaqī, following the estimate of 'trustworthy people', says that there were some 40,000 infantry and cavalry reviewed at Shābahār; clearly, no one was very certain how many there were, and the figure seems quite a high one.[84]

What is certain is that Mas'ūd was never able to take to Khurasan the army of 50,000 men and 300 elephants which at this time he promised to the notables of Nishapur; and eighteen months later he was only able to scrape together at the most 100 elephants for the final effort at Dandānqān in 431/1040. The Turkmens fielded 16,000 riders for this battle, having sent 2000 of the youths and those with poor mounts back to guard the baggage and families. Baihaqī does not mention the size of Mas'ūd's opposing force, but his troops were starved and demoralised and the news from his spies of the Turkmens' strength depressed him intensely. Hence it is unlikely that his forces equalled those of his opponents, and they may have been less.[85]

During this period there were garrisons and an army in India, but with the exception of the Hānsī campaign in the winter of 429/1037-8, major offensive operations were not undertaken; the cream of the Sultan's troops were in Khurasan. Even allowing for the troops in India, it seems unlikely that the strength of the regular army in Mas'ūd's reign approached that of his father's; a total of 30,000—40,000 might be a fair estimate.

CHAPTER IV

COURT LIFE AND CULTURE

I *The education and literacy of the Sultans*

The practical, military side of Maḥmūd's education came from accompanying his father into battle, and boyish exploits of his are recorded against the pagans of Ghūr and against the Hindū-Shāhī Rājā Jaipāl at Lamghān. No doubt Sebüktigin passed on to him all his distilled experience and skill. The academic side of his education came from a leading Ḥanafī scholar, the father of the Qāḍī Abū Naṣr Ṣīnī, who also acted as prayer leader for Sebüktigin; from him Maḥmūd learnt the Qur'ān and later derived much benefit from his counsel.[1] Because of Maḥmūd's early involvement at his father's side in the business of warfare and ruling, his academic education in the Muslim sciences and in literature was probably somewhat broken. We need hardly take seriously ʿUtbī's statement that Maḥmūd's skill in the religious sciences was too extensive for any innovation ever to get past his eye. Maḥmūd is said to have known Arabic well, although he disliked the language.[2] His knowledge of Persian was clearly adequate for him to work with his Persian advisers, although exactly how much he understood of the florid panegyrics, both in Arabic and Persian, which his poets dedicated to him, is more dubious. ʿAufī quotes in his *Lubāb al-albāb* some fragments of verse allegedly by Maḥmūd. The verdict of Ethé, Browne and Rypka has been against the authenticity of this attribution, even though it is true that most persons literate in Persian could at that time have turned out tolerably competent verses.[3]

From Baihaqī, we have a few details about the Islamic education which Maḥmūd gave to his own children. He had his two sons Masʿūd and Muḥammad and his young brother Yūsuf, who was only three years older than the two princes, educated together. Already by the age of fourteen Masʿūd had a good knowledge of *adab* and was able to teach a few of al-Mutanabbī's odes and the *Muʿallaqa* of Imru'ul-Qais to another boy. Their tutor at this time was a eunuch, Raiḥān Khādim. Afterwards, when Maḥmūd nominated Masʿūd to the governorship of Herat, Raiḥān Khādim accompanied him there as a

tutor, with a strict commission to watch over Mas'ūd's moral welfare; in Seljuq times, Raiḥān Khādim would have been described as an Atabeg.[4] As Sultan, Mas'ūd was a competent Persian stylist. As well as affixing his *tauqī'* to the documents prepared for him by the *Dīwān-i Risālat*, he sometimes added sections in his own hand. The draft of a treaty which Mas'ūd, just before his father's death, was secretly making with the Ziyārid Manūchihr b. Qābūs, was written in his own hand, of an excellence 'such as the masters among secretaries would have been impotent to indite'. Baihaqī retained in his possession many documents, drafts and notes by Mas'ūd which he utilised in putting together his *Mujalladāt*. From his knowledge of *adab*, Mas'ūd was certainly able to read Arabic and apparently able to understand it when spoken. The Caliph al-Qādir's envoy brought a diploma of recognition to the Sultan on his accession, and addressed him and his court in Arabic. Mas'ūd acknowledged the greetings, and then a Persian abridgement of the *manshūr* was read out for the benefit of those present who could not understand Arabic. Occasional expressions used by Mas'ūd reveal his intellectual processes as thoroughly Islamic; thus writing to the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan Sulaimān b. Qadïr Khan after the defeat at Dandānqān by the Seljuqs, the Sultan minimised the disaster and compared it with the Prophet's setback at Uḥud against Quraish. The knowledge of classical Islamic learning which the Ghaznavid Sultans early acquired is in striking contrast to the untutoredness which seems to have characterised the Great Seljuq Sultans down to a late date in that dynasty's history.[5]

It was nevertheless necessary for the Ghaznavid Sultans to stay attuned to the needs and aspirations of their Turkish ghulāms, upon whose military prowess much of the dynasty's success depended. Those of the ghulāms who had been in the Sultans' service for a long period doubtless acquired some knowledge of Persian, especially those in positions of high command who were thus brought into contact with the civil administration; but the ranks of the ghulāms were frequently replenished by fresh recruits from Central Asia who would know nothing but Turkish. Certainly Mas'ūd, and *a fortiori* his father, retained their ancestral Turkish tongue and always used it when speaking informally to their Turkish soldiers.[6]

2 *The Sultans as patrons of learning*

The sincerity of the Ghaznavid Sultans as Maecenases has provoked some speculation. A consideration in detail of the topic would entail an excursion into the sphere of literary history, but the question cannot be altogether ignored, for it helps us to assess the barbarian, Turkish elements in the natures and attitudes of the early Sultans compared with the cultured, Persian ones. Undoubtedly, the courts of Maḥmūd and Masʿūd at Ghazna became brilliant cultural centres. According to Daulatshāh, there were four hundred poets in regular attendance on Maḥmūd, presided over by the laureate, *Amīr ash-Shuʿarāʾ*, ʿUnṣurī, who was himself continuously busy commemorating in verse his master's exploits and campaigns. The polymath of his age, Bīrūnī, finished his days at Ghazna, and dedicated his great astronomical treatise, the *Qānūn al-Masʿūdī*, to Masʿūd, and his book on mineralogy, the *Kitāb al-jamāhir fī maʿrifat al-jawāhir*, to his son Maudūd. Inasmuch as it was Maḥmūd who brought Bīrūnī to Ghazna, the gateway to India, it was he who made possible the *Taḥqīq mā li'l-Hind*, although Sachau has pointed out that Bīrūnī's mentions of the Sultan's name are curt and unenthusiastic, and has added that during the thirteen years spent under his Sultanate, he had 'no official inducement or encouragement for this study [sc. his *India*] nor any hope of royal reward'.[7]

In the evaluation of the culture of the early Ghaznavids, two opposing views have been adopted. Many of Maḥmūd's admirers, especially those amongst Indian Muslim scholars, have stressed his rôle as a munificent patron of the arts and as the creator of a Muslim culture on the eastern fringe of the Islamic world, by whose influence Muslim religion and civilisation passed to the Indian peninsula. Maḥmūd has thus become the first hero of Indian Islam.[8]

At the other extreme, some European scholars have condemned this culture as derivative and insincere. The Sāmānid court at Bukhārā, which had nurtured such authors as Rūdakī, Balʿamī and Daqīqī, presented Maḥmūd with a striking model to emulate, and orientalists like August Müller, Barthold, Browne and recently Rypka have asserted with some justice that the Sultan's encouragement of culture did not spring from a disinterested love of learning. In the course of his conquests,

Maḥmūd brought back whole libraries to Ghazna (e.g. from Ray and Iṣfahān), and he seems to have had an acquisitive love of collecting around himself poets and scholars, if necessary, by force. In Browne's words, 'Sulṭán Maḥmúd has often been described as a great patron of letters, but he was in fact rather a great kidnapper of literary men, whom . . . he often treated in the end scurvily enough'. In telling how the Tabānī family of Ḥanafī faqīhs passed in Maḥmūd's time from Nishapur to Ghazna (see below, pp. 177-8), Baihaqī remarks that 'whenever he came across a man or woman who was an expert in any skill, he deported them thither [sc. to Ghazna]'.[9] Maḥmūd set forth his demands quite bluntly when he sent his ultimatum to the Ma'mūnid Khwārizmshāh Abū'l-ʿAbbās Ma'mūn:

> I have heard that there are at the Khwārizmshāh's court several men of learning, each peerless in his science, such as so-and-so and so-and-so. You must send them to our court, so that they may have the honour of being presented there and that we may derive prestige (*mustaẓhir shavīm*) from their knowledge and capabilities. We request this favour of the Khwārizmshāh.[10]

Barthold's strictures are based on the political and social background of this culture: the narrowness of the circle involved, and the ruthless financial exploitation which alone enabled Masʿūd, for instance, to dispense at Mihrgān celebrations 1000 dinars to ʿUnṣurī, 50,000 dirhams to Zainabī ʿAlawī and 20,000 dirhams to poets not regularly of the court circle. These points are valid ones, and our verdict must on the whole lie with the criticisms of Browne and Barthold rather than with Nāẓim's spirited defence.[11]

But three qualifications must be made. Firstly, all highly-developed Islamic cultures were at this period élite ones, resting not on popular but on royal or aristocratic bases. Although patronage inevitably brought the attendant vices of hyperbole, effusiveness and insincerity, it was the sole foundation upon which such a culture could then rest. Bīrūnī pointed out the necessity of the system when he said that 'to do this [sc. to honour learning and its representatives] is . . . the duty of those who rule over them, of kings and princes. For they alone can free the minds of scholars from the daily anxieties for the necessities of life, and stimulate their energies to earn more fame and

favour, the yearning for which is the pith and marrow of human nature.'[12] We know very little about anything which may be termed 'popular culture' at this time, e.g. dialect or folk poetry and epics in either Persian or Turkish; there are signs that elements of such a culture did exist, although almost none of it has survived. But it is quite clear that for the majority of the scholars and creative, conscious artists whose work we know about, support and encouragement from above were indispensable. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the financial basis of patronage was exactly the same as that upon which the fortunes of the dynasty and state rested; one cannot condemn the one without the other, but such a judgement is hardly the concern of the dispassionate historian.

Secondly, poets and writers were the publicity men of the age. Rulers glowed in the warmth of eulogists' effusions, and they retained them with this practical consideration in mind. Both sides benefited: 'For just as a patron becomes famous by the verse of a good poet, so do poets likewise achieve renown by receiving a great reward from the king, these two things being interdependent.'[13]

Thirdly, the culture of the early Ghaznavids did begin to show some individual traits of its own. Originally, there was no significant literary tradition in Ghazna and Zābulistān upon which to build. It is noteworthy that the great poets of the court of Ghazna all came from outside: ʿUnṣurī from Balkh; ʿAsjadī from Merv or Herat; Ghaḍā'irī from Ray; Farrukhī from Sīstān; and Manūchihrī from Dāmghān. The two last were attracted to Ghazna from the service of the Muḥtājī Amīrs of Chaghāniyān and the Ziyārids respectively. Minorsky has pointed out that the feelings of the renaissance of New Persian passed by Ghazna; the smaller courts like those of Gūzgān, Sīstān, and Ray were great centres of Persian learning, but these were either swept away or weakened by Maḥmūd. Conversely, Arberry has noted the greater receptiveness of the courts of Maḥmūd and Masʿūd, with their strongly Sunnī policy and cultivation of links with the Abbasid Caliphate (see above, pp. 51 ff.), to Arabic influences in learning and literature. These influences brought about an increased elaboration and euphuism in literary style, and set the pattern for the ornate poetry and prose which became increasingly popular in later Ghaznavid and Seljuq times, and Arberry concludes that

'Ghazna developed into a greater centre of Arabic learning than Bukhārā had ever been'.[14] According to Bahār, the penetration of Arabic influences into Persian literature marks the opening of the second great period of New Persian prose, whose style differs clearly from that of the Sāmānid period; and in the sphere of poetry Rypka notes the appearance of the 'romantic epic', whereas the *Shāh-nāma* had been the climax of the 'feudal epic' inspired by the Sāmānid milieu. On the evidence of a line by Manūchihrī:

> You are certainly able to say Turkish verses very well [or perhaps, 'You speak very well, just like a Turk']; recite to me poetry in both Turkish and Ghuzzī!

Turkish poetry seems to have been known under the early Ghaznavids and recited in literary circles, although it was probably popular in origin and not the product of cultured circles.[15]

A certain growth of individuality is also visible in architecture and the plastic arts. Under Maḥmūd, a great influx of treasure into Ghazna took place, and there can be little doubt but that the Sultan imported artisans and craftsmen from the conquered lands to beautify his capital, just as he imported scholars and literary men. As was the case in the literary sphere, there was originally no strong local artistic or architectural tradition to guide the men who planned and worked for Maḥmūd. But during his reign, and that of Mas'ūd, a certain style of building developed which used marble and carved decoration grafted on to the more sober traditional Persian technique of brick construction and moulded brick decoration. Godard surmised that the sumptuous use of marble by the Ghaznavids (e.g. at Lashkar -iBāzār) must have been introduced from India. More recently, however, the Italian Archaeological Mission working in Afghanistan has discovered an important marble quarry just outside Ghazna from which the material for the local buildings came; the site of Ghazna is still today strewn with pieces of marble. Bombaci has concluded from this that Indian artistic influences in Ghaznavid architecture only appeared under the later Sultans, and has suggested that such art historians as Flury, Pope and Godard were misled by too early a dating for much of Ghaznavid architecture and decoration.[16] Indeed, Bombaci's views on the comparatively late arrival of Indian

influences seem very reasonable. The loss of the western territories of the Ghaznavid empire in the middle of the 11th century gave the truncated empire which survived a predominantly Indian outlook, and we would expect influences from that direction to increase.

3 *The organisation of the palace*

The Sultans were lovers of splendour and luxury, as their zeal in building palaces and laying out gardens bears witness (see below, § 4). The lavish decoration and furnishing of these palaces, the high degree of organisation which was involved in their staffing and running, show that the way of life there fell within the Iranian aristocratic and monarchic tradition. The splendour of court life at Ghazna, as it may be gauged from descriptions in the historians and the poets, shows how far the Sultans were in this direction from the frugal ways of Turkish steppe life. The description of a celebration at Masʿūd's court in 429/1038 is worth quoting at length:

> The golden throne, the splendid carpet and the hall for audiences and merry-making which the Amīr had ordered to be constructed and on which they had been busy for over three years, was now ready. They informed the Amīr, and he ordered that they should install and set it down [sc. the throne] on the great dais of the new palace, and put the building in order. Everyone who on that day saw that adornment never saw anything after that which could compare with it. I was one of them at that time, and I have never known anything like it. The throne was constructed entirely of red gold, overlaid with shapes and patterns of branches and plant-fronds. It was set with a large number of precious jewels, and over it was stretched lattice-work, again all encrusted with jewels. The throne itself was overlaid with covers of Rūmī brocade. It had four well-filled cushions, made of silk and sewn with gold thread, laid down for the feet; a cushion for the back; and four other cushions, two for each side. A golden-plated chain hung from the ceiling of the chamber containing the dais, and came down over the dais where the crown and throne were. The crown was attached to this chain, and there were four bronze figures

fashioned in the shape of human beings and mounted on columns which were secured to the throne itself, so that their hands were outstretched and thus held the crown safely. In this way, the crown did not hurt the head since the chains and the columns supported it, and the Sultan's cap could go underneath it. They draped this dais with rugs, gold-woven Rūmī brocade and gold-woven parti-coloured carpets. Three hundred and eighty golden dishes were set out in the hall, each a *gaz* long and a *khushktar* (?) *gaz* wide. On these were placed cakes of camphor, vesicles of musk, fragments of sandal-wood and amber. Before the high throne were fixed fifteen settings of pomegranate-coloured and Badakhshānī rubies, emeralds, pearls and turquoises. Within that oppulently-appointed hall they had set out a table, and in the middle of it, stretching towards the ceiling, was a pavilion made out of *ḥalvā*, and there was ample other food.

On Tuesday, the 21st Shaʿbān, the Amīr, may God be pleased with him, came back from the Maḥmūdī Garden to this new palace and seated himself in his new golden throne on the dais. The crown was suspended above his cap and he wore a cloak of crimson brocade so heavily ornamented with gold that only a little of the material underneath could be seen. All around the hall, standing against the panels, were the household ghulāms (*ghulāmān-i khāṣṣagī*) with robes of Saqlāṭūn, Baghdādī and Iṣfāhānī cloth, two-pointed caps, gold-mounted waist sashes, pendents and golden maces in their hands. On the dais itself, to both left and right of the throne, were ten ghulāms, with four-sectioned caps on their heads, heavy, bejewelled waist sashes and bejewelled sword belts. In the middle of the hall were two lines of ghulāms; one line was standing against the wall, wearing four-sectioned caps. In their hands they held arrows and swords, and they had quivers and bow-cases. There was another line, positioned down the centre of the hall, with two-pointed caps, heavy, silver-mounted waist sashes, pendents and silver maces in their hands. The ghulāms of both these lines all wore cloaks of Shushtarī brocade. As for the horses, ten had bejewelled accoutrements and twenty had plain, golden ones. There were fifty Dailamīs with golden shields, ten of which were ornamented with jewels. The high-ranking servants of the state stood by, and outside the portico of the palace

there were many palace attendants and a crowd of infantrymen (*ḥashar*), all armed.

The court celebrations then took place. The great men of state and the holders of high rank came forward. Enormous quantities of largesse were distributed. The prominent people, governors and great men were invited to sit on that dais, and the Amīr held court, seated on his throne, till morning, when the *nadīms* came in, greeted the Amīr, and distributed largesses. Then the Amīr rose, mounted and made off to the garden. He changed his robes, rode back and sat down to feast in the splendidly-adorned hall. The nobles and great men of state came forward to the table too. Other tablecloths were spread outside the hall, to one side of the palace, and the *sarhangān*, *khailtāshān* and other groups of the army sat down there and began to eat. The musicians struck up and wine flowed like water, so that gradually, those who had become drunk left the tables. The Amīr rose up from the table in a mood of great joy, mounted, and rode off to the garden. They organised a splendid *majlis* there, similar to the first. The *nadīms* came along and they all settled down to drink wine till the evening prayer. Then they went back.[17]

For supplying the opulent clothes, carpets and hangings mentioned here, the Sultans depended in part on the spoils of war, in part on the customary presents brought by governors and tributary rulers at Naurūz and Mihrgān and in part on taxation levied in kind, for most cities of the empire produced textiles and carpets of some kind or other. We know that in the time of Bahrāmshāh (512-47/1118-52) there were also royal workshops, *kār-khānahā*, supervised by a *Mihtar* and a *Mushrif*, where the rich embroidery of the *ṭirāz* was sewn on to the robes. It is very probable that royal workshops existed under earlier Sultans, for there were Sāmānid precedents; Narshakhī describes the *bait aṭ-ṭirāz* of Bukhārā, which supplied the Abbasid Caliphs, as still in existence in his time (sc. mid-10th century).[18]

The running of the palace and its ancillary departments was organised on lines reminiscent of earlier Islamic courts and, ultimately, of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. At court, the Sultan was withdrawn from the masses, except when he held *maẓālim* sessions. Normally, his entourage consisted of his *nadīms*, the bureaucracy officials and the leading military com-

manders. Access to the royal presence came only through the intermediacy of the Court Chamberlain, a eunuch, the *Āghāchī-yi khāṣṣa khādim*, who also performed such personal services as waking up the Sultan, and was in charge of the inner living quarters of the palace.[19] At court, strict protocol was observed; Maḥmūd once hit a well-known traditionist on the head for speaking without permission and made him deaf for life. Discipline was maintained at court and around the palace precincts by the *Amīr-i Ḥaras* or Commander of the Guard, an office taken over from Sāmānid and Abbasid usage; Niẓām al-Mulk describes him as the executor of the ruler's wishes where any punishment is concerned, and as proverbially more feared than the ruler himself.[20] For the Sultans' drinking sessions, *majālis-i nashāṭ u sharāb*, poets, musicians and clowns were brought in, and to wait on the topers there were the cup-bearers or *sāqīs*, of whom Ayāz was chief in Maḥmūd's time.[21]

The smooth functioning of the palace service and the supplying of its needs was the responsibility of the *Wakīl-i khāṣṣ* (financial, expenditure and provisioning: see above, pp. 68-9) and of the *Āghāchī-yi khāṣṣa* (domestic affairs and staffing). An office of *Katkhudā*, overseer of the chambers of the harem and of the royal princes, is mentioned in Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd's reign (451-92/1059-99).[22] The *Āghāchī-yi khāṣṣa* had a staff of eunuchs and pages. The pages were often younger members of the royal family, sons of tributary princes or hostages taken from the families of the Sultan's commanders and governors. Many of the eunuchs were probably castrated in the slave-markets of Transoxania or India, but ghulāms were also castrated at the Ghaznavid court itself. It is not known whether black eunuchs were used; they were certainly employed as harem attendants by Maḥmūd's neighbour in Sīstān, Khalaf b. Aḥmad.[23] The eunuchs had special charge of the Sultan's harem. The harem and its attendants usually accompanied the Sultan, the army and the *Dīwāns* on their peregrinations, and were then housed in special tents. On the death of a Sultan, the new ruler often took over those of his predecessor's wives and concubines whom he desired. When Maḥmūd died, the Sultan's women were looked after by his sister, Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī, and those who were no longer wanted were assigned estates on whose revenues they could live. When Muḥammad was deposed after his brief reign, he had to make over his harem, together with other

possessions, to Mas'ūd. Hence, far from the comparative freedom of women in Turkish steppe life, the Ghaznavids immured their women in the confines of a harem system, with eunuchs and other of the traditional concomitants; and this system became so tightly knit that Bahrāmshāh is said to have been reluctant to allow even a physician to treat a slave girl in the harem.[24]

4 *The Sultans as builders*

Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd were both great builders, although little of their work has survived today. The effects of an extreme climate; natural catastrophes like earthquakes and floods; the ravages of war; the use of comparatively perishable materials like sun-dried brick, for stone and even fired brick were infrequently used; indifferent workmanship; the theft of building materials by the local population: all these combined to make much building work, however splendid and imposing at the time it was put up, impermanent and short-lived. How often in the sources does an author note that an edifice was put up only a few decades before the time of writing, but is now ruinous or totally disappeared! Nāẓim mentions some of Maḥmūd's public works, which included bridges, aqueducts and irrigation channels; of these, the Band-i Maḥmūdī, just north of Ghazna, has survived, and has still been used in recent times. Ghazna itself was sometimes exposed to inundations caused by sudden rainstorms or melting snows rushing down the bed of the river which ran through Ghazna. Baihaqī records a particularly disastrous flood in 422/1031 which wrecked most of the markets and caravanserais of the town and necessitated Sultan Mas'ūd's building a new bridge across the river. Irrigation works by the 'Kings of Zābul' are mentioned in the Herat and Bādghīs region.[25]

Of architectural works, the tombs of Sebüktigin and Maḥmūd are still in existence (the contemporaneousness of the latter one—at least in its extant form—with the Sultan's death is, however, doubtful).[26] The work of the French Archaeological Delegation brought to light in 1949-51 the shell of the great Ghaznavid palace of Lashkar-i Bāzār at Bust, the modern Qal'at-i Bist. Since Maqdisī mentions the *'askar* there, it seems probable that building operations there were begun by Sebük-

tigin. Baihaqī connects this *lashkar-gāh* 'at the Polo-Field at Bust' with Maḥmūd, and states that Mas'ūd made additions to it which were still in part intact when he wrote thirty years later.[27] Although only Lashkar-i Bāzār seems to have survived at all, we learn from Baihaqī that the Sultans possessed palaces and gardens in every important city of the realm. In Herat there was the 'Adnānī palace, which was reconstructed and added to by Mas'ūd. When he had been the youthful governor of Herat, he had built a house for his afternoon siesta in the garden of this palace. This house was cooled by water dripping down the hangings within it, and its walls were adorned with lascivious paintings of nude men and women in various convivial scenes (*ṣūrat'hā-yi ulfiyya*).[28] In Balkh, Maḥmūd possessed a lucrative market, the Bāzār-i 'Āshiqān, and a splendid garden, the upkeep of which was a distressing burden on the local people. It was probably in this garden that there was constructed the 'Abd al-A'lā palace. In the Nishapur suburb of Shādyākh, Mas'ūd built to his own design a palace with pavilions and courtyards, since there had not previously been an official residence there for the Ghaznavids. In Ghazna itself, Maḥmūd had a palace at Afghān-Shāl, and there was a Ṣad-Hazāra garden with the White and Zābūlī pavilions in it and a Fīrūzī palace and garden where the Sultan was eventually buried; but Mas'ūd decided to design and build a new palace for himself at Ghazna (see below).[29] The greater part of this building work was in unfired brick, with stone only for foundations, fired brick only for smaller walls and decoration, and marble only for friezes. But gold and other precious materials plundered from India were also incorporated into the fabric of these palaces and into that of the mosque and madrasa which Maḥmūd built at Ghazna on returning from his campaigns against Qanauj and Mahra. Recent finds of Indian figures and statuary at Ghazna indicate perhaps that these statues were incorporated in the Ghaznavid palaces as trophies of war.[30]

The expenditure on the construction and upkeep of all these buildings and gardens and the maintenance of an opulent standard of living within them must have been a heavy burden on the revenues of state and on the taxpayers. The buildings themselves were erected by means of the ancient oriental institution, described by Wittfogel as especially characteristic of his 'hydraulic' societies, of corvées. There is evidence in the

Iranian world, both before and after the coming of Islam, for the organisation of these labour services as a matter of course when large-scale constructional work was necessary. The Emperor Shāpūr is supposed to have built Nishapur by imposing corvées on the local people. When Abū'l-ʿAbbās al-Faḍl b. Sulaimān aṭ-Ṭūsī was governor of Khurasan (166-71/783-8), he ordered the Arab Amīr of Bukhārā to construct a fortified enceinte around the city to protect it from the Turks. The wall was completed by 215/830, but later Amīrs added to it and large sums of money and corvées on the local people were required to maintain it, until the Sāmānid Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad relieved the population of this burden.[31]

Although the Sāsānids had used peasant infantrymen in their armies as cannon-fodder, this usage was not followed to any appreciable extent by the Islamic rulers who relied on professional, often slave, armies (see above, Ch. III, §§ 1, 2). Thus the Ghaznavids relied on their professional soldiers and ghulāms, although we read that their opponent ʿAlītigin supplemented his forces with Turkmens and peasant levies (*ḥashar*) at the battle of Dabūsiyya in 423/1032.[32] But the Ghaznavids did make use of peasant levies (*ḥashar*, *mard-bīgārī*) for their building operations. Baihaqī more than once stresses Masʿūd's passion for building and his skill as the architect and planner of his own works. The new palace which he built at Ghazna took four years to complete, cost seven millions of dirhams and was erected by corvée labour. In this case, the workers may have been paid. Yet Baihaqī says the building was already dilapidated when he wrote. He also mentions corvées for other purposes. When the Sultan wanted to hunt, a peasant *ḥashar* was assembled by officers of the army after consultation of the registers kept for this purpose; it seems that there was some kind of a rota. Another *ḥashar* was organised to clear snow from the roads into Ghazna when the Sultan's army was due to return.[33] The exaction of forced labour in addition to the usual taxation was undoubtedly a weight on the shoulders of the population. However, the practice has lasted in Persia and Afghanistan down to the present day.[34]

PART II
KHURASAN UNDER GHAZNAVID RULE

CHAPTER V

KHURASAN AND ITS CAPITAL NISHAPUR

1 *Khurasan and its rôle in early Islamic history*

Geographically, Khurasan is part of the mountain and plateau zone which stretches from Anatolia through the Elburz to Afghanistan and the Pamirs. In the west, Khurasan began to the east of Gurgān and Qūmis; in the east, the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* considers that Qūhistān, Gūzgān, Bādghīs and Ṭukhāristān are part of it, but that Ghūr, Sīstān and beyond are only the marches of Khurasan.[1] In the south, the uninhabitable salt deserts of the Dasht-i Kavir and Dasht-i Lut provide one of the strongest of natural frontiers; in the north, Khurasan spills over the Iranian plateau towards the Oxus. The mass of brown shading or hatching which a relief map displays to us, the lifeless salt deserts, the land-locked river basins, the indeterminate rivers which peter out in lakes and swamps and permit no navigation or access to the sea: all these betray an uncertain water-supply, a harsh climate, an arid terrain and introspective, closed human communities. Thus life in Khurasan presented a challenge to its inhabitants, but as well as the inevitable localism there was vigour and industriousness.

The strategic position of Khurasan shows us one reason why the niggardliness of nature did not inhibit progress there. The historic trade route from the Near East to Central Asia and beyond passed along the southern edge of the Elburz through Ray and Dāmghān and then through the heart of Khurasan to the Oxus crossing at Āmul-i Shaṭṭ or Tirmidh, or else through Balkh and the upper Qunduz valley and the Ghōrband to Kabul and India. Khurasan was the springboard for the Arab conquests in Central Asia, and its importance in the first two centuries of Islam was essentially military, as a colonial frontier area for the Arab tribesmen. A millennium later, Nādir Shāh made his Afghan and Indian conquests from here and stored up his armaments and plunder in the natural stronghold of the Qalʿat-i Nādirī in the mountains of Khurasan.

But equally often, military movements have been in the reverse direction. Khurasan was the bastion first of Toynbee's Irano-Semitic 'Syriac' society, and then of Islam, against

Turkish and Mongol nomadic peoples from Central Asia. Here, the mountains rise steeply from the steppes to over 10,000 feet, and the nomad must leave the Eurasian plain and ascend the Iranian plateau. Here, the armies of the civilised Near Eastern peoples have often chosen to stand against incoming barbarians; here, for instance, took place the fighting between the Ghaznavids and Turkmens. Yet the failure of the Ghaznavids to stem the invaders should warn us that the abrupt change of terrain and habitat checked the nomads only temporarily. Not all Central Asian peoples were horse-rearing plainsmen, and in any case, the balance of a pastoral economy requires herds to be driven up each summer to *yailaqs* in the hills. In the event, the Turkmens of the 11th century found excellent pasture for their beasts in the oases of Khurasan and in the valleys of Azerbaijan and Armenia further west. Because of such movements of peoples, Khurasan inevitably became a cockpit. Ya'qūbī contrasts its open position to Baghdad's sheltered one, noting that it 'stretches out like a salient into the east, surrounded on all sides by fierce enemies and warlike aggressors'; and Curzon was probably correct when he said that 'more people have died a violent death in Khurasan than in any other territory of equal size in Asia'.[2]

However, the penalty of being a frontier area may well be cultural impoverishment and lack of material progress, because constant insecurity inhibits urban life, agriculture and commerce. There was always this danger in Khurasan. It flourished during the Greco-Bactrian period, when urban life was stimulated by Alexander the Great's activities in the east: his foundation of Merv and Herat is historically attested in Pliny. This prosperity continued under the Arsacids, as the etymology of the older name for Nishapur, *Abar-shahr* (<**Aparnak-shahr*, 'country of the Aparnak', one of the three tribes of the Dahae who founded the Parthian empire), shows.[3] But under the Sāsānids, as under the Achaemenids, the centre of Persia's gravity lay in the west, and the capital of the empire was not in ethnically Iranian territory but in Semitic Mesopotamia. Khurasan now became comparatively poor and backwards. The Sāsānids' political authority on the easternmost fringes of their empire was tenuous. What persisted of Khurasan's vitality came rather from its contacts with the Buddhist worlds of India and Chinese Turkestan, and was kept fresh by further waves

of incoming peoples, Indo-European, Turkish and perhaps Mongolian, from the steppes. The list of Persian towns mentioned in the sources on the Sāsānids and listed by Herzfeld is instructive here: out of a hundred Sāsānid towns given, eighty-two are in western Persia. Khurasan in its widest sense has only eleven, and of these, only Dāmghān, Nishapur, Merv ar-Rūdh and Pūshang are really certain.[4]

In the period of the early Caliphate, Khurasan was racked by Arab tribal and Persian sectarian strife, whilst western Persia and Iraq were enjoying great prosperity under the Caliphs. Only gradually did Khurasan become more prosperous and populous. During the 9th century, vigorous local Persian dynasties grew up in the east, practically if not nominally independent of Baghdad, and bringing a greater measure of prosperity and stability. Merv and Nishapur began to rival cities of central Persia like Ray and Iṣfahān as centres of industry and trade. The rise of dynasties like the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids coincided with a revival of interest in the nation's past. The Ṣaffārid occupation of Khurasan was only an interlude. The Ṣaffārids were essentially military adventurers, who gloried in their plebeian origins[5]; some of the earliest recorded building in Nishapur, of mosques and of the *Dār al-Imāra*, is attributed to ʿAmr b. Laith, but his brother Yaʿqūb had plundered houses and burnt down palaces when he had captured the city.[6] Under the Sāmānids, Khurasan and Transoxania became the centre of a cultural renaissance, whose manifestations were seen in the rise of the New Persian language, the moulding into poetic form of the Persian national epic and the development of a Perso-Islamic style of architecture and painting. The ambitions of the emergent Dailamī adventurers were met by Sāmānid firmness and deflected towards western and southern Persia. Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan was short-lived, and though initially it gave political stability, in the end it failed to protect the province from the Turkmens.

Although Khurasan and Transoxania were at this time predominantly Sunnī in outlook—the real home of revolutionary Shīʿism in Persia lay further west in the Caspian provinces and in such Arab garrison cities as Qum and Qazwīn—one district of Khurasan, that of Baihaq or Sabzawār, later played a decisive part in the dissemination of Shīʿism in eastern Persia, and Ismāʿīlism had strong Khurasanian connections (see

below, Ch. VI § 5). The ferment of these influences and the continued survival of pre-Islamic Iranian currents, together with Khurasan's position adjoining the *Dār al-Kufr*, gave the province a remarkable intellectual vitality. There must have been some movement of faqīhs and other enthusiasts for the faith into the unevangelised lands across the Syr Darya and Atrek, although we are badly informed about this. Furthermore, Khurasan was the starting point for the orthodox Sunnī reaction of the 11th century and after, producing such outstanding leaders here as the theologians Juwainī and Ghazzālī and the statesman Niẓām al-Mulk.

The Seljuq Sultans rapidly assimilated their rule to the Persian administrative tradition. The fact that a direct line of the Seljuq family, running from Chaghrï Beg through Alp Arslan to Sanjar, ruled Khurasan proper for over a century (the eastern fringes like Herat and Balkh were often granted out to other, lesser members of the family) gave the province some continuity of administration. Moreover, from the time when Toghrïl took with him westwards the Imām Muwaffaq (see below, Ch. IX, § 4), Khurasan provided the Seljuqs with a corps of efficient administrators, distinguished in the eyes of several contemporary historians from the oppressive and heretical *dabīrs* of Iraq and western Persia by their Sunnī orthodoxy and just conduct.[7] Unfortunately, the capture of Sanjar by the Ghuzz in the middle of the 12th century showed that the Seljuqs had failed to master the anarchically-inclined Turkmen bands who roamed the Khurasanian countryside with their flocks and who were to be henceforth a permanent element there. The Mongol ravages in Khurasan were grievous, but they were repaired, and the province probably benefited commercially from the internationalist attitude of the Mongols and the continuous traffic between Persia and Central Asia in the Ilkhanid period. The real end of Khurasan's vitality came only after the disappearance of the Timurids, for the Ṣafavids, a Kurdish dynasty from Azerbaijan, had little interest in the east and were unable properly to protect it from the Özbegs.

2 *The economic bases of Nishapur's prosperity: commerce and industry*

The modicum of political stability allowed by Khurasan's strategic position favoured the province's economic prosperity in the period from the 9th to the 13th centuries. Since the Khurasanian towns lay on the caravan route which connected Iraq and Baghdad, the supreme centres of consumption in the Middle East, with Central Asia and beyond, they benefited from the transit trade. To the north of Khurasan lay Khwārizm, which tapped the resources of the steppes and forests of Siberia and the middle Volga, some of which were luxuries like furs but others of which were materials of everyday use like leather and hides, wax and tallow and honey. These products came to Khurasan and were then distributed to the other regions of Islam.[8] Above all, there was the slave trade from beyond the Atrek and Syr Darya (see below, Ch. VII, § 1).

The products of China and the Far East had to be either small in bulk or luxurious in nature to make their importation across Asia worth while, but even fine porcelain from China could survive the trip; Paul Kahle has gathered together a great deal of information on this product and its importation into Islamic lands.[9] The growing ease of life in Baghdad and other urban centres during the Abbasid Caliphate stimulated the demand for luxury merchandise and raised up a class of entrepreneurs who organised the required long-distance caravans and created a mechanism of distribution. In the early 11th century a Nishapur merchant could have a business partner as far away as Bulghār on the Middle Volga; doubtless it was commercial contacts such as this which in 415/1024 prompted the King of Bulghār, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Iltebir, to send a substantial sum for the repair of the Friday mosques of Sabzawār and Khusrūjird in the Baihaq oasis.[10] Hence the economic and cultural renaissance of Khurasan was in part a reflection of the prosperity of the Caliphate in general at this time.

In addition to this east-west axis of trade, with its northern branch to Khwārizm and beyond, a secondary commercial route ran southwards from Khurasan to Kirmān, Fārs and the Persian Gulf. The Kirmānīs had a bazaar of their own in Nishapur, and the town of Kirmān or Jīruft was a prosperous entre-

pôt, especially under its own local Seljuq dynasty of the late 11th and the 12th centuries, when the settlements of foreigners there included Greeks and Indians. By this route, the commercial and economic influence of Khurasan was spread across the Persian Gulf. Maqdisī noted the trade connections of Khurasan and Arabia, and said of Qā'in in Qūhistān that 'its name is highly-regarded in 'Umān'.[11] In the early 10th century, Khurasanian coinage seems to have been considered poor in Iraq and the west, but it is a significant measure of the general rise of prosperity in Khurasan under the native dynasties and of the increasing adoption of a money economy that by the 11th century, the prestige of Nishapur currency was high and its circulation extensive. Thus when in 427/1036 the Caliph al-Qā'im tried to strike against the superior economic power of the Fāṭimids, he ordered that commercial transactions should no longer be made in Maghribī (i.e. Fāṭimid) dinars, but in Qādirī (i.e. those of the previous Caliph al-Qādir), Qāshānī or Nīshāpūrī ones, and notaries and legal attesters were not to entertain any legal or commercial documents relating to the former currency. Nāṣir-i Khusrau came home from the Pilgrimage in 443/1051 via Falaj in Yemāma, and found that commercial transactions in this part of eastern Arabia were done in Nīshāpūrī dinars. The geographers describe Nishapur in the latter half of the 10th century as an international trade centre, the resort of merchants from Iraq and Egypt, the depôt (*maṭraḥ*) for Khwārizm, Ray and Gurgān, and the entrepôt (*furḍa*) for Fārs, Sind and Kirmān, and as having inhabitants who were the richest in Khurasan.[12]

The manufacturing industry of Khurasan was organised on a small-scale, local basis, the activity of craftsmen and artisans in their own houses and shops. The artisans of Nishapur produced, among other things, ironware, needles, knives and other articles of metalware. The mountains of northern Khurasan yielded copper, lead, antimony, iron and silver (and, it seems, gold, but not in economic quantities); but on the whole, mineral exploitation was more highly developed in the mountain regions further east, such as Kabul and Badakhshān, where there were better supplies of timber for smelting purposes. The mountains of Khurasan were generally bare, and there was only deciduous woodland in any quantity in the valleys which ran down to the Caspian, like the Dīnār-Sārī defile which carried the Nishapur-

Isfarā'in-Gurgān road. Coal, of an indifferent quality, has been noted on the hills around Nishapur in recent times, but has never been in general use there as a fuel.[13] Especially valuable products of the mountains of Khurasan were the luxury building material of marble and the famous Nishapur turquoises. The turquoise mines, still worked today, lie to the north-east of the city on the Mashhad road; Curzon estimated that the workings covered forty square miles. The fame of these turquoises reached China; a 14th century glossary of the jewels of the Muslims mentions *ni-she-bu-di* turquoises.[14]

Above all, Nishapur produced textiles. The cloth industry was always an important one in the Islamic world. As the number of terms like 'muslin', 'tabby', 'damask', 'fustian', etc. which have passed into European languages shows, there were few Middle Eastern towns which did not produce cloth in some form or other. Cloth and clothing played a far greater part in the lives of mediaeval Muslims than in our own today, for clothes were the mark of social class or religious affiliation or were the uniform for an office or profession, and house furniture comprised essentially carpets and hangings.[15] Investing money in a store of clothing or bales of cloth was one way of keeping wealth in a fairly liquid form; often, cloth was taken for taxation. It is not therefore surprising that the New Testament makes moths and rust the great enemies of the hoarder. The workshops of Nishapur produced cloth of all grades. At the lower end were the utilitarian cottons and felts, produced for the masses of the people. At the upper end were the brocades and silks, for the demands of court and official ceremonial and the needs of the harem women always kept production here brisk. According to Tha'ālibī, the *'attābī* and *saqlāṭūnī* brocades of Nishapur were comparable with those of Baghdad and Iṣfahān, and the city produced an especially fine material named after itself, *Sābūrī* cloth. There were convenient sources of supply for all these materials. Raw silk came from the mulberry groves of the Caspian coastlands, although Merv, rather than Nishapur, was the foremost centre in Khurasan for silk manufacture; wool and hair came from local herds or from the Turkish steppes (see below, pp. 154-5); and cotton, whose use had spread from India, was either grown locally in irrigated oases or else brought from the *garmsīrs* of southern Persia and Makrān.[16] Because of the textile industry's importance, the cloth merchants of

Khurasan were very prominent among the bourgeoisie, and it seems to have been they who amassed the biggest fortunes in trade.

3 *Agriculture and irrigation in the Nishapur oasis*

A mixture of both urban and rural life was characteristic of Khurasan. The fundamental unit in Khurasanian topography was the *rūstā* or *rustāq* (Arabic pl. *rasātīq*), and the geographers enumerate four 'territories' (*ṭasāsīj*, *khānāt*) and thirteen districts (*rasātīq*) in the old province of Abarshahr. The *rustāq* comprised a central market town, not necessarily very big, with a hinterland of villages around it. Often it was coincident with an oasis. Each *rustāq* was an entity of its own, and frequently had its own distinctive dialect. Even the weights and measures used in Khurasan varied from one *rustāq* to another.[17]

The agricultural *rustāqs* and their market towns, and the bigger cities like Nishapur and Merv, were interdependent from both the human and economic points of view (see below); but the dominantly urban nature of Islam as an institution caused the townspeople frequently to regard the *rustāqs* as places where the good Muslim life could not be lived and their inhabitants as hayseeds, so that the description *rūstā-yi ṭab'* was a contemptuous one. Towards the end of his life the famous Ṣūfī Shaikh Abū Sa'īd b. Abī'l-Khair decided to leave Nishapur for his home town of Maihana, a small place in the *rustāq* of Khāwarān between Sarakhs and Merv. On hearing of this, two of the most eminent religious leaders of Nishapur, Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī, tried to dissuade him from losing himself in this obscure place: 'They pleaded with Our Shaikh in these terms, "O Shaikh, however one looks at it, Maihana is in the deep countryside (*rūstā*); what a sad loss it will be if you bury yourself there!".' After Abū Sa'īd was established at Maihana, the news of his saintliness reached the community of Ṣūfīs at Sarakhs, but they were sceptical that anyone of note could be living out in a *rustāq*. Similarly, the Seljuq Vizier Kundurī lamented that Ibn Funduq's grandfather, the *Ra'īs* Abū'l-Qāsim Baihaqī, a fine scholar and poet, should choose to bury his talents in a *rustāq*.[18] Despite such attitudes as these, city, village and countryside formed an integrated social and economic whole; each required the others for its own well-being.

Nishapur and its villages lie in a plain bounded on the north-west by the fairly low Kūh-i Chaghatai and on the north-east by a rather higher mountain chain, the modern Binālūd-Kūh, which separates Nishapur from Ṭūs and Mashhad. This is comparatively steep on the Nishapur side, rising to over 11,000 feet, but to the east it rolls downwards as a wide plateau, much of which is at four to five thousand feet and is dotted with villages and orchards. This was a very attractive region for townspeople to visit. The village of Bushtaqān or Būshangān was a favoured pleasure-resort (*tamāshāgāh*) of the Nishapurians; it was here that Shaikh Abū Sa'īd once gave a sumptuous feast for 2000 of the people of Nishapur. Mustaufī mentions a delightful spring on the Ṭūs side popular for holiday excursions. From the mountain ridges many streams run down through the Nishapur oasis and lose themselves in the salt desert to the west. One of them, the Saghāwar river, was especially important for irrigating the city itself.[19]

The soil of the oasis was very fertile. Its 'black earth', *turba 'alika*, indicates a loamy nature, and nearly a century and a half ago, J. B. Fraser found a good proportion of loam to sand in it. He also mentions a thick carpeting of grass over much of the oasis; this has resulted from the conversion of the mixed arable-pastoral farming of pre-Seljuq times into the predominance of pasture under the Turkmen and Kurdish nomads. On his mission to Timur, Clavijo saw the herds of sheep, cattle and camels of the Kurds who wandered here as tributaries of Timur. Yet the district still supported a dense agricultural population; the decisive event in its transformation was the ascendancy of the Özbegs on the borders of Khurasan.[20]

Thus Nishapur in the 11th century was the market centre for a rich agricultural region. It was also, as we have seen, a centre for industry and commerce, but the artisan and trading population of the city could not have been maintained without the imports of food and the human replacements of healthy peasants from the *rustāqs*, for the cities were insalubrious and mortality there was high. The bulk of agricultural produce in the Nishapur oasis was consumed locally, although certain luxury foodstuffs like truffles and that curious *specialité du pays* of eastern Persia and of the district of Zauzan in particular, edible earth, were exported as far as Egypt and the Turkish lands.[21] In the 10th century, Nishapur had to import a consider-

able proportion of its foodstuffs from the *rustāq* of Ustuwā, which lay a fair distance away, towards Nasā and on the headwaters of the Atrek; Khabūshān, the modern Kuchan, was its urban centre. As the name Ustuwā implies, it was an elevated plateau, and had corn fields watered by rain (*mabākhis*) as well as artificially irrigated ones. Sarakhs was less well favoured for water, but it too was a cereal-growing area and supplier of Nishapur; Maqdisī compares the amount of grain exported each week from Sarakhs to that sent from Old Cairo to Qulzūm and the Hijaz.[22] It is clear that the resources of the Nishapur oasis alone did not suffice for the city's alimentary needs, and that the agricultural production of more distant regions was to some extent geared to the city's needs, just as the provisioning of another great city of Khurasan, Herat, depended on the surrounding province of Bādghīs. Concerning agricultural techniques in Khurasan, it is unfortunate that a 'precious' book on agriculture (*dihqānī*) by a scholar of Baihaq, Abū Dujāna, has not survived, for the information in it seems to have been of value. Ibn Funduq quotes from it a passage on the cultivation of almond trees, and another on the fact that the niluphar would not grow in the Nishapur region; its fruit had to be imported from Balkh.[23]

The villages and hamlets of the oases of Khurasan were thickly sprinkled in the fertile valleys and on the stretches of plain. Maqdisī counted 6000 villages and 120 Friday mosques with *minbars* in the twelve *rasātīq* of northern Khurasan, and this survey excluded the regions of Ṭūs, Nasā and Abīward. Iṣṭakhrī contrasts this density with the more scattered distribution of nucleated villages in upland Qūhistān, each separated from the other by stretches of steppe ranged over by Turkish nomads.[24] Much of the land in the Nishapur oasis was laid out as orchard and garden, as well as in tillage, and extensive estates (*ḍiyā'*) were to be found.

Stock-rearing was also important in Khurasan, providing food, means of transport and raw materials for local industry. Camels, used as beasts of burden, were reared mainly on the northern fringes adjoining the steppes. Sarakhs in particular was the 'depôt for pack animals, supplying both Transoxania and the Khurasanian towns'; in the early 19th century it was still a great mart for horses and camels, and animals from the steppes were sold there. Sheep came mainly from outside

Khurasan, although there were within the province stretches of excellent pasture, some of which, like the Ūlang-i Rādkān between Mashhad and Khabūshān, have played significant parts in history as the camping and grazing grounds of armies. Sheep were imported from Ghūr and from the Khalaj Turk nomads of eastern Afghanistan and above all, from the Oghuz of the Qara Qum and beyond.[25] All in all, the interdependence of agricultural and pastoral economies is seen very clearly in this part of Asia.

Azerbaijan is the only province of Persia where dry-farming can be practised at all extensively. In Khurasan, artificial irrigation was the norm, and where fields were watered by rain alone, the geographers mention the fact. As in much of Persia, the *qanāt* or *kārīz* was a feature of the Nishapur oasis, and their shafts and mounds dotted the landscape, forming hazards for night travellers. The *qanāt* was often a small masterpiece of hydraulic construction, and the profession of *qanāt*-digger (*muqannī*, *qannā'*) was a highly-skilled and often hereditary one.[26]

In Nishapur itself, use was made of the streams which ran swiftly down from the mountains to the north-east and which provided cold water in the hottest weather. The Saghāwar one ran across the oasis towards the city for two farsakhs. It passed through the village of Bushtaqān, and turned seventy water-mills and filled many tanks and cisterns en route. In Mustaufī's time (sc. the 14th century), many *qanāts* had become ruinous, but there were still forty water-mills where the rapid current ground the grain down at amazing speed. When it neared the city, the water was canalised into *qanāts*. Some of the shafts down to water level in these *qanāts* were a hundred steps deep. They gave individual water supplies to the houses and gardens within the city and cooled the *sardābs* beneath the houses. Amongst the *qanāts* of Nishapur are mentioned those supplying the quarters of al-Ḥīra, (?) Balfāwā and Bāb Ma'mar and the Street of the Perfumers, the *qanāts* of Abū 'Amr al-Khaffāf, Shādyākh, Suwār, Sahl-tāshīn, Ḥamra-yi ulyā and that of Jahm from the village of Dastjird and the upper *qanāt* from the village of Jūrī. The water came up again at the other side of the city and was led off to irrigate fields and agricultural estates.[27]

We do not have such detailed information on the irrigation system of Nishapur as we possess, for instance, on the systems of

Qum and Merv, but we can infer that it was equally well-organised.[28] The system at Qum resembled what is known of the Nishapur one; water was channelled to cultivated fields and estates outside the town, and inside the town was run off in surface channels (and in places, through underground pipes) for domestic use and for gardens and orchards. Consequently, there was ample water for the land, for the *ḥammāms* and for private houses. The shares in the water at Qum were registered and were minutely regulated; at least in the period before the incoming Ziyārids and Būyids introduced changes in administration and property rights, there was a *Dīwān-i Āb* to supervise affairs. The water at Merv was regulated by a department called the *Dīwān al-Kastabzūd* (< Persian *kāst-afzūd* 'decrease-increase', the reference being to the repartition of the *kharāj* of the proprietors of the channels, where assessment was according to the waters over which rights were held). At Nishapur, we know of a group of officials concerned with the irrigation system, called *quwwām wa ḥafaẓa*, whose functions corresponded to those of the *Muqassim al-Mā'* and his staff at Merv, i.e. they repartitioned the water and kept the *qanāts* and channels in good repair. Doubtless too, as at Qum, fish from the *qanāts* formed an addition to the Nishapurians' diet; Fraser noticed how full of fish the *qanāts* of Nishapur were.[29]

Both surface irrigation works and underground *qanāts* are expensive to lay out and to maintain. Sudden spates of water after storms and after the melting of snows stretched and burst banks and made the tunnels of *qanāts* collapse, necessitating major salvage works. Agriculture by irrigation requires high-level direction and considerable capital resources, and it is these points which have led Karl Wittfogel in his *Oriental despotism* to discern a common social and political pattern in the irrigated areas of Asia, of America and of Africa, the 'agro-managerial hydraulic society'. Even today, in a Persian province like Kirmān, the upkeep of the *qanāts* is very expensive, because of the soft, sandy ground, and large landownership is the norm; the peasants are poor, peasant proprietorship is almost non-existent and the landlord's share in crop-sharing agreements is high.[30]

Because of these considerations, the lead in irrigation construction had often to come from local rulers, landowners or notables. At Qazwīn, the construction of *qanāts* replaced earlier

dependence on deep wells, and Mustaufī mentions various governors of his home town as active in this work; amongst them was the governor whom Maḥmūd of Ghazna installed soon after he had conquered the city, Ḥamza b. Ilyasaʿ, whose *kārīz* was still in use in Mustaufī's own day. At Qum, the *qanāts* of Sāsānid times had fallen into ruin, and the digging of over twenty new ones was the work of the Arab colonists from Kūfa, amongst whom the Ashʿarī family were especially prominent.[31] We do not know whether the initiative in developing and improving the irrigation system of Nishapur came from Arab or Iranian elements. Nishapur was never so predominantly an Arab military colony as were Qazwīn and Qum, but it is recorded that ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir, when he was governor of Khurasan, expended a million dirhams of his own fortune on *qanāts* at Nishapur, and his interest in irrigation questions is shown by his commissioning jurists from Khurasan and Iraq to compile an authoritative textbook on the legal aspects of *qanāts* and the allocation of water. According to Gardīzī, this *Kitāb al-qunī* was still the basis of current practice two centuries later. The notables of Nishapur dominated the life of the city in Sāmānid and Ghaznavid times, and their work as public benefactors touched many aspects of Khurasanian life. Thus Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAlī al-Muṭṭawwiʿ (d. 376/986), a member of the prominent Nishapur family of Mīkālīs, was a great benefactor of Farāwa, building there ribāṭs and endowing them with *auqāf*, and constructing *qanāts* in many villages of the region.[32] Such men felt that works like these were part of the religious and social responsibilities of their class, but they also furthered their personal interests as landowners.

4 *The topography and demography of the city of Nishapur*

Nishapur was of some importance in Sāsānid times, but in the early Islamic period it was eclipsed by Merv, the capital of Khurasan and the bastion of Muslim arms in the north-east. Nishapur was a 'spontaneous' and not a 'created' town, as were the Arab garrison towns. It had a garrison, as the name of the quarter al-Ḥīra shows, but it was not a key military point as were Qazwīn and Merv. The city's political rise in Islam seems to be connected with the success of the Abbasid *daʿwa* in Khurasan. Abū Muslim built a Friday mosque and a *Dār al-*

Imāra with a cupola and four basilican *īwāns* in the style employed by al-Ḥajjāj at Wāsiṭ. But Nishapur did not begin to overtake Merv in political and administrative importance till 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir made it his capital. Its comparatively dry and healthy climate, in contrast to the damp and febrile one of Merv, probably favoured its rise. During the Ṣaffārid occupation, some public buildings were erected: 'Amr b. Laith enlarged Abū Muslim's wooden mosque into a splendid structure with columns of fired brick, gilded tiles as ornaments, eleven doors with marble columns and a roof of three compartments each with its dome.[33]

In the 10th century, Nishapur assumed the tripartite layout of a typical eastern Islamic city.[34] It had a citadel (*quhandiz*, *ḥiṣn*), from which a road ran into the adjacent city proper (*shahrastān*, *madīna*). There were gates from the citadel into this city and into the suburb (*bīrūn*, *rabaḍ*) which surrounded them both. The markets were situated in the suburb or outer city. Around the Great Square and the Lesser Square were market halls (*khānbārāt*) where commercial transactions were done, and warehouses (*fanādiq*) where the various wares were stored and where the great merchants were to be found. Below these were humbler warehouses, caravanserais, workshops and booths, filled with such artisans as hat-makers, shoemakers, cordwainers and ropemakers. Highest in wealth and prestige were the clothiers, whose market halls and warehouses accommodated merchants from almost every region of the Islamic world. These commercial and industrial quarters of the city were teeming and chaotic, and this aspect of the place displeased the fastidious Maqdisī, otherwise favourably impressed by its prosperity. In a critical passage he adverts to its unclean streets, jumbled-up *khāns*, foul baths, sordid shops and dilapidated city walls. Nor did the local people please him; he alleges that boorishness (*jifā'*) was their salient characteristic, and that turbulence and faction were engrained in them, so that they had no respect for authority, for the *muḥtasib*, *khaṭīb*, *imām* or *mudhakkir*.[35]

Surrounding the city were its walls. In such a rich province as Khurasan, walls were an important factor in security. They did not hold up a determined invader—Curzon remarked that Nishapur 'has certainly been destroyed and rebuilt more than any other city in the world'[36]—but they did give protection against lesser marauders such as brigands and '*ayyārs* and

against long-ranging nomad bands. Hence when a town rebelled, it was often later punished by the razing of its walls, so that it might better feel its dependence on its master.

When Fraser crossed the Nishapur plain, he saw that all the villages dotted over it were in the form of square forts with towers at the corners. These may have been built to keep off Özbeg raiders, but were more probably a feature of the region from earlier times. The walls of Nishapur itself are mentioned at several points in the city's history. As re-founded in Sāsānid times by Shāpūr I, Nishapur is said to have been laid out on a chess-board pattern with walls 15,000 paces round, and after the transference of the city's population in 629/1232 from the suburb of Shādyākh back to the old site, the new city again had walls 15,000 paces round.[37] However, these walls were not necessarily massive stone ramparts. The number of times in which the city fell into the hands of conquerors shows that the walls were far from impassable. In the 19th century Nishapur had merely a mud wall and ditch round it, and its defences can have been little more elaborate in earlier times. When in 429/1038 a single band of Turkmens appeared, the *a'yān* immediately wrote off the town as indefensible (see below, Ch. IX, § 3). Likewise, the walls around the town of Baihaq consisted at this time of a wall which, though strong and provided with platforms from which the defenders could fight, only reached the height of two men. Spears could easily reach the top and cavalrymen could use their swords there. Hence in 464/1071-2 Niẓām al-Mulk had it raised. After the Ghuzz devastations of 548/1153 and after the move to Shādyākh, the new area of settlement at Nishapur was enclosed with a wall, but because of population losses consequent on the disruption of Khurasan's economy by the Ghuzz, the wall was of reduced circumference. When Shādyākh was rebuilt after an earthquake in 605/1208, the wall's circuit was only 6900 paces. When a Ghūrid army under the Sultan Ghiyāth ad-Dīn Muḥammad appeared at Nishapur in 597/1200-1, the walls seem to have been fairly substantial, for the attackers thought that they would have to use battering-rams to get at the garrison holding it for the Khwārizmshāhs. But in the event, two of the towers collapsed of their own accord from the weight of the defenders on them, 'in such wise that not one brick remained upon another, and Nishapur was taken'.[38]

The zone of Persia where clay was the basic building material extended eastwards through Khurasan until the rocky core of Afghanistan was reached and stone could be procured. The initial offensive of the Seljuqs came to a halt in the region where mountainous topography becomes more extensive and more elevated, and Balkh remained in Ghaznavid hands for some twenty years until 451/1059. The lack of a cheap, substantial building material has always been one of the bottlenecks of Khurasanian life. The traditional materials there have been clay and sun-dried brick. Even fired brick only came into use gradually in the Islamic period, and timberwork was only to be found in well-wooded regions like the Caspian provinces. These limitations of material have given a distinctive bias to the architectural development of eastern Persia, seen, for example, in the absence of large doming.[39] It is not therefore surprising that questions of building materials and fortification interested Khurāsānīs. We see this clearly in Nāṣir-i Khusrau's account of his travels, for he always shows an intense interest in walls and defences, above all when they are of stout stone. He describes the splendid fortifications of places like Mayyāfāriqīn and Āmid before dealing with anything else there, and shows particular interest in their gates, which were wholly of iron and not wooden. As he progresses through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Diyārbakr, Syria and Palestine, his interest in the defences of their towns is sustained. Clearly, this preoccupation represents the interest and envy of a traveller from a land where stone was a luxury material.[40]

In assessing the size and population of Nishapur, we can only proceed by inference. We need not assume that because of their richness, the towns of Khurasan were great concentrations of population; importance was not correlative with sheer size. In the oases of Khurasan, town and countryside were interdependent and the boundaries between the two ways of life often fluid. The *a'yān* of Nishapur frequently held estates and gardens in the countryside outside the city. The Sāmānid Vizier Abū'l-Muẓaffar Barghashī had a garden at Muḥammadābād outside the city, a village which was so popular for country residences that land-values there were very high (see below, p. 261), and Baihaqī's master, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, had a house and garden there. This village adjoined Shādyākh, the suburb to the south-west of the city and to the south of the modern city of Nishapur,

and in Sāmānid and Ghaznavid times it was the seat of the *Dīwān* of Khurasan, away from the insalubrious city. Here Mas'ūd of Ghazna built a palace with courts and pavilions, and here Maḥmūd's minister Ḥasanak (see below, pp. 182-4) had a palace which Mas'ūd appropriated for use as a residence for official guests after Ḥasanak's fall.[41] Shādyākh, already a popular residential area in the time of 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir, who had built a palace and stationed his troops there, took the place of the old city of Nishapur after the sacking by the Ghuzz, until in 629/1232 people moved back to the old site.

A limiting factor in the size of the Khurasanian towns was the problem of provisioning. Although much food came from local gardens and orchards, we have seen that Nishapur had to import meat and grain from outside the Nishapur oasis (above, pp. 153-4). We do not know how this traffic was organised. Grain could be borne on the backs of beasts of burden, and cattle and sheep could be driven into the city and then slaughtered. But for other, more perishable commodities, a system of transport and distribution would have been required, and of such arrangements we know little. Poor communications, endemic banditry and the arbitrary behaviour of political authority, all these discouraged potential entrepreneurs from putting their abilities and capital into such channels. The small-scale traffic in such luxury foodstuffs as the melons of Khwārizm and Transoxania, which, according to Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā'if al-ma-'ārif*, 129, were in the 9th century exported as far as Iraq, does not invalidate this point. Moreover, rural cultivators did not generally look further than the main town of their *rustāq* or oasis as a market for their surplus produce or for any cash crops which they might grow; and here again the fiscal demands of the authorities often discouraged farming at too high a level above subsistence.

This comparative inelasticity of supply and distribution, together with the exactions of governments, helps explain the grievous famines which attacked both town and countryside in Khurasan whenever adverse physical conditions arose. 'Utbī portrays graphically the horrors of famine in Khurasan when in 401/1011 the crops failed to ripen after an exceptionally heavy winter. In Nishapur alone ('Utbī must mean the whole oasis) 100,000 people are said to have died. People ate plants from the fields and boiled down old bones; newly-buried corpses

were exhumed, and human flesh sold openly on the streets; parents ate their own children; and men were enticed away and killed and their fat melted down, so that people were afraid to stray outside the central part of the city unless armed and in groups. Ibn Funduq says that the famine arose less from a dearth of provisions than from a disease which caused voracious hunger (*ʿillat-i jūʿ-i kalbī*), so that the more people ate, the less they were satisfied. Yet there were at one time during this crisis period large quantities of unsold corn stored away in Nishapur; and we have other instances of the localness of many famines, where places suffered tragic dearth whilst adjacent regions were enjoying plenty.[42]

Although we have no explicit figures on the size and population of Nishapur, we can get some indirect help from Nāṣir-i Khusrau again. He was a native of Khurasan and a typical member of the Persian secretarial class. He served first the Ghaznavids and then the Seljuqs, working for Chaghrï Beg as a financial official at Merv.[43] From his official experience we may regard him as a judicious observer. His interest in questions of topography, population and economic life is manifest throughout the *Safar-nāma*, and during his travels his standards of comparison are always with his Khurasanian homeland. Thus Jerusalem, with 20,000 inhabitants, was a 'great city'. The Qarmathian capital of Laḥsā in Baḥrain, which could field 20,000 armed men, and had also its women and children and 30,000 slaves, had 'all that constitutes a great city'. The towns within the Fāṭimid empire of Egypt, Palestine and Syria all impressed him tremendously, and we need not necessarily assume that his well-known Shīʿī sympathies influenced him here unduly, for he shows in general a spirit of fairness and tolerance. He estimated the population of Tripoli at 20,000, and even Askelon impressed him as a great city. New Cairo, al-Qāhira, dazzled him, and he estimated the population of Old Cairo, Miṣr, at five times that of Nishapur.[44] Nāṣir-i Khusrau's observations confirm what has just been emphasised, that the cities of Khurasan did not need to be greatly populous to be economically important. Perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 would be a fair estimate for the population of Nishapur in the early 11th century.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF NISHAPUR

1 *The* ʿaṣabiyyāt *of Khurasan*

The localism of Khurasanian life has already been stressed in connection with economic life. The same localism operated in the sphere of social relations and of belief. Frequently it expressed itself in the formation of groups and factions held together by adherence to some strongly-held political or religious view or by the pursuit of some common social purpose; contemporaries designated such a group or faction as an *ʿaṣabiyya* and its unifying belief as *taʿaṣṣub*.

We may begin by noting Maqdisī's information on the *ʿaṣabiyyāt* of Khurasan. One of Maqdisī's claims to be the greatest Muslim geographer of his age lies in the element of sociological information which he gives and which marks off his work from the jejune cataloguing of place-names, local products, roads and stages which characterised much of the earlier, road-book type of geography. Some of his opinions, e.g. that ports and riverine towns are centres of vice or that regions surrounded by rivers and waters have turbulent and rebellious populations, are more curious than profound; but the sections which he consecrates to the religious opinions and fanaticisms of the various provinces are of outstanding value and have not yet been fully utilised by historians.

Maqdisī stresses that in general, Khurasan was orthodox in religion (*mustaqīm*). He excepts from the *Ahl al-Jamāʿa* only the pockets of Khawārij in Sīstān and the districts around Herat, and 'the people who wear white' in the rural parts of Haiṭal, i.e. the provinces along the upper Oxus, 'whose beliefs approach *zandaqa*'. These must be counted under a heading he has previously given of 'rural sectaries', *allatī fī'-rasātīq*, amongst whom he names the Zaʿfarāniyya, Khurramdīniyya, Abyaḍiyya and Sarakhsiyya. Of the last, followers of ʿAbdallāh as-Sarakhsī, he speaks with respect, that they are people who practise asceticism and seek God's presence. The Zaʿfarāniyya must be the followers of az-Zaʿfarānī, whom al-Baghdādī describes as a man of Ray whose teachings stressed the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān.[1] It is interesting to see the other two sects, descendants of two

of the most powerful movements of Iranian national protest, al-Muqanna''s Mubayyiḍa and Bābak's Khurramdīniyya, identified with the peasantry and countryside. The Mubayyiḍa had arisen in 158/775 in the Zarafshān basin. The movement had united Iranian discontent with the Abbasids; Turkish restiveness under Arab political control; and al-Muqanna''s own religious claims to be an incarnation of God's Spirit which had passed through Abū Muslim to himself. Bābak's movement of the Muḥammira, 'people who wear red', was really a rebellion in Azerbaijan against the Caliphate; it continued for several years and spread to many other parts of Persia before Bābak was caught and executed in 223/838. Bābak himself was militantly anti-Muslim and his movement included dualist and neo-Mazdakist elements. Other Iranian religious movements were more specifically Khurasanian: Bihāfarīd was born at Zauzan; Sonpādh seems to have come from Nishapur; and Ustādhsis' movement arose in Bādghīs.[2]

These episodes illustrate the long history of disturbance and ferment in the Persian countryside, for orthodox, institutional Islam affected the urban populations and the landowning classes more than the peasantry. The towns were more open to new influences than the countryside. Moreover, the urban and mercantile ethos of Islam gave the merchant and artisan classes certain advantages, whereas Zoroastrianism, with its taboos and its elevation of the land and natural elements over the artificiality of commercial life, had constricted them. The landowners or dihqāns had a political and social motive for adopting Sunnī Islam, for by doing this they preserved their social and tenurial privileges. The peasants, with their minds turned inwards by the agricultural round and the struggle against natural conditions, were least touched by these considerations. Superficially Islamised, their social discontent and hatred against authority often erupted in the form of heterodox Muslim movements, in which extreme Shī'ī and Messianic ideas mingled with older Iranian beliefs; Zoroastrian currents are often discernible, although none of the uprisings seems to have been led by an orthodox Zoroastrian. It is not therefore surprising that remnants of these movements and sects should linger on in the rural and mountainous parts of Khurasan. They had little specific intellectual or doctrinal content, a fact which in the 10th century made it easy for Ismā'īlī *dā'īs* to work amongst

them. It also made it easy for any ambitious adventurer, like the Mahdī who arose in Chaghāniyān in 322/934. This false prophet attracted to his side large numbers of the 'ignorant masses' (*'āmma-yi juhhāl*), before the local ruler, Abū 'Alī Aḥmad Chaghānī, suppressed him on behalf of the Sāmānid government; but his supporters lingered on long after his death, awaiting their leader's return.[3] During the 11th century, these vaguely-articulated voices of protest come only occasionally within the purview of contemporary writers, but it is hard to believe that Messianic and religious ideas were not present in some at least of the peasant jacqueries we read about.

Thus Maqdisī, when he describes divisions within the Islamic *jamā'a* in Khurasan, is thinking primarily of the town populations, which were largely Sunnī, but had within this wider unity fierce sectarian divisions. The Ḥanafī law school already predominated in his time in Khurasan and Transoxania, and was to continue gaining ground in the next century under the patronage of Turkish dynasties, but Shāfi'ism was still very influential. In the 10th century, Shāfi'ism made much progress in Transoxania through the teaching of Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Qaffāl ash-Shāshī (d. 365/975-6), called by al-Ḥākim b. al-Bayyi' the greatest Shāfi'ī scholar of his age in that region. Maqdisī names several towns on the northern edge of Khurasan and in the Syr Darya basin where it was dominant: Shāsh, Īlāq, Ṭūs, Nasā, Abīward, Ṭarāz, Ṣanghāj, the environs of Bukhārā, Sinj, Dandānqān, Isfarā'in and Jūyān. In the 13th century, Khīva remained Shāfi'ī when the rest of Khwārizm had become Ḥanafī.[4] It seems that in Maqdisī's time Shāfi'ism was receding in a northwards direction, but substantial proportions of the peoples of Herat, Sīstān, Sarakhs, Merv and Merv ar-Rūdh were still Shāfi'ī. Furthermore, the *khaṭībs* at Nishapur and in one of the two Merv *jāmi's* were Shāfi'īs, and in the Merv *jāmi's* the *ṣalāt* was performed according to both the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī rites. The third main Sunnī element in the towns of Khurasan was that of the Karāmiyya sect, who are described as having a strong party (*jalaba*) in Herat and Gharchistān and as possessing several *khānqāhs* in Merv, the upper Oxus provinces and Transoxania. We know from both the historians and the heresiologists that the Karāmiyya were a vociferous and pushing group in Nishapur for at least two centuries (see below, § 3). Maqdisī mentions that there was a

sizeable minority of Muʿtazila in Nishapur; this sect seems to have been particularly long-lived in eastern Islam. He also mentions the Shīʿa as a minority in the city, and the community of ʿAlids there was accorded the respect usually given to descendants of the *Ahl al-Bait* (see below, § 5). But it is clear that at this time (sc. c. 980), moderate, Twelver Shīʿism was not yet a major factor in the Sunnī towns of Khurasan. Finally, Maqdisī mentions odd reminiscences of earlier Islamic sects. The Jahmiyya predominated amongst the people of Tirmidh and the Qadariyya amongst the people of Kundur; and the ruler of Gharchistān, the Shēr, followed the practice of Ibn Masʿūd in certain matters of ritual.[5]

He then passes to the *ʿaṣabiyyāt* of Khurasan, commenting that there were very few places without them. In Nishapur, enmity existed between the western side of the city, where it rose up to Manīshak, and the other side of the city, by the quarter of al-Ḥīra. Originally, there had been no religious element in this, but latterly it had become a Shīʿī-Karāmī struggle, an illustration of how a purely secular division easily acquired a sectarian religious tinge. In Sīstān, the Ḥanafī Samakiyya opposed the Shāfiʿī Ṣadaqiyya, and the ruler had to intervene to stop the resultant bloodshed. It is perhaps worthy of note that according to the *Taʾrīkh-i Sīstān*, this division was originally introduced by the Arabs.[6] In Sarakhs, the ʿArūsiyya were Ḥanafī and the Ahliyya Shāfiʿī. In Herat there were the Karāmiyya and the ʿAmaliyya (these last presumably received this name from their opposition to that section of the Karāmiyya which denied the efficacy of good works; cf. Maqdisī, 38). At Merv, the people of the town proper, the Madaniyya, opposed the people of the Old Market. At Nasā, the people of the Khanah quarter opposed those who lived at the top end of the market; at Abīward, the Kardārī group opposed the people of the upper part of the town.[7] Thus whilst some of these factions were grouped around a religious watchword, others were ostensibly topographical, comprising the inhabitants of a certain quarter or part of a town. Claude Cahen, in a thoughtful analysis of Maqdisī's passages on the *ʿaṣabiyyāt* of Persia, has pointed out that such violent factional strife, which often went so far as to provoke the ruin of whole quarter or town, is hardly explicable in purely religious terms. There must certainly have been social factors involved, although

we can only guess at their nature.[8] It may even be that purely irrational factors were present, such as those of involuntary group coalescence or of an engrained love of faction and partisanship.

A consideration of these *ʿaṣabiyyāt* leads us on to the further question of the links between them and the phenomena of *ʿiyāra* and *ṣaʿlaka,* roughly explicable as turbulent mob behaviour, lawlessness and banditry. Cahen has attempted to distinguish between *ʿiyāra* as an essentially urban phenomenon and *ṣaʿlaka* as a rural one, but frequent references to *ʿayyārs* in the countryside make this distinction a doubtful one.[9] It does seem in order to see, with Cahen, a connection between the *ʿaṣabiyyāt* and the para-military, sporting and gymnastic organisations which have had an almost continuous existence in Persia from early times to the present day. Some of these military and athletic energies were canalised into the urban organisations of *fityān* and *aḥdāth,* especially in western Persia, Iraq and Syria (for some evidence on their existence in Nishapur, see below, pp. 261-2). Beyond the confines of the towns there were always opportunities for the energetic and bellicose on the frontiers of Islam as ghāzīs. Khurasan and Transoxania in the 10th and 11th centuries provided large numbers of ghāzīs for such activities as manning the ribāṭs on the fringes of the Central Asian steppes and the Ghaznavid campaigns in India (see above, p. 114). However, these ghāzīs could equally be a source of unrest within the settled lands of Islam and a scourge to peaceable citizens. The force of 20,000 Khurasanian ghāzīs which came westwards in 355/966 to Ray, ostensibly to fight the Byzantines and Armenians, brought rapine and violence to Jibāl; the Būyid Rukn ad-Daula regarded their appearance as a Sāmānid plot against his dynasty, and he defeated them and hurled them back to Khurasan. That the boundary between *ghuzāt*, *ʿayyārūn* and *fityān* could be a fluid one appears from a subsequent episode in the history of this wave of ghāzī-activity provoked by the Byzantine successes in eastern Anatolia. At Baghdad in 361/971-2, popular response to the threat to the faith caused an outbreak of lawlessness; Ibn al-Athīr ascribes it to the thronging-together of groups of (?) Nabawiyya, *Fityān*, Sunnīs, Shīʿīs and *ʿAyyārs* for *ghazw*.[10]

Nevertheless, the *futuwwa* and its adherents was usually a clearly-defined social and para-military unit in society, and can

be generally distinguished from the *'ayyārs*, who emerge from the sources as a more lawless and anti-social element. Complaints about the *'ayyārūn* and *ṣa'ālīk* are perennial among the historians. Their ubiquity in Khurasan, as in other parts of Persia and Iraq, suggests that they included bandits, vagabonds and irregular troops, and that they were continually replenished by desperadoes loving an unfettered life, by peasants forced out of agriculture through lack of land or through fiscal oppression, by discharged and unemployed soldiers, etc. In the early 10th century we hear of a man who was discharged from the Sāmānid army as being too old, so went off and stirred up 'all the people and riff-raff of Sīstān' against the local Sāmānid governor. The disturbance caused in Persia by the Oghuz incursions favoured the spread of brigandage; in the west, Basāsīrī had to march into Ahwāz against Kurdish and Arab robbers who had taken advantage of the Turkmens' depredations to cloak their own activities.[11] Sometimes *'ayyār* bands arose from lawful vigilante groups of citizens which got out of hand. In 11th century Iraq, the citizens of Baghdad went out against predatory Bedouins who were infesting the neighbourhood, 'and that was one of the causes for the increase of *'ayyārūn* and the spread of evildoers'. In Sīstān, bands of *mutaṭawwi'a* were formed against the Khawārij, and out of one of these arose the Ṣaffārids. The *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān* shows that for two or three centuries after this the *'ayyārs* remained a powerful element in the province. They seem to have been organised with a definite pattern of military commands, for *sarhangān* and *naqībān* of the *'ayyārs* are mentioned. The later Ṣaffārids were at times dependent on their support, and when the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids intervened in Sīstān, the *'ayyārs* were the core of local resistance. As a result, to the author of the *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, *'ayyārī* is a term of praise, to be equated with *muruwwa*.[12]

We have detailed information about a sharp outbreak of violence in 425/1034 between the two Khurasanian cities of Nishapur and Ṭūs, in which the Ṭūsīs were joined by a contingent from Abīward and by other mischief-makers. During an absence at the Sultan's court in Ghazna of the civil governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, the people of Ṭūs and Abīward rose under the leadership of a man of Abīward who was an adviser to the remnants of the family of the famous Amīr of Ṭūs in the middle years of the 10th century, Abū Manṣūr b. 'Abd ar-Razzāq.

They marched over the mountain range separating Ṭūs from Nishapur, down through the village of Bushtaqān, intent on plundering Nishapur: 'making an uproar, tumult and din, they came running and hurrying along, just as if all the gates of the caravanserais in Nishapur had been flung open'. Fortunately for the Nīshāpūrīs, the Sultan's general Aḥmad b. 'Alī Nūshtigin was at hand, having just arrived from Kirmān with part of his defeated army (see above, p. 90). He organised over 20,000 of the townspeople, who were armed with weapons, clubs and stones, and instructed them to make a frightening clamour against the Ṭūsīs, so that their shouting, drums and trumpets were 'like the pandemonium on the Day of Resurrection'. In the morning, the Ṭūsīs poured in 'like ants and locusts', having 300 mounted men as well as five or six thousand armed men on foot. Aḥmad b. 'Alī Nūshtigin had 2000 infantry and several hundred cavalry, and his tactical skill and training as a professional soldier enabled him to draw the Ṭūsīs into an ambush and then rout them. He pursued them for three farsakhs as far as the village of Khālanjūy. Gallows were set up in Nishapur and captured Ṭūsīs hanged and gibbeted. Aḥmad b. 'Alī Nūshtigin also took members from the families of prominent men (*zu'amā'*) of the Tūs district as hostages for future good behaviour.[13]

Spuler treats this as a rising of *'ayyārs*, 'unzufriedener . . . Schichten'. He suggests that Turkmen ravages may have deprived them of their livelihood, and this may well be true. More detailed is the Marxian analysis of the Soviet scholar B. Zakhoder, who has no doubts that we have here a class-struggle, a rising of the proletariat. He states that these events took place at the end of July or the beginning of August 1034, when the harvest had been reaped and the cultivators were required to hand over a portion of their produce as taxation.[14] In fact, the rising must have been in July rather than early August, for the first news of it reached Ghazna some time in the second half of Ramaḍān = first half of August, although a full report did not come till a month later. The swiftest and most direct route between Nishapur and Ghazna, that via the Heri Rud valley and Ghūr, took fifteen days, but because of the difficult terrain, it was only used when exceptional haste was needed[15]; the more usual and longer routes were through northern Afghanistan or through Sīstān and Bust. In any case,

it seems an early date for the crops to have been already gathered in. But Zakhoder is right in drawing attention to the relative statuses of Nishapur and Ṭūs and to the fact that since the early 9th century Nishapur had been eclipsing the other city in importance. In the 11th century, Nishapur, the administrative capital of Khurasan, was the seat of a hated financial system. So the Ṭūsīs took advantage of the absence of Sūrī, head of this system. There may be a hint of this administrative jealousy in Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Nūshtigin's letter to Sultan Masʿūd, where he speaks of *taʿaṣṣub . . . az qadīm ad-dahr* between the two cities. Furthermore, Ṭūs was notorious for its turbulence and faction. Maqdisī calls it 'a house of bandits and a nest of rebels', and Ibn Funduq singles out the *ʿayyārs* of Ṭūs as the distinguishing element of the population there. Sectarian divisions within it were exacerbated by the existence of two great symbols of Shīʿism and of orthodoxy in the nearby village of Sanābād, the tombs of the Eighth Imām ʿAlī ar-Riḍā and of the Caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd. As Nishapur suffered too from *ʿiyāra*, many of the elements for a potential clash were present in both cities.[16]

That violence like this was not exceptional in Khurasan at this time may be further illustrated from the vicissitudes of Baihaq as recorded by its historian, Ibn Funduq. In 378/988 the Sabzawār region was attacked by raiders from Ṭūs, Isfarā'in and Juwain, who had banded together to devastate the oasis and to block up the *qanāts*; these marauders were routed by stout warriors summoned from the nearby villages. The contingent from one of these, Dīvrah, was led by the local Sālār of the Ghāzīs. There was in Baihaq itself a family, the Sālāriyān, descendants of one Abū'l-ʿAbbās al-Muḥsin b. ʿAlī al-Muṭ-ṭawwiʿ, a former *Ra'īs* of the town.[17] Ghāzīs who were not at the time employed on the frontiers of Islam or who had retired from front-line duty seem often to have been found in the local defence forces of the Khurasanian towns; hence the Sālār of the Ghāzīs was an important member of the notables of his town. Such local defence forces could not always stand up against professional armies, but were valuable, as here at Baihaq, for warding off bandits and nomads. Baihaq again suffered when in 396/1006 a certain Aḥmad Tuvāngar besieged the town for a month before he was killed. The Turkmen invasions unsettled the whole of the Khurasanian countryside, but at the opening of the 12th century the peasantry of the Baihaq oasis were

suffering also from the depredations of the *aṣḥāb-i qilāʿ* 'people in castles'; it is not clear whether these were rural *ʿayyārs* or perhaps Ismāʿīlīs. What peace there was in Khurasan in the second half of the 11th century came from the strength and unity of the Great Seljuq empire; after the death in 485/1092 of Malikshāh and the beginning of succession disputes within his family, the *ʿayyārs* got the upper hand at Baihaq until a police force of armed citizens and their slaves suppressed them.[18]

2 *The notables and orthodox ulema in Nishapur: Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanafīs*

We turn now to examine some of the groups within the population of Nishapur. In fact, our source material concerns almost exclusively members of what might be termed the landed classes and bourgeoisie, i.e. the rural landowners and urban notables or *aʿyān.* The local administrators of the city and the greater part of the religious leaders and teachers were drawn from these classes. The Ṣūfī shaikhs seem to have had considerable popular support, with enthusiastic followers among the urban petty trader and artisan classes. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the shaikhs themselves and their *murīds* came mainly from the lower strata of society in Khurasan; Shaikh Abū Saʿīd's father Abū'l-Khair was an *ʿaṭṭār*, i.e. druggist and grocer, in the small town of Maihana, and seems to have been a prosperous member of the community there.[19] Since we shall be dealing with people who came almost exclusively from the middle and upper ranks of society, it is convenient to consider them in the rest of this chapter primarily on a basis of religious affiliation, for in the strongly factional and sectarian atmosphere of the time, this was quite as important as social status.

As we have remarked, the ulema were by birth and status closely linked with the class of *aʿyān* who filled civic offices in Nishapur, often as semi-hereditary charges. For although in some ways Islam made the modern catch-phrase 'equality of opportunity' a reality, there was always a counter-feeling that the arcana of many offices and professions were best handed down within one group or family. So just as rulers sought their aides from Vizieral or secretarial families, so municipal charges like the *riyāsa* or *qaḍāʾ* were often kept within a restricted group.[20]

There was a common bond between the ulema and lay notables in that many of them had landowning and property interests, either privately or as part of their offices. The state allotted salaries to such officials as the *qāḍīs* and *khaṭībs*, but sometimes these were augmented by privately-given assignations of land to go with the office. Thus the Faqīh Abū Muḥammad al-Muʿallā b. Aḥmad, who was for a while *Ra'īs* of Nishapur during the Ghaznavid period, endowed estates and property for successive holders of the *qaḍā'* of Nishapur to enjoy; some of these endowments were still left in Ibn Funduq's time.[21] Where there was some divergence of outlook was in their respective attitudes to the external secular power, i.e. the Ghaznavid overlords of Khurasan. The viewpoint of the lay elements was an immediate one: how best could the social and economic interests of the city be furthered and protected? The religious classes had a deeper consciousness of being members of the whole Islamic community as well as of a particular city in Khurasan. Furthermore, they regarded the sovereign as the protector of orthodoxy and of the established order, and these considerations had to be reconciled with the local interests of Nishapur (see further, below, Ch. IX, § 4).

Of the lower classes, the shopkeepers, artisans, labourers, gardeners, domestic slaves, etc., we know little. The sources echo the attitude of the Muslim literate classes and lump them together as the turbulent and unstable *ghaughā'* or mob. The prevalence of the *ʿayyārs* has been noted in the previous section. A further element of violence in Nishapur seems to have come from the Turks employed in domestic service and perhaps too in domestic industry; we hear of robberies and assaults committed by drunken Turkish slaves. Indeed, there seems to have been an appreciable Turkish element in the Khurasanian towns before the Seljuq invasions, not all of whom were from the servile or labouring classes. Ibn Funduq has a section on the *Aulād at-Turk* of Nishapur and Baihaq, whom he describes as once numerous and as including faqīhs and imāms. Names like 'at-Turkī', 'Ṭarkhān', 'Khāqān', etc. occur in biographies of the Nishapur ulema, and al-Fārisī mentions a *Dār at-Turk* in Nishapur (=here, a Turkish quarter).[22] Nevertheless, despite the contempt of the upper for the lower classes, there are no signs of any real class hatred or jealousy between the ruling strata and the democracy. Religion was always there to bridge

the gap—not the formalised theology of the ulema, but the less inhibited piety of the dervish communities, not yet formally organised into *ṭarīqas*, but exercising their power through the personal saintliness of the local leader and his convent or *khānqāh*. We shall see such influence well displayed in the person of Shaikh Abū Sa'īd.

We have noted in the previous section Maqdisī's information on the *madhāhib* of Khurasan. If it is true that over the course of centuries the Ḥanafī rite gradually became dominant in the north-east, in the 11th century the intellectual appeal of Shāfi'-ism was commending it to some of the keenest minds among the ulema. At this time, the Ash'arīs were making orthodox *kalām* an incisive weapon against the Mu'tazila. Al-Ash'arī's own legal affiliations are dubious, although most authorities attach him to the Shāfi'īs after his conversion from the Mu'ta-zila; certainly, in the 11th century his theology came to be specially identified with Shāfi'ism. That Nīshāpūrī scholars of such eminence as Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and his son, the Imām al-Ḥaramain Abū'l-Ma'ālī, should fervently teach Shāfi'-ism and should pass on their learning to al-Ghazzālī, increased the attraction of Shāfi'ism for the learned classes. After the blast of official disapproval under the later Būyids and early Seljuqs had quietened down, the patronage of men like Niẓām al-Mulk and the promotion of Ash'arī and Shāfi'ī teaching in the mad-rasas enabled these doctrines to achieve full toleration and respect in the east.[23] It seems that in the east, Shāfi'ī purism in emphasising traditions from the Prophet and in rejecting accre-tions to the corpus of Ḥadīth recommended it to many thought-ful people, although from the numerical point of view, the Ḥanafī rite was probably more popular with the masses.

Nevertheless, the attractions of Shāfi'ism were by no means wholly intellectual. In the early 11th century it was widely adopted by many Khurasanian Ṣūfīs. Shaikh Abū Ya'lā Isḥāq Ṣābūnī, who was the brother of one of the most prominent Nishapur Shāfi'īs, Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī (see below, p. 179) and who frequently acted as his brother's deputy in preaching, was him-self a Ṣūfī. A certain Ja'far b. Ḥaidar Harawī (d. 481/1088) is described as 'Shaikh of the Ash'arī Ṣūfīs'.[24] In his youth Shaikh Abū Sa'īd imbibed Ash'arism from several eminent Khura-sanian scholars. His teachers at Merv were Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥuṣrī, himself a pupil at two removes of ash-Shāfi'ī, and Abū

Bakr al-Qaffāl. Then he passed on to the Imām Abū 'Alī Zāhir b. Aḥmad at Sarakhs. Abū 'Alī had been active in promoting the Shāfi'ī rite at Sarakhs, and was one of several Imāms, including Ḥumaid Zanjūya in Shahrastāna, Farāwa and Nasā; Abū 'Umar Fārābī in Ustuwā and Khabūshān; Abū Lubāba Maihanī in Abīward and Khābarān; and himself, Abū 'Alī, in Sarakhs, who had been spreading Shāfi'ism and combating the Mu'tazila in these regions. Shaikh Abū Sa'īd therefore became a Shāfi'ī, and in this period, asserts the Shaikh's biographer Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, many Ṣūfīs previously following other rites went over to Shāfi'ism.[25] A few decades later, al-Ghazzālī was able to unite Shāfi'ism with a deep respect for and insight into the Ṣūfī path.

Ḥanafism was the other great orthodox *madhhab* of the East, where it became linked with the Māturīdī *kalam*, whose founder, a Samarqandī contemporary of al-Ash'arī, had been a firm follower of Abū Ḥanīfa. It is often assumed that Ḥanafī school was the most liberal of the *madhāhib*, and as such, commended itself to the Turks and Mongols when they came into the Islamic world. The Ḥanafī attitude in law did tend to be less strict than the Shāfi'ī one, permitting as it did a freer use of *ra'y* and *qiyās* to supplement a narrow reliance on traditions from the Prophet, but the differences should not be pushed too far. Both the Māturīdīs and Ash'arīs were at one in their opposition to Mu'tazilī rationalism. Shaikh Abū Sa'īd's biographer is at pains to combat allegations that the Ḥanafī rite is too easy and the Shāfi'ī one too rigid; the points of variance, he says, are only on secondary matters, and not on basic principles. He frequently mentions opposition to the Shaikh and the Ṣūfīs in Nishapur on the part of the *Aṣḥāb ar-Ra'y*. Although this term became a popular one for the Ḥanafīs, its original application to them was, as Schacht has remarked (*EI*² Art. 'Abū Ḥanīfa'), largely adventitious; and there is no reason to suppose that the Ḥanafīs were at this time any more or less opposed in general to Ṣūfism than the Shāfi'īs were. Indeed, 'Alī b. 'Uthmān al-Hujwīrī, author of a pioneer treatise in Persian on Ṣūfism, the *Kashf al-maḥjūb*, was a keen Ḥanafī.[26]

In Nishapur, the Ḥanafīs were headed by such prominent families as the Ṣā'idīs and Tabānīs. The rite benefited from the patronage of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd of Ghazna; in Baihaqī, Maḥmūd speaks of it as the *madhhab-i rāst*. The Sultans often

chose members of the great Ḥanafī families for diplomatic and other official missions (see below, pp. 177-8). Royal patronage may have favoured the progress of the Sunnī revival in the east in its aspect of madrasa-building; even in a remote corner like Khuttal, there were already by 416/1025-6 over twenty madrasas, each fully endowed with *auqāf*.[27] It is clear that, whilst Niẓām al-Mulk's backing may have given the madrasa-building movement an impetus, it had begun well before his time.

For the first forty years or so of the 11th century the Qāḍī Abū'l-'Alā' Ṣā'id b. Muḥammad Ustuwā'ī led the Ḥanafīs of Nishapur. His prestige and wisdom were such that in al-Fārisī's biographical dictionary (see Note on the Sources, above, p. 14) he is often simply called *al-Qāḍī* without any of his personal names, the *qāḍī par excellence*.[28] He was born in 343/954 in the *rustāq* of Ustuwā, and learnt *adab* from Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Khwārizmī, *fiqh* from the Qāḍī Abū Naṣr b. Sahl and tradition from several authorities. Soon the fame of his learning spread beyond Khurasan; Ibn al-Jauzī, who does not normally concern himself with scholars unconnected with Iraq and Baghdad, accords him an obituary notice as head of the Ḥanafīs in Khurasan. The Qāḍī Ṣā'id made the Pilgrimage in 375/985, and was summoned to the Abbasid court in Baghdad to explain why in a *fatwā* he had refused to allow a covering to be erected over the tomb near Ṭūs of the Caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd. The Qāḍī's good sense and desire to keep down sectarian passions is shown in the reason he gave, that to have given a favourable reply would have inflamed the local Shī'a.[29]

During Maḥmūd's reign he was in high favour as the protagonist of orthodoxy and social stability in Nishapur. Known from his handsomeness as the 'Moon of Nishapur', he was famed as a scholar, and the Sultan made him tutor to the young princes Mas'ūd and Muḥammad. The military governor of Khurasan, the Amīr Naṣr b. Sebüktigin, was a keen Ḥanafī, and founded a madrasa in Nishapur for the Qāḍī, endowing it with *auqāf*.[30] An important episode in the Qāḍī's public career was the protracted struggle for power in the city with the Karāmiyya and their leader Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Isḥāq (see below, § 3). This eventually ended in a victory for the Qāḍī and orthodoxy, with a congenial layman appointed *ra'īs* of the city instead of the Karāmī leader.

The Qāḍī had close connections with the powerful Mīkālī family (see below, pp. 179 ff.), from whose patronage he had benefited when still a young scholar. He was thus glad to intercede for two members of this family, Abū'l-Faḍl and Abū Ibrāhīm, when in 421/1030 Sultan Mas'ūd came to Nishapur and heard *maẓālim*. The two brothers had been deprived of their hereditary property, and the revenues of the family *auqāf* had been diverted from the beneficiaries, by a distant cousin of theirs, Ḥasanak, and by other Ghaznavid officials, during the period when Ḥasanak had been *ra'īs* of Nishapur. Thanks to the Qāḍī's influence with his former pupil, the new Sultan, this intercession was successful. Moreover, Mas'ūd appointed his son *qāḍī* of Ray. Three years later, the Sultan again remembered his connections with the Qāḍī and appointed one of the latter's pupils to a diplomatic mission to Gurgān. The Qāḍī's relations with the Tabānī family of Nishapur were also cordial; Baihaqī used his *Mukhtaṣar-i Ṣā'idī* for information on the Tabānī faqīhs and their links with the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa.[31]

During Mas'ūd's reign, the Qāḍī's advanced age and prestige made him the Grand Old Man of Nishapur. When in 429/1038 the Seljuqs first appeared before Nishapur, he was the first person to whom the notables went for advice, and in the previous year the military commander in Khurasan, Sübashī, had consulted him on military and strategic topics. By now he was no longer acting as day-to-day *qāḍī* of the city, but had been succeeded by a man whom Sam'ānī names as Abū'l-Haitham 'Utba. Nevertheless, the Ṣā'idī family retained a grip on legal and religious offices in the city for many decades afterwards. Sam'ānī says that the *qaḍā'* of the city was still in his own day (sc. mid-12th century) held by a Ṣā'idī. The family had many marriage connections with the ulema of Baihaq, and later came to fill the offices of *qāḍī* and *khaṭīb* there. The Qāḍī Ṣā'id died in Nishapur at the age of eighty-six in the summer of 431/1040, when the city was under Seljuq occupation.[32]

The careers of three members of the Tabānī family of Nishapur show how the Ghaznavid Sultans exerted themselves to win over prominent members of the religious and legal classes in Khurasan and to draw them into their service. The Sultans were zealous to identify their imperialist political and military policies with the cause of Sunnī orthodoxy and the suppression of religious extremism (see above, Ch. II, § 1). Hence there was

a pressing need for reliable, orthodox scholars to serve in the Sultans' entourage as advisers and as diplomatic envoys and to fill religious and legal posts throughout the empire. In this way, it was hoped to consolidate religious orthodoxy and bring about political stability.

Maḥmūd was not averse from employing good men from other rites—in 391/1001, for instance, he sent the well-known Shāfi'ī Imām Abū Ṭayyib aṣ-Ṣu'lūkī on a mission to the Ilig Naṣr at Uzkend[33]—but the reputation of the Tabānīs as Ḥanafī scholars and their links with the founder of the rite particularly commended them to the Sultan. Abū'l-'Abbās Tabānī had been a pupil in Baghdad of Hārūn's Chief Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf, himself the disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa, and the Tabānīs were always thereafter proud of this affiliation to the great Imām. The family prospered under the Sāmānids, and it was when Maḥmūd was a commander in Nishapur for that dynasty that he first became aware of the Tabānīs' reputation as Ḥanafī divines. So in 385/995 he invited the Faqīh Abū Ṣāliḥ Tabānī to Ghazna, where he became head of the Ḥanafīs there and taught in a madrasa. One member of the family, Ḥasan Tabānī, entered Maḥmūd's service as a soldier; he fought against Abū 'Alī Sīmjūrī and against the Qarakhanid invaders of Khurasan, passing into Mas'ūd's service and being present at his ally Shāh Malik's victory in 432/1041 over the Khwārizmians.[34] But in the main, the Tabānīs used their talents in the peaceful spheres of religion and scholarship.

In 402/1011-12 Maḥmūd was negotiating a marriage alliance with the Ziyārid Manūchihr b. Qābūs. Khwāja 'Alī Mīkālī was in charge. The Sultan remembered the fame of the Tabānīs, and instructed Khwāja 'Alī that as he passed through Nishapur on his way to Gurgān, he should 'enquire whether there are any of the Tabānīs left, and whether any of them can come to Ghazna and our court. Win these people over, and convey from us promises of favour, reward and benevolence.' Although Khwāja 'Alī made much of both Abū Ṣādiq Tabānī, Abū Ṣāliḥ's nephew, and Abū Ṭāhir Tabānī, no positive action resulted. But in 414/1023 Ḥasanak returned from the Pilgrimage which in the end was to prove so inauspicious for him (see below, pp. 182-3), and brought Abū Ṣādiq and several others of the Nishapur ulema back to the Sultan at Balkh, where Maḥmūd was preparing to meet his ally Qadïr Khan Yūsuf.

Abū Ṣādiq returned to Nishapur and was established by Ḥasanak in a madrasa in the Street of the Basket Weavers, but received a promise that the Sultan would summon him to Ghazna when he had finished with Qadïr Khan and the Somnath expedition. This was fulfilled; Abū Ṣādiq was awarded a monthly pension and was shortly afterwards appointed *Qāḍī al-Quḍāt* of Khuttal.[35]

Abū Ṭāhir was appointed *qāḍī* of Ṭūs and Nasā by Maḥmūd. Mas'ūd continued this favour. He inherited from his father the policy of alliance with Qadïr Khan and the eastern branch of the Qarakhanids against their rival 'Alītigin of Bukhārā. In 422/1031 Mas'ūd proposed a double marriage alliance with the court of Kāshghar, and Qāḍī Abū Ṭāhir was one of the two envoys chosen to arrange this. His judicial duties in Ṭūs and Nasā were to be exercised by deputies, and as a reward, he was to add to his existing offices the *qaḍā'* of Nishapur. The negotiations in Kāshghar dragged on for nearly four years. In 425/1034 the envoys returned, but Abū Ṭāhir died on the journey home through Badakhshān. Mas'ūd's relations with the heir and second son of Qadïr Khan, Bughra Khan of Talas and Isfījāb did not run smoothly, and in 428/1037 another embassy was sent to restore amity. Qāḍī Abū Ṣādiq Tabānī was commissioned to undertake this, again with promise of the *qaḍā'* of Nishapur as reward. His stay of eighteen months among the Qarakhanids was a great success, and the latter delighted in his disputational skill as a Ḥanafī scholar.[36]

Amongst the Shāfi'īs of Nishapur, the Ṣābūnīs were a prominent family. The *nisba* 'soap-maker' suggests humble origins, but Sam'ānī mentions nothing of their prehistory. By the Ghaznavid period they had become renowned for their learning and piety. 'Utbī mentions a Ṣābūniyya madrasa in Nishapur where a copy of the famous hundred-volume compendium of Qur'ānic sciences made for the Amīr Khalaf b. Aḥmad of Sīstān was kept; this madrasa was destroyed in Sanjar's time by the Ghuzz.[37] The Khaṭīb Abū 'Uthmān Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī (373-449/983-1057) belonged to the generation after the Qāḍī Ṣā'id. He was well versed in the religious and legal sciences, and it is recorded that while studying in the west he visited Abū'l-'Alā' at Ma'arrat an-Nu'mān. The Sunnīs of Khurasan called him the 'Shaikh of Islam' and his polemical fervour brought him the titles 'Sword of the Sunna' and 'Discomfiter of the Innovators'.

From his compositions, several of which were extant in Yāqūt's day, only one is now known.[38] It was as a preacher and orator that he was most famed in Nishapur; Baihaqī says of his preaching that 'all the eloquent ones threw up the sponge (literally, 'threw down their shields') in comparison with him'. When he was still a youth, great scholars like Ibn Fūrak and Abū Isḥāq Isfarā'inī used to come and hear him discoursing. Consequently, in 426/1035 Sultan Mas'ūd appointed him to succeed his father in the official charge of the *khiṭāba* of Nishapur, an office which he held for some twenty years. He was buried in a Nishapur madrasa; Sam'ānī often visited his tomb, and his prayers there were invariably answered.[39]

Although the Qāḍī Ṣā'id is frequently mentioned as an enemy of the Ṣūfīs, Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī always appears in Shaikh Abū Sa'īd's biography as a warm admirer of the Shaikh. It seems that we have here an instance of a certain sympathy existing at this time between many Shāfi'īs and Ṣūfīs. Both men had in their early life studied tradition from Abū 'Alī Zāhir at Merv, and their friendship may have dated from then. We find Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī among the ulema of Nishapur who pleaded with the Shaikh not to return to the obscurity of Maihana. During the Shaikh's stay in Nishapur, he had frequently attended his *dhikrs* and had, it is said, been at times drawn into religious ecstasy by the Shaikh's eloquence, so that he neither felt nor expressed any disquiet when the Shaikh finally exclaimed 'there is no one within this shirt except God!' (*laisa fī'l-jubba siwā Allāh*).[40] It is not easy to discern from the hagiographical nature of the *Asrār at-tauḥīd* whether Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī's enthusiasm for the Shaikh and his practices was really as unbounded as this, but it is possible that he was more sympathetic than others of the orthodox ulema. Certainly, his brother Abū Ya'lā Isḥāq was himself a follower of the Ṣūfī path (see above, p. 173) and he may have influenced Ismā'īl favourably.

The most influential of the Nishapur families, that of the Mīkālīs, has yet to be mentioned. This family produced many theologians, traditionists, poets and literary men, although in the Ghaznavid period they were more prominent as administrators, officials and sometimes soldiers than as pure scholars or divines. Their fame in the eastern Islamic world dates from the early Abbasid period. Sam'ānī traces their genealogy back to Yezdegird II and Bahrām Gūr, but Soghdia rather than Persia

seems to have been their original home. Among their ancestors was a Shūr Dīvāstī, one of the local lords of Ṣughd who was killed in 104/722-3 fighting the Arab invaders of Transoxania. Islamic names now begin to appear in their genealogy. The early Abbasids encouraged Persians to emigrate to the capital Baghdad, and in this way the Mīkālīs were drawn into the cosmopolitan sphere of the Caliphate. Shāh b. Mīkāl (d. 302/914-15) was a protégé of the Ṭāhirids and was eulogised by al-Buḥturī; his nephew 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad was governor of Ahwāz in the early 10th century, starting out in the service of the Ṣaffārids.[41] His son Abū'l-'Abbās Ismā'īl was educated by Ibn Duraid, who wrote for him his *Jamharat al-lugha* and dedicated to him his *qaṣīda* in *alif maqṣūra*, which spread the fame of the Mīkālīs in the Islamic world as far as Aden and earned its author 10,000 dinars from them. Under Abū'l-'Abbās the family settled in Nishapur; in 347/958 the Sāmānid Vizier Abū Ja'far 'Utbī gave him charge of the *Dīwān ar-Rasā'il*, a post which he held till his death in 362/973.[42]

It was apparently Abū'l-'Abbās who became the first Mīkālī *ra'īs* of Nishapur, an office which his son Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh later took over. 'Abdallāh was well known as an authority on poetry and law, and especially on the science of *shurūṭ*; when Maqdisī came to Nishapur, he stayed with him. Although in 364/974-5 he refused to head the *Dīwān ar-Rasā'il*, he was nevertheless, like his father, drawn into the Sāmānid administration.[43] His son Abū Ja'far became *ra'īs* of Nishapur, and with the latter's grandson Abū'l-Qāsim 'Alī, we find the family fully involved in the circle of Ghaznavid officialdom.

Khwāja 'Alī appears frequently in Baihaqī's pages. Maḥmūd drew him to Ghazna, where he settled down and became *ra'īs*. The Sultan employed him in 402/1011-12 to escort his daughter to her future husband, Manūchihr b. Qābūs (see above, p. 177). On Maḥmūd's death, he opportunely espoused the cause of the winning candidate, and was among those who sent to Ray encouraging Mas'ūd to come eastwards and claim the throne. Shortly afterwards he organised the grand reception at Balkh for the envoy from Baghdad who came to announce the death of al-Qādir and to secure Mas'ūd's homage to the new Caliph. For this ceremony, Khwāja 'Alī was ordered by the Sultan to marshal all the ulema, *qāḍīs*, faqīhs, 'Alids, etc., to meet the envoy; to erect stands and booths along the route of the proces-

sion to the mosque where the *khuṭba* in the new Caliph's name was to be pronounced; and to see that the populace did not become disorderly.[44]

His successes as a negotiator and organiser made him in 423/1032 Masʿūd's natural choice as leader of the Pilgrimage of Khurasan and Transoxania. The Caliph had just announced that he had got the Būyids to put the route in order and to guarantee free access, and Masʿūd himself had sent 2000 dinars for repair work along the route. Khwāja ʿAlī was given a robe of honour, a ceremonial litter with gold fittings, a canopy (*ghāshiya*) and the title of 'Khwāja' (a prized one at that time, notes Baihaqī, and not then so debased as it had become by the time he was writing). During his absences from Ghazna, his son Abū'l-Muẓaffar normally acted as deputy *ra'īs*.[45]

A line of the Mīkālī family parallel to that of Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh was that of his elder brother Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAlī (d. 376/986-7), known from his love of *jihād* as 'al-Muṭṭawwiʿ', although he was also a scholar and traditionist. He fought against the Greeks at Tarsus, and then returned to Khurasan, settling at Farāwa on the edge of the Oghuz steppes. He was a great benefactor to the town, building two ribāṭs there with stores of arms and equipment, and improving cultivation and irrigation by digging *qanāts* and wells.[46]

Of Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAlī's sons, Abū ʿAbdallāh Ḥusain followed his father's ways and combined the callings of warrior and administrator. Gardīzī gives him the title of *Ra'īs*, so he may at some time have held this position in Nishapur or some other town of Khurasan. He became *katkhudā* of the Ghaznavid general Begtoghdī's army in 426/1035, but when that army was defeated by the Seljuqs, he was left marooned on his elephant and was unable to flee. His Turkmen captors were about to kill him but were restrained by Chaghrī Beg. Thenceforth he remained with the Seljuqs and cast in his lot with them. Ibn al-Athīr lists him as Toghrïl's second Vizier, with the title *Ra'īs ar-Ru'asā'*, and the anthologist Bākharzī, author of the *Dumyat al-qaṣr*, served under him as a clerk.[47]

Abū ʿAbdallāh's brother Abū Naṣr Aḥmad served for a time as *ra'īs* of Nishapur. ʿUtbī praises his learning and quotes some of his verse and letters. He also praises the attainments of his two sons Abū'l-Faḍl ʿUbaidallāh and Abū Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl, the former of whom was a fine poet and authority on tradition;

until his death in 436/1044-5 he gave lectures in Nishapur which were widely attended by scholars. It was these two brothers who suffered dispossession of their lands and rights when Ḥasanak became *ra'īs* (see above, p. 176). Early in Mas'ūd's reign they regained their inheritance, and the Vizier Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad stayed at Abū'l-Faḍl's house when in 424/1033 he passed through Nishapur.[48]

A further collateral branch of the Mīkālīs gave birth to the famous Abū 'Alī Ḥasan b. Muḥammad, called Ḥasanak, whose fate is recorded in detail by Baihaqī. His father had supported Maḥmūd's interests in Nishapur during the last years of the Sāmānids, and when he had died prematurely, the boy Ḥasan had entered Maḥmūd's service, where his handsomeness and frankness led the Sultan to call him by the hypochoristic 'Ḥasanak', a name which stuck to him for the rest of his life. At one time he was *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* of Sīstān. Court favour and family tradition gained him the *riyāsa* of Nishapur. Later, he exercised this office by a deputy, his kinsman Abū Naṣr Manṣūr b. Rāmish, whilst he himself remained at court; hence it is possible that some of the tyrannies attributed to him at Nishapur were not his direct responsibility. From his closeness to the Sultan, Ḥasanak was a candidate for the Vizierate after Maimandī's dismissal in 415/1024. Despite his youth and lack of experience in the central administration, he was chosen as Vizier; according to Abū Naṣr Mishkān, the Chief Secretary, Maḥmūd very soon repented of his choice, but Ḥasanak retained the office for the rest of the reign.[49]

The year before he was invested as Vizier, Ḥasanak had gone on the Pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and because of the unsettled and dangerous state of the routes across Nejd, had returned through the Fāṭimid territories of Palestine and Syria. Whilst there he was injudicious enough to accept a robe of honour from the Fāṭimid Caliph aẓ-Ẓāhir and to convey letters of friendship to Maḥmūd. The possibility of any intercourse between the Ghaznavids and his Fāṭimid enemies alarmed the Abbasid Caliph, and he accused Ḥasanak of Qarmathian, i.e. Ismā'īlī, sympathies. Maḥmūd regarded the charge as ridiculous and called al-Qādir a doting old fool, but to appease him, the offending *khil'a* was sent back to Baghdad for burning.[50]

Ḥasanak kept the Sultan's favour, but his high-handedness was making him many enemies. He espoused the cause of

Prince Muḥammad, whom Maḥmūd had in the end designated as his heir, and went out of his way to offend Prince Mas'ūd. So when Muḥammad's short-lived Sultanate collapsed, Ḥasanak was arrested at Bust. The old charge of Qarmathian sympathies was revived by Mas'ūd's confidant Abū Sahl Zauzanī (see above, p. 60), who hated Ḥasanak for the humiliating treatment he had received from him in the past. His promptings coincided with the Sultan's own desire to make a clean sweep of the *Maḥmūdiyān*, men of the old régime, so his fate was doubly sealed, and in 432/1031 he was executed at Balkh.[51]

Sa'īd Nafīsī pictures Ḥasanak as a symbol of Iranian nationalism, the member of a family of pure Iranian ancestry hounded to death by the Arab Caliphs. Ḥasanak was certainly a great patron of Persian literature, and there are six *qaṣīdas* dedicated to him in the *dīwān* of Farrukhī. But the main factor in his fall was the Sultan's hostility; Mas'ūd could have shielded him from the wrath of the Caliph, as his father had done previously. It is, however, true, as Nafīsī points out, that the actual execution of Ḥasanak was done in the face of popular disapproval; the crowd mourned deeply at the sight, especially the Nīshāpūrīs who were present, and they refused to stone the victim when ordered to do so by the authorities. A poet of Nishapur wrote a moving elegy on him, including the verses

> They cut off his head, he who was the head of heads, the adornment of the age and the diadem of the land;
>
> Whether he was a Qarmathian, a Jew or an infidel, to be hurled down from the throne to the gallows was a dreadful thing.[52]

Ḥasanak no doubt resembled most other officials in that he did not hesitate to line his own pockets, and the rich presents which he brought back for the Sultan after his Pilgrimage may have been in part financed by his exactions. He had considerable property in Nishapur, including a fine palace at Shādyākh, which was confiscated on his death by the Sultan and used to lodge distinguished travellers. The scale on which he lived and the size of his retinue are shown by the existence around this palace of booths (*withāqhā*) which accommodated his five or six hundred personal ghulāms. Comparatively distant branches of the Mīkālī family benefited from his influence in the state; one

notable of Baihaq had a Mīkālī mother, and Ḥasanak secured him exemption from the *kharāj* on his property in the village of Zamīj.[53] Yet the sources do not attribute to him exactions and tyrannies on the scale such as the Vizier Isfarā'inī or the *'Amīd* Sūrī were guilty of in Khurasan. He was already by birth a rich man, and the sympathetic attitude of the common people at his execution indicates perhaps that it was the rich, who could afford to be squeezed, who had suffered most from Ḥasanak. The confiscation by Ḥasanak of the property of Abū Naṣr Aḥmad's sons in Nishapur was possibly in pursuance of some feud between the two branches of the Mīkālī family; a certain Mīkāl savagely abused Ḥasanak just before his execution, bringing down on himself the execration of the crowd. 'Utbī stresses the many benevolent works done by Ḥasanak when he was *ra'īs* of Nishapur; he covered over the streets of the bazaar as a protection against wind and snow, the first time this had ever been done, and expended 100,000 dinars out of his own pocket.[54]

We infer from the history of the various branches of the Mīkālī family how adaptable the family was and how tenacious it was of power and privileges. The Mīkālīs retained a grip on the *riyāsa* of Nishapur which, whilst not continuous, embraced the last few decades of Sāmānid rule and most of the period of Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan. The office of *ra'īs* or *za'īm* was a key one in the Khurasanian towns at this time, for the dynasties controlling the province had their administrative capitals outside Khurasan at Bukhārā and Ghazna, and were accordingly compelled to leave the province with a considerable amount of local autonomy. The central government nominated the *ra'īs* and installed him with an official robe of honour, *ṭailasān* and *durrā'a*, a horse and the title of 'Khwāja-yi Buzurg'. He then became the channel between sovereign and subjects, and was responsible to the central government for the internal security of the city. Whenever the sovereign visited the city, he marked the *ra'īs* out from the rest of the *a'yān* by special honours; in turn, the *ra'īs* was expected to organise official festivities or receptions for distinguished visitors or envoys. If the Sultan's army appeared in the neighbourhood, he and the local representatives of the administration had to arrange supplies for the army. If he was specially trusted by the ruler, he might be used for a diplomatic mission.[55] Furthermore, once nominated to the

riyāsa, there was a good chance of one's descendants acquiring an hereditary grip on the office.[56]

The *ra'īs* had to be a man of social status and wealth, for leadership in the organisation of public works and charities was expected of him; and he had to patronise the ulema and keep open house for travellers and the needy. Obviously, he had to be *persona grata* with the rest of the *a'yān*, for his leadership of them was more by persuasion and counsel than by coercive power. It was therefore natural that the *ra'īs* should be chosen from the *haute bourgeoisie* of the city. These various conditions were in Nishapur well fulfilled by the Mīkālīs, who had accumulated wealth from their estates and *auqāf* and also, it seems, from trading and manufacturing interests; one Mīkālī courtier at Ghazna had the name *Bazzāz* 'Clothier', and Baihaqī mentions Mīkālī boots.[57] Yet though their social position and wealth was bound up with Khurasan and in particular, with Nishapur, they were not restrictedly provincial in outlook. Successive members of the family served various dynasties in turn, from the Ṭāhirids to the Ghaznavids, and at least one Mīkālī adapted himself to the new Seljuq régime. All in all, the Mīkālīs are a striking example of the qualities which gave Khurasanian life much of its characteristic resilience and energy.

3 *The Karāmiyya*

The early 11th century marked the zenith of fortune and power for the Karāmiyya, a religious sect which flourished in Khurasan and especially in Nishapur. Barthold described the sect as 'pietistic', but in practice it was extremely activist and distinguished by its intolerance and persecuting zeal, and in Nishapur at least, it caused a great deal of social and political commotion. Its founder was Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Karām as-Sagazī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 255/869), who was born in Sīstān of Arab descent, but studied and spent much of his life in Nishapur. He was an ascetic and hell-fire preacher, and if the allegations of his opponents are to be believed, held the doctrine of anthropomorphism to an extreme degree; his tenets were summed up in a treatise, the *'Adhāb al-qabr*, which is no longer extant but which in its day achieved considerable fame in Islam. He preached his doctrines in Ghūr, Gharchistān and the countryside of Khurasan, denouncing both Sunnīs and Shī'īs alike, and

appealing especially to the peasants of those regions. Finally, Muḥammad b. Karām arrived in Nishapur with a group of adherents from Gharchistān, where he had been working, comprising weavers and others from depressed classes. Thus it was probably the social and political implications of his activities as much as the theological ones which drew upon his head the wrath of the governor, Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir, who imprisoned him for some time. At this time, the countryside of Khurasan was much disturbed by sectaries, and the ruling classes were understandably suspicious of any new movement which seemed to attract a large following from the lower classes.

Nevertheless, the sect put down strong roots in Nishapur. At the same time, its adherents spread to other parts of Islam; in the 10th century, there were Karāmī groups and *khānqāhs* in Baghdad, Jerusalem and Fusṭāṭ, where they even had their own quarter. But Khurasan remained the nucleus of the sect, with much strength in the lands along the upper Oxus, where Muḥammad b. Karām had first begun his propaganda; in the 10th century their *khānqāhs* were to be found in Gūzgān, Khuttal and Farghāna, as well as at Merv and Samarqand. It was suggested by J. Ribera y Tarragó that these *khānqāhs*, together with the madrasas of the Karāmiyya which are later heard of, were educational institutions, and that their existence in Nishapur was a stimulus to the growth of the orthodox Sunnī madrasa movement, but there is no firm evidence for this.[58]

In the latter half of the 10th century, the Karāmiyya in Nishapur were led by Abū Ya'qūb Isḥāq b. Maḥmashād [d. 383/993), famed for his preaching and evangelistic fervour; he is said to have converted over 5000 People of the Book and Zoroastrians in Nishapur. His son Abū Bakr Muḥammad succeeded to leadership of the sect on his father's death. The piety and asceticism of Abū Ya'qūb had made a deep impression on Sebüktigin when he was in Khurasan, and had actually converted him to the sect's beliefs. Consequently, his secretary Abū'l-Fatḥ Bustī penned the lines

> The only true legal system (*fiqh*) is Abū Ḥanīfa's, just as the only true religious system (*dīn*) is Muḥammad b. Karām's;
> Those who, as I observe, disbelieve in Muḥammad b. Karām's system are a vile lot indeed (*ghair kirām*).[59]

Maḥmūd seems to have inherited this sympathetic attitude towards the Karāmiyya, and in the earlier part of his reign supported them as a conservative force and as a weapon against Mu'tazilī or Ismā'īlī religious radicalism.[60]

For his part, Abū Bakr Mūḥammad used this favour to further his plans and to establish a temporal ascendancy within Nishapur over the notables and over other members of the religious classes. Already, when the Qarakhanid invaders occupied Nishapur in 397/1006, they feared the strength of his party in the city so much that they carried him off with them. He escaped when the Sultan's army approached, and became even more favoured in Maḥmūd's eyes. Under pretext of ferreting out Bāṭinī heretics, he set up a reign of terror in Nishapur, so that 'people saw that his saliva was deadly poison and his delation meant ruin'. A common practice of his was to extort money as the price of silence about alleged heretical proclivities.[61] He played a prominent part in the trial and execution in 403/1012-13 of the Fāṭimid *dā'ī* Tāhartī. This man had come on an open and peaceful mission to Maḥmūd from the Caliph al-Ḥākim. On reaching Herat he had been arrested, sent back to Nishapur and interrogated by Abū Bakr Muḥammad, who pronounced his doctrines baseless but dangerous.[62] Abū Bakr Muḥammad's pursuit of anything smacking of unorthodoxy also brought him up against the extremist Shī'īs of his city (*ar-Rawāfiḍ*), whose new mosque he had demolished, and against the Ṣūfīs and Shaikh Abū Sa'īd. Even a famous scholar like the Ash'arī divine Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak, who had come to Nishapur to teach and who was a fierce opponent of the Karāmiyya, was harried by the sect. They accused him of heresy and had him summoned before the Sultan at Ghazna. Ibn Fūrak vindicated his orthodoxy, but it was allegedly they who had him poisoned on his way back from the capital in 406/1015-16. Likewise, the biographer of the ulema of Nishapur, al-Ḥākim b. al-Bayyi', fell foul of the Karāmiyya; they smashed his minbar and prevented him from leaving his house for the mosque.[63]

The peak of Abū Bakr Mūḥammad's power came when Maḥmūd, reversing the normal policy of giving the *riyāsa* of the city to a leading member of the lay *a'yān*, made him *ra'īs*. He continued to parade hypocritically in the woollen cloak of an ascetic, but he had a well-disciplined following to attend him

and to execute his commands, headed by an adjutant (*ḥājib*).[64] In harrying the Bāṭinis and the Ṣūfīs he had the support of the Qāḍī Ṣā'id and others of the orthodox ulema, but events now moved towards a breach between these two strong-minded personalities. Although the ensuing struggle was fought out on the theological plane, the real question at issue was over the temporal power in Nishapur.

After returning from his Pilgrimage of 402/1011-12, the Qāḍī Ṣā'id came to Maḥmūd's court at Ghazna. In a theological discussion there, the Qāḍī brought up the unorthodox ideas held by the Karāmiyya, their anthropomorphism and consequent attribution to God of what did not befit Him. When summoned to reply, Abū Bakr Mūḥammad denied all the allegations and so saved his skin, but the Sultan ordered local governors in Khurasan to investigate members of the sect and to purge them from the madrasas and minbars. The next stage was that he again tried to clear himself by bringing a host of witnesses to testify, so the Sultan appointed the Chief Qāḍī of Ghazna, Abū Muḥammad Nāṣiḥī, to preside over a court of enquiry. At this, Abū Bakr Muḥammad and the Qāḍī Ṣā'id accused each other of Mu'tazilī and anthropomorphist views respectively. But the governor of Khurasan, Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Naṣr, testified to the Qāḍī's pure Ḥanafī faith, and the Sultan refused to believe that he could have become a Mu'tazilī.

Finally, Maḥmūd dismissed Abū Bakr Muḥammad from the *riyāsa*, and reappointed a layman. With the appointment of Ḥasanak, the office returned to the class of the *a'yān* and to the Mīkālīs in particular. Ḥasanak took draconian measures, with a severity, according to 'Utbī, surpassing that of Ziyād b. Abīhi, against the Karāmiyya in Nishapur. The most tyrannical were jailed in fortresses; Abū Bakr Muḥammad's spoliations were recovered from him and he was enjoined to fade away into a life of seclusion and contemplation. Ḥasanak then warned other members of the religious classes, especially the 'Alids, that their favoured position and the respect they were accorded depended wholly on their obedience to the secular power. They for their part recognised that the Sultan was the Shadow of God on earth, and that nothing would avail them except submissiveness and extreme circumspection (*al-mail ilā 'l-ghulūw li'l-iqtiṣād*).[65]

This was the end of the Karāmī bid for power in Nishapur,

although the sect continued to be influential there. It is unlikely, *pace* Barthold, *Turkestan*, 290 n. 2, that the Qāḍī Ṣā'id and Abū Bakr Muḥammad ever became friends again. On the contrary, we know that enmity between the two families persisted eighty years later. Ibn al-Athīr records under 488/1095 civil strife in Nishapur between the Ḥanafīs and Shāfi'īs on one side, led respectively by the Qāḍī Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ṣā'id and the Imām al-Ḥaramain's son Abū'l-Qāsim, and the Karāmiyya on the other, led by Maḥmashād, which ended in the killing of many of the latter and the razing of their madrasa. Nevertheless, the Karāmiyya persisted as a sect in Khurasan and Transoxania well into the 13th century.[66]

4 *The Ṣūfīs*

The community of Ṣūfīs in Nishapur, and in particular those Ṣūfīs grouped around the famous Shaikh Abū Sa'īd b. Abī'l-Khair Maihanī, have been mentioned in passing. In the development of Islamic mysticism, the Ṣūfīs of Khurasan played an outstanding part. Controversy over the origin of Ṣūfī mysticism still rages. Certainly, if we posit an origin in the Buddhist or Hindu east, Khurasan must have played a rôle in its transmission into Islam. But whatever the origins of Ṣūfism, it found a congenial home on Persian soil, and at an early date produced one of the best-known Ṣūfī pantheists, Abū Yazīd Ṭaifūr Bistāmī (d. 261/874 or 264/877-8). Al-Hujwīrī attributes the spread of Ṣūfism in Nishapur and Khurasan to Abū 'Uthmān Sa'īd b. Ismā'īl al-Ḥīrī, whose preaching was very popular in Nishapur; and by the 11th century, he says,

> It would be difficult to mention all the Shaykhs of Khurásán. I have met three hundred in that province alone who had such mystical endowments that a single man of them would have been enough for the whole world. This is due to the fact that the sun of love and the fortune of the Ṣúfí path is in the ascendant in Khurásán.[67]

The career of Shaikh Abū Sa'īd, who lived in Nishapur for roughly the decade 415-25/1024-34, is known in detail from his

biography, the *Asrār at-tauḥīd fī maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Sa'īd* (see Note on the Sources, p. 16). His career shows Ṣūfism in the stage before it became institutionalised into formal *ṭarīqas*, but when great shaikhs were already the foci of devotion and enthusiasm, with large bands of *murīds* dwelling in the shadow of their *baraka*. It also illustrates the tensions which were generated in a city like Nishapur where the ruling stratum was prosperous, conservative and orthodox in religion, and jealous to preserve the political and social status quo in the city. Into all this, the Shaikh brought a new way of life and behaviour. His spiritual gifts drew many followers to his side from the Ghaznavid official class, the city notables, the merchants, shopkeepers and master craftsmen, but the ruling stratum was in general suspicious of the Shaikh's powers of leadership and his special appeal to the lower classes, and fears of social disturbance are explicitly voiced in his biography.

There are also signs that the Shaikh's personal philosophy of life struck a discordant note in the busy, commercial atmosphere of Nishapur. As head of his *khānqāh*, he followed the Ṣūfī doctrine of *tawakkul*, dependence on God, to the extreme, relying on benefactions and presents from sympathisers, which were, it is true, not infrequently extorted by methods approaching spiritual blackmail. Often his major-domo and right-hand man in the *khānqāh*, Ḥasan-i Mu'addib, was at his wits' end to make ends meet and to find where the next meal was coming from. Yet Abū Sa'īd would lavish money on entertainments and luxurious living while the money lasted. This fecklessness drew censure from the more staid members of the community; it seems that the bourgeoisie of 11th century Nishapur cultivated the virtues of circumspectness and carefulness (*iqtiṣād, iṣlāḥ*) just like the bourgeoisie of Merv and Khurasan, as recorded by Jāḥiẓ in his *Kitāb al-bukhalā'*, had done so two centuries or so before. On two occasions the Shaikh was specifically accused of the vice denounced in the Qur'ān of *isrāf*, profligacy or extravagance; but then, as al-Hujwīrī notes, he was never one of those shaikhs who vaunt the superiority of poverty over wealth.[68]

For Abū Sa'īd lived like a great prince of the church. The local *qāḍī* at Kharaqān was not the only person to find a gap between what he expected of a Ṣūfī and presumed ascetic, and the way of life which he found the Shaikh in fact enjoying:

> The Qāḍī came in and gave a greeting. Then he saw the Shaikh, lolling back asleep on four cushions like a sultan, and with a dervish sitting by his feet massaging them. The Qāḍī said, 'I thought to myself, what sort of poverty is this? How can this man, living in such luxury as this, be considered poor? This man is a king, not a Ṣūfī or dervish'.

We hear of Abū Sa'īd giving a banquet for the Ṣūfīs of Nishapur, 300 of them all told, of roast lamb and almond confectionery; and of a feast on a far grander scale held at the village of Būshangān (see above, p. 153). An open invitation was proclaimed, and 2000 people, of both high and low estate, came to the celebration; aromatic sandalwood and 1000 candles were burnt at it, even though it was daytime.[69] When the Shaikh rode out across the countryside, it was not on the ass, traditionally associated in the East with holy men, but on horseback, with his faithful steward holding the stirrup. In the streets of the city, his retainers would carry him in state, since he attracted considerable numbers of novices, *murīds*, who always provided him with an escort. The offerings of these *murīds* provided a fair proportion of the Shaikh's income, although he also drew contributions from such varied classes as the rich merchants and, after he had left Nishapur for Maihana, from members of the administration installed by the Seljuqs. As well as the *murīds*, there were the *muḥibbān* or *'azīzān*, sympathisers who pledged themselves to follow the Ṣūfī way as far as possible in their everyday callings (thus corresponding roughly to the tertiaries or lay brethren of the mediaeval European religious orders and to the *'āshiqān* of later Muslim dervish orders like the Bektāshīs). These came from the ordinary people, artisans, shopkeepers, etc., and when added to the professed *murīds*, swelled the number of potential retainers whom the Shaikh could call upon.[70]

Abū Sa'īd's popularity with the masses in Nishapur aroused the suspicions of the ulema and notables. From the doctrinal point of view, the ulema were distrustful of Ṣūfism in general, and they noted the gap between the conventional picture of a Ṣūfī ascetic and the pomp of the Shaikh's household. This conservative opposition embraced all sects and rites. The leaders of the orthodox legal schools were prominent, led by the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, and the Imām al-Ḥaramain's father Abū Muḥammad

Juwainī was so strongly opposed to Shaikh Abū Sa'īd when the latter first came to Nishapur that no one dared mention his name in Abū Muḥammad's presence. The Twelver Shī'īs and 'Alids were another element of the conservative religious establishment (see next section), and were as keen against the Shaikh as any of the Sunnīs, even cursing him openly in the streets as he passed.[71] Above all, he was hated by Abū Bakr Muḥammad and the Karāmiyya, apparently at this time still influential in the city. Finally, not all the Ṣūfīs were solidly behind the Shaikh. There was in Nishapur a moderate party of Ṣūfīs, led by Abū'l-Qāsim Qushairī, who were concerned to vindicate Ṣūfism's right to a lawful place within the community of Islam, and who therefore deprecated any extremism which might prejudice this. Qushairī was both an Ash'arī in theology and a Ṣūfī, and he composed his *Risāla al-Qushairiyya fī 'ilm at-taṣawwuf* to show how Ṣūfism accorded with orthodox beliefs and practice. In particular, he seems to have been dubious about the orthodoxy of some of the Shaikh's mystical poetry, concerning the hearing of music in his *dhikrs* or *majālis-i samā'* and about the propriety of dancing (*raqṣ*) to induce ecstasy.[72]

According to the *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, all the currents of opposition came to a head when the Qāḍī Ṣā'id and Abū Bakr Muḥammad Karāmī drew up a written indictment of the Shaikh's misdeeds and sent it off to the Sultan at Ghazna. In it, the Shaikh's sybaritic life and his concentration on music and dancing rather than on the teaching of orthodox doctrine were mentioned. But there was a further charge, that public security was being threatened, that the majority of the common people had joined the Shaikh and that a general *fitna* was imminent in the city. The Sultan's reply gave the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī imāms a free hand to inflict the ultimate penalty of the *Sharī'a*, and it was resolved to hang the Shaikh and his followers. The episode ends, as do all similar ones in the biography, with the frustration of these knavish tricks by the Shaikh's spiritual powers; his accusers make a *volte-face* and become his warm supporters.

Nicholson believed that this story might not be entirely fictitious, and it undoubtedly reflects the tension which must have existed between the Shaikh and the orthodox ulema. As Nicholson observes, their charges were substantially true, and Abū Sa'īd made no effort to deny them. If there was a reconciliation of the two sides, it can hardly have been all that

cordial, even though Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar mentions several joint meetings of the spiritual leaders of Nishapur for discussion and disputation, at which were present such figures as the Shaikh, Qushairī, Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and his son, the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, Abū Bakr Muḥammad, Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī, etc. Possibly some sort of respectful *modus vivendi* was reached.[73]

This alleged appeal of the Nishapur ulema to the central government implied that they expected the dynasty's attitude to the Ṣūfīs to accord with their own. The policy of the Ghaznavids was to encourage any form of orthodox religion which could play a part in securing political and social stability. They were not insensible to the appeal of saintly men, as the visits of the Nishapur shaikh Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad Khargūshī (d. 406/1015-16) to Maḥmūd's court show. According to Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, when in 440/1049 Shaikh Abū Sa'īd Maihanī died, one of his disciples obeyed his dying master's injunction and went to the court of Ghazna to beg the 3000 dinars for a debt outstanding on the Shaikh's *khānqāh*. The Sultan paid up immediately, and added 1000 dinars to erect a canopy over the tomb and another 1000 for the envoy's travelling expenses. However, in one place in Baihaqī, Sultan Mas'ūd refers to the Ṣūfīs as 'long-moustached ones' (*sūhān-sablat*: literally, 'with moustaches like a file') and expresses his general opinion of them thus: 'He would always joke, when he saw a dervish who was a notorious hypocrite and who wore a dervish cloak, "His heart is blacker than his cloak".'[74] Perhaps we might formulate the dynasty's attitude in these terms: it regarded individual holy men with respect, whilst recognising that among the Ṣūfīs were many tricksters. It was suspicious of Ṣūfī shaikhs who collected great bands of followers around themselves, thereby creating a nexus of loyalties which could not directly be controlled by the central government or its local agents. The orthodox religious leaders, on the other hand, were often employed in state-salaried offices like the *qaḍā'* or *khiṭāba*, and were thus amenable to pressure and control.

B. Zakhoder has suggested that at this time Ṣūfism in Khurasan was really a religious cloak for political activity secretly directed against Ghaznavid rule there. He is right in pointing out that Abū Sa'īd had many links with the class of merchants, traders and shopkeepers; his own father had been an *'aṭṭār* in Maihana, and he depended much on the generosity of

this class for supporting his *khānqāh*. Yet this class was not by its nature anti-Ghaznavid; the Shaikh's own father, Bābā Bū'l-Khair, had been such a warm admirer of Sultan Maḥmūd that he had frescoes painted on the walls and ceiling of his house at Maihana depicting the Sultan, his name and titles, his retainers and his panoply of war.[75]

Zakhoder goes on to assert that Ṣūfism and the *ṭarīqas* were the agents of the nobles and ruling classes in Khurasan. He quotes the appeals of the *a'yān* of Khurasan to the Qarakhanids against Ghaznavid oppression, and the resulting stimulus to the Turkmens' invasions (cf. Baihaqī, 412), and suggests close relations between the *a'yān* and Ṣūfīs of Khurasan on one side and the Oghuz on the other. These assumptions have no solid evidence behind them. The Turkmens were received in Khurasan with resignation rather than with positive joy. We know nothing of a Ṣūfī conspiracy against the state in Khurasan. Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar tells a story of how when the two brothers Toghrïl and Chaghrï Beg were overrunning Khurasan, they came to the Shaikh at Maihana for his blessing. The latter told them that their successes were being dictated by the Divine Will, and went on to say to Chaghrï, 'We have given you rule over Khurasan', and to Toghrïl, 'We have given you rule over Iraq'.[76] It is not necessary to take this story very seriously; the type of anecdote where the wise man meets with and encourages someone who is to achieve future greatness is a common enough one, and in another part of his biography, the Shaikh allegedly meets the young Niẓām al-Mulk and prophesies his future rise to power. Nor does it seem that the Ṣūfīs were direct agents of the ruling classes' ambitions; although Abū Sa'īd had supporters in all ranks of society, most of his fiercest enemies in Khurasan were from the ruling classes of the *a'yān*, the local officials and the ulema. Where unrestrained Ṣūfī activities seemed to threaten the established social or religious order, these classes were at one with the central government in Ghazna.

5 *The Shī'a: Sayyids and Ismā'īlīs*

The Sayyids or 'Alids enjoyed considerable respect and prestige in Khurasan, as they did in many other parts of the eastern Islamic world.[77] This respect accorded to them was independent

of political factors, for in the first half of the 11th century the progress of political Shī'ism was being checked by a Sunnī revival. Numerically, the Sayyids were only a small minority in Khurasan, and outside the ranks of the Ismā'īlīs, who by virtue of their semi-secret status had achieved a definite form of organisation, Shī'ism was still a diffused body of unsystematised beliefs rather than a closely-knit sect. Within the general body of Shī'ism, the moderate Twelver, Ja'farī Shī'a were a conservative rather than a revolutionary force. Indeed, such an attitude of quiescence was forced on them in Khurasan by the political environment, for the successive dynasties who reigned there, the Ṭāhirids, the Sāmānids and the Ghaznavids, were all orthodox Sunnī powers (in so far as the Ṣaffārids showed any religious feeling, their sympathies were with the Khawārij, but their dominion in Khurasan was brief). The extravagances of Shī'ism in western Persia and the Caspian provinces and the expansionist policy of the Dailamīs there, who had adopted Shī'ism as an expression of their own particularism and of Iranian national feeling, stimulated the rulers of Khurasan to make it a bulwark of orthodoxy.

Within these circumstances, the moderate Shī'is could nevertheless exist peacefully in Khurasan. The price for this tolerance was that they should engage in no political activity and should subordinate themselves strictly to the temporal power. Despite their own strict orthodoxy, the Ghaznavid Sultans were prepared to leave them in peace; this point was clearly explained to the Nishapur 'Alids after the episode of the Karāmī bid for power (see above, p. 188). During the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in 429-30/1038-9, the *Naqīb* of the 'Alids showed himself as one of the most faithful of the notables to the Ghaznavid connection (see below, pp. 263-4). When the Fāṭimid *dā'ī* Tāhartī was arrested and brought to the court at Ghazna, it was a Shī'ī divine, Ḥasan b. Ṭāhir b. Muslim, who took the lead in the interrogation. As a descendant of al-Ḥusain, he was able to demonstrate the falsity of Tāhartī's claim to be an envoy of the true Caliph-Imam, and so recommended his execution.[78] The Sayyids of Khurasan integrated themselves into the social structure of the towns of the province and into the ranks of the landowning and mercantile classes, and were little inclined to pursue revolutionary policies. There is no evidence to show that they encouraged or approved of the various Ziyārid and

Būyid attacks on the Sāmānids in Khurasan, and the victory of irresponsible Dailamī adventurers would have been inimical to their material interests.

Ibn Funduq describes the coming of the 'Alids to Khurasan and Nishapur in the latter half of the 9th century:

Muḥammad Zabbāra b. 'Abdallāh al-Mafqūd was Amīr of Medina, and his son Abū Ja'far Aḥmad was a mighty commander. Now there was in the land of Ṭabaristān the One who summons to God, one of the Imāms of the Zaidīs, and the people of Ṭabaristān gave their allegiance to him. There arose a contention between him and the *Dā'ī*, so he departed to Nishapur and settled there. His son, the Sayyid al-Ajall Abū'l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad az-Zabbāra, was born and brought up in Nishapur. An extensive following of people gathered round him and did allegiance to him as Caliph. Ḥākim Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥāfiẓ records in his *Ta'rīkh Naishābūr* that for a while they pronounced the *khuṭba* in his name as Caliph. Then the Amīr 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir, governor of Khurasan, gave him his niece, the daughter of his brother 'Alī b. Ṭāhir, in marriage. The Sayyid al-Ajall Abū Muḥammad Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad was born of them, and became the influential *Naqīb* and *Ra'īs* in Nishapur; they used to call him 'Sayyid of the House of the Messenger of God'. His son was the Sayyid al-Ajall Abū'l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, who was *Naqīb* and *Ra'īs* in Nishapur and highly respected. They placed him too in the *khuṭba* as Caliph, and a group of people gathered round him. This Abū'l-Ḥusain Yaḥyā was a highly-cultivated man: he knew the Qur'ān by heart, was a *rāwī* for poetry, was a traditionist, was able to relate history, was skilled in genealogies and was eloquent. They gave allegiance to him at the time when the Fortunate Amīr Abū'l-Ḥasan Naṣr b. Aḥmad ruled [sc. 301-31/914-43]. He was carried off to Bukhārā and kept there for some time. Then they set him free, gave him a robe of honour and assigned him a regular pension. He was the first Khurasanian 'Alid to be given a pension from the royal treasury; they called him, therefore, *Ṣāḥib al-arzāq*. Abū'l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā lived over a hundred years. His son Sayyid-i Ajall Abū 'Alī Muḥammad was the most noble of sayyids, was *Naqīb* and

Ra'īs and was a great preacher and deliverer of homilies. There were always large concourses of people in his house. He had a brother, Sayyid Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain, known as Jauharak. He was an impetuous youth, and a quarrel arose between him and the sons of Sayyid Imām Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain b. Dā'ūd the traditionist. The followers of the Imām-i Muṭṭalibī Shāfiʿī, May God be pleased with him, considered it advisable to help the sons of the Sayyid Abū ʿAbdallāh [al-Ḥusain b. Dā'ūd], and the *niqāba* passed from this line [sc. from that of Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad and Jauharak] to the other one, and the sons of the Sayyid-i Ajall Abū ʿAlī became dispersed.

Ibn Funduq then goes on to say that the Sayyid-i Ajall Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad was *Naqīb* and *Ra'īs* of Mashhad-i Ṭūs for a time, that he himself possessed the patent from Sultan Masʿūd appointing him, and that Thaʿālibī praised him in his poetry.[79]

We see from this passage, and from others in the *Ta'rīkh-i Baihaq*, how the ʿAlids came first to Nishapur, spreading thence to other towns of Khurasan like Baihaq, and how they established their right to such important positions as custodianship of the shrine of the Eighth Imām ʿAlī ar-Riḍā at Mashhad. That many of the Khurasanian ʿAlids came from the Caspian provinces, where Shīʿism had had a powerful hold since the end of the 8th century, is confirmed by several entries in al-Fārisī's biographical dictionary, the *Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*; in particular, several came to Nishapur from Gurgān, as the *nisbas* 'Gurgānī' and 'Astarābādhī' show.[80]

So long as their political interests were not menaced by Shīʿī activity, the Sunnī authorities did not generally interfere with the ʿAlids. The ʿAlids seem to have been on particularly good terms with the Ṭāhirids. The family of Sayyid Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad, the first of the line to settle in Nishapur, acquired marriage links with the Ṭāhirids. His own mother had been a daughter of Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusain Dhū'l-Yamīnain, the first Ṭāhirid governor of Khurasan (205-7/820-2), and later, a daughter and granddaughter of the Amīr ʿAlī b. Ṭāhir b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir were given in marriage to the family.[81] In the next century, it appears from the passage quoted above that the Sāmānids at first viewed the Sayyids of Nishapur as a

potential danger to political stability there, but eventually came to regard them with tolerance.

Once established in Nishapur, Abū Ja'far Aḥmad's family assumed the *niqāba* as of natural right. The *Naqīb* was marshal of the 'Alids in each town, and ranked as one of the foremost of the town notables. It was he who kept the registers of the 'Alids, *ansāb al-ashrāf*, in each community. The birth of each child and the death of each person was carefully recorded here, in order that purity of lineage might be verifiable, for 'Alid ancestry always gave prestige and often gave entitlement to fiscal privileges. The office of *Naqīb* was a prize and might well be fought over, as the above citation shows, by rival claimants. In this case, the Shāfi'ī ulema lent their weight to one side, and in 395/1005 the dispossessed claimant transferred to Baihaq. At Baihaq, too, a quarrel began amongst the Sayyids over a question of precedence and was ultimately referred to the Sultan in Ghazna.[82]

Where a considerable proportion of a town's population was Shī'ī, the *Naqīb* was the natural leader and spokesman for the whole town, with a position corresponding to that of the *Ra'īs*. Like the latter, the *Naqīb* was in a semi-official position *vis-à-vis* the central government, as surety for the good behaviour of the Shī'ī community. The Sultans for their part treated the *Naqībs* with some deference. When at the outset of his reign, Mas'ūd was at Ray, he was concerned to win over the notables of the city, then newly conquered from the Būyids. He gave robes of honour to several of the *a'yān*, but it was the *Qāḍī*, the *Ra'īs* and the *Naqīb* of the 'Alids who got more expensive ones than the rest, and the importance accorded here to the religious leaders, both Sunnī and Shī'ī, is notable.[83]

Because they came generally from the educated classes and perhaps because of their prestige as descendants of the Prophet, the Sultans sometimes used Sayyids as diplomatic envoys.[84] The social standing of the Sayyids of Khurasan in the 11th century is shown by their marriage connections with the highest families. A branch of the famous Arab family of Muhallabīs, which had settled in Nishapur in the middle of the 10th century and had subsequently become frequent holders of the *riyāsa* at Baihaq, gave a daughter to the local Sayyids in the early years of the 11th century. In the following century, a collateral branch of Niẓām al-Mulk's family became allied to the Sayyids of Baihaq.

In numbers and material strength, the Sayyids were, by the latter part of the 11th century, a growing influence. In 488/1095 we hear of the Sayyids of Sabzawār collecting a military force of their own, marching to the neighbouring settlement in the Baihaq oasis of Khusrūjird, breaking down its gate and burning down one of its quarters, in revenge for an insult to one of the leading Sayyids of Sabzawār.[85] The Sayyids included some very rich men; one Abū'l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, who taught in the two Friday mosques of Nishapur in *Majālis al-imlā'*, had great estates, property, merchandise and trading capital in Samarqand.[86] Several centuries later, under the Ṣafavids, the Sayyids were to become dominant in Persia; though still very much a minority in our period, the bases for this triumph were quietly being laid.

It has been remarked that the Ghaznavids were prepared to leave the moderate Shī'īs in peace, provided that the latter eschewed all interference in politics. Towards Shī'ī extremists, however, the Sultans were implacably hostile (see above, pp. 52-3). The Ismā'īlīs were suspect because of their religious and social radicalism, their wide intellectual appeal, and above all for their political linkage with the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Cairo. In Persia and Transoxania the Ismā'īlīs seem to have aimed especially at converting the ruling classes to their doctrines. The Ghaznavid Sultans were anxious to demonstrate their orthodoxy and their support for the Abbasids; the happy outcome of the execution of the Fāṭimid *dā'ī* Tāhartī was that 'when the affair of Tāhartī was ended in this way, a report of the matter was sent to the Caliph's court; in this way, the sword silenced the tongues of the censorious ones, and praise for what he [sc. Maḥmūd] had done was heaped on him'.[87]

The Ismā'īlī *da'wa* seems to have begun work in Khurasan around the opening of the 10th century, after it had already been active for some fifty years previously in Ray and Jibāl. The succession of the Khurasanian *dā'īs* in the first half of the 10th century is known from a list in Maqrīzī's history of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, the *Itti'āẓ al-ḥunafā'*. The succession after 332/943 is obscure, but at least one later *dā'ī* is mentioned, and the well-known *dā'ī* Abū Ya'qūb Sijistānī worked in Sīstān till he was executed by the Amīr Khalaf b. Aḥmad (reigned 353-93/964-1003).[88] We have little explicit detail about Ismā'īlī activity in Nishapur during the Ghaznavid period, but it is probable

that there were adherents there just as there were in many of the cities of Transoxania and Būyid Persia; Ismāʿīlīs had always to be expert practitioners of *taqiyya.* The Karāmī leader Abū Bakr Muḥammad was active in Nishapur persecuting Ismāʿīlīs, who had become bold enough openly to build their own mosque (see above, p. 187; I assume here that by *ar-Rawāfiḍ* are meant Ismāʿīlīs). Sultan Maḥmūd himself harried the Ismāʿīlis of Multan, the one region of the eastern Islamic world where the Ismāʿīlīs for a while secured temporal power, and he celebrated the conquest of Ray from Majd ad-Daula by massacring the Bāṭiniyya there and burning their books.[89]

6 *The* Dhimmīs

The *Dhimmīs* played a less prominent part in Khurasan at this time than in Iraq and western Persia. Maqdisī attributes to the province 'many Jews, few Christians and various classes of Zoroastrians'.[90] On the eastern fringes of Khurasan, Buddhism had been the major religious and cultural influence of pre-Islamic times; the Buddhist monasteries or *vihāras* have left several traces in the Islamic toponomy of the region, the most famous of them all being that which gave its name to the Nau-Bahār quarter of Balkh. There had been a famous fire-temple near Nishapur, and the mountainous parts of Khurasan were some of the typical refuge-areas where Zoroastrianism long persisted. Ibn Funduq mentions two ancient, sacred trees in the Baihaq oasis which were venerated by the Zoroastrians; one of them was cut down by order of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil, but the other remained standing till 537/1142-3.[91]

In the Sāsānid period, Nestorian Christianity spread widely within the Persian empire, and its patriarchal seat was in the capital Ctesiphon. Most of the chief cities of Khurasan and Sīstān, and to a lesser extent, those of Transoxania and Khwārizm, had by the end of the Sāsānid period their own communities of Christians, often with a bishop over them. The communities of the Sāsānid empire never enjoyed anything more than a bare toleration, for the Zoroastrian state church was a fiercely persecuting one. However, away from the direct surveillance of the Emperors in their western Persian capital, the Christians of the eastern Iranian world enjoyed somewhat more freedom.

The Nestorian church had metropolitan sees of Parthia (sc. the Nishapur area), Margiana (Merv), Herat, Sīstān and the Caspian provinces, the first two of which achieved metropolitan status by the 6th century. In the province of Parthia, the diocese of Abarshahr (=Nishapur) is shown as united with that of Ṭūs in the records of the Synod of 497. In the early years of the 11th century, the Metropolitan of Merv was the most important Christian dignitary of Khurasan, but a Bishop of Ṭūs is still mentioned as late as 1279. Nevertheless, the numbers of Christians can never have been great, and they must always have been a diminishing band in Khurasan.[92]

Jewish communities in Khurasan, such as those at Merv and Balkh, begin to be mentioned in the Islamic period from the late 9th century onwards, when their financial contributions for the support of the Mesopotamian academy of Pumbeditha are recorded. Not only was the Rabbanite-Karaite division present among the Jews there, but both the Rabbanite and Karaite Jews of Khurasan developed their own peculiarities of ritual and law which distinguished them from their Mesopotamian co-religionists. The Jews were comparatively numerous in certain towns of Persia, and whole settlements of Jews with the name 'Yahūdiyya' were found at Iṣfahān and in Gūzgān at the place later known as Maimana.[93]

The religious and intellectual strength of the eastern Persian *Dhimmī* communities was by the 11th century weak, and they made no contributions to the cultural life of the Islamic world comparable with those of the more numerous Iraqi or Syrian or Egyptian communities. This may be in large part ascribed to their remoteness from the centres of spiritual life and enthusiasm in the West. The Nestorians spent much of their energy on the work of evangelising parts of Central Asia and the Far East, but the laxness of ecclesiastical life and the waning of faith in the eastern Iranian congregations was shown by several *causes célèbres* and scandals among their hierarchy.[94] We must also remember the brilliance and superiority of Muslim scholarship in Khurasan at this time, which must have led many *Dhimmīs* to desert their own faith for that of Islam.

Shaikh Abū Sa'īd's biography makes a few references to the non-Muslim communities of Nishapur in his day. The Shaikh's spiritual powers were demonstrated on various occasions by his conversion of large numbers of Jews, Christians and Zoro-

astrians, and his conversion of forty of the Christians of Nishapur is described in detail. He was outside the church of the Christians (*kilīsīyā'yi Tarsāyān*). He called to the pictures of Christ and Mary hanging from a platform erected in front of the church to fall down if they acknowledged Muḥammad and his religion as true; the pictures fell down with their faces towards the Kaʿba, and because of this miracle, several of the onlooking congregation were converted to Islam.[95]

A profession with which the *Dhimmīs* were frequently associated in Islam, that of medicine, was still practised by them in the East during the Ghaznavid period. A Zoroastrian physician attended Shaikh Abū Saʿīd when he was ill, and was converted by his *baraka*. Although the Ghaznavid Sultans were such staunchly orthodox Sunnīs, they did not scorn the employment of *Dhimmī* physicians; Masʿūd had a Jewish one called Yaʿqūb-i Daniyāl, and Bahrāmshāh a Christian one, Abū Saʿd Mauṣilī.[96]

PART III
THE COMING OF THE SELJUQS AND THEIR TRIUMPH IN MAS'ŪD'S REIGN

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGINS OF THE SELJUQS

1 *Early connections of the Turks with the Islamic world*

From the 11th century onwards, the Islamic world became increasingly ruled by Turkish dynasties until eventually, rulers of Turkish origin were to be found in such distant places from their homeland as Algeria and Bengal. Many changes in land tenure and utilisation in the Persian region had been made under the Dailamī Būyids, but the appearance of the Seljuqs brought further changes. Relative to the existing population, the numbers of the incoming nomads were not large, and for long the Seljuqs felt themselves to be a small band among a potentially hostile non-Turkish majority.[1] But pastoral nomadism is an extensive and in many ways wasteful way of life, and the Turkmens' beasts did considerable damage to the existing rural economies of many parts of the Middle East (see below, Ch. IX, § 4). Supreme political power also passed to the Turks, although it was the Mongol rather than the Seljuq invasions which were more significant for the increased orientalisation of the Islamic world.

Although Firdausī makes the Oxus the traditional boundary between Īrān and Tūrān and states that there was a natural antipathy between the two racial groups, 'Two elements, fire and water, which rage against each other in the depths of the heart',[2] and although the defence of the north-eastern frontier has always been one of Persia's historic rôles, there was never in practice a hard-and-fast division between the two racial groups. Turkish peoples had long been familiar to the Iranians, for the Iranian world had frequently been invaded by steppe peoples and these last had often left pockets behind when the tide of invasion had receded. Some of these incomers had been Indo-European, at least in leadership, such as the Sakae and Kushans, but others, like the Ephthalites or White Huns, were Turkish or Mongol in origin; in any case, these seem all to have been confederations of diverse ethnic elements rather than homogeneous racial groups.

The valleys and pastures of the upper Oxus lands were especially congenial to Central Asian peoples. Several of the

empires founded by these peoples centred on this region, from which incursions could be made into Persia or the Indian plain; thus the Ephthalites, whose rulers bore the Turkish princely title of 'Tigin', ruled from Bāmiyān.[3] In the early Islamic period there were, as we have seen (above, pp. 35-6), Turkish elements in much of what is now eastern Afghanistan, with Khalaj and Oghuz nomadising on the plateau between Kabul, Ghazna and Bust. Thus the eastern margins of Khurasan had admixtures of Turkish peoples from an early date, and it is likely that by Firdausī's time, the stark antithesis of Īrān and Tūrān was more a literary and historical preconception of the Persian national consciousness than a description of the actual state of affairs. Jāḥiẓ, keenly interested in the questions of national differences raised by the Shuʿūbiyya movement, seems to have seen this. He recognises that there is a difference between Turk and Khurāsānī, but does not place a rigid barrier between the two:

> The difference between the Turk and Khurāsānī is not like the difference between the Persian and the Arab, or between Rūmī and Ṣaqlabī or Zanjī and Ḥabashī, let alone what is even more disparate in constitution and in the difference separating it; on the contrary, it is like the difference between the Meccan and Medinan, or Bedouin and sedentary, or plainsman and mountaineer, or like the difference between the mountain-dwelling Ṭayyi' tribesmen and the plains-dwelling Ṭayyi'.[4]

Transoxania and Khwārizm were in intimate geographical and economic contact with the Turkish steppes. At the time of the Arab conquest, Transoxania was a politically decentralised region of city-states, and its dominant social classes those of the feudal landowners or dihqāns and the merchants. These governing classes always resisted heavy-handed and unintelligent control from outside, for their trade interests demanded that the caravan routes across Asia should be kept open, and this meant skill and conciliation in dealing with the peoples who controlled these routes. When there was internal disturbance, or when aggression from outside was threatened, the Transoxanian leaders at times called in Turks as a counterbalancing force, either from Turks living outside or from those already settled within the borders of Transoxania. Narshakhī tells how the first

settlers of the Bukhārā oasis came from 'Turkestan', i.e. from the east. Later, a group of dihqāns and rich merchants fled from the tyranny of the Amīr of the oasis, Abrūy, to the Ṭarāz area and founded there the city of Jamūkat. Meanwhile, at Bukhārā itself, other dihqāns and nobles called in the Turkish Yabghu, Qara Jūrīn Türk (identified by Marquart as Istemi, ruler of the Western Tiu-Kiu, thus placing these events in the second half of the 6th century), against the oppressor Abrūy. On the latter's defeat, Qara Jūrīn Türk's son Shīr-i Kishvar [sc. Il-Arslan) founded the city of Bukhārā proper and reigned there for twenty years.[5]

On this occasion, Turks were called in from outside, but the rulers of Soghd used Turks from Īlāq, Chāch, Farghāna and Ṭukhāristān against the Arab invaders, and these may have been residents of long standing or even aboriginal inhabitants of the region. Bīrūnī and Bal'amī place the ancient boundary of Īrān and Tūrān at Mezdurān (which they explain as *Marz-i Tūrān*) between Mashhad and Sarakhs. The legends centred around Afrāsiyāb localise his exploits in Transoxania and his tomb at Rāmitīn near Bukhārā. According to Kāshgharī, all Transoxania was once a Turkish land, 'but when the Iranians (*al-Furs*) became numerous, it became just like Persian territory (*bilād al-'Ajam*)'.[6] We are left with the general picture of a Transoxania which was not only familiar with Turks as mercenaries, slaves and traders, but also as local settlers and landowners.

The economic and commercial links of Khwārizm and Transoxania with the Eurasian steppe were of considerable significance. These two provinces received the products of the Volga lands, of Siberia and of the Far East, and distributed them to the Islamic lands to the south. The frontier regions of Transoxania, such as that of Isfījāb, bristled with ribāṭs against the pagan Oghuz, Kimäk and Qïpchaq, and ghāzī warfare would flare up there sporadically. Nevertheless, there were long periods of peace during which normal life went on; despite its frontier position, the town of Isfījāb was a populous agricultural and commercial centre which dealt with the products of the steppes.[7] Khwārizm depended much on commerce for its prosperity, and had connections with the Volga and Urals region (see below, pp. 214-15). As early as Qutaiba b. Muslim's time there was an influential Jewish colony there with its own rabbis, and in the 10th century Khwārizmian traders used the Muslim

kingdom of Bulghār as a base for their activities in western Siberia and in eastern Europe, where several place-names attest to their trading colonies.[8]

In a region like Central Asia, the nomad and the sedentary cultivator are often in a symbiosis, each dependent on the other for certain basic products. The settled area supplies the nomads with such things as flour and the finer cereals like wheat and barley, with luxuries like sugar and spices and with manufactures like arms and textiles.[9] We have noted the part which the nomads played in the economy of Khurasan (above, pp. 154-5), and their part was equally significant in that of Transoxania. Transoxania's industrious population of merchants and artisans supplied the nomads with goods. For their part, the nomads fulfilled a rôle similar to that of the Bedouin of the Near East and, in more recent centuries, to that of the Turkish and Persian nomads and transhumants of Persia, driving their herds to the frontier towns and selling there their livestock, hides, wool and dairy products. According to Iṣṭakhrī, Transoxania and Khwārizm were supplied with horses, sheep, asses, mules and camels by the Oghuz and Qarluq. As well as supplying goods, the nomads also provided escort service for the caravans across the steppes, the equivalent of the Bedouins' *khifāra*. From such contacts as these, a spirit of tolerance and trust often grew up. Under a bond resembling the Arabs' *jiwār*, the caravan of Ibn Faḍlān's party (see next section) received shelter and hospitality from the Oghuz; according to Togan, relations like these were still kept up in the 19th century between Muslim traders and the Kirghiz.[10]

Finally, the trade in human beings linked steppe and settled zone and made Turkish mercenaries and slaves familiar in almost every part of the Islamic world. Turkish slaves first appeared in the Caliphate during the Umayyad period when Arab armies raided through the Caucasus to the Volga mouth and across the Oxus into Central Asia. Soon the slave-traffic became a large-scale commercial enterprise which the civil powers endeavoured to control and profit therefrom. The farm of a customs-post in Azerbaijan on the road from the Caucasus sometimes fetched a million dirhams. In Transoxania, the Sāmānid government issued licences (*ajwiza*) for the transit of slaves.[11] The governors of the eastern provinces regularly sent slaves as presents to the Caliphs. The father of Aḥmad b.

Ṭūlūn, who ruled in Egypt in the second half of the 9th century, had been presented to al-Ma'mūn by the Sāmānid governor of Bukhārā and was of Toghuz-Oghuz origin. Concerning the price of these slaves, Barthold concluded from the evidence of Ibn Khurradādhbih that the average price of a Turkish slave in the 9th century was 300 dirhams. For the next century we have the words of Ibn Ḥauqal, although it is true that his information relates primarily to the outstandingly valuable slaves:

> The most valuable slaves are those which come from the land of the Turks. Among all the slaves in the world, the Turks are incomparable and none approach them in value and beauty. I have not infrequently seen a slave boy sold in Khurasan for 3000 dinars; and Turkish slave girls fetch up to 3000 dinars. In all the regions of the earth I have never seen slave boys or girls which are as costly as this, neither Greek nor one born in slave status.[12]

Some of the Turks to be found in Baghdad and other big cities were traders or artisans who had been attracted thither and chose to settle there; in Baghdad they fulfilled lowly tasks like baking, selling vegetables and stoking baths. But it was as soldiers that the Turks chiefly impressed people, and it is as a bullying and brutalised soldiery that the Arab folk-consciousness has perpetuated them in the *Thousand and one nights*.[13] For the Turks were prized as soldiers rather than as domestic slaves, since their hardy steppe background gave them stamina and courage. Ibn Ḥassūl praises the Turkish race for its pride: they are not content to be inferior to their masters in respect of mounts, food and drink and equipment, but demand equality of treatment; nor will they perform menial household tasks like cleaning, nor tend animals as domestic and agricultural slaves do. Furthermore, the nostalgia often felt by long-established, rather blasé societies for the fresh, unspoilt barbarian credited the Turks with some of the qualities of the noble savage:

> The Turks know not how to flatter and coax, they know not how to practise hypocrisy or backbiting, pretence or slander, dishonesty or haughtiness on their acquaintance, or mischief on those that associate with them. They are strangers to heresy and not spoiled by caprice; and they do not make property lawful by quibbles.[14]

To summarise this section: by the time of the Seljuq invasions, the Turkish peoples had become familiar to the Muslims as traders and as military slaves. Some of them were beginning to acquire estates and possessions inside the borders of Islam. On the eastern fringes of Islam, the two worlds of Īrān and Tūrān had become in large part intermingled and the peaceful settlement of Turkish peoples was proceeding in certain regions; thus, in some ways, the irruption of the Seljuqs speeded up processes which had already begun.

2 *The early history of the Oghuz*

The Oghuz appear in history as a group of nine tribes, the Toghuz-Oghuz, who formed an important part of the Eastern Tiu-Kiu confederation; they are amongst the Turkish peoples apostrophised in the Orkhon inscriptions of the 8th century. The prominence of this group within the Tiu-Kiu empire is reflected in the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* where it says that 'the kings of the whole of Turkistān in the days of old were from the Toghuz-ghuz', and the Oghuz-Qaghan, grandson of Yāfith, progenitor of the Turkish race, plays a large part in the legends retailed by Rashīd ad-Dīn and Abū'l-Ghāzī.[15] The Toghuz-Oghuz were closely connected with another component people of the Eastern Tiu-Kiu empire, the Uighur, if, indeed, the two are not identical. The names *Oghuz* and *Uighur* seem to have a common origin in a root meaning 'people, population'; an intermediate, rhotacised form of *Oghuz*, *Ogōr*, is found in early Byzantine sources.[16]

The Eastern Tiu-Kiu kingdom collapsed in 744 from internal attack by a coalition of the Turkish Uighur, Basmïl and Qarluq peoples. The Uighur Iltebir eventually succeeded to the Qaghanate, and it is likely that the head of the Oghuz now took over the office of military leader (*Yabghu*) for one of the wings of the horde, taking the place there of the Uighur chief.[17] The Oghuz now became less and less a homogeneous ethnic group. The incorporation of defeated peoples into a victor's group was a common process in Central Asia. It is this incorporation, and not extermination, which accounts for the disappearance of famous names from the Eurasian steppe, such as those of the Gepids in Pannonia and the Basmïl in Mongolia.[18] Among the twenty-two component tribes of the Oghuz listed in the 11th

century by Kāshgharī are several which may, it has been surmised, be non-Turkish.[19]

During the course of the 8th century, the Oghuz confederation moved from the heartland of the Eastern Tiu-Kiu, the Orkhon and Selenga valleys in Mongolia, westwards to the Irtysh, the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya. Stray elements of the Oghuz had already found their way two centuries or so before this into the upper Oxus lands and into the Qara Qum and Dehistān steppes, but it was this major migration across Siberia which brought the Oghuz people as a whole into the field of Muslim writers. Ibn al-Athīr refers to it when discussing the origin of the Ghuzz who ravaged Khurasan during Sanjar's reign; he gives their original home as Khiṭā, and then quotes 'some historians of Khurasan' that they came in the first place from the remotest of the Turkish lands, the region of the Toghuz Oghuz, during the Caliphate of al-Mahdī (158-69/775-85). Ṭabarī mentions an attack of the Toghuz-Oghuz on Ushrūsana in 205/820-1, and the Ghuzz appear in Balādhurī, apparently for the first time in Muslim literature.[20]

In the writers of the 10th century there are several references to this migration of the Oghuz and to their new position in the Siberian steppes. Abū Dulaf Misʿar b. Muhalhil accompanied an embassy from the Sāmānids to the western borders of China in 331/941 and later wrote an account of the lands and peoples through which it passed. His information has to be handled with caution, for it is unlikely that he witnessed personally all the things which he describes, and he had a reputation among contemporaries for exaggeration and fancifulness; but he places the Oghuz to the east of the Kimäk of the Irtysh and before the Toghuz-Oghuz, who may be placed either at Kau-chang in the Turfan basin or on the Orkhon around Qara Balghasun.[21] Masʿūdī places the encampments of the Oghuz on the Irtysh, where their pastures bordered on those of the Kimäk and Qarluq, but adds that they were already driving their flocks in winter as far as the Volga and crossing the frozen ice to attack the Khazar lands and the Azov and Black Sea coasts. The existing Turkish peoples of the Aral Sea and Syr Darya region, like the Pechenegs and Bajghird, were being forced to move westwards to the Urals and South Russia, and the wars between the *Patzinakitai* and the *Ouzoi* now become known to us from Byzantine sources.[22]

According to Mas'ūdī and Ibn Ḥauqal, the Turks had a town on the lower Syr Darya, the 'new town' of Yängi-känt (*al-qarya al-ḥadītha, dih-i nau:* modern Jānkänt-kala), where there were Muslims living. Most of these Turks were Oghuz, including both nomads and sedentaries (*bawādī wa ḥaḍar*). They were divided into three hordes, an Upper, Middle and Lower, and were pre-eminent among the Turks for their bravery, their short stature and their small eyes. Yängi-känt was the largest of three towns lying to the east of the Aral Sea, the others being Jand and Khuvāra. The pagan king of the Oghuz used Yängi-känt as his winter capital and exercised political dominion over the Muslim settlers there. Barthold surmised that these three towns had been found by emigrants from Sāmānid Transoxania with the assent of the indigenous Turks and that they formed a bridgehead into the steppes for the trade with the Siberian forests and with the Kimäk and Kirghiz.[23] Yet there is no reason why these towns should not be purely Turkish creations; there were traditions of sedentary life among the Turks stretching as far back at least as the Tiu-Kiu empire on the Orkhon. Towns further up the Syr Darya, such as Saurān and Sighnāq, were Turkish ones; the whole of the middle stretch of the river was profoundly Turkish and the expanse between Jand and Uṭrār was held by pagan Qïpchaq and considered *Dār al-kufr* by the Muslims till the end of the 12th century.[24]

As a centre for the Oghuz and a spring-board for the expansion of the Seljuq family, the lower Syr Darya merits closer attention. We have very little literary evidence to help us here; the region had cultural and commercial connections with Khwārizm, but there was also frequent hostility between the two. However, much light has recently been thrown by the researches of Soviet archaeologists, above all, by those of V. V. Struve and S. P. Tolstov. They have shown that this region, known to have been the home in pre-Christian times of peoples like the Massagetes and Sakae, had a rich barbarian culture in the first millennium of our era. The peoples living there were not pure nomads, but were also cattle-raisers, fishermen and agriculturists. The Ephthalites lived here before moving southwards, and the information of the Byzantine authors Procopius and Menander Protector that the Ephthalites were essentially dwellers in settlements is in this way confirmed. According to

Tolstov, there is no break in the cultural history of the towns of the Syr Darya basin between the Ephthalite and Oghuz periods; the Oghuz culture of the 10th century is a direct development from that of the Ephthalites in the 5th and 6th centuries. No doubt there was also some ethnic continuity, with the incoming Oghuz imposing themselves as a new set of leaders but in part integrating themselves with the existing population. So by the opening of the 11th century the Oghuz had to some extent taken over the older sedentary traditions of the area and had become cattle-raisers and agriculturists as well as pastoral nomads, just as the Khazars had done in the similar conditions of the lower Volga. Idrīsī (drawing on 10th century sources, including the geographical work of Jaihānī) and Kāshgharī describe the towns of the Oghuz as numerous, and on his map, Kāshgharī shows the lower Syr Darya as the 'land of the Oghuz towns'. During the 10th century, the old Hunno-Turkish settlement of Yängi-känt in the delta was rebuilt and refortified, hence its name 'new town'; today, archaeology and air photography have disclosed there a rich complex of irrigation canals, citadels, walls and caravanserais.[25]

The Oghuz of the lower Syr Darya thus succeeded to a cultural and social heritage which had some fairly advanced elements in it. The region, together with the surrounding steppes where Oghuz pastoralist nomads roamed, was also in part susceptible to influences from Muslim Khwārizm and Transoxania and, to a lesser extent, from recently Islamised peoples of South Russia like the Bulghars and Khazars. At certain times, when natural conditions were particularly severe or when other factors were at work, there was pressure from the nomads on the margins of the settled Muslim lands, and warfare would follow. Ibn Ḥauqal speaks of regular campaigns against the Oghuz, and Bīrūnī mentions the Khwārizmian *Faghburiyya* festival, that 'of the king's expedition', held each autumn before the ruler set off on his annual expedition against the Oghuz. Nevertheless, there must have been at the same time attempts by a few bold and enthusiastic spirits among the Muslims at evangelistic work within the steppes. Our knowledge about such activity is very slight, and what we do know relates to the Qarluq peoples who made up the Qarakhanid confederation rather than to the Oghuz. It is likely that a certain Nīshāpūrī

missionary, one Abū'l-Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Kalamātī, who passed from the service of the Sāmānids at Bukhārā to that of the Qarakhanids and died among them at some time before 350/961, played a part in the conversion of the Qarakhanid prince Satuq Bughra Khan, who assumed the Muslim name of 'Abd al-Karīm.[26] We have seen that in Maqdisī's time there were several *khānqāhs* of the Karāmiyya in Farghāna from which evangelism into the surrounding areas was probably carried on (see above, p. 186). Missionary work by dervishes and mullahs has continued in the steppes almost to the present century, and has only been slowed down by the counter-efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church after 1700.

It is in the latter half of the 10th century that the term 'Turkmen' comes into use. Maqdisī speaks of two places in Transoxania as being defence points (*thaghrān*) against the Turkmens (*Turkmāniyyūn*), who although converted to Islam 'out of fear', had clearly not given up their old predatory habits.[27] Gardīzī and Baihaqī almost invariably call the Oghuz who harried the Ghaznavid frontiers 'Turkmens', and Niẓām al-Mulk refers to the Seljuqs' tribal followers by this name, although the term Oghuz/Ghuzz continued in popular and official usage down to the Mongol period. It is thus apparently a synonym for the south-western Turks, the Oghuz and Qïpchaq, although there are some difficulties in this semantic identification, in that Kāshgharī, tr. Atalay, I, 473, also applies the term to the eastern Turks of the Qarluq group. Kafesoğlu has therefore suggested recently that 'Turkmen' is a political rather than an ethnic term.[28] Whatever the truth of this—and there is still much dispute about the actual meaning and etymology of the word—it is certain that in the early 11th century there was a definite linguistic distinction between a south-western Turkish dialect, 'Turkmenī' or 'Ghuzzī', and an eastern one, 'Turkī'. The line from Manūchihrī cited above, p. 134, points to this, and Kāshgharī, whilst calling both the Oghuz and Qarluq 'Turkmens', carefully distinguished the speech of the two groups, and outlines some of the sound changes which distinguish the former from the latter.[29]

The commercial links between Khwārizm and South Russia have always been close, and across the Oghuz steppes ran a caravan route connecting Gurgānj with the Khazar capital Atil on the Volga delta. Ibn Faḍlān travelled along this way in a

caravan of 5000 men and 3000 horses; the trip was made every spring, returning to Khwārizm in the autumn. In 1946 Tolstov found, with the aid of aerial photographs, the clearly-defined traces of the route between Gurgānj and the lower Emba. On it were still standing splendid stone caravanserais and wells with stone covers, attesting to the importance which the Khwārizmians attached to this route. There were also some maritime links. Mas'ūdī says that large ships sailed up the Volga with merchandise from Khwārizm; this must have been sent over the Üst Urt plateau to Manghishlaq for shipment, for it does not seem that there was ever in historic times a navigable channel connecting the lower Oxus and the Caspian.[30] The 10th century witnessed an increase in the volume of trade between Khwārizm and Bulghār and Khazaria, bringing about the political and economic rise of Gurgānj and leading eventually to the triumph in 385/995 of the local Ma'mūnid family over the ancient Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs of Kāth. Trade contacts across the steppes brought cultural exchanges. The Christian communities of Khwārizm seem to have been Orthodox or Jacobite in complexion and not Nestorian, i.e. their connections were with the Byzantine and Slav west and not with the east. Bīrūnī describes the Christians of Khwārizm as observing certain western festivals, and in the 14th century the Armenian King Haithon observed whilst passing through the region that the local Christians acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Patriarchs of Antioch.[31]

Yet despite these cultural currents at work in the regions adjoining their territories, and despite perhaps some evangelistic activity by the Muslims of Khwārizm or Bulghār, the Oghuz seem in the 10th century to have been unaffected by any of the higher religions. Zakariyā' Qazwīnī's *Āthār al-bilād*, written during the 13th century but drawing on earlier sources, describes Christianity as widespread among the Oghuz, but Togan has rightly discounted this report for which no definite evidence exists and which is in itself unlikely.[32] The names of the four sons of Seljuq, Mūsā, Mīkā'īl, Isrā'īl and Yūnus, have been traced to Jewish influences stemming from the Khazar court, where the ruler and the aristocracy were Judaised, but all we can legitimately deduce from this is that Biblical names like these had a certain cachet among the steppe peoples.[33] The successes of Christianity in the western steppes came later and

affected primarily the Qïpchaq, successors there to the Oghuz, and the *Codex Cumanicus* is its enduring monument. All that Abū Dulaf mentions of religion among the Oghuz is that they had a 'house of prayer' which contained no idols.[34] Significant of the Oghuz' low level of culture is the fact that they were complete strangers to writing. The old Turkish script, used in the Orkhon and Yenissei inscriptions, by the Türgesh in the Semirechye and by the Manichaeans of Turfan, left no traces among these western Turks.[35] On the other hand, the Turks living further east remained to some extent literate through the adoption of the Uighur alphabet, which we find in full use among the Qarakhanids and which was only gradually supplanted by the Arabic one. From being illiterate, the Oghuz adopted the Arabic script straight away, probably in the early 11th century.

The condition in the early 10th century of those Oghuz who wandered from the Dehistān steppes in the south through the Üst Urt plateau to the mouths of the Ural and Emba rivers and the Bashkir lands is known to us from the illuminating narrative of the Caliphal envoy Ibn Faḍlān, concerning the value of which Togan has written 'Jede kleine Einzelheit in den Berichten Ibn Faḍlāns verdient jedenfalls entschieden die Beachtung und Aufmerksamkeit des Forscher'. The account of his journey from Gurgānj to the land of the Bulghars on the middle Volga in 309-10/922 was previously known only from extensive passages given in Yāqūt's article 'Bulghār' in the *Mu'jam al-buldān*, but A. Z. V. Togan discovered a largely-complete manuscript of the original at Mashhad. Whilst traversing the Üst Urt plateau, his embassy met an Oghuz tribe who were wandering 'like wild asses' and living in a wretched state. Their women never veiled themselves and had little compunction about displaying their genitalia in public. Sick people were either left to recover as best they could or else turned out into the desert to die. Their personal habits were filthy: 'They do not make ablutions after performing their natural functions, they do not wash themselves after sexual contamination or anything like that, nor do they have any contact with water, especially in winter.' However, the chastity of their womenfolk and their abhorrence of pederasty are favourably commented on.[36]

As far as Ibn Faḍlān could see, these Oghuz were almost irreligious. One of their military commanders, the 'Lesser

Yïnāl', had been a Muslim, but had had to renounce the faith when the people had told him that he could not be one of their leaders unless he did that. What vague religion they had consisted of the formal acknowledgement of the existence of the 'One God', *Bir Tängri*, and the recognition of some kind of afterlife for their great warriors. Slaughtered horses were thrown on warriors' tombs and effigies of men to attend them in the next life were erected on them (*balbals*).[37] These sketchy beliefs attest to little more than a primitive animism. The reverence for water, and particularly for running water and springs, which was displayed by Ibn Faḍlān's Oghuz, was widespread among Turkish and Mongol peoples. The Orkhon inscriptions refer to 'the Turks' auspicious Earth-Water' (*Türk ïduq yiri subï*) as a religious principle co-existent with 'the Turks' Heaven' (*Türk tängrisi*); and reverence for water was written into the *Yasa* or fundamental law of the Mongols in Chinggiz Khan's time.[38]

Ibn Faḍlān mentions that these Oghuz had their *qams* or shamans who took part in the burial rites of their great men, and he seems also to refer to the rites of shamans among the Bulghars, still only in part Islamised. The *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* says that the Oghuz held their medicine-men (*ṭabībān*, *pijishkān*) in great veneration and allowed them a power of life and death. In the old Turkish tradition it was Oghuz, the grandson of Yāfith, who held the magical rain-stone (*yada-tash*) which could bring victory in battle through control of the elements.[39] The early Seljuq tribal leaders seem to have set some store by soothsaying and magic to guide them in their movements and campaignings. At the battle of Dandānqān in 431/1040, the victorious Seljuqs had their *munajjim*, and after the fighting, when Toghrïl proclaimed himself ruler of Khurasan, this astrologer was rewarded, presumably for his correct prognostications. Among the Seljuq family itself, Qutalmïsh b. Arslan Isrā'īl, Toghrïl's cousin, was very skilled in astrological lore; according to Ibn al-Athīr, this was thought remarkable, but as his rebellion later showed, Qutalmïsh represented conservative Turkmen feeling, and he may have retained the customs and lore of older tribal life particularly tenaciously.[40]

Ibn Faḍlān also gives us some information about the political and tribal organisation of the Oghuz whom he encountered. Their ruler, he says, is called the *Yabghu*, a title of military

origin which goes back to Tiu-Kiu times (see above, p. 210). His deputy was called the *Küdhärkin*, apparently the *Külärkin* of Kāshgharī, tr. Atalay, I, 108. These two had the moral authority of tribal chiefs, and were perhaps descended from the ruling families of the Turks in the steppes.[41] However, the actual direction of military and political affairs was done by a man whom Ibn Faḍlān calls *Ṣāḥib al-jaish*, i.e. *Sübashï* or *Sübegi*. It was to this leader, and not to the *Yabghu*, that Ibn Faḍlān presented his credentials, handing over letters from the Abbasid court and giving special presents. Under the *Sübashï* were several subordinate military commanders with the titles *Ṭarkhān* (*Tärkän*), *Yïnal* and (?) *Y.gh.l.z.*[42]

On the whole, the Oghuz were in a less advanced state than other Turkish peoples like the Khazars on the lower Volga or the Qarluq in the Semirechye, who in the 10th century were constituting themselves as the nucleus of the Qarakhanid confederation. Politically, the Oghuz were disunited. They had no Qaghan of their own, but only the *Yabghu* as their head. The title of Qaghan and the theoretical dominion of the steppes passed to the Uighur and the Qarakhanids, but the Seljuqs were never to assume it. Turbulence and fragmentation appear as characteristics of the Oghuz people at an early date. In the Orkhon inscriptions, the rebelliousness of the Toghuz-Oghuz is frequently mentioned. According to the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 'each of their tribes [sc. of the Oghuz] has a (separate) chief on account of their discords with each other', and in the 10th century we hear of an important split which led to a section of the Oghuz taking over pastures in the previously-uninhabited Manghïshlaq peninsula to the east of the Caspian. One of the reasons adduced by the Oghuz who in 416/1025 approached Maḥmūd of Ghazna with a request that they be allowed to settle in Khurasan, was the oppression of their own amīrs.[43] Even after the Seljuq Sultans had become rulers of a mighty empire in the Middle East, they never succeeded in exacting full obedience from their own Turkmen followers, and the *débâcle* of Sanjar and the Ghuzz in Khurasan signalised the final failure of the Seljuq family to secure recognition amongst their own people for their supreme authority.

3 *The migrations of the Oghuz into Transoxania and Khurasan*

Kāshgharī [tr. Atalay, I, 55-9) list twenty-two tribes of the Oghuz, and says that the Qïnïq are the leading one, the tribe of the princes of the Oghuz. The Seljuq family—it does not seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this—belonged to the Qïnïq.[44] Our principal source for Seljuq beginnings is the anonymous *Malik-nāma*, probably written for the young prince Alp Arslan shortly after the death of his father Chaghrï Beg in 451/1059. Thus it dates from within a generation of the events which it describes. It is known to us from extracts in later historians like Ibn al-Athīr, al-Ḥusainī, Barhebraeus and Mīrkhwānd. Their information has been thoroughly examined by Cahen, who has combined it with the evidence of other sources (such as the Ghaznavid ones, the Khurasanian one of Ibn Funduq's *Mashārib at-tajārib*, which is known from citations, and the Būyid one of Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi' and his son and continuator Ghars an-Niʿma, again known from extracts in other works) to produce a critical account of the appearance of the Seljuqs down to their victory at Dandānqān. O. Pritsak has also dealt with Seljuq origins, but from the point of view of the Turcologist as well as that of the Islamic historian. The two scholars have differed on several points, with Cahen tending to uphold the older, traditional views against Pritsak's more speculative ones.[45]

The ancestor of the Seljuq dynasty, Duqāq or Tuqāq, was called *Tämir-Yalïgh* 'Iron-bow' from his bravery and strength. He served the 'King of the Turks', the *Yabghu* of the Oghuz (often spelt *B.y.ghū* or *P.y.ghū* in the sources).[46] In Mīrkhwānd, the *Yabghu* is called 'King of the Khazars'. Relations between the *Yabghu* and his servant became strained; according to the *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, Duqāq had opposed the *Yabghu*'s plan to raid Islamic territory, but this is clearly a later touch designed to show that the Seljuq family were already moved by the divine light before their formal adhesion to Islam. Duqāq's son Seljuq was also in the *Yabghu*'s service and held the important military office of *Sübashï* (interpreted in the Arabic and Persian sources as *Qā'id al-jaish*, *Muqaddam al-jaish*). However, the *Yabghu*'s wife grew alarmed at the power and prestige of Seljuq and poisoned her husband's mind against him. Seljuq

fled before the blow could fall, taking with him a hundred men from his family and retainers, 1500 camels and 50,000 sheep. He reached Jand near the mouth of the Syr Darya, where 'God Most High flooded his heart with His most holy light', and he sought instruction on Islam and the Qur'ān from the local faqīhs and ulema. Seljuq and his band then settled in the steppes near Jand, gathered together a band of Turkish ghāzīs and freed the local Muslim population from the exactions of 'the envoy of the pagans' who came each year to collect taxes. Although Seljuq may have become nominally a Muslim, al-Ḥusainī's account records that when he had a dream in which he found himself urinating fire, the sparks from which spread all over the world, it was a *mu'abbir* (sc. one of the Turks' shamans) whom he asked to interpret this portent of universal dominion for his descendants.[47]

The locale of these events is the steppes stretching from the lower Syr Darya to the Volga, the expanse over which the Oghuz *Yabghu* ruled, with his winter capital at Yängi-känt. The connections of the *Yabghu*, Duqāq and Seljuq with the Khazars on the lower Volga have recently attracted the attention of scholars, especially as Abū'l-'Alā' b. Ḥassūl, the Ghaznavid official who went over to the Seljuqs and wrote a book for Toghrïl extolling his family, mentions a curious episode involving Seljuq (here spelt *S.r.j.q*) b. Duqāq. According to this, Seljuq struck the King of the Khazars with his sword, and this is cited to show the nobility and daring of Toghrïl's ancestors. Barhebraeus says that Duqāq was in the Khazar service and his son reared at their court. D. M. Dunlop has therefore assumed a connection between the Seljuqs and Khazars and has suggested that the cause of Seljuq's flight to Jand may have been a final rupture with the Khazars. There are, however, arguments against this view. The mention of the Khazars in the sources may be a recollection of earlier Oghuz-Khazar connections, but their relations in the second half of the 10th century were hostile. The Khazars were by then a declining military and political force, and in dealing with Vladimir of Kiev's Volga expedition of 985, the Russian Primary Chronicle speaks expressly of a Russo-Oghuz alliance against the Khazars.[48]

In the whole episode we have an instance of the political disunity and divisiveness of the Oghuz. The power of the *Yabghu*, nominal head of the people, was being challenged by

the ambitious *Sübashï* Seljuq, and we have here the story of this over-mighty subject's expulsion. When Seljuq reached Jand he in turn expelled the *Yabghu*'s representatives from there. Thus began the bitter hostility between the older, ruling line of the Oghuz, that of the *Yabghu* and his nephew Abū'l-Fawāris Shāh Malik b. ʿAlī, and the Seljuqs, who could only be regarded by the former as rebels. Seljuq's adoption of Islam gave what was potentially an additional motive for hostility, that of religion, but in practice it can have made little difference. The conversion of the *Yabghu* and his circle at Yängi-känt must have followed in the early years of the 11th century; Shāh Malik had a full complement of Islamic names and his father had assumed the name of ʿAlī. In any event, it is far from certain that all the Turkmens who followed the Seljuq leaders southwards into Transoxania and Khurasan were Muslims, and perhaps only a minority were; their violent behaviour was not conspicuously Muslim.

The *terminus ad quem* for the conversion of Seljuq and his family may be fixed at 382/992, for in that year Arslan Isrā'īl b. Seljuq was aiding the Sāmānids against the Qarakhanid Bughra Khan, who conquered Bukhārā in that year. The three sons of Seljuq, Arslan Isrā'īl, Mīkā'īl and Mūsā (the fourth, Yūnus, died young) moved towards Transoxania and entered the service first of the Sāmānids and then of various Qarakhanid princes. Gardīzī records the conversion of the Oghuz *Yabghu* and his alliance with the last of the Sāmānids, Ismāʿīl b. Nūḥ al-Muntaṣir, in 393/1003, and the Oghuz again joined the latter in the next year against the Ilig Khan Naṣr. According to ʿUtbī, the Oghuz had a traditional bias in favour of the Sāmānids: *lahum ṣaghwᵘⁿ ilā 'd-daula as-Sāmāniyya.*[49] Cahen and Pritsak have differed over the identity of this *Yabghu*, whether the original holder of this title is intended or whether Arslan Isrā'īl b. Seljuq, who is later found with the title, is meant. Cahen inclines to the traditional view, held, for example, by Barthold, that this *Yabghu* = Arslan Isrā'īl, who had assumed this title in rivalry to the *Yabghu* proper and as an assertion of the Seljuqs' independence of him. On the other hand, Pritsak denies that Arslan Isrā'īl could have assumed the title so early, and he asserts that it must have been the *Yabghu* of Yängi-känt and Jand who aided the Sāmānids. It seems to the present writer that Pritsak's interpretation accords better with the sketchy

information which we possess on these events. His stress on dating is justified, and it is significant that Shāh Malik's *kunya* 'Abū'l-Fawāris' points to Sāmānid connections, for this was a favourite patronymic of the later Amīrs.[50] At whatever date Arslan Isrā'īl's assumption of the old Turkish title took place, it was an act of defiance towards the original *Yabghu*, for it implied headship of the whole Oghuz people. It is possible that the Qarakhanids prompted this act as a display of hostility towards the Sāmānids' old ally, the Oghuz *Yabghu*, especially as the Oghuz rulers of Yängi-känt and Jand continued to be bitter enemies of the Qarakhanids as well as of the Seljuqs, transferring their alliance after the fall of the Sāmānids to the Qarakhanids' enemies, the Ghaznavids.

What impelled the Seljuqs and their followers to move southwards from Jand and seek pastures in the neighbourhood of Bukhārā? The region was, of course, politically troubled: two old-established dynasties, the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs and the Sāmānids, had recently collapsed and two new ones, the Qarakhanids and Ghaznavids, had arisen to fill the vacuum of power. There were numerous opportunities for Turkish tribesmen to find employment as military auxiliaries or as frontier guards. Economic factors may have been involved. Several sources on the history of Central Asia speak of lack of pastures there and overcrowding of its population. Marvazī and, following him, 'Aufī say that the Qūn, who seem to have been a Turkish people living with the Qāy tribe (which is not to be confused with the Qayïgh tribe of the Oghuz) in Mongolia, came westwards because of pressure on pasture grounds. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī and, following him, Rāwandī specifically say of the Seljuqs that 'these noble ones left Turkestan for the province of Transoxania on account of the large number of families and the shortage of pastures', and Jamāl Qarshī confirms that this took place 'because of the crowding-together of their families'.[51] It may well be that this was one of the motives swaying the Seljuqs. Disputes over living-space were not infrequent in the steppes; these often ended either in a bloody struggle, after which the winners took over the losers' pastures, or else with an irruption into the settled lands, which thereby served as a safety-valve. We do know that the Seljuqs and their followers were in a wretched physical and material condition whilst they were spreading into Ghaznavid Khurasan. But the

arguments of climatic change, increased desiccation, over-population and economic pressure have so often been put forward as facile explanations for complex population movements that it is safest to treat the economic motive behind the Seljuq invasions as only one among several.

It is very probable that pressure from the Qïpchaq and their associated tribe of the Qanghlï was a factor in the migrations of the Oghuz at this time. The Qïpchaq were an old people who arose from the Kimäk of the Irtysh basin. Gardīzī describes them as one of the seven constituent tribes of the Kimäk, but his information must have been quite old, for Ibn Khurradādhbih in the 9th century gives them as a separate people, the Khifshākh. On the other hand, the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* says that although the Khifshākh had separated from the Kimäk, their ruler (*malik*) still acted as deputy for the Kimäk. The geographers of the 10th century mention that the Oghuz and Kimäk harried the northern frontiers of Transoxania; by the next century, the name 'Kimäk' has disappeared from use, but Baihaqī says that the Qïpchaq were harrying the confines of Khwārizm at Masʿūd of Ghazna's accession (sc. in 421/1030).[52] Undoubtedly, important ethnic movements were taking place at this time in the western steppes, leading to the occupation of South Russia by the Polovtsi or Comans and transforming the name of these western steppes from the older title 'Oghuz steppe' to that of 'Qïpchaq steppe'. Pritsak plausibly conjectures that since Shāh Malik fled after the Seljuq occupation of Khwārizm southwards into eastern Persia (according to Ibn Funduq, he passed through Baihaq in 433/1041-2) and not back to Yängi-känt, the lower Syr Darya had by then passed out of Oghuz into Qïpchaq hands.[53]

In the first three decades of the 11th century, the Seljuq family lived as condottieri on the Islamic frontiers, giving their services to whomever would promise them plunder and pasture land for their followers. Arslan Isrā'īl married a daughter of the Qarakhanid ruler of Bukhārā, ʿAlītigin b. Bughra Khan Hārūn or Ḥasan, and eventually, the two sons of Mīkā'īl, Abū Ṭālib Toghrïl Beg Muḥammad and Abū Sulaimān Chaghrï Beg Dā'ūd, joined him in ʿAlītigin's service and settled on pastures at Nūr-Bukhārā or Nakhshab.[54] Towards the end of the second decade of the century, in 409/1018 or 412/1021, a long-distance foray of the Turkmens under Chaghrï Beg into Armenia and

Azerbaijan is recorded by certain historians (Mīrkhwānd among the Islamic ones and Barhebraeus, Matthew of Edessa and Vartan among the Syrian and Armenian Christian ones). Kafesoğlu has devoted a special study to this expedition and has asserted its historicity as an exploratory, preparatory raid; but Cahen has raised telling objections and has asserted that the historians' reports must refer to the raids made some ten years later, some chronological confusion having occurred.[55]

There was no unified direction among the whole body of Turkmens, and no coherent policy; sections of them alternated now between the service of the Qarakhanids and that of the Ghaznavids. When in 426/1025 Maḥmūd allied with the eastern Qarakhanid Qadïr Khan Yūsuf against the latter's brother and rival 'Alītigin, 'Alītigin was temporarily driven out of Soghd and his Turkmen auxiliaries also compelled to move. The Sultan felt that these Turkmens were a potential danger, so Arslan Isrā'īl was captured and jailed in India for the rest of his life. His nephews Toghrïl and Chaghrï did not at this stage have sufficient prestige—their title 'Beg' implies no special primacy—further to impose the rule of their family over the Turkmens. Arslan Isrā'īl's former followers then asked Maḥmūd for permission to settle on the northern fringes of Khurasan and act as guards there, alleging that they were suffering from the oppression of their Amīrs. The Sultan hoped to follow 'Alītigin's policy and use them as auxiliaries, and he allowed 4000 families, together with all their baggage, sheep, camels, horses and mules, to cross the Oxus and settle near Farāwa, Sarakhs and Abīward.[56]

Deprived of Arslan Isrā'īl's leadership, these Turkmens degenerated into a complete rabble. Various minor chieftains led sections of them, but there was no unified direction. They plundered the settled lands of northern Khurasan and their flocks were a menace to agriculture there (see below, pp. 259-60). In 418/1027 the people of Nasā and Abīward complained to the Sultan of these depredations and punitive measures were taken, first by the governor of Ṭūs, the ghulām general Abū'l-Ḥārith Arslan Jādhib (? Ḥājib), and then (419/1028) by the Sultan in person. A crushing defeat was inflicted on the Turkmens, who then scattered far and wide, some back into the Dehistān steppes and the Balkhān-Kūh hills, others westwards into Persia, where some of them found employment

with local rulers. It was these whom Ibn Kākūya of Iṣfahān (see above, p. 74) enrolled into his service on more than one occasion. They now became a cause of chronic unrest in the provinces of Ray and Jibāl. Mas'ūd enlisted some of them under their leader Yaghmur at Ray in 420/1029 and brought them eastwards with him. They were then placed under one of his own ghulām commanders and used for an expedition to Makrān, but never proved reliable as a military force. Yaghmur's followers continued to raid Khurasan from the Balkhān-Kūh region; and in 424/1033 the Ghaznavid commander Tash Farrāsh executed fifty of the Turkmen chiefs, including Yaghmur. It was hoped in this way to cow the remaining Turkmens, but in practice it merely added a further motive, that of vengeance, to their violence.[57]

These Turkmens are the "Irāqī' ones familiar from Baihaqī and Ibn al-Athīr, so-called from their penetration into western Persia or 'Irāq 'Ajamī. From these two sources we learn the names of some of their leaders: Yaghmur (who seems to have held a certain primacy), Būqā (Bogha), Göktash, Qïzïl, Manṣūr and (?) Nāṣ-oghlu (Mükrimin Halil Yïnanç, *Anadolu'nun fethi* [Istanbul 1944], 37, reads 'Anasï-oğlu'). But it is clear that the "Irāqī' Turkmens were composed largely of independent bands.[58] In general, they remained separate from those bands which the Seljuq family led and there was hostility rather than solidarity between the two groups. The amīrs of whose tyranny the "Irāqīs' complained may have been members of the Seljuq family attempting to impose their authority. In their letter of 426/1035 to the governor of Khurasan Sūrī, the Seljuq leaders Yabghu, Toghrïl and Chaghrï promised that if the Sultan would let them settle at Nasā and Farāwa, they would act as guards against fresh Turkmen incursions from Balkhān-Kūh, Dehistān and Khwārizm, and would inflict punishment on the "Irāqī' Turkmens.[59]

Meanwhile, there remained in the Bukhārā area Toghrïl, Chaghrï and the Yabghu, who, according to Baihaqī and the *Malik-nāma*, was the uncle of the two brothers. The exact identification of this Yabghu is difficult; some sources explicitly identify him with Mūsā b. Seljuq, who would have succeeded to the title after Arslan Isrā'īl's death in imprisonment and 'Alītigin's killing of Yūsuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq. There are, however, many contradictions in the sources, and Cahen frankly

avows that he is unable to resolve them. In practice, Toghrïl and Chaghrï were the directing brains behind the Seljuq bands' military adventures. Concerning the composition of these bands, it is probable that the Seljuqs' successes attracted additional groups of Oghuz and elements from other tribes in the surrounding steppes. The Qïnïq begin to drop out of mention, but other Oghuz tribes come into prominence: the Ivä, the Dögär, the Salghur and the Avshar. All four of these appear in Kāshgharī's list of the tribes of the Oghuz (as Ivā, Tugar, Salghur and Afshār), and they were to play important rôles in the later history of the Seljuqs and their Atabegs: the Artuqids arose from the Dögär, the leaders of the Salghur founded during the 12th century a dynasty of their own in Fārs and the Qaramanlïs of central Anatolia probably arose from the Avshar.[60]

A group within the Turkmen following of Toghrïl, Chaghrï and the Yabghu which has recently attracted the attention of Minorsky and Cahen is that of the Yināliyān/Ināliyān. The three leaders crossed the Oxus in 426/1035 with 10,000 riders and with another group of Turkmens from Khwārizm who had no mounts and who had to go on foot, and made for Merv and Nasā. According to Baihaqī, the riders comprised both Seljūqiyān and Yināliyān.[61] The latter group were led by Ibrāhīm Ināl, whom the sources all take to be Toghrïl's uterine half-brother, but whom Cahen thinks was probably a son of the man who was for a brief period *Yabghu*, Yūsuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq. What is certain is that these Ināliyān were not a separate tribal group; no such tribe is mentioned, for instance, in Kāshgharī. But there is the well-known Turkish title of *ïnal/yïnal*, which is found as far back as the Tonyuquq inscription. The *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm* interprets *yināl* as 'the *walī-'ahd* of the *Yabghu* or of any Turkish ruler', and Kāshgharī defines it 'son of a princess or vassal'. We know that it was used among the Oghuz, for Ibn Faḍlān met the *Yināl aṣ-ṣaghīr*, who was one of their military commanders. Minorsky concludes that among the Seljuqs, the family of the Yināl had a special place and retained hereditary rights, so that their retinue and following had a separate, semi-independent existence; possibly the Qïnïq had been ruled by Yināls. In this way, the later pretensions of Ibrāhīm Ināl, which were to lead to his execution in 451/1059, become more explicable as the attempted assertion of old tribal rights.[62]

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUCCESSION TO THE SULTANATE OF MAS'ŪD B. MAḤMŪD

1 *Sultan Mas'ūd: the man*

The military machine which Maḥmūd had perfected during an active career of over forty years passed now to Mas'ūd, who had himself a reputation already forged in many battles. Maḥmūd had taken the two brothers Mas'ūd and Muḥammad when they were both fourteen years old on his campaign of 401/1011 against the Ghūrī chieftain Muḥammad b. Sūrī. He again took Mas'ūd with him four years later when Ghūr was invaded from Bust and Zamīndāwar and the region of Khwābīn attacked. The 'lion-hearted youth' distinguished himself as an intrepid cavalryman and archer; a single arrow of his killed the commander of a tower whose defenders had been causing the Muslims much trouble, thereby demoralising the pagan Ghūrīs and driving them to surrender. Because of this and similar deeds, Maḥmūd shortly afterwards made him his *walī-'ahd* or heir, 'for he saw and realised that when he departed from this mansion of false reality, this mighty house—may it always endure—would not be able to stand without him'. At the same time, the Sultan made Mas'ūd governor of Herat, although he did not take up this post till 408/1017-18. Since Herat was one of the great cities of the empire and a key defence point, the office was commensurate with his position as heir.[1]

The close of Maḥmūd's life found Mas'ūd in the far west of the empire. On the conquest of Ray and Jibāl in 420/1029, the Sultan left the further pacification of this region to his son. Mas'ūd campaigned vigorously against the Musāfirids and Kākūyids, and later asserted that but for his father's death, he would have carved a way through to Syria and Egypt.[2] Already there had been one rift between Maḥmūd and his son, when Mas'ūd had fallen from grace and had been temporarily exiled from Herat to Multan. He had remained *walī-'ahd*, but had never regained his father's full trust. Now, at the end of the old Sultan's life, relations again deteriorated. Prince Muḥammad's partisans were active at court slandering Mas'ūd, and Maḥmūd's powers of judgement were beginning to fail; advancing

age, illness and effects of a lifetime of furious activity were now telling. Baihaqī says that at this time, 'his constitution gave way and in the greatness of his nature, a weakening faculty of judgement was apparent'; according to Shabānkāra'ī, Maḥmūd even grew harsh and ill-tempered towards his favourite Ayāz. He accordingly transferred the succession to Muḥammad. Mas'ūd was in Ray at this time, and he later asserted that he had been deliberately left there with a weak force so that he would not be able to achieve any spectacular successes. (In reality, it seems unlikely that Maḥmūd would have hazarded his recent conquests merely to spite his son).[3] Ibn Bābā alleges that Maḥmūd used to envy brave people, and so favoured the weaker son Muḥammad; but he must surely have realised that in a struggle for power, the experienced Mas'ūd would have the stronger hand. Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān is said to have shown bewilderment at Maḥmūd's preference for Muḥammad, and to have been told that the Sultan wanted Muḥammad to receive some respect and honour while his father lived, for he would get none after then.[4] Clearly, the decision puzzled both contemporaries and later writers.

Maḥmūd died in Rabī' II 421/April 1030, and Muḥammad succeeded in Ghazna according to his father's will. He rejected the idea of a division of power with his brother, himself to have Khurasan, Ghazna and India, and Mas'ūd to have the new conquests in the west and the title of Sultan. But Mas'ūd progressed triumphally eastwards to Nishapur, and at the end of Ramaḍān 421/September 1030, the army of Ghazna received news that the troops in Khurasan had proclaimed Mas'ūd Sultan, and it thereupon deposed Muḥammad at Tigīnābād. Even before this, a part of the army of Ghazna had been inclining towards Mas'ūd because of his military reputation.[5]

Despite the fact that Maḥmūd was fortunate in coming forward when there was a power vacuum in eastern Islam through the collapse of the Sāmānids and the weakening of the Būyids, the Ghaznavid empire was basically dependent on the military leadership and executive talent of its Sultan; the infrastructure of the civilian administration was not strong enough to bear up the empire in the absence of a strong lead from the top. Thus Muḥammad's first Sultanate (he was again briefly raised to the throne by the rebels who in 432/1041 murdered Mas'ūd) broke down because other members of the Ghaznavid

family like Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Yūsuf and his sister Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī, together with the great Turkish slave commanders, realised that Muḥammad would never be able to hold the empire together. They feared that the army would become run down and that the steady flow of booty for the state treasury and for the soldiers themselves would cease. These factors overrode Maḥmūd's dying wishes.

In this light, it is important to determine the character and capabilities of Masʿūd and to assess how these affected the running and defence of the empire during his ten and a half years' reign. Maḥmūd, in some ways *felix opportunitate mortis*, had died when the empire was at its apogee. However, towards the middle of his reign, Masʿūd became faced with a complex and difficult military situation, and his failure to resolve it led to the fall of the Ghaznavid empire in the west and his own assassination by discontented troops. Barthold's verdict on Masʿūd's character is severe in the extreme:

> [He] inherited only his father's faults. Masʿūd held the same high opinion of his power as Maḥmūd, and like him wished to decide everything according to his own judgement, but lacking his father's talents came to disastrous decisions, which he obstinately maintained, paying no heed to the advice of men of experience. The tales of Masʿūd's prowess in the chase show that he was distinguished by physical bravery, but all the more striking is his complete lack of moral courage; in the hour of misfortune he showed himself more pusillanimous than a woman. In cupidity he yielded nothing to Maḥmūd, and the overburdening of the inhabitants by forced levies was carried in his time to an extreme degree.[6]

That he was physically brave is undeniable. At Dandānqān, he fought desperately with sword, lance and mace, when most of his retainers had fled: 'If on that day a thousand choice cavalrymen had stood by him and aided him, he would have successfully finished that affair; but they did not aid him.'[7] Yet Barthold is right: the finer, moral element which raises bravado from the level of an instinct to true nobility of character, was lacking. As Masʿūd's reign progressed, observers noted a decline in his character and resolution. Earlier generosity gave way to avarice. Failing to weigh up correctly the relative claims on his attention of India and of Khurasan, he made several wrong

strategic appraisals. Baihaqī noticed a decided change in 431/1040 after the defeats at Dandānqān and Balkh, when the Sultan's melancholy grew deeper. Mas'ūd concealed his decision to abandon Ghazna for India, but it leaked out to his advisers, and he had to defend this abdication of responsibility by adducing the unfavourable prognostications of his astrologers for a winter campaign in Afghanistan. It was fear of his master's growing capriciousness that made the Vizier Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad seek a special *muwāḍa'a* when he was appointed to accompany Prince Maudūd's army (see above, p. 62). Mas'ūd's advisers had for long grumbled about his *istibdād*, the obstinacy of weakness, and had made unfavourable comparisons between him and his father:

> This lord is the reverse of his father in firmness and strength [lit. 'liver']. His father was a man of resolution and perspicacity. If he adopted some unsound policy and said, 'I intend to do so-and-so', his despotic and kingly position made him speak out; and if anyone demonstrated the wise and unwise aspects of this, he flew into a rage and was voluble in insults and abuse. Then when he had [reflected over the affair, he eventually came to the right decision. But this lord is of a different stamp; he acts irresponsibly and without reflection.[8]

All this gives an unfavourable picture of Mas'ūd, and we are also influenced by our hindsight, the fact that his father was successful and he was not. Moreover, the differences in personal character, though important, were not wholly decisive. Rather, it was the different sets of circumstances which each had to face which brought out varying traits, for Mas'ūd was presented with problems such as his father had never had to tackle.

2 *The vendetta against the* Maḥmūdiyān

During the first two or three years of the new reign, a struggle for power and influence went on amongst the court circle and high command of the army. Mas'ūd deliberately deprived himself of a rich fund of wisdom and counsel by repudiating many of his father's officials and commanders, and instead, surrounding himself with his own partisans, some of whom like the *'Āriḍ* Abū Sahl Zauzanī had long supported Mas'ūd

whilst his father was still alive, others of whom attached themselves to the winning side when Muḥammad's Sultanate collapsed. In Baihaqī these last are often called the *Masʿūdiyān* or *Nau-khwāstagān*, 'parvenus', and contrasted with their rivals, the *Maḥmūdiyān* or *Pidariyān*; the division between the two groups emerges very clearly from his pages.

Once established on the throne, Masʿūd began systematically to get rid of all whom he disliked: those who had slighted him during his father's lifetime; those who, he thought, had persuaded Maḥmūd to deprive him of the succession; and those who had been prominent during Muḥammad's reign. Shabānkāra'ī describes the ascendancy of the *Masʿūdiyān* which now began:

> When Sultan Masʿūd had been in Herat for a while, a youthful group who knew nothing about the real management of affairs and a gang of malevolent ones rose to power. Wherever there was some official or person who had been esteemed by Sultan Maḥmūd, they were unable to tolerate this state of affairs continuing, and succeeded in the end in either jailing them all or driving them away from court.[9]

Only one man, Ḥasanak, was executed on a trumped-up charge of religious heresy, and the assassination of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash was attempted unsuccessfully. But several others were removed from their positions and jailed, and the early deaths of some of them shows that their captivity was by no means a pleasant one.[10]

More than anyone else, Ḥasanak had incurred Masʿūd's hatred for the contemptuous way in which he had treated him as prince: he had accused Masʿūd of squandering the wealth of Herat and Balkh when he was governor of Herat, and had set *Mushrifs* over him. During Muḥammad's Sultanate, Ḥasanak had not retained the Vizierate, but had remained influential. On the military side, the chief mover in proclaiming Muḥammad had been the Chief Ḥājib ʿAlī b. Il Arslan, called Qarīb or Khwīshāwand from his kin relationship (?by marriage) to Sultan Maḥmūd. ʿAlī Qarīb had extended his power over the civil as well as the military sphere at Ghazna: 'In this last period, all the Sultan's [sc. Muḥammad's] affairs were dealt with by him and he became a universal influence (*nā'ib-i kull*), so that Viziers, secretaries and deputy officials were all under

his direction.' However, he was on bad terms with Ḥasanak, and soon decided to betray Muḥammad and bring the army over to his brother's side. But this switch did not save him, and shortly afterwards he was arrested, deprived of his ghulāms and his wealth, and jailed.[11]

Mas'ūd's uncle 'Aḍud ad-Daula Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf b. Sebüktigin had during the latter years of his brother's reign been military governor of Khurasan. He had joined 'Alī Qarīb in proclaiming Muḥammad Sultan, but had like him deserted to Mas'ūd later. On his accession, Mas'ūd made much of his uncle and appointed him commander of a punitive expedition to Quṣdār and Makrān. But he also charged Yūsuf's officers to watch over their master, and his chief deputy and favourite was secretly made a *Mushrif* over him 'so that he might count Yūsuf's very breaths'. Mas'ūd not only mistrusted his uncle for his former support of Muḥammad, but also had a grudge against him over a projected marriage with one of Yūsuf's daughters which had never materialised. The mission to Quṣdār was largely a ruse to get him away from the centre of power whilst Mas'ūd consolidated his own position; when Yūsuf returned in 422/1031, he was arrested and jailed.[12]

These people had been directly involved in Muḥammad's Sultanate, but Mas'ūd's suspicious nature led him to plot the fall of men who had had no part in this and who had even promoted his own interests. In 422/1031 two of his father's Turkish generals, Eryaruq, Commander-in-Chief of the army in India, and Asïghtigin Ghāzī, who had succeeded Arslan Jādhib as commander in Khurasan, were arrested and imprisoned. In this case, it was the old guard of the *Maḥmūdiyān*, who objected to the two generals' arrogance and disrespect, who largely engineered their fall. Eryaruq had been tempted by the resources to hand in India and had been suspected of disloyalty in Maḥmūd's reign, for he had refused to obey orders and return from India. But Asïghtigin had several claims on Mas'ūd's gratitude. As commander of the army in Khurasan, he had declared for him on his father's death and had brought over the people of Nishapur and the army to his side. He had then become so high in the Sultan's favour that Mas'ūd had reportedly loved him 'just like one of my own brothers'. Nevertheless, relates Baihaqī, the intrigues of the *Maḥmūdiyān*, resenting Asïghtigin's comparative youth and his overbearingness towards

them, accorded with the Sultan's fears of this powerful subject. Both Eryaruq and Asïghtigin had large retinues of personal ghulāms and could command the loyalties of their armies, and these considerations determined the Sultan's decision to overthrow them.[13]

Masʿūd was emboldened by these successes to move against the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash, most powerful and experienced of the provincial governors, and, from the geographical isolation of Khwārizm, virtually independent. On Maḥmūd's death, Altuntash had behaved with circumspectness; both claimants regarded him as a figure embodying impartiality and reasonableness. Masʿūd appealed to him for military aid, and Altuntash's advice was one of the factors which persuaded the leaders in Ghazna to go over to Masʿūd.[14] He came to Masʿūd's court at Herat, but despite the Sultan's welcome to him as 'excellent commander, uncle', his fears were aroused by the fall of ʿAlī Qarīb and the insinuations of enemies within the Sultan's entourage, and he hurried back to Khwārizm on the plea that threats from the Qïpchaq and Oghuz could not be neglected. Masʿūd was forced to hide his suspicions and to blandish Altuntash, for his skill and advice in renewing the alliance with Qadïr Khan Yūsuf against ʿAlītigin were required. Altuntash himself was never taken in by this show of friendliness and never returned to the Sultan's court. Egged on by his *ʿĀriḍ*, the malevolent Abū Sahl Zauzanī, Masʿūd agreed to an assassination plot. The commander of Altuntash's Küjet auxiliaries, Monjuq, was suborned, but the Khwārizmshāh learnt of the plot and struck first against the traitors. It was feared after this that Altuntash would be driven into an alliance with ʿAlītigin, but he did in fact remain loyal to the Ghaznavids and shortly afterwards, died fighting for them.[15] The full effects of the episode were not seen until Altuntash's two sons succeeded him in Khwārizm (see next section).

Although Masʿūd freed Maimandī and restored him to the Vizierate, and was thus able to draw on his advice for the remaining three years of the Vizier's life,[16] the removal of so many other experienced servants deprived the Sultan of their services at a time when the empire was facing many serious problems. The *Masʿūdiyān* who replaced them were often sycophantic and encouraged their master in dubious courses. Fortunately, an element of continuity and level-headedness re-

mained at the core of the bureaucracy in the shape of men like Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān and Aḥmad b. ʿAbd aṣ-Ṣamad. Beyond the inner circle of officials and courtiers, the fiction was always preserved that these plottings and dismissals were never the work of the Sultan himself but always of his 'evil counsellors'[17]; but since the Sultan's word was law, the ultimate responsibility was obviously his. The resultant atmosphere of intrigue and insecurity affected those officials and commanders who had survived from Maḥmūd's reign, so that the Sultan's *istibdād* and inferiority to his father in judgement became axiomatic for them. The fall of their masters seems also to have affected on at least one occasion the subsequent behaviour and loyalty of ghulāms; we have noted (above, p. 106) that ghulāms belonging to the fallen generals were amongst those who deserted to the Seljuqs at Dandānqān.

3 *The defence of the empire*

Maḥmūd's policy towards the Būyids had been generally one of non-intervention. He had been unable to resist meddling in a succession dispute among the Būyids of Kirmān in 407/1016-17, but this brought no permanent success, and when later in his reign troubles again rose within the Būyid family there, Maḥmūd made no attempt to interfere. As for central Persia, it was for long the Sultan's view that the weak rule of Majd ad-Daula and his mother Sayyida rendered that quarter innocuous; if a vigorous man had been ruler there, he used to say, he would have had to keep an army stationed at Nishapur. Sayyida died in 419/1028, and Majd ad-Daula's inability to control his Dailamī troops led him to call in Maḥmūd; but when the Sultan arrived, he deposed the Būyid Amīr. Ghaznavid arms then penetrated into Dailam, Kurdistan and Fārs against other local rulers.[18] However, Masʿūd found it difficult to control these regions from distant Ghazna or even from Nishapur. As soon as Masʿūd left Ray to claim the throne, the recently-subdued Ibn Kākūya threw off Ghaznavid suzerainty. During the next few years he even occupied Ray for a while, but the Ghaznavid governor Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī drove him out of his capital Iṣfahān for two years and seized his minister Ibn Sīnā's library of heretical books. But Ibn Kākūya strengthened his position by recruiting some of the 'ʿIrāqī' Turkmens, and in

428/1037, having in his following some 1500 Turkmens under their leader Qïzïl, he was able for a time to occupy Ray after the Ghaznavids were finally compelled to abandon it.[19] It is indeed remarkable that, in the face of pressure from the Kākūyids and from the Oghuz in Khurasan, the Ghaznavids should have been able to retain a hold in western and central Persia till this late date.

India had been the scene of some of Maḥmūd's greatest triumphs. He did his work well in northern India; the great confederations of princes which had caused him so much trouble had been broken by the end of his reign, and the dynasty of one of his most persistent enemies, that of the Hindūshāhīs of Waihand, came to an end in 417/1026. After the campaigns early in Maḥmūd's reign against the Qarmathians of Multan, these heretics did not rise again until Maudūd's reign.[20] Mas'ūd held on to his father's gains in the Dōāb and Ganges valley, and he personally made fresh conquests, like that of the 'Virgin Fortress' of Hānsī, some sixty miles north-west of Delhi, in 428/1037.[21] It was not always easy to control the troops left in India, for the Sultan could only afford to be there sporadically, and the concentration in the garrisons of unruly ghāzī elements made for turbulence. For some time after 424/1033 the Commander-in-Chief there, Aḥmad Inaltigin, was in revolt, but the Sultan's authority was eventually restored (see above, pp. 76-7).

Nevertheless, the claims of India caused a certain confusion in strategic aims and policies during Mas'ūd's reign. Maḥmūd's successes in India had given the empire a bias in that direction; in some ways, it was in his time an institution geared to the exploitation of India. Some indication of the importance which the Ghaznavid family itself attached to this may perhaps be gauged from a letter which Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī wrote to her nephew Mas'ūd on Maḥmūd's death: in it she describes Ghazna, with its face towards India, as the heart (*aṣl*) of the empire, Khurasan as next in importance and the rest as subsidiary. It is not therefore surprising that Mas'ūd should feel drawn towards India too, so that he tended to neglect Khurasan and to minimise the dangers there, despite the advice of his more perspicacious ministers.[22] Consequently, the situation there got out of hand, and the Turkmens secured a foothold from which they could not in the end be dislodged.

The most serious threats to Mas'ūd's empire came from the

Turkmens of Central Asia and from the ambitions of the Qarakhanids of Transoxania. The defence of the northern frontiers of the empire, along the Oxus and along the fringes of the Qara Qum desert, was therefore of paramount importance. Maḥmūd had divided the former Sāmānid dominions with the Qarakhanids, but an initial entente with them had not lasted long, and in 396/1006 the Ilig Abū'l-Ḥasan Naṣr b. 'Alī (d. 403/1012-13) had invaded Khurasan.[23] Thereafter, the Qarakhanid family had been rent by internal discord, and the Sultan had been able to exploit this and to ally first with Abū Naṣr Aḥmad Toghan Khan (d. 408/1017-18), ruler of the Semirechye and, until the last years of his life, of Kāshghar, and then with Qadïr Khan Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan. This last alliance, in which a personal meeting at Samarqand and complicated marriage proposals played a part,[24] was directed primarily at the brother of these two last Khans, 'Alītigin. 'Alītigin had captured Bukhārā in 411/1020, and he maintained himself there and in Samarqand till his death in 425/1034. Whilst he lived, he was the most skilful and resolute of the Ghaznavids' opponents in Central Asia. His speedy re-establishment in Bukhārā and Samarqand after his defeat in 416-17/1025-6 by the allies Maḥmūd and Qadïr Khan probably indicates that the mercantile elements in these cities found his strong rule favourable to their interests. The riches of the two cities also enabled him to subsidise Turkish tribesmen like the Seljuqs and enrol them as auxiliaries.[25] The Sultans were unable to make any lasting impression on 'Alītigin's position. After his death, the power of his two sons was only broken by a rival branch of the Qarakhanids, the two sons of the Ilig Naṣr, Böritigin (the later Tamghach Khan Ibrāhīm, d. 462/1068) and Muḥammad 'Ain ad-Daula of Uzkend, after 'Alītigin's sons had been weakened by the loss of the Seljuqs as auxiliaries. But at Maḥmūd's death there was something like a state of equilibrium in Transoxania, and Barthold surmised (*Turkestan*, 285) that the Sultan had been not unpleased to see 'Alītigin's kingdom as a counterpoise to that of Qadïr Khan.

Maḥmūd had two footholds on the northern banks of the Oxus, one in Khwārizm and the other on the upper Oxus, comprising the crossing-point of Tirmidh and the regions of Chaghāniyān, Qubādhiyān, Wakhsh and Khuttal. The importance of these last was primarily strategic, for they served as

bridgeheads for attacks on the Qarakhanids. In the Sāmānid period, they had been ruled by local dynasties, loosely tributary to Bukhārā and descended either from the indigenous Iranian lords or from Arab Amīrs, such as the Āl-i Muḥtāj in Chaghāniyān and the Abū Dā'ūdids in Khuttal. Local dynasties seem to have survived under Ghaznavid suzerainty, although their connections with earlier lines are not clear. According to the *Chahār maqāla*, Fakhr ad-Daula Abū'l-Muẓaffar Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, the patron of Farrukhī, was Amīr of Chaghāniyān in Maḥmūd's time; no further members of the Āl-i Muḥtāj are known after him.[26] In Mas'ūd's time the *wālī* of Chaghāniyān was the Amīr Abū'l-Qāsim, a son-in-law of the Sultan. No separate dynasty is mentioned for Khuttal in the early Ghaznavid period, unless the name of Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī be a reminiscence of some marriage connection with a local family there.[27] Khwārizm was seized from the Ma'mūnids in 408/1017 by an act of brutal aggression; Maḥmūd's ultimatum to the Khwārizmians caused the murder by his troops of Abū'l-'Abbās Ma'mūn and so gave the Sultan a final motive for interfering, for the murdered ruler's wife was Maḥmūd's own sister Ḥurra-yi Khuttalī or Ḥurra-yi Kaljī. He thus gained the rich and fertile region of Khwārizm proper, and also outposts along the southern edge of the Qara Qum which had been held by the Shāhs, including Nasā and the ribāṭ of Farāwa; these points were to figure prominently in the incursions of the Turkmens.[28] Maḥmūd could now turn the flank of the Qarakhanids, but in the event, the appearance of the Seljuqs and the generally conciliatory policy followed by Maḥmūd's governor Altuntash combined to preserve 'Alītigin from serious harm.

Thus Mas'ūd inherited a strong position on the northern borders of his empire, but during his reign three events combined to undermine this strength and to bring about the collapse of Ghaznavid power in Khurasan and the Oxus valley. These were firstly, the loss of Khwārizm; secondly, the pressure of the Qarakhanids, 'Alītigin, his sons and then Böritigin; and thirdly and most significantly, the impact of the Turkmens. The first two events will be briefly examined in the remainder of this section, and the third will be treated at length in the next chapter.

After the annexation of Khwārizm, Maḥmūd installed as governor there his slave general Altuntash, who assumed the

traditional, pre-Islamic title of 'Khwārizmshāh'. Altuntash had begun his career with Sebüktigin, and throughout his life, up till his death in battle against 'Alītigin in 423/1032, remained perfectly loyal to the Sultans. It was really only his faithfulness which enabled some control to be kept over Khwārizm, for it was remote from the core of the Ghaznavid empire and was virtually an island in the surrounding steppes, linked only to the south by the route along the Oxus. The strongpoints of Āmul-i Shaṭṭ and Tirmidh were important in maintaining connection with Khwārizm, and a convenient island at Tirmidh made it possible to bridge the Oxus with boats[29]; but the stretch below Āmul was vulnerable to the attacks of 'Alītigin and later of the Seljuqs, who crossed there and then spread across the Qara Qum towards Khurasan. Altuntash was always aware of his key position and realised too that he was a potential target for the Sultans' jealousy. At this time, there was some disturbance in the western steppes through the movement of Oghuz and Qïpchaq peoples (see above, Ch. VIII, § 3), and this was being felt on the frontiers of Khwārizm. Altuntash recruited Qïpchaq, Küjet and Chaghrat tribesmen as frontier guards, and he also possessed as many as 1500 Turkish ghulāms of his own, a retinue of truly royal dimensions. Tolstov has pointed out that Altuntash, whilst remaining loyal, adopted a policy of his own, identifying himself with the traditional interests of the province, and he has suggested that his relationship with the Sultans resembled that of Ma'mūn b. Muḥammad (385-7/995-7) with the Sāmānids.[30]

As we have seen in the previous section, Mas'ūd's attempt to have Altuntash murdered was a failure. When the latter died, his son Hārūn succeeded in 423/1032 as *de facto* ruler of Khwārizm, although the Sultan refused him the title of 'Khwārizmshāh' and two years later had him killed by his own ghulāms. Not unnaturally, Hārūn's brother Ismā'īl Khāndān became the Ghaznavids' bitter foe, especially as during Hārūn's brief reign, a third brother had died at the court of Ghazna in mysterious circumstances.[31] The ease with which Khwārizm now fell away from the Ghaznavids shows that the Sultans' control there had little lasting basis; Khwārizm looked to the steppes for its livelihood, and its interests lay either in being an independent political unit or else being linked with a powerful Central Asian dynasty which could control the steppes. So Mas'ūd's policy in

Khwārizm ended in total failure. Ismā'īl Khāndān was eventually driven out by the Sultan's ally Shāh Malik of Jand, but Mas'ūd himself was by then (432/1041) dead, and the Turkmens had poured southwards and sealed off Khwārizm from the rest of the Ghaznavid empire.[32]

During his reign, Mas'ūd had also to contend with an unstable position on the middle and upper Oxus and with threats to Ṭukhāristān and the regions to the south of the river. 'Alītigin and his sons inevitably regarded the Ghaznavid bridgehead of Tirmidh as a threat to their security. Moreover, when Mas'ūd had come eastwards from Nishapur to claim the throne, he had expected a struggle with his brother and had foolishly promised Khuttal to 'Alītigin in exchange for military help. This help was not in the event needed, but 'Alītigin continued to claim his side of the bargain, and the Sultan's advisers saw that their master had made a serious error of judgement in encouraging 'Alītigin's ambitions. In 435/1034 'Alītigin allied with the rebellious Hārūn b. Altuntash against Mas'ūd; Hārūn was to attack Merv and 'Alītigin was to march from Samarqand, take Tirmidh and ravage Chaghāniyān. 'Alītigin's sons put the plan into effect after their father's death. A fierce but unsuccessful siege of Tirmidh followed and the Ghaznavid governor of Chaghāniyān was temporarily expelled, but Hārūn's death caused a suspension of hostilities.[33] It was probably also 'Alītigin who just before his death stirred up the Kumējīs. They raided Khuttal, and four years later in 429/1038 the Qarakhanid Böritigin collected a force from among them of 3000 and devastated Khuttal and Wakhsh. Contemporary sources usually call the Kumējīs, who dwelt in the Buttamān Mountains at the head of the valleys running down through Chaghāniyān and Khuttal, 'Turks', but they were almost certainly the remnants of some earlier Central Asian people like the Ephthalites or more probably, the Sakae, since Ptolemy mentions a Saka tribe of *Komēdoi*.[34] 'Alītigin further encouraged the ambitions of the Turkmens, and as early as 425/1034 their raiders penetrated to Tirmidh, Qubādhiyān and Ṭukhāristān. After Dandānqān, the Seljuqs were able to besiege Balkh for a while; their raiders were attracted into the upper Oxus valleys by the rich pasture there for their own herds and by the opportunities for carrying off local livestock.[35] There was a possibility of raids from this quarter penetrating to the very heart of the empire, for the

routes from Ṭukhāristān through Baghlān, Bāmiyān and across the Ghōrband to the Kabul valley and Ghazna were not difficult. Whether the Turkmens would have been able to hold these regions permanently is another matter; the subsequent course of Ghaznavid-Seljuq relations suggests that the Seljuqs could not have held much of the mountain territory beyond Balkh.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE TURKMENS AND THE DOWNFALL OF GHAZNAVID POWER IN KHURASAN

1 *Military and strategic considerations*

Events in Transoxania and Khwārizm stimulated the movement southwards of the Seljuqs and their Turkmen followers, so that they filled up the steppes adjoining northern Khurasan vacated by the "Irāqī' Turkmens. The Seljuqs had remained on their pastures near Bukhārā in the employment of ʿAlītigin, who had attached them to himself 'by promises and by subsidies' and who had used them as military auxiliaries. The *Malik-nāma* [in Ibn al-Athīr and Mīrkhwānd) mentions that discords arose between ʿAlītigin and the Seljuqs after 420/1029, and these eventually caused the movement of the Turkmens from the Bukhārā district.[1] The death in 425/1034 of ʿAlītigin and the devolution of power to his two young and inexperienced sons and to their mentor the general Qūnush or Tūnush (? Tutush) certainly meant the end of the connection with the Seljuqs. At Hārūn b. Altuntash's invitation, they moved into Khwārizm, but shortly afterwards, Sultan Masʿūd procured Hārūn's murder, Khwārizm became disturbed and much of it passed into the hands of the Seljuqs' old enemy, Shāh Malik of Jand. Thus the Seljuqs were forced to depart southwards for Khurasan.[2]

The Sultan was absent in Gurgān during the winter and spring of 426/1035-6 when in 426/1035 Shāh Malik expelled the Turkmens from Khwārizm. Ten thousand of the Seljūqiyān and Ināliyān crossed the Oxus and made for Merv. Their leaders' intentions were not at this time openly bellicose. The governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, received a very humble letter from 'the slaves Yabghu, Toghrïl and Dā'ūd, Clients (*Mawālī*) of the Commander of the Faithful', mentioning the tribulations which they had endured and throwing themselves on the Sultan's protection. They sought the grant of Farāwa and Nasā, promising to stand on guard there against any further incursions from the steppes and offering to send a hostage from among their leaders to the Ghaznavid court. The Sultan's

civilian advisers suggested a pacific answer, at least until the Seljuqs had openly shown their bad faith—the Turkmens had specifically asked for the intercession of the Vizier Aḥmad b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad, with whom they had had previous dealings in Khwārizm—but the Sultan and his generals were bent on destroying the Seljuqs at the earliest possible moment. The account in the *Malik-nāma*, which naturally puts the most favourable construction on the Seljuqs' actions, confirms Baihaqī that the Seljuqs hoped to secure a foothold in Khurasan by peaceful infiltration, but had their proposals rejected by the Sultan: 'When this news reached the leaders, they despaired of making a peaceful settlement with Mas'ūd or of entering his service as auxiliaries. They sent their dependents and wives back to a safe place, started a policy of spoliation against the local people and became busy preparing for warfare.'[3]

A Ghaznavid punitive expedition led by the general Begtoghdï was heavily defeated on the road to Nasā in 426/1035. The nomads' haul of booty and military equipment was so great that they were amazed at their own victory. The belief in Ghaznavid invincibility, in the inability of lightly-armed bands to defeat a trained, professional army, was still fixed in their minds. They ascribed their victory to God's Will and to their opponents' poor tactics rather than to their own ability: 'We were poor, now we have become rich, but Sultan Mas'ūd is a great king and there is none like him in Islam. If this has happened to his army on account of bad management and poor leadership, he has many [other] generals and armies, and we must not become over-confident by what has taken place.' The Sultan had no option but to grant the Seljuqs Nasā, Farāwa and Dehistān, and Yabghu, Toghrïl and Chaghrï were given patents for these three places. They also received the insignia and dress of governors, a standard, a two-pointed hat, sewn garments in the Persian style, horses and appropriate bridles, a golden belt in the Turkish style and thirty uncut pieces of cloth, and they were to be addressed as dihqāns. It is interesting to note that each one of the three leaders sent his own envoy for the negotiations and was to provide a hostage from his own circle; the Seljuq leaders did not conceive of themselves as a united body.[4]

The Sultan attempted to divide the Seljuq leaders, in particular, by detaching Yabghu, who now appears with the addi-

tional title of 'Inanj Beg', from the other two.[5] In an effort to secure some influence over them, marriage alliances were proposed: a daughter of the *'Amīd* of Khurasan, Sūrī, for Yabghu, a daughter of the Ghaznavid amīr 'Abdūs for Toghrïl and another free-born wife for Chaghrï. But only Yabghu accepted Mas'ūd's presents and was inclined to accept the proffered alliance, for the Seljuqs had by now become suspicious of the Sultan's good faith.[6]

Their deference towards the Sultan was wearing thin. Emboldened by their successes, they made fresh demands on him in the autumn of 428/1036. They had found the pastures allotted to them on the desert fringes inadequate and now asked for the grant of Merv, Abīward and Sarakhs. They proposed that administration should remain in the hands of the Sultan's existing officials, the *Ṣāḥib-Dīwān*, the *Qāḍīs* and the *Ṣāḥīb-Barīds*, but that the revenues should be handed over to the Seljuqs. In return, the Turkmens would be formally recognised as auxiliaries and would serve wherever the Sultan wished.[7] It was, however, impossible for the Sultan to hand over these important places without a struggle. Merv was a rich commercial centre and its continued possession enabled some watch to be kept on the approaches to Khwārizm and Transoxania, where Ismā'īl b. Altuntash and the sons of 'Alītigin were actively hostile. Furthermore, the possession of these bases would bring the nomads within easy striking distance of the heart of Khurasan and of cities like Nishapur, Ṭūs and Herat.

The last piece of evidence we have for the over-estimation of Ghaznavid power by the Turkmens comes from the autumn of 431/1039 when they were actually in possession of Nishapur and on the brink of gaining the whole province of Khurasan. The three leaders met for a colloquy at Sarakhs, Toghrïl coming from Nishapur and Yabghu from Merv, and they were accompanied by a concentration of tribesmen estimated by Ghaznavid spies at 20,000. A difference of opinion arose here. Toghrïl and the Ināliyān suggested moving on to western Persia and the Byzantine marches as the ''Irāqī' Turkmens had done, for there was no opposing power in that region comparable with Mas'ūd's, but only a series of local Dailamī and Kurdish rulers. Chaghrï conceded the Sultan's superior resources in wealth and manpower, but pointed out their own advantages in superior mobility; hence, he said, they should stay in Khurasan.[8] This

was indeed a crucial point; when the Ghaznavid armies were defeated, the attendant losses of material proved disastrous, whereas the Oghuz did not usually take their baggage into battle with them, and if defeated, could merely withdraw into the desert where they had left their belongings.

The question of the supreme leadership among the Seljuq family cannot be answered in a clear-cut manner. Since the *Malik-nāma* was probably written for Alp Arslan, we would expect to see in it a bias in favour of his father Chaghrī, and this in fact seems to be the case. According to this source, ʿAlītigin eventually turned against the Seljuqs (see above, p. 241) and tried to detach Yūsuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq from the other leaders; it was Chaghrī who restrained Toghrïl from action against Yūsuf, pointing out to him that splitting the family was just what ʿAlītigin wanted. According to Baihaqī, whom we would expect to be impartial here, the decision of 431/1039 to stay in Khurasan was Chaghrī's, against the opinions of Toghrïl and Yabghu. The *Malik-nāma* cites as other instances of Chaghrī's percipience and magnanimity that he restrained the Turkmens from pursuing the fleeing Ghaznavids after Dandānqān lest the Seljuq forces become too dispersed, and that he released a thousand of the Ghaznavid officers and notables captured in battle, providing them each with a horse, clothing and provisions for a safe return to their own land.[9]

The sources differ on the topic of the plundering of Nishapur when the Seljuqs first occupied it in 429/1038. According to Baihaqī, Toghrïl gave special orders to Chaghrī and Ibrāhīm Inal that they should not oppress the local people. In the source or sources drawn on by ʿImād ad-Dīn, Ibn al-Athīr and Barhebraeus, Toghrïl forbids Chaghrī to plunder the city, threatening to kill himself if his brother does so, for he has promised the Caliph's envoy that Nishapur and the Muslims there will be spared. The problem of holding back barbarian Turkmens when it was their natural instinct to despoil everything within reach was an acute one for the Seljuq leaders, who did not want totally to alienate the local populations; it was only really soluble by deflecting them towards some *Dār al-kufr* like Byzantium.[10] However, the *Malik-nāma* records that Chaghrī assured the notables of Merv, after the city had peaceably opened its gates to the Seljuqs, that there would be no pillage and that measures for the restoration of the devastated sur-

rounding countryside would be taken.[11] Sultan Mas'ūd seems to have regarded Yabghu as nominal head of the Seljuqs, as indeed his title implied among the Oghuz. Diplomatic contacts were made through him; in 429/1037-8 he took an oath binding himself to restrain the destructive proclivities of his followers and tribe, and it was to him that Mas'ūd sent the severed heads of Turkmens whom he slew for violating the agreement.[12] But in practice, Toghrïl and Chaghrï seem to have been the directing brains behind the Turkmens' movements, in so far as there was any central direction at all. Of these two, Toghrïl emerges from the general history of the early Seljuqs as the more energetic and vital, and Cahen has concluded from the haziness of the sources that Chaghrï was a comparatively colourless and politically passive individual (*EI*^{2} Art. 'Čaghrï-Beg').

In the campaigns across northern Khurasan and the Qara Qum desert, the advantages were at first sight heavily on one side. The Sultan disposed of a numerous, experienced and well-armed body of professional soldiers. The Turkmen bands were not numerous; probably there was no overwhelming superiority on either side.[13] The traditional skill of steppe peoples with the bow and arrow made the Turkmens fearsome in this respect, but their swords and other cutting weapons were of poor quality. For protective clothing, the nomads had usually only light jackets of skin and leather, although when Toghrïl entered Nishapur in 429/1038, a large proportion of his 3000 cavalry-men had cuirasses (*zirih-pūsh*). This must have been exceptional, and the Turkmens may have acquired their cuirasses from booty left on the battlefield by defeated Ghaznavid armies.[14]

The Turkmens were often in a miserable condition, affected by the drought and famine prevailing in Khurasan and by the buffetings which they had received from the rulers of surrounding lands. Baihaqī describes the wretched condition of the Seljūqiyān and Ināliyān after their defeat on the borders of Khwārizm by Shāh Malik; these fugitives had lost their wives, children, baggage, beasts and all. The group of 200 horsemen with which Ibrāhīm Inal entered Nishapur in 429/1038 is described as being very ragged and battered in appearance.[15] In this way, it seems very likely that before the capture of Nishapur, the defection of the Khurasanian towns from allegiance to the Sultan and then the total collapse of Ghaznavid

arms in Khurasan at Dandānqān, the Turkmens were not primarily motivated by a desire to establish political dominion over the region. The more far-sighted leaders like Toghrïl and Chaghrï may have had visions of political authority, as the description of themselves as *Mawālī Amīr al-Mu'minīn* and the attempts to establish some relations with the Abbasid Caliphate perhaps show. But for the masses of Turkmens, the primary aims were to achieve some measure of security from their many enemies, to find pasture for their flocks and to add to their wealth by raiding the herds of the settled peoples (see further, below, § 5). To achieve this last aim, they sent small bands deep into Ghaznavid territory which rounded up and drove off any beasts which they came across. In the winter of 425/1034 the regions of Tirmidh and Qubādhiyān were raked and the beasts there driven off, and in the following winter Farāh and Zīrgān in the Sīstān-Bust area were similarly stripped of their herds. As early as the summer of 424/1033 the far-sighted Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān sold off the 10,000 sheep which he had in Gūzgān, fearing—rightly, as events showed—that the Turkmens would get them if they were left there.[16] These swiftly-executed probes had an importance additional to their purely material consequences; they created within the Ghaznavid dominions an atmosphere of fear and of uncertainty as to where the next blow might fall, and so a certain air of defeatism spread among the civilian elements of the bureaucracy.[17]

The mobility and lightness of the Turkmen bands was their chief asset. Up till modern times, the nomads of the Eurasian steppes have had advantages over the professional armies of the civilised, settled powers. These last have rarely been able to use in pitched battles their superior fire-power and tactical knowledge. The raiders have snatched up their plunder and retreated into the steppes before an engagement could be made; and pursuit has had little point, for the nomad has no possessions worth capturing. Slaves have been the only assets brought back from punitive campaigns. As far back as 617 a Chinese chronicler complains of the disadvantages of his country's forces as compared with the Tiu-Kiu. He cites their superiority as cavalrymen and archers, their ability to live off mutton and horsemeat, their willingness to camp anywhere, their lack of interest in constructing formal fortifications, above all, their dashing exploitation of any advantages but unashamed flight if faced by

superior forces. Accordingly, he concludes, it is rare that the Chinese are victorious over the Turks.[18] Amongst the Turkmens as amongst the Tiu-Kiu, a raiding-party on the move was self-sufficient, provided that pasture could be found; the riding-beasts provided not only meat but also such products as dried milk, cheese and *qumīs*, and for long-distance expeditions, herds could be driven along with the party.

These considerations were valid for the Turkmen invasions of Khurasan. The more mobile and frugal nomads wore down in the end the Ghaznavid armies, despite the fact that the latter were led by Turkish professional soldiers. One of Masʿūd's courtiers said that 'the steppe is father and mother to them, just as towns are to us', and Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān complained that

> We have to encamp with our army in any rocky place or area of scrubby undergrowth we can find, whereas this crowd [sc. the Turkmens] merely encamp on tillage and green vegetation and the most suitable spots. They can find the cold and flowing waters, whereas we have to drink from waterholes and cannot find cold and flowing waters. Their camels can forage freely on herbage and find pasture over a wide distance, whereas we have to keep our camels in the encampment, tethered outside our tents, for they cannot be left to pasture outside the camp. That is the reason why they have no heavy baggage, so that they can come and go, whereas we have heavy baggage, and the need to look after it keeps us from going off to do other things.

Since the Turkmens travelled so light and since each rider could operate as a self-sufficient fighting unit for quite a long period, they could afford to leave their baggage as much as thirty farsakhs from the main body. The Seljuqs realised this advantage. Baihaqī reports that Chaghrī himself attributed the defeat in 429/1038 of the Ghaznavid generals Begtoghdī and Sūbashī to their being encumbered by their baggage and supply train. Although in the next year the Sultan sent back to Ghazna for equipment suitable for steppe warfare (*ālat-i jang-i biyābān*) and was then able to set off westwards from Herat with this lighter gear, the Ghaznavid armies remained in this respect handicapped when compared with the Turkmens.[19]

Clearly, the Ghaznavid armies were hampered by their inferior mobility and by their dependence on fixed bases where

provisions, fodder and other war material was concentrated. They functioned from the towns of Khurasan and from strong points, each under a *kūtwāl* or castellan appointed directly by the Sultan, where supplies were kept and where valuables could be stored in times of danger.[20] But the nomads deployed their raiding parties through the countryside and against the outlying agricultural villages of the oases. They did not waste time trying to reduce towns or strong points, a process for which they were ill-equipped both militarily and psychologically. Instead, they by-passed them and devastated the surrounding agricultural areas, thereby starving out the larger concentrations of population in towns and fortresses. Furthermore, they interrupted the caravan traffic upon which the commercial prosperity of Khurasan depended to a considerable extent.[21] It was only towards the end of the decade 1030-40 that the Turkmens got possession of great cities like Ṭūs, Nishapur and Merv, and then it was by peaceful surrender rather than by conquest.

It was the Turkmens' policy to avoid pitched battles, for they realised that their advantage lay in hit-and-run tactics. They were reported to have said in their deliberations:

> It is unwise to seek a pitched battle (*maṣāff*) with this sovereign. Let us keep to our own way [of fighting] and not be burdened with baggage and impedimenta. In this way we will gain the preponderance. We will not disperse, unless some difficulty arises, so let him [sc. Mas'ūd] go backwards or go forwards, just as he wishes (?). Winter has passed and summer has begun; we are steppe-dwellers and are well able to endure extremes of heat and cold, whereas he and his army cannot, and after suffering this distress for a while, will have to turn back.[22]

When the nomads could be cornered and forced into a pitched battle, the superior weapons and training of the Ghaznavid soldiers often told in their favour. But these advantages were often negatived by such human factors as divided command and ill-advised interference from the rear by the Sultan, resulting in confused directions to the soldiers. The pitched battle which took place on the road to Nasā in 426/1035 went first in the Ghaznavid general Begtoghdī's favour but later turned into a defeat. There had been several voices claiming a part in the high command, and a confusion of orders had followed; one

commander had turned his men back for water and this had been interpreted as flight, so that the enemy had made a final, successful onslaught. Before the battle, Begtoghdï had complained about the dangers of contradictory commands and about the giving of responsible posts to young and untried court favourites.[23] After Begtoghdï, the general Sübashï ('Sübashï' seems here to be a personal name and not a military office) was next placed in command of the army on Khurasan. He remained there for three years, during which the Seljuqs 'were dodging him like foxes' (*yurāwighūnahu murāwaghat ath-thaʿlab*). Sübashï's supposed dilatoriness led to allegations at court that he was spending his time in Khurasan drinking and womanising, and that he was either a coward or else secretly in league with the Seljuqs. Eventually, the Sultan gave him a specific order to engage the enemy, although this was against Sübashi's better judgement. He was defeated near Sarakhs in 429/1038, Ṭūs, Nishapur and much of Khurasan were temporarily lost and Herat threatened. In a later apologia before the Sultan at Ghazna, Sübashi is reported by Ḥusainī to have said that he had been given an impossible task: 'How can a physician restore an old man to his youth, or how can a traveller turn the mirage into water?' There is also the testimony of Baihaqī that Sübashï was a very skilful tactician in Khurasan, so much so that the Turkmens named him 'the magician' (*jādū*).[24] But for Masʿūd it was always his servants and never himself who was at fault.

2 *The devastation of Khurasan by the Turkmens*

Apart from the elusiveness of the Turkmens, the most notable factor in the failure of the Ghaznavid armies was their having to operate in a land devastated by the enemy and racked by famine. Much of the fighting was done on the northern fringes of Khurasan, where the cultivation grew sparser and where the desert steppes of the Qara Qum began, and in this zone the limited amounts of forage and water available were inadequate to supply large armies. The provisioning of the Ghaznavid forces, with their baggage trains, strings of elephants and camp followings, all in addition to the actual combatants, presented terrible problems for the Sultan and his advisers. It was not usual for professional Muslim armies to remain in the field for

years on end, but by 431/1040 many Ghaznavid soldiers had been continuously on active service with Sübashī and then with the Sultan, who in 429/1038 had returned from India to take personal charge in Khurasan, for three years.[25] The Turkmens regarded Khurasan as a foreign land and had no concern for its economy and its agriculture; they plundered indiscriminately and were quite prepared to let their flocks eat their way across the agricultural oases. But to the Sultan, Khurasan was one of the richest and most profitable jewels in his crown, and he could not afford beyond a certain point to let his armies live off the land and denude it of wealth and supplies.

The damage from the Turkmens' devastations was a factor in the increasing savagery of the warfare between the two sides. On seeing the ravages done by the "Irāqī' Turkmens, the Ghaznavid general Tash Farrāsh put to death over fifty of their leaders, including Yaghmur; their sons naturally carried on subsequent warfare in a spirit of vendetta. In 426/1035 Mas'ūd ordered that Turkmen prisoners should be trampled to death in the army camp by the elephants, so that this might be a warning to the rest.[26] But towards the end of the decade, when the struggle for Khurasan entered its most acute phase, the Sultan's own starving armies threw off restraint and vied with the Turkmens in despoiling the province in the search for supplies. The opposing forces rode and marched over the face of Khurasan, so that the wretched local peoples were faced with the normal burden of taxation and with food requisitions by the Sultan's armies on the one hand, and with the devastations of the nomads and their flocks on the other. Long-term planning, a necessity for highly-organised agricultural and commercial communities, became impossible, food production declined, the value of land dropped catastrophically (see below, pp. 260-1) and famine inevitably followed.

The strategy of the Ghaznavid commanders became increasingly dictated by considerations of food and water supplies. As early as the winter of 426/1034-5, the army at its Nishapur base was suffering from the cold and from lack of provisions, and it was in part this which prompted Mas'ūd's decision to move westwards to Dehistān, where he had heard that ten *mans* of wheat or fifteen *mans* of barley could be had for a dirham. The towns of northern Khurasan suffered especially badly. Sarakhs, once prosperous and populous, was ravaged and waterless when

the exhausted army of the Sultan reached it in the summer of 430/1039. There was much skirmishing with the Turkmens over the possession of waterholes on the edges of the almost waterless Qara Qum. The army commanders protested at this time that their soldiers were discontented and too weak from lack of food and water to fight properly, and they blamed the *'Āriḍ* for his inadequate budgeting for the supplies required. Shortly before this, it had also been alleged that Sübashī had been cornering wheat and selling it in the army bazaar at inflated prices.[27]

Nishapur was re-occupied by the Sultan and his army towards the beginning of 431/end of 1039. Famine was raging in the city itself and in the surrounding *rustāq*, with a *man* of bread fetching sixteen dirhams and with much mortality from starvation. Mas'ūd was forced to send camels 250 miles westwards to Dāmghān in Qūmis to fetch back food for the army.[28] The following spring, the army was in the Ṭūs area, where bread and barley were quite unobtainable. The whole region had been denuded of crops and food. The governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, whose normal task it was to see that dumps of supplies were kept at various points for the use of the army, had so devastated and burnt the region that the local people and their beasts were dying of hunger. The army, now almost rebellious from lack of food, went on again to Sarakhs, but 'the town was ruined and waterless, with not a blade of corn there. All the people had fled, and the plain and mountain were just as if they had been scorched, being without a scrap of grass.'[29] Consequently, this army, of which it had been said when first it had been fitted out, 'if it had been hurled against the pillar of Fate, that pillar would have collapsed, or if the succession of Time had been affrighted by its soldiers, it would have fled', was in a sorry state for fighting at Dandānqān. On the journey across the desert from Sarakhs to Merv, the drought conditions were exceptionally harsh. Large watercourses were totally dry and no surface water was seen on the whole journey; after three days' march the army had to dig to find water. The army's mounts suffered worst of all, especially the horses; the state of the one-horse troopers was parlous and the palace ghulāms were reduced to fighting on camels. There were quarrels over the distribution of water from the meagre desert holes, inadequate even for the Sultan and his personal entourage, and this

brawling contributed to the army's demoralisation. For their part, the Seljuqs were aware of these difficulties among their opponents and aggravated them by blocking up wells.[30]

3 *Baihaqī's account of the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur (1038-9)*

The Seljuqs first appeared in Nishapur in Shaʿbān 429/May 1038, and we possess a detailed account of this, sent to the Sultan at Ghazna in the form of a despatch from his local intelligence officer. When the Seljuqs first arrived, he went underground, concealing himself in a subterranean vault, and during the occupation he was helped by the local ʿAlids and was able to send out messages in code to the Vizier in Ghazna. Then when the Seljuqs left, he re-emerged to greet the returning Sultan. The account of the Seljuqs' arrival is given in Baihaqī, 550-4:

A letter arrived from Abū'l-Muẓaffar Jumaḥī, the *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* of Nishapur.[31] He wrote that he was writing it in concealment and that it was only after much scheming that he had been able to despatch this messenger. [The letter arrived between two and three months after the events described in it.] He explained that after the news came of Sūbashī's defeat, and twelve days after that event, Ibrāhīm Yināl had appeared on the outskirts of Nishapur with 200 men. He sent an envoy with a message which said, 'I am the advance guard for Ṭoghrïl, Dā'ūd and Bīghū. If you want war, I will go back and make [your choice] known; but if you do not want war, let me come into the city and have the *khuṭba* performed [in their name]. For there is a large army following behind me.'

They escorted the envoy into the city. A great clamour broke out there, and all the *aʿyān* flocked to the house of the Qāḍī Ṣāʿid and said to him, 'You are our Imām and leader; what do you think about this message which has just arrived?' He replied, 'What do you yourselves think about it, and what course of action do you contemplate?' They said, 'You are quite well aware of this city's position and its lack of fortification; indeed, it is just like a grain of sand in the eye (?). It people have no weapons, and they [sc. the Seljuqs] defeated a powerful army like the one which the Ḥājib Sūbashī had. What power can we dispose of? This is our view.'

The Qāḍī Ṣā'id said, 'you have reasoned very well. Organising warfare is not the business of subjects (*ra'iyyat*). You have a ruler, Amīr Mas'ūd, who has adequate forces. If this province means anything to him at all, he must necessarily send someone and secure his rule here. But as for the present, a great conflagration has flared up and a horde eager to set their hands to bloodshed and pillage has appeared; there is no course open except submission.'

The Imām Muwaffaq, who was the *Ṣāḥib-Ḥadīthān*, and all the *a'yān* agreed that 'there is no other reasonable course but this. If we do anything else, the city will be violently sacked. The Sultan is far away from us. We can justify our conduct to him later, and he will accept our explanation.'

The Qāḍī said, 'When the Ilig's forces under Sübashītigin came from Bukhārā, the men of Balkh resisted them until they set about massacring and plundering, but the men of Nishapur did exactly what they are doing just now [i.e. submitted]. When Amīr Maḥmūd, God's mercy be upon him, returned to Ghazna from Multan, he spent some time there putting affairs in order and then set out for Khurasan. When he reached Balkh, he saw that the Bāzār-i 'Āshiqān, which had been constructed under his orders, had been burnt down, and he castigated the people of Balkh, saying, "What have subjects to do with war? It was natural that your town should be destroyed and that they should burn down the property belonging to me [sc. the market] which used to bring in such revenues. You should have been required to pay an indemnity for the losses, but we have pardoned you; [only] take care it does not happen again. If any ruler proves himself the stronger [at a given moment] and demands taxes from you and protects you, you must hand over the taxes and thus save yourselves. Why do you not consider the example of the men of Nishapur and of other cities, who submitted? They acted quite rightly in doing that, so that no plundering took place. Why do you not consider other cities, from which no further taxes were demanded, since they had already been accounted for [by the previous masters]?" They replied, "We are very sorry and will not pursue such erroneous courses in future". The problem today is exactly the same as it was then.' They all agreed that it was indeed exactly the same.

Then they summoned Ibrāhīm's envoy and gave him the reply, 'We are subjects, and have a lord; now subjects do not fight. Your commanders should come, as the city is open before them. If the province is of any concern to the Sultan, he will come after it or else send someone. However, you must know that the people have become apprehensive of you because of what has happened in the past, so that with regard to this policy which you have pursued in other places of plundering, massacring, killing and execution, you must adopt another course; for beyond this world lies another one, and like yourselves, Nishapur has seen much. The people of this region have the weapon of prayer in dawn vigils, and if our Sultan is far away, the Lord, He is exalted and magnified, and His servant the Angel of Death are near.'

The envoy went back. When Ibrāhīm Yināl had perused the reply, he moved to a position one farsakh away from the city and sent an envoy back again with a message, saying, 'You have appraised the situation sensibly and have spoken very wisely. I have written this instant to our leader Ṭoghrïl and acquainted him of the position, so that he may rally Dā'ūd and Bīghū, who are at Sarakhs and Merv, and all the other numerous great men who are in other places; and then Ṭoghrïl himself, who is a just ruler, will come here with his retinue. Do not be downcast, for the plundering and unlawful behaviour which has taken place up to now happened inevitably because of the rabble who were at that time carrying on warfare. Today things are different; effective power (or, 'the province', *wilāyat*) has passed to us; there is no need for anyone to become agitated. Tomorrow I shall come to the city and install myself in the Khurramak Garden, so that [all these things] may be made known.'

When the *aʿyān* of Nishapur heard these words, their peace of mind was restored, and a herald went round the markets and explained the situation so that the general public might be reassured. They laid out furnishings and carpets in the Khurramak Garden and prepared food and got ready to go out and meet [him]. The Sālār of Būzgān, Abū'l-Qāsim, a most capable and intelligent man, who had in the past been beaten and ill-treated by Sūrī, threw himself whole-heartedly into preparing the Turkmens' reception. The *Ṣāḥib-Ḥadīthān* Imām Muwaffaq and the other *aʿyān* of the city assembled

together and went out to meet Ibrāhīm Yināl, with the exception of the Qāḍī Ṣā'id and Sayyid Zaid, *Naqīb* of the 'Alids, who did not go.[32]

Half a farsakh from the city, Ibrāhīm appeared with two or three hundred horsemen, a banner,[33] two beasts of burden, and with the whole group having a generally ragged and battered aspect. When the reception committee came up to him, [they saw that] he had a splendid horse; he had a pleasing face and manner of speaking which encouraged everyone. He rode on. An enormous crowd of people had turned out to watch; older men, who had only seen the [well-turned out] forces of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd, were secretly weeping, although outwardly smiling at that procession and concourse. Ibrāhīm dismounted at the Khurramak Garden, and they brought him large quantities of the food and refreshment which they had prepared for him. Each day people came to greet him. On Friday, Ibrāhīm went to the congregational mosque, being by now more smartly arrayed. The Sālār of Būzgān had brought three or four thousand of the armed men under his command, and had made an agreement (*mukātabat*) with this group [sc. the Turkmens]; thus as a result of Sūrī's tyranny they became friends with each other, for the loss of Khurasan was really to be laid at Sūrī's door (?). They had argued at great length with Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī the *Khaṭīb* to persuade him quietly to pronounce the *khuṭba*. But when they pronounced the *khuṭba* in Ṭoghrïl's name, a fearful hubbub broke out among the crowd and there was danger of an outbreak until they calmed [them] down, finished the service and went back.

A week later some riders arrived and brought letters from Ṭoghrïl to the Sālār of Būzgān and the Imām Muwaffaq. He had written to Ibrāhīm Yināl that the *a'yān* of the city were wise and praiseworthy in what they had done; they [sc. the Seljuqs] must take care to act equitably towards them and towards all the populace. He had sent round instructions to his brother Dā'ūd and his uncle Bīghū and to all the military commanders and their forces, and he was coming along personally in the advance force with his personal entourage to take care that the people of that district should not be harmed, since they had shown themselves submissive and percipient of their own interests.

The people were reassured by these messages. They laid out furnishings and carpets in Ḥasanak's old garden at Shādyākh. Three days later Ṭoghril arrived in the city, and all the *a'yān*, with the exception of the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, went out to meet him. Ṭoghrïl was accompanied by 3000 horsemen, the majority of them wearing cuirasses. He himself had a strung bow over his arm, with three wooden arrows fastened at his waist, and was fully armed.[34] He wore a *mulḥam* tunic, a head-dress of *Tawwazī* cloth and felt boots.[35] He installed himself in the garden at Shādyākh, as did as many as possible of his forces who could be contained there, the rest encamping round the perimeter of the garden. They brought there large quantities of food and refreshment which they had prepared and gave provisions to all the soldiers. As he went along, Ṭoghrïl conversed continuously with Muwaffaq and the Sālār of Būzgān, and the Sālār carried out all his wishes.

Next day the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, accompanied by his sons, grandsons, pupils and a large group, went to pay his respects to Ṭoghrïl, after people had reasoned with him the previous night. Also, the *Naqīb* of the 'Alids and a group of Sayyids came along. The interview took place when it was still not yet light. A small, disorderly group of the mob had gathered round, and each one who got up spoke out boldly and addressed Ṭoghrïl. Ṭoghrïl had seated himself on the lord Sultan's throne at the front of the dais.[36] He got up when the Qāḍī Ṣā'id came in, and they placed a cushion for him at the foot of the throne. Then he sat down. The Qāḍī said, 'May the sovereign's life be long! This throne which you are sitting on is Sultan Mas'ūd's. There are happenings like this [reversal of fortune] hidden in the Unseen, and no one knows what further ones may be in store. Be circumspect, and fear God, His name is exalted. Render justice, and listen to those who have suffered tyranny and who are in wretched circumstances. Do not give free rein to this army of yours for them to wreak oppression, for an act of injustice is an inauspicious event. I am fulfilling my duty in coming to greet you, and I shall not come again because I am occupied in study, and apart from that, I do not give my attention to anything else. If you want to go back with a piece of wisdom, this advice of mine will be sufficient.'

Ṭoghrïl replied, 'I do not want to incommode the Qāḍī by

his coming again; any other communication necessary can be done by messages. I promise you that I will take full account of what you have said. We [Seljuqs] are new and strange [to all this] and do not know the usages of the Perso-Islamic tradition (*rasmhā-yi Tāzīkān*).[37] The Qāḍī must not refuse sending advice to me in future [if only] by means of messages.' He replied, 'I will do that then'. He turned away and all the *a'yān* who were with him returned too.

Next day he handed over the administration of the city to the Sālār of Būzgān, who put on a robe of honour, a tunic and a woollen robe, arranging this outfit personally on himself, and he also received golden saddle accoutrements of the Turkish type. Then the Sālār went back to his house and assumed the duties of his office. The people saw him in the black woollen robe, endowed with the majesty of office, giving him the insignia of being Ṭoghrïl's Amīr.

At present I myself [sc. Abū'l-Muẓaffar Jumaḥī] am with Sayyid Zaid the *Naqīb* of the 'Alids, who is showing himself very friendly and helpful. After [writing] this, my envoys are leaving, and through the good offices of this 'Alid I am able to complete this despatch.

The other sources do not add much to this remarkable eye-witness account, although they do give some information about the attitude of the Seljuq leaders. Gardīzī is wholly silent about the first Seljuq occupation. Most of the other sources are pro-Seljuq ones, and often they reflect the *Malik-nāma* (e.g. 'Imād ad-Dīn, Ḥusainī, Ibn al-Athīr, Barhebraeus and Mīrkh-wānd); we expect therefore to find a favourable construction placed on the Seljuq leaders' actions. According to 'Imād ad-Dīn, the Turkmens entered Nishapur in Ramaḍān (sc. the month after Sha'bān). Their natural instinct was to plunder, but Toghrïl restrained them because it was the sacred month: 'Do not tear away its sanctity and do not gnaw at its inviolateness, for nothing is to be gained by plundering [then] . . . Control yourselves for the remainder of the month, but do what you will after the *Fiṭr*.' Meanwhile, the Caliph's envoy arrived to restrain the Turkmens and to instil them with the fear of God. When the *Fiṭr* came round, Toghrïl in fact restrained his tribesmen, but he only deterred his brother Chaghrï from pillaging by threatening suicide and by promising the Turkmens 40,000

dinars, the greater part to be levied on the local people and the rest to come from Toghrïl's own pocket.[38] Ibn al-Athīr gives most detail on the Seljuq occupation in his entry for the year 429. He says that in that year Chaghrï entered the city, changing nothing there, and that Toghrïl followed later; then comes the episode about Chaghrï's intended pillaging. Mīrkhwānd is brief: the people rejoiced at Toghrïl's coming, and the *'ulamā'*, *fuqahā'*, *a'yān*, *ru'asā'*, *wulāt* and *umarā'* all sent presents and promised submission. Ḥusainī only mentions in passing that Chaghrï came to Ṭūs and that the notables of Nishapur came to meet him. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī also places Toghrïl's coming in Ramaḍān 429. He, and following him Rāwandī, says that Toghrïl mounted Mas'ūd's throne at Shādyākh, and that this caused unrest among the people until a herald went round proclaiming that no one would be hurt by the incomers; these details accord with what Baihaqī says.[39]

4 *The attitude of the notables of Nishapur*

To understand why the *a'yān* of Nishapur and of other Khurasanian towns for the most part surrendered peacefully to the Turkmens, we must recall briefly what was said in Chapter V about the economic and commercial interests of the province, the agriculture of its fertile oases, the manufactures of its urban craftsmen and the long-distance trade organised by its merchants and financiers. Its interest lay in stable, firm government. The Khurasanians expected to pay taxes, but required in return adequate defence. The Ghaznavid connection had not been at the outset wholly an imposition by force majeure, for as the Sāmānids declined and then fell, the régime of Sebüktigin and Maḥmūd had been supported by the landowners, merchants and notables of Khurasan as politically and economically useful. However, Mas'ūd found it difficult to reconcile the claims of Khurasan with the temptations of expansion in India, and his military prestige was waning as the strength of the Turkmens grew. The loyalty of the people of Khurasan inevitably suffered when the Sultan became patently unable to provide protection; hence towards the end of his reign the tacit contract between the Ghaznavid dynasty and the people of Khurasan crumbled. Local forces reasserted themselves and the cities salvaged what remained of their interests and came to terms individually with

the Seljuqs. A similar process of the withdrawal of allegiance may also be seen in the history of Transoxania. The commercial interests of the Soghdian cities necessitated their being on good terms with the steppe peoples through whose territories the Soghdian caravans passed; this explains the comparatively smooth accessions to power of dynasties like the Qarakhanids and Qara Khitay.

When the Turkmens entered Khurasan, they brought with them the only permanent wealth which they possessed, their herds of horses, camels and, above all, sheep. The nomads' first demands on the settled populations were for pastures. But the oasis plains around the great cities like Nishapur, Merv and Herat were highly fertile and thickly dotted with villages. Agriculture was intensive and there were complex irrigation systems of canals and *qanāts*. The irruption of the nomads and their herds into such a highly-developed economy was a tragedy. If the forest hunter is amongst the most carefree of men—those amongst the Mongols regarded their pastoralist brethren as tied down to an intolerable life—the steppe pastoralist also has an irresponsible attitude towards nature and the land. Unlike the agriculturist who must conserve his seed and think of future years, the nomad is a true *ibn al-waqt*, living only in the immediate present. This irresponsibility makes him the terror of settled peoples and his close-cropping sheep more feared than his arrows.

It is only rarely that the sources allude explicitly to the menace of the herds, but Baihaqī was not speaking wholly figuratively when he said that the "Irāqī' Turkmens had in the latter part of Maḥmūd's reign 'devoured Khurasan as if it were food laid out for hunting falcons'. Mīrkhwānd has a brief yet illuminating description of the distressed state of the Nishapur area just before it was first occupied by the Seljuqs: 'That region became ruinous, like the dishevelled tresses of the fair ones or the eyes of the loved ones, and became devastated by the pasturing of [the Turkmens'] flocks (*ba-'alīq-i chārpāyān furū mānda*)'. Barhebraeus seems also to allude to these facts when he says of the hordes following Toghrïl: '. . . and no one district . . . is able to support them for more than one week because of their vast number. And from sheer necessity they are compelled to depart to another quarter in order to find food for themselves and their beasts.'[40] The Turkmens' herds caused economic

disturbance in other parts of Persia. When Seljuq raiders first appeared in Sīstān 'they devastated the land, seizing provisions and fodder and pasturing their herds'. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm records it as a virtue of Qāvurd b. Chaghrī Beg Dā'ūd that the immense number of beasts required to supply his kitchens were not a burden on the people of Kirmān but were pastured well out in the surrounding steppes.[41]

The ravages of the flocks in Khurasan were aggravated by the trampling of rival forces across the land, interrupting agriculture and either commandeering crops as food for themselves or else destroying them lest they fall into the enemy's hands. We have already seen (above, § 2) how the Turkmens drove off the beasts they found and how both sides practised scorched-earth tactics. We may further cite the information given by Ibn Funduq on the state of affairs at Baihaq. This town suffered badly from a Ghaznavid commander sent there with an army in 428/1037. The army encamped in the oasis and started to plunder. Then the commander ordered the cutting-down of the pistachio-nut trees of the villages because their oily and resinous wood made them good fuel for the ovens, and finally ordered the whole lot to be felled and sent off to Ghazna. Hence the Khurasanians called him 'the commander who makes a clean sweep' (*Ḥājib-i Pāk-rūb*). This came on top of seven years of Oghuz raids; in the seven years before 429/1038 no sowing had been possible outside the boundaries of the town of Baihaq, but only in the gardens and orchards protected by the outer wall. During this time, mutton had been unobtainable; only venison, veal and eggs had been procurable, and these had been scarce.[42]

The position of the densely-populated towns of the oases thus became parlous. A city like Nishapur or Herat could not normally feed itself (see above, Ch. V, § 3). The towns now found it difficult to draw food from the surrounding countryside. There followed general famine and depopulation. Land fell out of cultivation and peasants took to flight, swelling the bands of *'ayyārs* and other malcontents. When in 428/1037 the Seljuqs occupied Merv, Chaghrī wrote letters and caused proclamations to be read inviting those who had fled to return to their homes. In the Nishapur district, land values plummeted, and it is possible that this contributed to the decline of the dihqān and small landowner class into peasant status. In 431/1039 the small

owners (*katkhudāyān*) of the city were reduced to selling the roofs of their houses to buy food, and a *dāng* of land could be had for a dirham. In the adjacent village of Muḥammadābād, where land having trees, tillage or vineyards had formerly fetched the high price of 3000 dirhams per *juftvār*, it now fetched only 100 dirhams, and Baihaqī heard that during famine conditions it was being offered at a *juftvār* for a *man* of wheat. It is recorded by al-Fārisī that the fortunes and property of one ancient Nishapur family, the Mu'ammalīs, declined so much from the ravages of famine and the Turkmens that they were obliged to move to Baihaq.[43]

It is not surprising that the landowners and notables of Khurasan in many cases decided that it was less damaging in the long run to come to terms with the Turkmens, even where resistance was feasible. If, as the notables stated to the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, Nishapur's defences were at this time weak, other cities like Merv, Herat and Balkh were adequately protected, and the towns on the northern fringes of Khurasan, such as Nasā, Abīward and Sarakhs, were well fortified against attack from the steppes. It seems that in the Nishapur area, the Sālār of Būzgān disposed of an armed force (above, p. 255) which could presumably have been used for resistance. The mention of the Imām Muwaffaq as being the *Ṣāḥib-Ḥadīthān* is particularly interesting, for it points apparently to the existence in Nishapur of a body of local vigilantes, whose task was doubtless the preservation of internal order and the defence of the city against bandit and *'ayyār* depredations. The factionalism and social disturbance endemic in Khurasan at this time have been discussed above, Ch. VI, § 1, and we know that at this time of economic dislocation and tottering local administration, Nishapur was troubled by *'ayyārs*; one benefit which the Seljuqs are said to have brought when they re-entered the city in 431/1040 was relief from the *'ayyārs*.[44] I have not found other mentions of *Ḥadīthān* (Arabic pl. *Aḥdāth*) in Nishapur or in any other of the Khurasanian cities at this time, although it is well known that vigilante bodies flourished in Sīstān at a somewhat earlier period (above, p. 168). The term *Aḥdāth* was much used in the 11th century for the para-military vigilante and police bands of citizens of the Syrian and Mesopotamian towns, but does not seem to have been current in Khurasan. In the latter region we have the ubiquitous *'ayyārs*; and Cahen has recently sought to

discover whether the Persian *'ayyārs* are not in some way the counterparts of the *Aḥdāth* of further west, without, however, reaching any clear conclusions.[45] Thus we can only conjecture what was the composition of these putative *Ḥadīthān* of Nishapur and what were their duties. We do not know whether they were recruited from the bourgeoisie and upper classes, as were the later *Fityān* sponsored by the Caliph an-Nāṣir, or whether they resembled more the *Aḥdāth* of Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, etc., and the Anatolian *Akhīs* of Rūm Seljuq and early Ottoman times in being based on the urban craft and trade associations. The latter seems more likely; cities like Nishapur, Aleppo, Damascus and Qonya were all great industrial and commercial centres, and Cahen has in fact detected some early Persian traces in the later *Akhīs*.[46] In Nishapur, the leader of the *Ḥadīthān*, the Imām Abū Muḥammad Hibatallāh b. Muḥammad al-Muwaffaq, was a Shāfi'ī *'ālim*, son of a *qāḍī* and grandson of the famous scholar Abū'ṭ-Ṭayyib Sahl b. Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣu'lūkī; al-Fārisī says that his family had been *ru'asā'* and imāms and leaders of the *Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* for 150 years.[47] Whatever the exact nature and composition of this force of *Ḥadīthān* in Nishapur, there does not seem to have been any reason why it should not have been used against the Seljuqs if there had been any strong will to resist.

Instead of holding out in the uncertain hope that help from distant Ghazna would come, the *a'yān* of Nishapur, with the lay elements being particularly prominent, came to terms with the Seljuqs. Already in the previous year of 428/1037, Sultan Mas'ūd had been warned that the people of Khurasan had become resigned to giving allegiance to the Seljuqs, and in their *fatḥ-nāma* to the Caliph after Dandānqān, the Seljuqs claimed that 'the notables and prominent people' of the province had appealed to them for protection.[48] This section of society had in the past suffered much from the tyranny of the Ghaznavid civil governor Sūrī. Niẓām al-Mulk's father was harried by Sūrī for not squeezing enough taxation out of his *'amal* (see above, pp. 88-9). His ill-treatment of the Sālār of Būzgān is specifically mentioned in Baihaqī's account (above, p. 254). Although a fair amount about this local leader may be gleaned from the sources, the exact nature of his position is not clear. Al-Fārisī gives his full name as Abū'l-Qāsim 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad b. 'Alī al-Būzjānī and praises his scholastic attainments.

Some sources list 'Abū'l-Qāsim Būzgānī' as Toghrïl's first Vizier. Harold Bowen surmised that he was the local lord of the Būzgān region on the borders of Qūhistān and Bādghīs, and that he may have wielded some authority there on behalf of the Ghaznavids; this could explain how he had fallen foul of Sūrī.[49] I would further suggest that his title 'Sālār' was a reminiscence of an earlier military command or of participation in ghāzī warfare, and that the force of men which he headed may well have been either landholders from his estate or else local ghāzīs whom he had mobilised.

The interplay of local interests and vestigial loyalty to the Ghaznavids can be traced in Baihaqī's account. The record of Ghaznavid government over the previous years had sapped the loyalty of the lay elements among the Nishapur *a'yān*. The Imām Muwaffaq, although a member of the religious institution, was caught up with the *Ḥadīthān* and other secular elements in the city, and threw his weight on to the side of peace with the Seljuqs. But for the other religious leaders, there was something of a dilemma. They came from the leading families of Nishapur, were connected by birth and marriage with the lay notables and shared with them interests in landowning and commerce. On the other hand, the ulema and scholars were the most cosmopolitan of classes within Islam, and since the Ghaznavid Sultans encouraged Sunnī orthodoxy as a matter of policy and frequently employed learned men as diplomatic envoys and officials, they owed much to the dynasty. Hence there must at this time have been a tug of loyalties among some at least of the leading religious figures in the city, and the reserved attitudes of the Khaṭīb Ismā'īl Ṣābūnī, and above all of the Qāḍī Ṣā'id, reflect this. Whenever the Sultans had visited the city, the Qāḍī and his sons had always been singled out for special honour. Offices like the *qaḍā'* and the *khiṭāba* were state-appointed and state-salaried. Yet the Qāḍī could not be blind to the pressing threat to his native city, and he contented himself by giving level-headed advice to the other notables and by maintaining a correct but cool attitude towards Toghrïl.[50] Although the Ghaznavids were staunch Sunnīs, they also cultivated the support of the moderate, Twelver Shī'a (see above, p. 195). Here in Nishapur it was the Sayyid Zaid who sheltered the Sultan's intelligence officer and who hung back from welcoming the Seljuqs. In sending orders to the 'Alids

that they were to help Abū'l-Muẓaffar Jumaḥī, Mas'ūd counted them among his most reliable supporters in the city, and on re-entering Nishapur he gave the *Naqīb* and the 'Alids robes of honour.

As a parallel to the attitude of the religious classes in Nishapur, we may cite events in Sīstān a few years later during Maudūd b. Mas'ūd's reign. The local ruler, Abū'l-Faḍl Naṣr b. Aḥmad, a scion of the Ṣaffārids, was attempting, latterly with Seljuq aid, to throw off Ghaznavid control. As in Nishapur, it seems to have been the religious classes who clung most strongly to the Ghaznavid connection. Maudūd tried to rally his own partisans in Sīstān until in 435/1044 Abū'l-Faḍl swept down on them and jailed them; they included a *qāḍī*, two faqīhs and two amīrs.[51]

The interpretation given above of the ambivalent attitude of the religious classes in Nishapur differs somewhat from that of Cahen, who has suggested that the known Sunnī orthodoxy of the Seljuq chiefs made them acceptable when they appeared before the city.[52] I have put forward the view here that material considerations were uppermost in the minds of most of the lay *a'yān*, i.e. the preservation of their interests, but that the religious classes were to some extent still swayed by loyalty to the Ghaznavids. Neither group could look forward to the coming of the barbarian Turkmens with any satisfaction or enthusiasm, for their predatory habits were well known and their Islam very nominal; the attitudes of Toghrïl and Chaghrï over the sacking of the city (see above, pp. 244, 257-8) show that even their leaders were only marginally affected by religious considerations.

The subsequent careers of the two leaders from among the Nishapur notables who favoured surrender to the Turkmens as the lesser of two evils, the Sālār of Būzgān and the Imām Muwaffaq, show that they had fully realised that the future of Khurasan lay with the Seljuqs. The former was appointed the Seljuqs' administrative representative in the city (above, p. 257) Various sources name him as Toghrïl's first Vizier, and Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī says that at the time of Dandānqān he was the Seljuqs' 'Vizier, helper, counsellor and executive'; the decision after the battle to write to the Caliph for confirmation of Toghrïl's kingship is attributed to him. The Imām Muwaffaq left with the Seljuqs when they evacuated Nishapur in 430/1039,

being too compromised with them to stay and face the Ghaznavids again. He was later installed as administrator of the city for the Seljuqs, and it was during this latter period that he recommended to Toghrïl Abū Naṣr Kundurī, one of the many former Ghaznavid officials who passed into Seljuq service.[53]

When Mas'ūd temporarily re-occupied Nishapur, he appointed as *Ra'īs* not one of the local notables, whose loyalty had proved dubious, but one of his own permanent officials, and this man is said to have behaved harshly towards the *a'yān*. But Ghaznavid rule there had little longer to run. The next year, the Seljuqs returned, this time for good. Both lay and religious elements found it easy to make their peace with the new rulers, and indeed we find the Qāḍī Ṣā'id's eldest son in favour with Toghrïl and used by him for a diplomatic mission.[54]

There are references to other towns of Khurasan making their own terms with the invaders whilst nominally under Ghaznavid rule. Like that of Nishapur, the Merv oasis suffered from the attacks of the Turkmens and the ravages of their flocks, so that towards the end of 428/1037 the 'prominent men of the ulema and the best known of the worthies' surrendered the city on condition that the Turkmens did not harm the populace. Toghrïl and Chaghrï entered, and amongst other things, gave orders for the restoration of devastated lands and estates.[55] Complaints were frequently made to Sultan Mas'ūd by local commanders that local populations were making agreements with the Seljuqs. Shortly before the Sultan's re-occupation of Nishapur, the people of Abīward handed over the citadel of the town to the Seljuqs, and from Nishapur, the Sultan had to lead a punitive expedition against a group in the snow-covered mountains near Ṭūs, who had made an agreement with the Seljuqs and, it appears, joined them in their depredations. That allegiance was refused because the Ghaznavids were no longer able to provide protection emerges clearly from events at Sarakhs; just before Dandānqān, the people there refused taxes to the Sultan, saying that they were already pressed by the Turkmens, and fortified themselves against his forces.[56]

The cost of keeping the Sultan's armies in the field bore heavily on Khurasan, so that even the loyalty of the more easterly districts, of Bādghīs, Gūzgān and Ṭukhāristān, was strained, although the terrain there was mountainous and

unsuitable for the nomads to operate in. Law and order broke down there and *'ayyārs* flourished.[57] In a desperate effort to raise money, the Sultan in the summer of 430/1039 levied a tax on Herat and the nearby regions of Bādghīs and Ganj Rustāq of a million dirhams. It was allotted to the army as *barāts*, and the troops collected it violently, on the pretext that the people had been in collusion with the Turkmens. Consequently, several of the notables of the area fled. The rot spread to official employees of the dynasty. Among those jailed for collusion with the enemy was the *Nā'ib-i Barīd* of Herat, a nominee of the Chief Secretary Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān; and the *'Āmil* Abū Ṭalḥa Shaibānī was sentenced to be skinned alive, because after Sübashī's defeat and the appearance of the Seljuqs before Herat, he had gone out to welcome and entertain them. The excesses of the Sultan's own armies alienated many people in this region. In the summer of 431/1040, an army travelling from Ghazna to Balkh started plundering *en route*; the exasperated local people informed Chaghrī of the army's approach and gave help to the Seljuqs in other ways.[58]

5 *The attitude of the Seljuqs*

In conclusion, we will endeavour to determine, so far as is possible, whether the Seljuqs had any consciously-formulated attitude to power at this time. It is necessary always to remember that they were barbarians; their supplanting of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan is a classic instance of successful barbarian infiltration across the borders of civilisation. We have seen (above, Ch. VII) that the Turkmens' contacts with Islamic culture and religion were very recent and that the Oghuz were among the less-advanced Turkish peoples of Central Asia. Hence earlier political achievements of Turkish peoples, such as those of the Tiu-Kiu and Uighur, are of no relevance here. The chronological and geographical gap is too wide for any continuity to be traced, and the problems faced by the Seljuqs as they installed themselves in the ancient lands of Perso-Muslim civilisation were very different from those of earlier tribal chieftains assembling vast but ephemeral steppe empires.

Our information suggests that the Turkmens were impelled to overrun Khurasan by a combination of political and economic circumstances—the pressure of enemies in Khwārizm and

Transoxania and the necessity of finding food and pasture for their families and beasts. Certainly, the driving factor of pure hunger must not be neglected. The Seljuq leaders Toghrïl and Chaghrï clearly possessed the attributes of leadership, and gradually they acquired additional responsibilities, assuming the rôle of protective power in Khurasan. But even for the leaders this was a novel concept, whilst for the rank-and-file of the Turkmens it always remained incomprehensible; to them, the sole function of a chief was to lead his followers towards plunder.

As early as 426/1035 the three leaders Toghrïl, Chaghrï and Yabghu called themselves 'Clients of the Commander of the Faithful', but Cahen is perhaps reading too much into this when he views it as a remarkable indication that the Seljuqs were already seeking the cachet of orthodoxy and Caliphal recognition. Such phrases were stereotypes and the Seljuqs were at this time a band of desperadoes in whose activities few signs of future greatness were as yet discernible.[59] The Turkmens were for long overawed by the prestige of the Ghaznavids, and even in 431/1039 Toghrïl thought of moving to western Persia where there was no opposing power comparable to the Ghaznavids (above, p. 243). The occupation in 429/1038 of Nishapur was a turning-point, for the Seljuqs now found themselves masters of the administrative capital of Khurasan. It was natural that Toghrïl, proud of his success, should seat himself upon Mas'ūd's throne at Shādyākh as successor there to the Sultan, and Ibrāhīm Inal's first demand on appearing in Nishapur was for the *khuṭba* to be pronounced for the Seljuqs (above, p. 252). According to 'Imād ad-Dīn, Toghrïl behaved like a fully independent ruler: 'He forbade, he gave orders, he made grants, he levied taxes, he administered efficiently, he abolished things, he ordered affairs correctly, he abrogated them and he presided every Sunday and Wednesday over the investigation of *maẓālim*.'[60] He also began calling himself *as-Sulṭān al-Mu'aẓẓam* and *Rukn ad-Dunyā wa'd-Dīn*. Nevertheless, it is possible that these sources which incorporate material from the *Malik-nāma* exaggerate the degree of Toghrïl's political sophistication at this time. Ibn al-Athīr adds that the Seljuq leaders continued to pronounce the *khuṭba* in Khurasan for Sultan Mas'ūd mistakenly (*'alā sabīl al-mughālaṭa*); a possible explanation here is that the Seljuqs continued to place Mas'ūd's name

there after their own, as if some degree of his suzerainty in Khurasan were still recognised.[61]

When the Seljuqs entered Merv, Mīrkhwānd records that on Toghrïl's advice Chaghrï nominated *nuwwāb* and *'ummāl* and gave orders for the restoration of agriculture and estates.[62] Previous contacts with the Ghaznavids must have taught them something of prevalent administrative ways. When the three leaders were granted Nasā, Farāwa and Dehistān, they received the dress and insignia of Ghaznavid governors; at Nishapur, the Sālār of Būzgān was invested as Toghrïl's deputy with a similar outfit (above, p. 257). It is likely that those members of the Nishapur notables who went over to the Seljuqs guided Toghrïl further into the fields of Islamic administrative and diplomatic procedure. Before this time, the Seljuqs had some assistance from secretaries and faqīhs for their diplomatic exchanges with Sultan Mas'ūd. Baihaqī mentions that they had as an envoy 'a *dānishmand* from Bukhārā, advanced in age and eloquent', and after Dandānqān, the Seljuqs' *fatḥ-nāma* to the Caliph was taken by one Abū Isḥāq al-Fuqqā'ī. However, the Seljuqs had nothing approaching a chancery of their own, for on this occasion they used writing-materials salved from the Ghaznavid *dawīt-khāna* which had been left on the battlefield.[63]

Against this evidence of nascent political consciousness must be set the plundering instincts which were innate in all Turkmens, including, at least at the outset, leaders like Toghrïl and Chaghrï. The Seljuqs were all unfamiliar with the ways and usages of civilised life. When they entered Nishapur in 431/1040, Toghrïl is said to have tasted almond confectionery (*lauzanj*) and to have said that it was excellent *qaṭmāch* except that there was no garlic in it; other Turkmens tasted camphor but exclaimed, 'This is bitter salt!'[64] In their desire for plunder, the masses of Turkmens were prepared to destroy the administrative capital of the province and to alienate the classes whom the Seljuq leaders would have to depend on for guidance. Apart from Toghrïl and Chaghrï, it does not seem as if any other of the leaders showed awareness of the new horizons opening up before them. Thus the division between the supreme ruler and his entourage on one side, and the mass of tribesmen on the other, which was to bedevil the Sultanate of the Great Seljuqs, existed already in embryo.

NOTES

Note on the Sources

1. Cahen has now contributed a valuable and thorough survey, 'The historiography of the Seljuqid period' to *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London 1962), 59-78. This symposium contains further sections relevant to our period in the contributions of M. Minovi, 'The Persian historian Bayhaqī', 138-40, and of A. K. S. Lambton, 'Persian biographical literature', 141-51.

2. Details of the editions, etc., of the works discussed in this *Note on the sources* are only given if they do not appear in the bibliography at the end of the book (pp. 308-14). Nor have I thought it necessary to give references to Brockelmann and Storey.

3. For a fuller discussion of these preceding five works, see Bosworth, *Isl. Qterly.* (1963), VII/1-2.

4. The problems connected with the authorship of this work are discussed by Muh. Iqbal in the introduction to his edition of the text.

5. On the fragments in this last work, see O. B. Frolova, quoted by M. Canard in *Arabica*, VII (1960), 105-6.

6. Ed. Hyderabad, 1369/1950.

7. For general surveys of the local histories of Nishapur, and in particular, for those works mentioned here, see H. Ritter, 'Philologika XIII. Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul - Fortsetzung', *Oriens*, III (1950), 71-6, and Frye, 'City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The *Ta'rīx-i Nīšāpūr*', *Togan'a armağan* (Istanbul 1955), 405-20.

8. Tr. R. A. Nicholson (London 1936).

9. Extracts from this section were translated by C. Barbier de Meynard, 'Tableau littéraire du Khorassan et de la Transoxiane au IV[e] siècle de l'hégire', *JA* Ser. 5, Vol. I (1853), 169-239, Vol. III (1854), 291-361.

10. A new edition of the *Dumya*, to replace the defective Aleppo one of 1349/1930, is now being printed in Baghdad.

11. On these two works, see further, Bosworth, *Isl. Qterly.* (1963).

12. The question of the authenticity of the *Siyāsat-nāma's* attribution to Niẓām al-Mulk does not affect its value as a source for Ghaznavid practice; it is certainly true that the manuscript must, at the least, have been edited after the great Vizier's death, probably by Malikshāh's old copyist, Muḥammad Maghribī.

13. See further, Bosworth, *op. cit.*

14. These anecdotes have been translated into English, from the British Museum manuscript, by Miss I. M. Shafi, 'Fresh light on the Ghaznavîds', *IC*, XII (1938), 189-234.
15. See further, Bosworth, *op. cit.*
16. Minorsky has recently surmised that the author might perhaps be identical with the Ibn Farīghūn who wrote a pioneer encyclopaedia of the sciences, the *Jawāmiʿ al-ʿulūm* ('Ibn Farīghūn and the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam', *A locust's leg, Studies in honour of S. H. Taqizadeh* [London 1962], 189-96).
17. Ed. and tr. Minorsky, *Abū Dulaf Misʿar ibn Muhalhil's travels in Iran* (*c. A.D.* 950) (Cairo 1955).
18. Tr. G. Ferrand in *Relations de voyages et textes géographiques arabes, persans et turcs relatifs a l'Extrême-Orient du VIII*e *au XVIII*e *siècles* (Paris 1913-14), I, 208-31; cf. Marquart, 'Das Itinerar des Misʿar b. al-Muhalhil nach der chinesischen Hauptstadt', in *Streifzüge*, 74-95.

Chapter I

1. *Turkestan*, 212-13, 225-6. There is a revealing anecdote on the relative characters of the Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids and Sāmānids in *Guzīda*, 380 = Ch. Schefer, *Description . . . de Boukhara par Mohammad Nerchakhy* (Paris 1892), 101.
2. I Ḥauq., 468-9 (the first half only of this passage in Iṣṭ., 292); Maqd., 338-9; Baih., 199. Frye, *History of Bukhara*, 127 n. 145, gives the geographers' statistics of the tax yield of Transoxania under the Sāmānids, and notes that it was a large sum in comparison with the yield of other parts of the eastern Caliphate.
3. Samʿānī, f. 341b; Mīrkhw., IV, 16; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 246.
4. Barthold accepted this episode as historical (*op. cit.*, 242-5), but Qazwīnī ridiculed it, considering it to be one of the tales which grew up in Niẓām al-Mulk's time when the Ismāʿīlīs were much in the public eye and their exploits magnified (*Siyāsat-nāma*, 220-2, n.).
5. Narsh., 109, tr. Frye, 93 and 153 n. 313; Dhahabī, in *Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*, II, 249 n. 1; Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi', in *ibid.*, III, 340-5, tr. VI, 365-70; Thomas, *JRAS* (1848), 271-2, 307; Lane Poole, *B. M. Catalogue*, II, 131; Oliver, *JRASB* (1886), 134. On the titulature of the Sāmānids, see Bosworth, 'The titulature of the early Ghaznavids', *Oriens*, XV (1962), 214-15.
6. Narsh., 31-2, tr. 25-7 (Riḍawī's text, like Schefer's, is corrupt here; see Barthold, *Turkestan*, 229 and n. 7); *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 53-79; cf. Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 337-8. The Department of the Army is not mentioned in Narshakhī's list; it is possible that it was not fixed, but accompanied the army wherever it campaigned.
7. Samʿānī, f. 323a.
8. Iṣṭ., 315 = I Ḥauq., 491; Narsh., 31, tr. 25.

9. Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, VIII, 144-5, IA, VII, 322; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam*, I, 841-2, s.v. 'Turkistān'; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 210-12; *idem*, *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel-Asien* (Tübingen-Leipzig 1901), 31-2.

10. Iṣṭ., 327-8, 333; I Ḥauq., 489, 504-5, 510; Maqd., 272-4; *Ḥudud al-'ālam*, 113; Narsh., 22, tr. 18; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 175-8.

11. Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 66-7; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur* (Berlin 1953), 178, 226.

12. Iṣṭ., 289, 291; I Ḥauq., 465-6, 468; Maqd., 285; Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi', in *Eclipse of the 'Abbasid Caliphate*, III, 373, tr. VI, 400; Gard., 48; I Baṭṭ., III, 4.

13. Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rīkh-i Baihaq*, 130; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 259. A continuator of Narshakhī, in *Ta'rīkh-i Bukhārā*, 39-40, tr. 33, says concerning the *kharāj* of Bukhārā that after the fall of the Sāmānids it was everywhere lightened; the Sāmānid administration collapsed and the incoming Turks did not replace it by anything so complex and costly to run.

14. *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, 318-19 = E. D. Ross, 'A qasida by Rudaki', *JRAS* (1926), 213-37, vv. 23-36; Niẓāmī 'Arūḍī Samarqandī, *Chahār maqāla*, 49 ff., Browne's Revised Tr., 33 ff.

15. *Eclipse of the 'Abbasid Caliphate*, III, 373-4, tr. VI, 400-1.

16. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān* (Cairo 1959), 386; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, ed. Houtsma (Leiden 1883), II, 258, 333-4; *Murūj*, V, 302; *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, 105-6; Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 248-54, 291-8, and *idem*, 'Das Reich Zābul', 272-6, with references to the sources for the Ṣaffārid expeditions, to which should be added Gard., 11, and *TS*, 204-6, 215.

17. See Iṣṭ., 280, and I Ḥauq., 450, on the Indian influences at Kabul; and Bīrūnī, *India*, tr. Sachau, II, 10-14, and H. C. Ray, *The dynastic history of Northern India* (Calcutta 1931-6), I, 55-106, on the Shāhīs of Afghanistan and the Panjab.

18. *Ērānšahr*, 253, 'Das Reich Zābul', 257-8. Cf. Maqd., 299, where we have the spelling 'Jābulistān'; *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 111, 347-8; Minorsky, 'The Turkish dialect of the Khalaj', *BSOS*, X (1940-2), 430-2; R. N. Frye and A. M. Sayili, 'Turks in the Middle East before the Saljuqs', *JAOS*, LXIII (1943), 205-6; Togan, *Giriş*, 144-5; R. Ghirshman, *EI*[2] Art. 'Afghanistān', V, I.

19. Ibn Khurradādhbih, ed. de Goeje, *BGA*, VI (Leiden 1889), 37; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 392; I Khall., tr. IV, 302, on the authority of Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. al-Azhar; Iṣṭ., 244-5, with *lisānihim*, which Marquart thought was the original; I Ḥauq., ed. de Goeje, 302, ed. Kramers, 419, and Yāqūt, *Mu'jam*, IV, 220, with *libāsihim* 'their clothes'.

20. *Bābur-nāma*, tr. A. S. Beveridge (London 1912-21), 219. On the early history of Ghazna, see A. Bombaci, 'Ghazni', *East and West*, N.S. VIII (1957), 247-59.

21. ʿUtbī, I, 64-72; Jurb., 33-5; Gard., 43-4, 54; *TS*, 326-7, 333; *SN*, 118; IA, VIII, 157, 359, 503; *ṬN*, tr. 74 (Nassau Lees' text, 7, has an omission here); *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, ff. 164a-b, 166b; Mirkhw., IV, 36.

22. *SN*, 122-3; *ṬN*, 7, tr. 71-2; *Majmaʿ al-ansab*, f. 164b.

23. *ṬN*, tr. 43; Thomas, *JRAS* (1848), 295-302; Lane Poole, *B. M. Catalogue*, II, 128.

24. Ibn Bābā, *K. ra's māl an-nadīm*, ff. 203b-204a; *ṬN*, 7, tr. 71-3; *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, ff. 164a-165b; cf. ʿAufī in Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 180, and Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 26-7.

25. Thomas, *JRAS* (1860), 142-3, 184; Oliver, *JRASB* (1886), 130; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 251.

26. This is confirmed in the *K. ra's māl an-nadīm*, f. 203b. The conventional spelling of western orientalism, 'Sabuktigīn', presumably with an etymology from Pers. *sabuk* 'light (not heavy)', gives no sense. I follow Le Coq, 'Türkische Namen und Titel in Indien', *Aus Indiens Kultur, Festgabe R. von Garbe* (Erlangen 1927), 1, and Pelliot, *TP*, XXVII (1930), 16, in deriving it from the Tkish. root *sev-* 'love, like', giving *sevük/sebük* 'amiable, beloved', a root whose derivatives are found in the onomastic of Orkhon and Uighur Turkish (Pelliot, Rásonyi). However, Barthold, *Turkestan*, 261 n. 1, and Togan, *Ibn Faḍlāns Reisebericht*, 141-2, and *Giriş*, 145, have preferred a derivation from *sü-beg* 'army commander'.

27. Nazim, 'The Pand-nāmah of Subuktigīn', *JRAS* (1933), 609-11, tr. 621-2; *ṬN*, 6, tr. 69-70; Thaʿālibī, *Yatīma*, IV, 296.

28. Minorsky, *Marvazī on China, the Turks and India* (London 1942), 31, *19; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 99, 300-4.

29. Nazim, *op. cit.*, 611-14, tr. 622-3; Baih., 201-3; ʿUtbī, I, 56-7; Jurb., 31; *SN*, 111-13, 119-21; IA, VIII, 503; Mīrkhw., IV, 35-6. On the alleged *cursus honorum* for ghulāms, see p. 102.

30. ʿUtbī, I, 62; Jurb., 32; *ṬN*, 7, tr. 73-4; IA, *loc. cit.*; *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, f. 166a; Thomas, *JRAS* (1848), 268, 303-6; Lane Poole, *B. M. Catalogue*, II, 128-30; S. Flury, 'Le décor épigraphique des monuments de Ghazna', *Syria*, VI (1925), 62-3; cf. Nazim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 28-9. The account of the *SN*, 125-6, followed by *Guzīda*, 384 ff., contains no mention of Abū Isḥāq, Bilgetigin or Böritigin, but makes Sebüktigin succeed immediately after the death of a sonless Alptigin.

31. Cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 261 ff., and Nāẓim, op. cit., 30-2, with references.

32. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 49a, tr. I. M. Shafi, 'Fresh light on the Ghaznavîds', *IC*, XII (1938), 208. The topography, climate and products of these areas are described in the *Bābur-nāma*, tr. 218 ff.

33. *SN*, 118; *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 166a-b; Mīrkhw., IV, 36; see further, pp. 124-5. On the terminology of the fief or *iqṭā'*, see Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, 29-30; Cl. Cahen, 'L'évolution de l'Iqta' du IXe au XIIIe siècle', *Annales: Économies, Societés, Civilisations*, VIII (1953), 26-34.

34. 'Aufī, q. in Nazim, *JRAS* (1933), 605-7, cf. M. Niẓámu'd-Dín, *Introd. to the Jawámi'u'l-Ḥikáyát, GMS* (London 1929), 62, 222; 'Utbī, I, 67-72; Jurb., 33-5; Tha'ālibī, *Yatīma*, IV, 302-4; Saif ad-Din Faḍlī, *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 88a and margins of ff. 87b-88a.

35. Thomas, *JRAS* (1848), 275-6, 287-90; *idem*, 'On the coins of the Hindú Kings of Kábul', *JRAS*, IX (1848), 189-90; Lane Poole, *Additions to the oriental collection*, I, 198-9. The mint-cities of the Ghaznavids are listed by Thomas, *JRAS* (1860), 184-5. Against Thomas's views on Ghaznavid silver coinage, Lane Poole opined that it was often of low standard, with much copper alloy in it (*B. M. Catalogue*, II, 136 n.); it is possible that this generalisation is based on the later rather than the earlier coinage.

36. Thomas, *JRAS* (1860), 157-9; Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, II, 149-51; Oliver, *JRASB* (1886), 120-1, 130; M. Longworth Dames, *EI*[1] Art. 'Ghaznavids'.

37. 'Utbī (Lahore 1300/1883), 110 ff.; Jurb., 119; Ibn Bābā, *K. ra's māl an-nadīm*, f. 204b; *ṬN*, 8, tr. 75. Of Sebüktigin's two sons Ḥasan and Ḥusain, only the names are known; another, Yūsuf, was only a child when his father died and was brought up by Maḥmūd. I have suggested elsewhere that the preferences for Ismā'īl and for Muḥammad when Maḥmūd died, may have been a reminiscence of the Central Asian practice of ultimogeniture and of the *otchigin* of the Mongols ('A Turco-Mongol practice amongst the early Ghaznavids?', *Central Asiatic Journal*, VIII [1963]).

38. For all these events, see the masterly account in Barthold, *Turkestan*, 260-74, and also Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 38-51.

39. *ibid.*, 67-70, to whose references add *TS*, 346 ff.; cf. D. Sourdel, *Inventaire des monnaies musulmanes anciennes du Musée de Caboul* (Damascus 1953), 38-9.

40. Sachau, 'Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwârazm', *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 292-311; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 275-9; Nāẓim, *op. cit.*, 56-62, 177-8.

Chapter II

1. See E. I. J. Rosenthal's two chapters on the Mirrors for Princes and on the theory of the power state in Ibn Khaldūn, in his *Political thought in mediaeval Islam* (Cambridge 1958), 62-109.

2. *SN*, 21-2, 191; Baih., 101-2.

3. On the *'aṣabiyyāt* of some of the regions and cities of Persia, see Ch. VI, § 1.
4. This passage is translated in full, p. 253.
5. Baih., 664.
6. The general topic of the Sultans' relations with the Caliphs is discussed at length in my article, 'The imperial policy of the early Ghaznawids', *Islamic Studies, Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi*, I/3 (1962), 49-82.
7. 'Utbī, I, 317; Jurb., 138; Gard., 62. The titles of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd are discussed in my article, 'The titulature of the early Ghaznavids', *Oriens*, XV (1962), 215-26.
8. 'Utbī, II, 72-6; Jurb., 180-1; 'Unṣurī, *Dīwān*, 82; Gard., 67-8; IA, IX, 131-2; cf. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 96-9.
9. Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 33; Gard., 87-8; Ibn al-Jauzī, *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 53; IA, IX, 171.
10. Farrukhī, 93; 'Unṣurī, 51.
10a. *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 38-40, where the complete text of the *fatḥ-nāma* is given (this document translated by Bosworth in *Islamic Studies*, I/3, [1962], 70-2); *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 180b.
11. Baih., 44-9, 286-94, 369-72.
12. Baih., 221, badly tr. in Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 101. On the Turkish element in the Ghaznavid forces, see further, Ch. III, §§ 1 and 2.
13. *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 173b; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 75b; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 88a.
14. 'Utbī, II, 61 ff.; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 78b; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 114b. On the exact form of Aḥmad's name (IA, IX, 294, has 'Abū Naṣr Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad') see Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 301 n. 1.
15. Baih., 245, 362, 367-8; *TB*, 130-1, 182.
16. Cf. Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, 50-1.
17. Baih., 400.
18. Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-nāma*, ed. G. Le Strange and R. A. Nicholson, *GMS* (London 1921), 118; Baih., 367; *TB*, 111; 'Abbās al-'Azzāwī, Arabic introd. to the text of the *Tafḍīl al-Atrāk*, *Belleten*, IV (1940), 10-11, Tkish. tr. 240, quoting the *Tatimmat al-yatīma* of Tha'ālibī, I, 107-12.
19. Baih., 179, writes of him, 'evil and malignity were engrained in his nature . . . and this evil was accompanied by the absence of any compassion'. The beginning of Abū Sahl's influence with Mas'ūd seems to date from the time when he was the prince's *katkhudā* in Herat (Gard., 74).
20. Baih., 180 (=Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 90), 257-260; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 114a.

21. Baih., 316-28, 435, 600-1; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, *loc. cit.*; see further, p. 233.
22. Baih., 366-8. For this military campaign, see Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 301-3, and Barthold, *Turkestan*, 295-6, both of which accounts are based on Baih., 342 ff.
23. Baih., 477, 530-1.
24. IA, IX, 334; *Āthār al-wuzara'*, f. 114b.
25. Baih., 654-5.
26. *ibid.*, 435, 477.
27. *ibid.*, 99.
28. *ibid.*, 69-70, 145, 322.
29. *TB*, 175.
30. *ibid.*, 176-7.
31. Baih., 146.
32. A. Mez, *The renaissance of Islam*, Eng. tr. (Patna 1937), 120-2; M. Minovi and V. Minorsky, 'Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī on finance', *BSOS*, X (1940-2), 755-89; *SN*, 244.
33. Baih., 256, 499; cf. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 147. The model for the Ghaznavid *wakīl* was doubtless the Sāmānid *wakīl-i dār* (cf. *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 74b), and the term itself was used in Ghaznavid terminology (Baih., 273).
34. *ibid.*, 129-30, 254.
35. Gard., 53.
36. Baih., 128-31, 356; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 28b, tr. Shafi, 201; *Majma' al-ansab*, f. 187a.
37. Gard., 96; Baih., 72-3, 83, 93.
38. Minovi and Minorsky, *BSOS* (1940-2), 774.
39. Baih., 600.
40. See Maimandī's words on the dangers of taking office, Baih., 152 = Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 64, and see also Aufī, *Jawāmi' al-ḥikāyāt*, in Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 186-7.
41. See R. Levy, *EI*[1] Suppl., Art. 'Muṣādara', and *idem*, *The social structure of Islam* (Cambridge 1956), 307. For some examples of the techniques of *muṣādara* as practised at Baghdad, see Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, VII, 194-5, VIII, 115-16.
42. Baih., 362; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 101b.
43. 'Utbī, II, 156-65, cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 288; *Waṣāyā-yi Niẓām al-Mulk*, in Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 486-8. The *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, ff. 75b-76a, and *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 88a-89b, adduce as an additional reason for Maḥmūd's vindictiveness a quarrel with Isfarā'inī over a Turkish slave boy belonging to the Vizier, for whom the Sultan had become empassioned.

44. Baih., 362-5; Gard., 98-9; IA, IX, 294; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, ff. 76b-77b; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 101b-111a; Nazim, *EI*¹, Art. 'al-Maimandī'.

45. Baih., 185 = Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 96; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 293.

46. Cf. Baih., 159; a notice of him in Thaʿālibī, *Tatimmat al-yatīma*, II, 60-2.

47. Baih., 362 ff.; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 78b; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 114b.

48. Gard., 97; Baih., 267.

49. Quoted by Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 133 n. 4.

50. *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 110a.

51. Baih., 130; *TS*, 358; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 76a; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 89b.

52. Cf. Baih., 168, where a flogging is commuted into a payment to the royal treasury.

53. Cf. Baih., 218, 361; IA, IX, 262-3, 292; *ṬN*, tr. 93; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 83-4. On these Dailamī dynasties, see Cl. Huart, 'Les Mosâfirides de l'Adherbaïdjân', *Essays to E. G. Browne* (Cambridge 1922), 228-56; Aḥmad Kasravī, *Shahriyārān-i gum-nām*, I-II (Tehran 1928-9); and the works of Minorsky (who has laid special stress on the 'Dailamī interlude' in Persian history), especially *EI*¹ Arts. 'Musāfirids' and 'Ṭārom', and *Studies in Caucasian history* (London 1953).

54. See on this dynasty, *Mujmal at-tawārīkh*, 402 ff., and, *faute de mieux*, Huart, *EI*¹ Art. 'Kākōyids'.

55. Baih., 15-17, 392-3, 501, 510, 521; IA, IX, 232-3, 262, 269, 279, 284-5 (first pages of this numbering), 288 (second page of this numbering) -91, 304, 310; Ibn al-Qiftī, *Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig 1903), 421-2.

56. ʿUtbī, II, 172 ff.; Ibn Isfandiyār, *History of Ṭabaristān*, abridged tr. Browne, 233-4; IA, IX, 261-2; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Marʿashī, *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān u Rūyān u Māzandarān*, ed. A. Shāyān (Tehran 1333/1954), 142. For the Ziyārids, see Huart, 'Les Ziyârides', *Méms. de l'Acad. des Inscrs. et Belles-lettres*, XLII (Paris 1922), 357-436; I have endeavoured to throw light on the confused later history of this dynasty in an article, 'On the chronology of the Ziyārids in Gurgān and Ṭabaristān', *Der Islam* (1963).

57. Baih., 340, 376, 444; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Marʿashī, 143.

58. ʿUtbī and Gardīzī, quoted by Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 102, 114.

59. The same sources, quoted in *ibid.*, 97; cf. S. M. Stern, 'Ismāʿīlī propaganda and Fāṭimid rule in Sind', *IC*, XXIII (1949), 298-307. The figure of 20,000 dirhams in IA, IX, 132, for the fine levied on Multan seems more feasible.

60. Cf. Baih., 293; 'Aufī, *Jawāmiʻ al-ḥikāyāt*, in Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 189; S. H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim history*, 176.

61. Baih., 266-71, 400-2, 404-6, 423, 433-5 = Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 116-34; Gard., 97, 102-3; IA, IX, 291, 300-1 = Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 250; cf. Haig in *Camb. Hist. of India*, III, 28-30, and Habib, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin*, 94-8.

62. Baih., 128-9, 273, 495; Gard., 83-4 = Barthold, *Turkestan*, 283-4.

63. 'Utbī, quoted in Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 90; IA, IX, 243 (wrongly quoted in Nāẓim, *op. cit.*, 118); *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 40 (a different set of figures for Ray in IA, IX, 261).

64. Thomas, *JRAS* (1848), 289, 307, 311, 335, 350; *idem*, *JRAS* (1860), 156; Sourdel, *Inventaire des monnaies musulmanes anciennes du Musée de Caboul*, 30.

65. *JRAS* (1848), 315, 339; *JRAS* (1860), 165-6; Sourdel, *op. cit.*, 45, 47.

66. *JRAS* (1848), 290; Sourdel, *op. cit.*, 49-52, 62-3, 65, lists Ghaznavid bronze coins, but the dates and mints are all unknown, or, in one case, very uncertain.

67. *JRAS* (1848), 358-66, 370-4; Sourdel, *op. cit.*, 70.

68. Thaʻālibī, *Yatīma*, IV, 410.

69. *ibid.*, IV, 66; these are verses of Abū Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr al-Kātib against the Sāmānid *ʻummāl* of Nishapur.

70. H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the West*, I, i (Oxford 1950), 205-6.

71. *SN*, 20; *Mafātīḥ al-ʻulūm*, 60-1.

72. Cf. Cahen, 'L'évolution de l'Iqtaʻ du IXe au XIII siècle', 31, 37 ff.

73. Cf. *TB*, 272-3.

74. *Mafātīḥ al-ʻulūm*, 60-2. More specifically, al-Khwārizmī says that *at-takhmīn* means the valuation of growing crops, *al-khuḍar*; in regard to date-palms and vines, one uses *al-kharṣ* 'appraisal, valuation'. On the *ʻibra*, see Amedroz, 'Abbasid administration in its decay, from the Tajarib al-Umam', *JRAS* (1913), 832.

75. Baih., 541-2; *SN*, 245; *Chahār maqāla*, 30, Browne's Revised Tr., 20.

76. *SN*, 244-5; a slightly different text in the edn. of Sayyid 'Abd ar-Raḥīm Khalkhālī (Tehran 1310/1931), 179. See also B. Zakhoder in *Belleten*, XIX (1955), 511-12.

77. Baih., 460-2, 588.

78. *ibid.*, 36, 444, 512.

79. ʿUtbī, II, 128; Jurb., 202; *SN*, 105; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 29b, tr. Shafi, 203. The distribution of seeds and tools by the ruler is often advocated in the 'Mirrors for Princes', e.g. in *SN*, 20, and it is recorded that Sebüktigin did it (*Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, f. 166b).

80. Baih., 262-6, 339-40, 387-94; IA, IX, 287 (second page of this numbering), 291-2.

81. Baih., 19-24, 42-3; IA, IX, 284 (first of this numbering), 287 (second of this numbering), 292.

82. ʿUtbī, II, 330-1.

83. *ibid.*, II, 77, 158-9; Jurb., 182, 215-16; Mīrkhw., IV, 40. As against ʿUtbī's condemnation, one ought perhaps to note Thaʿālibī's enthusiastic praise of Isfarā'inī as the one who nurtured the growing Ghaznavid empire and made it prosperous and populous (*Yatīma*, IV, 437). There is some justice in both views: one of the prices of empire was financial oppression for its subjects.

84. ʿUtbī, II, 125-8; Jurb., 200-2; *TB*, 176; IA, IX, 158; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 287-8; see also pp. 161-2.

85. Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 159; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 76b; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 90a; A. de Biberstein Kazimirsky, *Menoutchehri, poète persan du onzième siècle de notre ère* (Paris 1886), Persian text, 63, tr. 200.

86. Baih., 273, 411-13; *TB*, 178-9 (the second fragment of poetry also in Baih., 414); cf. Thaʿālibī, *Tatimmat al-yatīma*, II, 90-1.

87. *TB*, 78-83.

88. Baih., 412-13, 542, 545, 611; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 14; Rāwandī, *Rāḥat aṣ-ṣudūr*, 94. ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī mentions a madrasa of Sūrī's in Nishapur (*as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 30a).

89. *TS*, 346-57; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 66-70, giving the other sources for Maḥmūd's campaigns in Sīstān.

90. *TS*, 358, 360, 363 ff.

91. Baih., 423, 429-32; IA, IX, 282 (second page of this numbering).

92. Clearly a gross over-estimate, even though Āmul was certainly a populous and prosperous city, attracting the commerce of the Volga basin and the Khazar lands to its port a few miles down-river from Āmul itself (cf. Ibn Isfandiyār, tr. Browne, 33-4; H. L. Rabino, *Mázandarán and Astarábád*, *GMS* [London 1928], 33 ff.; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 134-5; L. Lockhart, *EI*[2] Art. s.v.).

93. Baih., 456, 460-2, 468; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Marʿashī, *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān u Rūyān u Māzandarān*, 143.

94. Baih., 144. Nāẓim has a short section on the Correspondence Department in *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 142-4.

95. Baih., 110, 144, 600-1. There is a notice on Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān in Thaʿālibī, *Tatimma*, II, 62-5.

96. Baih., 144, 484, 609.

97. *ibid.*, 77, 292, 295-316.

98. The etymology of *Barīd* has been traced back (in the first place, it seems, by Quatremère, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Égypte* [Paris 1837], II, ii, 87-92 n. 34) to the Late Latin *veredus* 'post-horse' and *veredarius* 'courier', words used in Byzantine administrative terminology; for the popular Islamic etymology (< Persian *burīda* '[horses with] docked [tails]', see *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 63-4, and further, Levy, *The social structure of Islam*, 299-302. Niẓām al-Mulk is thus quite right in tracing the *Barīd* back to pre-Islamic times (*SN*, 66-7).

99. *Oriental despotism: a comparative study of total power* (New Haven 1957), 54-9.

100. Nazim, *JRAS* (1933), 616, 620, tr. 624-5, 627; *SN*, 79; cf. *QN*, 126, tr. Levy, 214, with similar advice.

101. *SN*, 49-50, 66 ff., 168-73; cf. *QN*, 126-7, tr. 215-16 (poor and obscure men not to be given office, but only those of ample personal means).

102. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 40b-42b.

103. Baih., 326, 646; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, f. 79a; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 101a.

104. Cf. Baih., 361, 387, 397, 421.

105. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 42b. The historian ʿUtbī was once *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* of Ganj-Rustāq (*Yamīnī*, II, 356-7), and Masʿūd's *Ṣāḥib-Barīd* in Nishapur, Abū'l-Muẓaffar Jumaḥī, was highly praised as a poet by Thaʿālibī (*TB*, 178-9).

106. Baih., 27, 323, 332, 398, 421, 437, 528, 655, 684.

107. *ibid.*, 137, 250; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 101b-102a.

108. Baih., 159-60 (cf. Gard., 93), 336. Nāẓim has dealt with this *Dīwān* in *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 144-6.

109. Baih., 139, 221, 272, 477.

110. *ibid.*, 69-70, 121-2, 145-6, 250, 252-5, 322.

111. *ibid.*, 674, 684; IA, X, 110-11; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 50b-51a, tr. Shafi, 211.

Chapter III

1. A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*[2] (Copenhagen 1944), 107, 132, 206-8, 368.

2. *SN*, 127; *QN*, 129-30, tr. Levy, 221.

3. Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, VIII, 49-51; *TS*, 222, 308-9; IA, VII, 347; Mīrkhw., IV, 6.

4. Miskawaih, in *Eclipse of the 'Abbasid Caliphate*, II, 77, 99-100, 163-4, 166, 173-4, 234, 329, tr. V, 81, 104-5, 176-6, 178, 186-8, 248, 356; IA, VIII, 343; cf. Minorsky, *Le domination des Dailamites* (Paris 1932), 20, and *EI*² Art. 'Daylam'.

5. Narsh., 100-1, 110-11, tr. Frye, 85-6, 94-5; Miskawaih, in *op. cit.*, II, 122, tr. V, 126; Iṣṭ., 291-2; I Ḥauq., 471; IA, VIII, 58-9, 363; cf. Barthold, *Four studies on the history of Central Asia*, I (Leiden 1956), 70.

6. 'Utbī, II, 85; Jurb., 184.

7. Bundārī, *Zubdat an-nuṣra*, 235; cf. Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 129.

8. *Murūj*, IX, 29-30; Miskawaih, in *op. cit.*, I, 162-3, 312-15, tr. IV, 182-4, 353-6; Bundārī, 208-9.

9. *SN*, 111, 119; IA, VIII, 157.

10. Baih., 1, 482, 624.

11. *ibid.*, 404 ff. = Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 125-9; Gard., 102; Sanā'ī, *Dīwān*, ed. Mudarris Riḍawī (Tehran 1320/1941), 568.

12. Baih., 252; 'Unṣurī, *Dīwān*, 50; Gard., 84; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 53.

13. 'Utbī, I, 62; Jurb., 32; IA, VIII, 503; Baih., 481-2.

14. 'Utbī, II, 290-1; Jurb., 247; Gard., 76.

15. *SN*, 109-10, cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 227; Nazim, *JRAS* (1933), 613, tr. 623; Gard., 42.

16. Baih., 568, 603, 615, 624 and *passim*.

17. *ibid.*, 267, 270, 464; Gard., 100; *SN*, 108.

18. Baih., 1, 374-5; Gard., 93-5.

19. Baih., 37, 271, 394, 410, 603, 621, 651; Gard., 73, cf. Baih., 678. As appears from the *Shāh-nāma*, the lion device is an ancient Persian one; cf. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 210-12.

20. See D. Schlumberger, 'Le palais ghaznévide de Lashkari Bazar', *Syria*, XXIX (1952), 251-70, and Ahmad Ali Kohzad, 'Uniformes et armes des gardes des Sultans de Ghazna', *Afghanistan*, VI/1 (Kabul 1951), 48-53.

21. Baih., 410. The Ghaznavid royal *chatrs* were black, and in the time of Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd the *chatr* was surmounted by the bejewelled image of a falcon (Baih., 639; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 15b, tr. Shafi. 200). The banners and *chatrs* of the Ghaznavids are discussed by Gulam Mustafa Khan, 'A history of Bahram Shah of Ghaznin', *IC*, XXIII (1949), 80-3. We know nothing of the *chatrs* of the Sāmānids apart from a mention of their existence by Manūchihrī, *Menoutchehri, poète persan*, 13, tr. 166. In *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Art. 'Bayrak', Köprülü says that the Ghaznavids had a moon and phoenix device on their flags, but in support

of this he merely states that it 'is to be understood from contemporary literary sources', and does not specify which ones. It has already been pointed out (e.g. by Brockelmann in *Keleti Szemle*, XVII [1916-17], 187-90) that Mīrkhwānd's mention of the *māhīcha-yi rāyat* of Sebüktigin is not to be relied on.

22. Baih., 288, 524, 568; *ṬN*, 10-11, tr. 83-4. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 140, misreads these sources and says that the total number of slaves was 4000; in fact, it is explicitly said that this is the number of the palace ghulāms, and the total number of slaves must have been greater than this.

23. Baih., 680 ff.; Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 303-10.

24. Baih., 271, 281-2, 394, 402.

25. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 20a, tr. Shafi, 202=B.M. MS. f. 43a with a slightly different text and set of figures.

26. Baih., 230, 237, 517, 524, 570.

27. Cf. an *'Āriḍ*'s contemptuous advice to an old soldier in the Sāmānid forces, Gard., 23.

28. *QN*, 134, tr. 230; *SN*, 107 (not 2000 each of Dailamīs and Khurāsānīs, as Schefer translated, *Le Siasset Nameh* [Paris 1893], 135).

29. IA, VIII, 366; Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Safar-nāma*, 58-60; W. Ensslin in *Byzantium*, ed. N. H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss (Oxford 1948), 296-7, 301.

30. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 37b-38a, 50b, tr. 204, 210. Shafi's suggestion 204 n. 4, that *Bū Sa'īd*='irregular' is confirmed in Baihaqī, 283, where *Bā Sa'īdān* are linked with the 'men of Transoxania', sc. the ghāzīs.

31. Baih., 267, 401-2 (cf. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 122-3), 497, 615.

32. Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 3, and the references in M. Fuad Köprülü, 'Kay kabîlesi hakkïnda yeni notlar', *Belleten*, VIII (1944), 422-7, 430-2, 446-9.

33. Baih., 317, 320, 323, 684; Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 304; Köprülü, *op. cit.*, 435-44; 'Utbī, II, 79, 84; Jurb., 184; 'Unṣurī, *Dīwān*, 83; IA, IX, 135.

34. Gard., 94; Baih., 237, 251-2, 497; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 140 n. 7.

35. Baih., 429-32; IA, IX, 282 (second page of this numbering); *TS*, 355, 357; cf. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 59-60, 130-1.

36. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 209-10; *Safar-nāma*, 61, 63; Baih., 207.

37. Continuators of Miskawaih, in *Eclipse of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate*, III, 196, 218, 356, tr. VI, 207, 230, 383; Gard., 91 (*zhūpīndāran* in the Dailamī bodyguard of Majd ad-Daula of Ray), cf. Minorsky, *Le domination des Dailamites*, 20; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Histoire des Seljoucides du Kermân*, 2, 49; Baih., 288, 524, 541.

38. *ibid.*, 497, 518, 603; Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 240-2.

39. Baih., 51, 369. This name for daring troops is reminiscent of the Sāsānid *Gyānavspār* 'those who sacrifice their lives' (in the Arabic of Dīnawarī, *al-Mustamīta* 'those who seek death') and the Ottoman *Dīvānegān* and *Jānbāzān*, 'madmen' and 'those who wager their lives'.

40. 'Utbī, I, 346, II, 83-4; Jurb., 148, 183; Gard., 73, 101; Baih., 678; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 108; *TB*, 70; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 94-5.

41. Baih., 135, 451-2.

42. *ibid.*, 258, 452, 481, 600, 614, 617; Gard., 68; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 38b, tr. Shafi, 205, and f. 41a.

43. Bīrūnī, *India*, tr. Sachau, I, 1, 208, cf. 199; K. de B. Codrington, 'A geographical introduction to the history of Central Asia', *Geogr. Jnal.*, CV (1944), 39. However, Minorsky has suggested that the name 'Afghan' may have a Far Eastern origin and have been brought by a conquering aristocracy ('Addenda to the *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*', *BSOAS*, XVII [1955], 265).

44. Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, V, 478-9; E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval researches from eastern Asiatic sources* (London 1910), I, 140, II, 258, 263-4; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 65a-66a, 72b.

45. I Ḥauq., 452; Baih., 614, 618, 621, 675; Bundārī, 5; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 3; Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 297-9.

46. Baih., 603-4; cf. Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi', in *Eclipse of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate*, III, 423, tr. VI, 449 (practice of mounting Dailamī infantry on mules and camels).

47. Baih., 281, 429-30, 575. Sagazī infantry had long been famous, and the Achaemenids and Sāsānids had used the Sakae and Segistānīs as auxiliaries; cf. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 209, and *TS*, 333.

48. *SN*, 119, 124; 'Utbī, II, 262 ff.; Jurb., 242; Gard., 65; Baih., 404.

49. *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 29-30; IA, IX, 241; Baih., 531, 626, 639.

50. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim history*, 146; Baih., 622.

51. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 208; *TS*, 206; Miskawaih, in *Eclipse of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate*, II, 368, tr. V, 402.

52. Baih., 483; IA, IX, 268; Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 492-3.

53. Christensen, *loc. cit.*; ʿUtbī, I, 184; Jurb., 91; Gard., 69, 82; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 53; Mīrkhw., IV, 41; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 273.

54. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 50a, tr. Shafi, 210; Bundārī, 263; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 91; IA, X, 354-5, who has much the fullest account of the battle, numbers Arslanshāh's elephants at 120.

55. ʿUtbī, II, 153-6; Jurb., 213; Gard., 76; IA, IX, 172-3. Hodivala suggests, *op. cit.*, 144-5, that the obvious meaning of *Ṣailamān* 'Ceylon' may not be meant here, although Ceylon elephants were certainly famed for their courage (cf. Minorsky, *Marvazī on China, the Turks and India*, 46-7), but that the reference is rather to the wild elephants found in the Siwālih range near Thanesar, on the borders of the former United Provinces and the Panjab.

56. Gard., 80; Baih., 284, 567; Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 346; ʿUtbī, II, 300; Jurb., 250. Jūzjānī puts the total of Maḥmūd's elephants at 2500 (*ṬN*, 10, tr. 83).

57. ʿUtbī, II, 28-9; Jurb., 712; Gard., 83-4; Baih., 430, cf. 501 and *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 30a, tr. Shafi, 203; Farrukhī, quoted in Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 138; Hodivala, *op. cit.*, 139-40.

58. ʿUtbī, II, 129 ff., Jurb., 203; Baih., 126-7, 270; *Menoutchehri, poète persan*, 44, tr. 187, cf. 347. The meaning of the term *āyīna-yi pīl* is illumined by an anecdote in the *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 75a, where an archer shoots at a steel *āyīna* and stampedes the beast.

59. Baih., 567; IA, IX, 238. On the *faras an-nauba*, see Quatremère, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks*, I, ii, 165, II, i, 12-13.

60. Cf. Baih., 8, 456, and Gard., 82, where, in deploying his forces, Maḥmūd places an armoury behind each of the sections of his front line.

61. Baih., 394, 456; Gard., 78.

62. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 94a-b; Gard., 82.

63. *SN*, 105-6; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 138 n. 4.

64. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 94a; Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden* (Leiden 1879), 96; Schlumberger, *Syria* (1952), 262 and Pls. XXXI, 2-3, XXXII, 1; Kohzad, *Afghanistan* (1951), 51. On the *qalāchūr/qarāchūr*, see the lexica; the etymology of the word is uncertain, but it is likely that Tkish. *qïlïch* 'sword' underlies the first element.

65. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 80a-b, 81b, tr. Shafi, 215-18; Baih., 624; Gard., 118; *Menoutchehri, poète persan*, 24, 41, tr. 173, 181; *ṬN*, 13, tr. 91; *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, ff. 181a, 186b.

66. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 78a; *ibid.*, tr. Shafi, 231 (this anecdote not in the India Office MS.); 'Utbī, II, 81; Nöldeke, *Das iranische Nationalepos*[2] (Berlin and Leipzig 1920), 53. I have not found any reference to the use of cross-bows and similar weapons among the Ghaznavids, but the cross-bow (*nāwak*) is mentioned by Firdausī and there seem to have been *nāwakiyān* amongst the bands of *ayyārs* who infested Khurasan and Sīstān at this period. See *TB*, 51, 267, and a discussion by Cahen in *JA*, CCXXXVI (1948), 169.

67. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 77b; Maqd., 325; Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, ed. P. de Jong (Leiden 1867), 129.

68. I Ḥauq., 450; *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 110; Baih., 115, 119-20, 466; IA, IX, 155; *ṬN*, 41, 47, 356, tr. 321, 336-7, 1047.

69. 'Utbī, I, 85-6, 101; Baih., 458. *Qarātigīniyyāt* are again mentioned in 'Utbī, I, 114, as used in Khurasan for close-in fighting between Tash and Fakhr ad-Daula's Būyids; for the origin of this term, I can only suggest that it was a particular type of mace popularised by the Sāmānid general Qaratigin Isfījābī (see p. 37).

70. Baih., 129-30, 481, 498, 524.

71. *ibid.*, 524; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 49a, tr. 208; Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 345-6.

72. *Mujmal at-tawārīkh*, 74; Ṭabarī, in Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber*, 247-9; Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 213-14; IA, VIII, 300; Baih., 430, 482 (cf. *SN*, 17), 651; *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 56.

73. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 81b-82b.

74. Baih., 523-4; *SN*, 134-6. On the feasts of the early Turks, see Brockelmann, 'Volkskundliches aus Alttürkestan', *Asia Major*, II (1925), 120-1; E. Rossi, *Il 'Kitāb-i Dede Qorqut'*, *Studi e Testi* CLIX (The Vatican 1952), 50-1, 101 ff., 165 ff.; *Bābur-nāma*, tr. 39, 49-50.

75. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 95a; I Ḥauq., 469, but cf. *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 65, where it is said that as well as the quarterly pay-issues, the Sāmānids also made payments to certain of the military twice or three times a year; *SN*, 106.

76. Baih., 146, 498, 611, 652; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-saljūqiyya*, 5.

77. *SN*, 106; *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 60, 62; *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 166a-b.

78. Köprülü, *Belleten*, VIII (1944), 449-52. The word *m.q.ṭ.'* occurs in Baih., 556, but the reading is dubious and the context unenlightening.

79. Gard., 93; Baih., 59, 257-60.

80. Baih., 119, 483, cf. 466; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 41b, 111b, 113a, 126b-127b; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 138, quoting Farrukhī.

81. See on this, Cahen, 'Le Malik-Nameh et l'histoire des origines seljukides', *Oriens*, II (1949), 32-7.
82. Cf. the figures of 30,000 and over 100,000 for Ghaznavid armies in IA, IX, 311, 328, which are not very credible.
83. Gard., 80, 90; Baih., 69, 430-1, 452, 456.
84. Baih., 481, 493-4, 498, 556; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūq-iyya*, 4-6.
85. *ibid.*, 10; Baih., 554, 603, 619.

Chapter IV

1. Baih., 491. His son, the Qāḍī Abū Naṣr, was used by Mas'ūd as a diplomatic envoy to the Seljuqs (*ibid.*, 490-3; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 5).
2. 'Utbī, II, 238-40; Bīrūnī, *Kitāb aṣ-ṣaidana*, quoted in Togan, *Giriş*, 146.
3. Browne, *Literary history of Persia*, II, 117-18; Rypka, *Iranische Literaturgeschichte*, 171; cf. Nöldeke, *Das iranische Nationalepos*, 28.
4. Baih., 112, 121.
5. *ibid.*, 47, 51, 136, 634; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 308 (illiteracy of Sanjar).
6. Cf. Baih., 163, 166, 450.
7. 'Aufī, quoted in A. J. Arberry, *Classical Persian literature* (London 1958), 53; Rypka, *op. cit.*, 171-2; Sachau, *Alberuni's India* (London 1888), I, x-xvi; D. J. Boilot, *EI*[2] Art. 'al-Bīrūnī'.
8. Cf. Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 156-9.
9. *Literary history of Persia*, II, 95-6; Baih., 208. In parallel to the Sultans's acquisitiveness here, cf. also the zeal of the Dailamī ruler of Ṭārom, Muḥammad b. Musāfir, in luring artisans and craftsmen into his service, as reported by Abū Dulaf (Minorsky, *Abū-Dulaf Mis'ar ibn Muhalhil's travels in Iran, circa A.D.* 950 [Cairo 1955], 34, also in Yāqūt, *Mu'jam*, III, 148-9, s.v. 'Samīrān').
10. *Chahār maqāla*, 118, Browne's Revised Tr., 86, cf. *Literary history of Persia*, II, 96 ff. In his *GMS* edition of the text (London 1910), Qazwīnī doubted the authenticity of this story, and certainly, the contemporary sources on the annexation of Khwārizm (Gardīzī, Baihaqī) do not mention this.
11. Baih., 274; *Turkestan*, 289; Nāẓim, *loc. cit.*
12. *India*, tr. Sachau, I, 152.
13. *Chahār maqāla*, 75, Revised Tr., 53.
14. Minorsky, *BSOS*, VI (1930-2), 1022; Arberry, *Classical Persian literature*, 54.

15. M. S. Bahār, *Sabk-shināsī*² (Tehran 1337/1958), II, 63-6; Rypka, *Iranische Literaturgeschichte*, 172; *Menoutchehri, poète persan*, 148, tr. 261, cf. 395; cf. Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fuad, 'Gazneliler devrinde türk şi'ri', in *Turk dili ve edebiyatï hakkïnda araştïrmalar* (Istanbul 1934), 26-32. The *mamdūḥ* of the poem is unfortunately not known.
16. A. Godard, 'Ghazni', *Syria*, VI (1925), 58-60; Flury, *Syria* (1925), 61-90, esp. 89-90; Bombaci, 'Summary report on the Italian Archaeological Mission in Afghanistan. I: Introduction to the excavations at Ghazni', *East and West*, N.S. X (1959), 3-22.
17. Baih., 539-41, cf. Gard., 103.
18. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 15a, 28b, tr. Shafi, 199-201; Narshakhī, *Ta'rīkh-i Bukhārā*, 24, tr. 19-20; cf. Minorsky, 'Geographical factors in Persian art', *BSOS*, IX (1937-9), 627.
19. Baih., 39, 159, 169, 472, 653; Gard., 95.
20. *TB*, 185-6; Baih., 228, 435, 659, cf. 441 where is mentioned a *khaima-yi ḥaras* used for confining people; *SN*, 141-2, cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 227-8.
21. Baih., 252, 259, 274 and *passim*.
22. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 28b, tr. 201.
23. Baih., 270, 375, 464; *TS*, 346.
24. Baih., 73, 256, 395; Gard., 109; *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 180a; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 13a-14a, tr. 197-9.
25. *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 166-7, cf. *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 181b; Baih., 260-2, quoting Maḥmud Warrāq; Mu'īn ad-Dīn Zamchī, *Rauḍāt al-jannāt fī auṣāf Harāt*, ff. 32a-b. The *Bābur-nāma*, tr. 219, mentions three or four dams in the Ghazna area constructed by Maḥmūd.
26. Flury, *Syria* (1925), 62-5, 87-9. The two so-called minarets or towers of Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd have been shown to be really the work of Sultans of the next century, Bahrāmshāh and Mas'ūd III b. Ibrāhīm respectively (cf. Flury, *op. cit.*, 75-8, and J. Sourdel-Thomine, *Syria*, XXX [1953], 110 ff.).
27. Schlumberger, *Syria* (1952), 251-70; Sourdel-Thomine, *EI*² Art. 'Bust'; Baih., 149.
28. *ibid.*, 56, 121. These pictures, together with the murals of Lashkar-i Bāzār and the mention in *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 108, of murals on the walls of the palaces at Balkh, form interesting evidence for the survival of the ancient artistic traditions of Bactria and Afghanistan into the Islamic period.
29. Baih., 13, 95, 149, 186, 252, 287, 360, 499-500, 551; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 288-9, quoting a lost part of Baihaqī in Ḥāfiẓ-i Ābrū; *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 180a. The Fīrūzī palace and garden have now been located by the Italian Mission; cf. Bombaci in *East and West* (1959), 19.

30. ʿUtbī, II, 290-300; Jurb., 249-50; U. Scerrato in *East and West* (1959), 39-40.
31. The Persian epitome of al-Ḥākim b. al-Bayyiʿʾs *Taʾrīkh Naishābūr* in Frye, 'City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The *Taʾrīx-i Nīšāpūr*', *Togan'a armağan* (Istanbul 1955), 410; Narsh., 41, tr. 34.
32. Baih., 343.
33. *ibid.*, 273, 411, 499-500, 534.
34. For later instances, see Juwainī, tr. Boyle, I, 31 (Mongol period); *Tadhkirat al-mulūk*, tr. Minorsky, 181-2 (Ṣafavid corvées for palace building); and A. Hottinger in *Middle East Forum*, Dec. 1959, 9-10, on corvées in modern Afghanistan.

Chapter V

1. *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 102-12; G. Le Strange, *The lands of the eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905), 382 ff.
2. Yaʿqūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān*, ed. A. W. T. Juynboll (Leiden 1861), 5; the Hon. G. N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian question* (London 1892), I, 8.
3. Markwart, *A catalogue of the provincial capitals of Ērānshahr*, ed. G. Messina (Rome 1931), 45-7, 52-3, *idem*, *Ērānšahr*, 74-8. The etymology *Abar-shahr* = 'cloud-city' or 'upper city' is a popular one.
4. E. Herzfeld, 'Khorasan: Denksmalsgeographische Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Islams in Iran', *Der Islam*, XI (1921), 148-52. The respective rôles of the eastern and western halves of Persia in the development of Persian culture have been the subject of much argument by archaeologists and art historians: Sarre and Herzfeld have attributed the dominant share to the west, whereas Hartmann, Strzygowski and Diez have championed the east. Barthold attempted to harmonise the two views. See the discussion in Minorsky, *BSOS* (1937-9), 647-52.
5. Cf. Yaʿqūb b. Laith's words to the Caliph's envoy in *SN*, 15-16.
6. Iṣṭ., 254; Maqd., 316; Ibn Bābā, *K. raʾs māl an-nadīm*, f. 196b.
7. This feeling against officials from the old Būyid lands can be traced clearly in the sources. The *Siyāsat-nāma*, 69, puts into Maḥmūd of Ghazna's mouth, as justification for his attack on Ray, that ʿIrāqī *dabīrs* are malevolent Bāṭinī and Khārijī sectaries, and that he is coming with an army of sincere, Muslim, Ḥanafī Turks. A *raʾīs* of Isfahān denounced to Barkyāruq how ʿIrāqīs with Ismāʿīlī sympathies had infiltrated into the *dīwāns*, so the Sultan began deliberately to favour Khurāsānīs at the expense of ʿIrāqīs (Anūshirwān b. Khālid, in Bundārī,

95-6). Rāwāndī complains volubly that with the Khwārizmshāhs' occupation of Persia, tyrannical 'Irāqī 'Ash'arī and Rāfiḍī' officials have insinuated themselves into the administration, whereas the Seljuqs maintained the pure faith (*Rāḥat aṣ-ṣudūr*, 30-2). In all these cases, by ''Irāq' is meant, of course, 'Irāq 'Ajamī, western Persia, as Rāwandī specifies.

8. Cf. the list in Maqd., 323 ff., of the products of Bulghār imported through Khwārizm and those from the land of the Turks imported through Chāch.
9. 'Chinese porcelain in the lands of Islam', in *Opera minora* (Leiden 1956), 326-61, with references to such sources from our period as Tha'ālibī, Bīrūnī, etc.
10. Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, *Asrār at-tauḥīd fī maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Sa'īd*, 140; *TB*, 53.
11. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 254; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Histoire des Seljoucides du Kermân*, 25-6, 49; Maqd., 321.
12. *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 88, IA, IX, 308, cf. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, Eng. tr. 475; *Safar-nāma*, 106; Maqd., 315; Iṣṭ., 282; I Ḥauq., 452.
13. *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 103; I Ḥauq., 434; C. E. Yate, *Khurasan and Sistan* (Edinburgh 1900), 357.
14. Maqd., 326; Iṣṭ., 258; I. Ḥauq., 434; Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, 115-16; Curzon, *Persia and the Persian question*, I, 264-7; Bretschneider, *Mediaeval researches*, I, 175.
15. A. von Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients* (Vienna 1875-7), II, 285-300; Mez, *op. cit.*, 459-65; C. S. Coon, *Caravan, the story of the Middle East* (London 1951), 165-8.
16. Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, 116; Maqd., 323; Iṣṭ., 255; I Ḥauq., 452; *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 102, 105; I Baṭṭ., III, 75, 81.
17. Maqd., 336; Khwārizmī, *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 67-8.
18. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 193-4, 219; *TB*, 111. On the *rustāq* as a unit in Khurasanian life, see also B. Zakhoder, 'Selçuklu devletinin kuruluşu sïrasïnda Horasan', *Belleten*, XIX (1955), 496-7.
19. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 126-7; Mustaufī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, tr. Le Strange, *GMS* (London 1919), 147-8. On Nishapur in general, see E. Honigmann's article in *EI*[1], with references to the literature.
20. Maqd., 315; J. B. Fraser, *Narrative of a journey into Khorasan in the years 1821 and 1822* (London 1825), 391; Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane*, tr. Le Strange (London 1928), 181-3.
21. Maqd., 326 n. e; *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, 114-15; cf. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 436.
22. Maqd., 313, 319; Sam'ānī, f. 31a; Yate, *Khurasan and Sistan*, 180.
23. Mu'īn ad-Dīn Zamchī, *Rauḍāt al-jannāt fī auṣāf Harāt*, f. 36b; *TB*, 146-7.

24. Maqd., 300; Iṣṭ., 274; I Ḥauq., 446.

25. Maqd., 313, 325; Iṣṭ., 281; I Ḥauq., 445, 452; Fraser, *Narrative of a journey*, Appx. B [41]; Yate, *op. cit.*, 362-3 and also 183-4 on the importance of the *chamans* of Khurasan at the end of the last century.

26. On the *qanāt*, see Quatremère, *Histoire des Sultans Mongols de la Perse* (Paris 1836), 183 n. 50, with references to European travellers; Curzon, *Persia and the Persian question*, I, 115 n. 1; Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, 217 ff.; A. Smith, *Blind white fish in Persia* (London 1953), *passim*. In early Islamic times the people of Ray were famed for their tunnelling skill (Minorsky, *Abū-Dulaf Misʿar ibn Muhalhil's travels in Iran* (*c.* 950 *A.D.*), 53).

27. Maqd., 329; Iṣṭ., 255; I Ḥauq., 433; Yāqūt, *Muʿjam*, IV, 857; Mustaufī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, tr. 147; Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 414-15; Frye, 'City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The *Ta'rīx-i Nīšāpūr*', *Togan'a armağan*, 413.

28. The Merv system was dealt with by Barthold, 'K istorii Merva', *Zap. Vost. Otdel. Imp. Russ. Arkheol. Obshch.*, XIX (1909), 115-38; for Qum see Ḥasan al-Qummī, *Ta'rīkh-i Qum*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl ad-Dīn (Tehran 1313/1935), 40-56; and for Qazwīn, Mustaufī, *Guzīda*, 833, abridged tr. Browne, 228-9.

29. *Ta'rīkh-i Qum*, 40-53; Iṣṭ., 255; I Ḥauq., 433; Khwārizmī, *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 68-9; Fraser, *Narrative of a journey*, 406; cf. Mez, *op. cit.*, 449 ff. The technical terminology of the *Diwan al-Mā'* in *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 68-72, relates primarily to the irrigation system of Merv.

30. Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, 269, 275, 311-12.

31. *Guzīda, loc. cit.*; *Ta'rīkh-i Qum*, *loc. cit.*, and 240 ff.; Lambton, 'An account of the Tārīkhi Qumm', *BSOS*, XII (1947-8), 589-90.

32. *Rauḍāt al-jannāt fī auṣāf Harāt*, ff. 66a-b; Gard., 8; Maqd., 320 n. s, 333-4. For the Mīkālīs, see Ch. VI, § 2.

33. Herzfeld, *Der Islam* (1921), 172; Maqd., 316. Baih., 47, mentions a *muṣallā* in Nishapur constructed by Yaʿqūb b. Laith.

34. Cf. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 412; G. E. von Grunebaum, 'The structure of the Muslim town', in *Islam, essays in the nature and growth of a cultural tradition* (London 1955), 148.

35. Iṣṭ., 254-5; I Ḥauq., 432-3; Maqd., 33, 315-16; cf. Le Strange, *The lands of the eastern Caliphate*, 383-4.

36. *Persia and the Persian question*, I, 262.

37. Fraser, *Narrative of a journey*, 388; Mustaufī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, tr. 147.

38. *TB*, 53; *ṬN*, 75, tr. 380-1.

39. Cf. Herzfeld, *Der Islam* (1921), 160-3, with a list of information on building materials in Persia compiled from the Arabic geographers, and A. Godard, 'Khorāsān', *Āthār-e Īrān, Annales du service archéologique de l'Iran*, IV (1949), 7-150.

40. *Safar-nāma*, 4-5, 8-9, 12, 14-17, 63.

41. Baih., 38, 149, 359, 395, 484, 608-9. Material on Shādyākh has been assembled by Sa'īd Nafīsī in the notes to his edition of Baihaqī (Tehran 1319-32/1940-53), II, 897-914.

42. 'Utbī, II, 125-8; Jurb., 200-2; *TB*, 175-6; IA, IX, 158; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 287-8.

43. *Safar-nāma*, 1-2, 70.

44. *ibid.*, 14-15, 25, 45, 54-5, 69, 109.

Chapter VI

1. Maqd., 37, 323. I Ḥauq., 439, 441, mentions pockets of Khawārij in the countryside of Bādghīs. On the Za'farāniyya, see al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bain al-firaq* (Cairo 1328/1910), 197-8, tr. Halkin (Tel Aviv 1935), 11-12.

2. Cf. G. H. Sadighi, *Les mouvements religieux iraniens* (Paris 1938), and Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 196-206.

3. Gard., 37-8; IA, VIII, 216.

4. Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi'iyya al-kubrā*, II, 176-8; I Khall., tr. II, 605-6; Maqd., 323; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam*, II, 512.

5. Maqd., *loc. cit.*

6. *TS*, 336. The same source also mentions another *ta'aṣṣub* which arose in the town of Ūq in 341/952-3 between the Shanguliyān and (?) Zātūruqiyān; its basis is unknown, but it was still of significance a century later (*ibid.*, 325, cf. 364-5, 367).

7. Maqd., 336.

8. *Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen âge* (Leiden 1959: originally in *Arabica*, V-VI [1958-9]), [29]-[32].

9. *ibid.*, [49]; cf. Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 437.

10. Miskawaih, in *Eclipse of the 'Abbasid Caliphate*, II, 222-8, tr. V, 234-40; *Muntaẓam*, VII, 33-4; IA, VIII, 421-2, 455-6; cf. Cahen, *op. cit.*, [40].

11. Gard., 23-4; *TS*, 297 ff.; IA, VIII, 52-3, IX, 409.

12. IA, X, 17; Gard., 11; *TS*, 192 ff. and *passim*, esp. 328 and 363, where officers of the *'ayyārs* are mentioned; Nöldeke, *Sketches from eastern history*, tr. J. S. Black (Edinburgh 1892), 177-9; Barthold, 'Zur Geschichte der Ṣaffāriden', *Nöldeke-Festschrift* (Giessen 1906), I, 177-87; Cahen, *op. cit.*, [47]-[48].

13. Baih., 423, 426-9; IA, IX, 296; cf. Minorsky, *EI*[1] Art. 'Ṭūs'.
14. Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*; Zakhoder, *Belleten* (1955), 518-19.
15. Baih., 536.
16. Maqd., 316, 319 n. c; *TB*, 28; cf. IA, X, 366, under year 510/1116-17, where long years of friction culminated in the razing of the Mashhad 'Alī by the Sunnīs of Ṭūs.
17. *TB*, 51, 124, 267.
18. *ibid.*, 51, 59, 97, 267, 274-5; cf. Cahen, *Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain*, [44]-[45], on the breakdown of public order as the Great Seljuqs declined.
19. Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, *Asrār at-tauḥīd fī maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Sa'īd*, 13-14.
20. That rulers should choose their ministers, secretaries, etc. from the families which specialised in these callings is a common recommendation of the 'Mirrors for Princes'; see, for example, *SN*, 176 ff. (Vizier), and *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 36b (Vizier), 39b (Mustaufī), 43b (Chief Ḥājib).
21. *TB*, 172.
22. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 133-4; *TB*, 126; Frye, 'City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The *Ta'rīx-i Nīšāpūr*', 407-8.
23. L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* (Paris 1948), 60-2; W. Montgomery Watt, *EI*[2] Art. 'Ash'ariyya'.
24. al-Fārisī, *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, ff. 46b, 51a.
25. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 17-18, 22-3; cf. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic mysticism*, 6.
26. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 18-22, 84 ff. (cf. Nicholson, *op. cit.*, 28-32), 133-5; *Kashf al-maḥjūb*, tr. Nicholson (London 1936), xii, cf. 92-5. In *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 110, it is related that the Shāfi'ī Abū Muḥammad Juwainī was equally violently opposed to the Shaikh when he first came to Nishapur.
27. Baih., 209-10. Maḥmūd may have had an early flirtation with the Karāmiyya (see § 3), but there does not seem to be any support in the historical sources for the anecdote in I Khall., tr. III, 342-3, given on the authority of the Imām al-Ḥaramain, of the Sultan's changing from Ḥanafism to Shāfi'ism, although it may have been tales like this which led Subkī to include a section on Maḥmūd and his father in his *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, 14 ff.
28. *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, ff. 41b, 42a, etc.
29. *ibid.*, ff. 74a-b; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 108.
30. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 91; Baih., 38, 198; 'Utbī, II, 330-1; Jurb., 260.
31. Baih., 40-1, 198, 211, 376.

32. Baih., 49, 359, 536; Sam'ānī, ff. 31a-b; *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 74b; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 108.
33. 'Utbī, II, 28; Jurb., 172.
34. Baih., 198-9, 689. Sam'anī, f. 103a, derives the *nisba* 'Tabānī' from a place at Wāsiṭ.
35. Baih., 208-10.
36. *ibid.*, 83-4, 197-8, 211, 425, 528-9; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 294-5, 299-300.
37. Sam'ānī, f. 346b; 'Utbī, I, 375 ff.; Jurb., 158.
38. A *Kitāb al-mi'atain*, a collection of a hundred selected traditions and a hundred stories about them; see *GAL*, I 446, Suppl., I, 618.
39. *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, ff. 38a-39b; Sam'ānī, ff. 346b-347a; Yāqūt, *Irshād*, II, 348-9; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 117-29 (derives from al-Fārisī).
40. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 156-7, 166-7, 194, 257, 294.
41. *TS*, 237, 273.
42. Sam'ānī, ff. 548b-549b; Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 490; I Khall., tr. III, 40; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, II, 145. A large amount of material on the Mīkālīs has been assembled by Sa'īd Nafīsī in the notes to his edition of Baihaqī, III, 969-1009, with a genealogical table on p. 1008.
43. Maqd., 186; Sam'ānī, ff. 548b-549a; a notice also of him in *Yatīmat ad-dahr*, IV, 417-18.
44. Baih., 18, 286-7, 290 ff.
45. *ibid.*, 246-7, 357, 360; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 69; a brief notice of Khwāja 'Alī in *Tatimmat al-yatīma*, II, 106-7.
46. Sam'ānī, f. 549a; Maqd., 320 n. s, 333-4.
47. Baih., 481, 484; Gard., 100-2; IA, IX, 359; cf. H. Bowen, 'Notes on some early Seljuqid Viziers', *BSOAS*, XX (1957), 107-8.
48. 'Utbī, II, 34-5; Jurb., 173-4; Baih., 373; *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 85b; *TB*, 117 (Ibn Funduq mentions the Mīkālīyān only briefly; they were not essentially a Baihaq family); a long section on Abū'l-Faḍl's literary works in *Yatīmat ad-dahr*, IV, 354-81.
49. 'Utbī, II, 321, 326; Jurb., 257-8; Baih., 146, 366-8; *Nasā'im al-aṣhār*, ff. 77b-78a; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 111b-114a.
50. Baih., 181-3 (=Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 91-3); Gard., 96-7; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 16; IA, IX, 239; *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 111b, according to which the *khil'a* was torn into four pieces and burnt at Ghazna.
51. Baih., 52, 64, 178-89 (=Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, II, 88-100); Gard., *loc. cit.*

52. Sa'īd Nafīsī, edition of Baihaqī, III, 996; Baih., 187-9.
53. *ibid.*, 38, 187, 395, 411; *TB*, 108-9.
54. Baih., 186; 'Utbī, II, 328-9; Jurb., 258-9.
55. Baih., 23, 36, 247, 610.
56. Thus at Mazīnān in the Baihaq oasis, Sultan Maḥmūd appointed a man as *ra'īs* and deputy of the civil governor of Khurasan, and the man's descendants continued to be rulers of the district (*TB*, 169).
57. Baih., 40-1, 129, 184; cf. *SN*, 26, Zakhoder, *Belleten* (1955), 510, and Barthold, *Turkestan*, 234.
58. References and fuller details in Bosworth, 'The rise of the Karāmiyyah in Khurasan', *Muslim World*, L (1960), 5-14, to which should also be added a section on the sect in L. Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (Paris 1922), 230-42.
59. Sam'ānī, f. 477a; 'Utbī, II, 310; Jurb., 254; *TS*, 339.
60. According to an anecdote in the *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, ff. 111b-112a, Maḥmūd was originally a great admirer of the sect and its holy men; but see Bosworth, *op. cit.*, 9 n. 13.
61. 'Utbī, II, 77, 310-12; Jurb., 182, 254. Maḥmūd himself followed this ugly practice of extorting money from citizens in return for a certificate attesting to sound belief; cf. IA, IX, 283 (first page of this numbering).
62. 'Utbī, II, 237-50; Jurb., 237-9; Gard., 71; Sam'ānī, f. 102b; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, 16, quoting the lost history of Herat by Qāḍī Abū Naṣr Fāmī.
63. al-Fārisī, *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 3b (this passage translated in Bosworth, *op. cit.*, 13-14); *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 84 ff., cf. 119, 163; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 52-4, 68.
64. 'Utbī, II, 311; Jurb., 254; *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 89.
65. 'Utbī, II, 311-25; Jurb., 254-8; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 289-90. Although it was exceptional in Nishapur for the *riyāsa* to be in religious hands, this became the norm in other parts of eastern Islam. In particular, Bukhārā had several lines of local religious leaders who wielded very great authority within the city. For the most famous of these, the *Ṣudūr* of the Āl-i Burhān, see *Turkestan*, 326-7, 353-5, and O. Pritsak, 'Āl-i Burhān', *Der Islam*, XXX (1952), 81-96.
66. IA, X, 171; *TB*, 268-9, recording this *fitna* as occurring in Ṣafar 489. On the later history of the Karāmiyya in Ghūr, see Bosworth, 'The early Islamic history of Ghūr', *Central Asiatic Journal*, VI (1961), 116-33.
67. *Kashf al-maḥjūb*, tr. 134, 174.
68. *ibid.*, 21; *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 127, 134-5.

69. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 104, 126-7, 161, 179, cf. 109-10.
70. *ibid.*, 84, 113-15, 147-8, 151, 159, 194, 208, 211 (where *muḥibbān* are described as coming from the *ahl-i dunyā u bāzāriyān*), 419, 435.
71. *ibid.*, 84, 110, 119-20, 131-2, 163.
72. *ibid.*, 97-8; Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Heidelberg 1910), 175-6; V. A. Zhukovsky, 'Persian Sufiism', *BSOS*, V (1928-30) [=a tr. of the literary parts of the preface to his edition of Hujwīrī, Leningrad 1926], 478-9; cf. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic mysticism*, 33 ff.
73. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 84-91, 275-8, 294; Nicholson, *op. cit.*, 28-33.
74. IA, IX, 247; *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 453-7 (the reigning Sultan in 1049 was Maudūd b. Mas'ūd); Baih., 513.
75. Zakhoder, *Belleten* (1955), 513-16; *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 14.
76. *ibid.*, 205-6; Zakhoder, *op. cit.*, 516.
77. According to Maqd., 323, 'the children of 'Alī are held in the highest esteem there [sc. in Khurasan]'.
78. 'Utbī, II, 247-9; Jurb., 238-9.
79. *TB*, 254-5, cf. 54 ff. Al-Fārisī mentions the family under the biography of Sayyid Abū Manṣūr Ẓafar b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Zabbāra (d. 410/1019) (*as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, ff. 77b-78a).
80. *ibid.*, ff. 59b-60a, 61b, 63b, 78a, 79a.
81. *TB*, 55.
82. *ibid.*, 55-6, 255; cf. C. van Arendonck, *EI*[1] Art. 'Sharīf'; Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 146-55; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal* (Istanbul 1941), 11.
83. Baih., 23. At Āmul in Gurgān, the *Naqīb* was the town's spokesman against Sultan Mas'ūd's claims (*ibid.*, 460 ff.; see p. 91).
84. *ibid.*, 17.
85. *TB*, 57-8, 77, 92, 269; the Seljuq Arslan Arghun demolished the main wall and citadel of Sabzawār as a punishment for this.
86. al-Fārisī, *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 14b.
87. 'Utbī, II, 250; Jurb., 239; cf. S. M. Stern, 'The early Ismā'īlī missionaries in north-west Persia and in Khurāsān and Transoxania', *BSOAS*, XXIII (1960), 56-90.
88. *ibid.*, 77-90.
89. Stern, 'Ismā'īlī propaganda and Fāṭimid rule in Sind', *IC*, XXIII (1949), 298, 303; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 83, 96-9.
90. Maqd., 323.

91. Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 218-19; *TB*, 281-3; cf. Barthold, 'Zur Geschichte des persischen Epos', *ZDMG*, XCVIII (1944), 141-2.

92. Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 75-6; Sachau, 'Zur Ausbreitung des Christentums in Asien', *APAW* (1919), No. 1, 17-21, 63-8; A. Mingana, 'The early spread of Christianity in Central Asia: a new document', *Bull. John Rylands Libr.*, IX (1925), 318-20; Barthold, *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel-Asien*, 21 ff.; Spuler, *op. cit.*, 209-15.

93. W. J. Fischel, 'The Jews of Central Asia (Khorasan) in mediaeval Hebrew and Islamic literature', *Historia Judaica*, VII (New York 1945), 33-47; Spuler, *op. cit.*, 215-17; Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 37; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 107, 131; Le Strange, *The lands of the eastern Caliphate*, 203-4, 424-5.

94. Mez, *op, cit.*, 33 n.

95. *Asrār at-tauḥīd*, 120-1, 143, 168-70.

96. *ibid.*, 145-6; Baih., 235; *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 13a-b, tr. Shafi, 197-8.

CHAPTER VII

1. Cf. the words attributed to Alp Arslan: 'I have often pointed out that we are strangers in this land, and have conquered this country by force [alone]' (*SN*, 163).

2. T. Kowalski, 'Les Turcs dans le Šāh-nāme', *RO*, XV (1939-49), 87 ff.

3. Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 211-12; Codrington, *Geogr. Jnal.* (1944), 85; R. Grousset, *L'empire des steppes*[4] (Paris 1952), 110-15.

4. *Tria opuscula*, ed. van Vloten (Leiden 1903), 29, Eng. tr. C. T. Harley Walker, 'Jāḥiẓ of Basra to al-Fatḥ b. Khaqan on the "Exploits of the Turks and the army of the Khalifate in general" ', *JRAS* (1915), 638.

5. Narsh., 5-7, tr. Frye, 6-8, 106-8; Markwart, *Wehrot und Arang* (Leiden 1938), 147-51.

6. Narsh., 19-20, tr. 16-17; Frye and Sayīlī, *JAOS* (1943), 202; Kāshgharī, tr. Atalay, III, 149-50.

7. *Murūj*, VIII, 144-5; Maqd., 272-4; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 118; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 175-8.

8. Cf. M. C. Inostrancev, 'Note sur un point de l'histoire ancienne du Khârezm', *JA*, Ser. 10, Vol. XV (1910), 141-5; Togan, *Ibn Faḍlāns Reisebericht*, Excursus § 76a, 217-20; *idem*, *The Khorezmians and their civilisation*, preface to facs. edn. of Zamakhsharīs' *Muqaddimāt al-adab* (Istanbul 1951), 21-2.

9. The goods appreciated by the nomads are illustrated by the presents which Ibn Faḍlān's embassy gave to the Oghuz through whose territory they passed: pepper, nuts, millet, raisins, robes of honour and leather slippers, with a special present for their military leader, the *Sübashī*, which included three *mithqāls* of musk (*Reisebericht*, § 34, text 15-16, tr. 28-30).

10. Iṣṭ., 281, 288; I Ḥauq., 452, 464; *Reisebericht*, § 25, text 12, tr. 23-4, and Exc. § 25a, 133-4.

11. I Ḥauq., 353; Maqd., 340.

12. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 240 n. 1; I Ḥauq., 452.

13. Barhebr., tr. 208; cf. J. H. Kramers, 'The Turks in the history of Hither Asia', in *Analecta orientalia* (Leiden 1954), I, 46.

14. Ibn Ḥassūl, *Tafḍīl al-Atrāk 'alā sā'ir al-ajnād*, ed. 'Abbās al-'Azzāwī, *Belleten*, IV (1940), 40-2 of Arabic text; Jāḥiẓ, tr. in *JRAS* (1915), 678.

15. V. Thomsen, 'Alttürkische Inschriften aus der Mongolei', *ZDMG*, LXXVII (1924), 140, etc.; *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 94. For general surveys, see Barthold's articles in *EI*[1] 'Ghuzz', 'Toghuz-ghuz' and 'Turks. A. 1. Historical and ethnographical survey'.

16. Whether the Toghuz-Oghuz are to be identified with the Uighur or not has much exercised scholars; for a résumé of views, see Grousset, *L'empire des steppes*, 162-3 n. 2, and on the connection of the names of the two peoples, Marquart, *Über das Volkstum der Komanen*, 37, 200-1.

17. Grousset, *op. cit.*, 161-2; Pritsak, 'Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden', *ZDMG*, CI (1951), 274; *idem*, 'Der Untergang des Reiches des Oğuzischen Yabğu', *Köprülü armağanï* (Istanbul 1953), 403.

18. Cf. Pritsak, 'Titulaturen und Stammesnamen der Altäischen Völker', *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher*, XXIV (1952), 50 ff.

19. Kāshgharī, tr. Atalay, I, 55-8; cf. Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, 264-5, who takes some of these tribes to be originally of Indo-European and Mongol origin.

20. IA, XI, 116-17, under 548/1153-4; Ṭabarī, III, 1044; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 420.

21. Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, 80-1 (who here accepts the equation of the Toghuz-Oghuz with the Uighur); G. Ferrand, *Relations de voyages et textes géographiques . . . relatifs a l'Extrême-Orient* (Paris 1913-14), I, 213-14.

22. Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, ed. de Goeje, *BGA*, VIII (Leiden 1894), 60-2, 180-1, tr. Carra de Vaux (Paris 1896), 90, 92-3, 245, and *Murūj*, I, 213, II, 18-19, commented on by Marquart, *Streifzüge*, 337-41, cf. 63; *idem*, *Komanen*, 25-7; Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, 81-2; Togan, *Giriş*, 137.

23. *Murūj*, I, 212; I Ḥauq., 512; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 122; Marquart, *Streifzüge*, 339; Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs*, 49; cf. Abū Dulaf in Ferrand, *Relation de voyages*, I, 213, who says that the Oghuz had a town built from stone, wood and reeds, materials which would be readily available on the lower Syr Darya.

24. O. Lattimore, 'The geographical factor in Mongol history', *Geogr. Jnal.*, XCI (1938), 14-16; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 178-9.

25. Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, 60-9, 228-30, 264-6. Tolstov has also written a special article on the towns of the Oghuz, 'Goroda Guzov', *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, III (1947), 55-102.

26. Bīrūnī, *The chronology of ancient nations*, tr. Sachau (London 1879), 224; Samʿānī, f. 486a, quoting al-Ḥākim b. al-Bayyiʿ; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 225-6; *idem*, *Histoire des Turcs*, 59; F. Grenard, 'La légende de Satok Boghra Khân et l'histoire, *JA*, Ser. 9, Vol. XV (1900), 5-79.

27. Maqd., 274.

28. 'À propos du nom Türkmen', *Oriens*, XI (1958), 146-50.

29. Kāshgharī, ed. Kilisli Rifʿat Bey, I, 31-6, tr. Brockelmann, 'Maḥmūd al-Kāšgharī über die Sprachen und die Stämme der Türken im 11. Jahrh.', *KCsA*, I (1921), 38-40.

30. Togan, *Reisebericht*, § 29, text 14, tr. 26, and Exc. § 29a, 136; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, 284-6; Masʿūdī, *Tanbīh*, 62, tr. 97; on the problem of the Uzboi channel, see Spuler, *EI*[2] Art. 'Amū-Daryā'.

31. Togan, *The Khorezmians and their civilisation*, 20-1; D. M. Dunlop, *The history of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton 1954), 256; Barthold, *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel-Asien*, 43-4.

32. Qazwīnī, *Āthār al-bilād wa akhbār al-ʿibād* (Beirut 1380/1960), 587; Barthold, *A history of the Turkman people*, 98-9; Togan, *Reisebericht*, Exc. § 28a, 135-6.

33. Dunlop, *op. cit.*, 260-1, favours Jewish influences here, but Biblical names had long been popular in Central Asia; cf. their frequency in the names of the sons and grandsons of Asad, founder of the Sāmānid dynasty's fortunes (IA, VII, 192-3).

34. Ferrand, *Relation de voyages*, I, 213.

35. A knowledge of the old Turkish script does seem to have been taken westwards by the Széklers, who accompanied the Magyars in their migrations into Central Europe; but Togan's conjecture that the Volga Bulghars retained a form of it (*Reisebericht*, Exc. § 72a, 193-6) is unlikely ever to be proved unless by the findings of archaeology.

36. *Reisebericht*, §§ 20-4, 27, 30, text 10-14, tr. 19-27.

37. *ibid.*, §§ 29, 28, 31, text 10, 13-15, tr. 20, 25-8. Ibn Faḍlān does not actually use the term *balbal*, but he is clearly referring to this type of funerary monument, on which see W. Kotwicz, 'Les tombaux dits «kereksur» en Mongolie', *RO*, VI (1928), 1-11, and *idem*, 'Contributions à l'histoire d'Asie Centrale. IV Origine du mot *batbat*', *RO*, XV (1939-49), 190-3.

38. Thomsen, *ZDMG* (1924), 131, 146; cf. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs*, 12, and *ṬN*, tr. 1107-9.

39. *Reisebericht*, §§ 31, 65, text 14-15, 29, tr. 27-8, 65-6; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 100; *Mujmal at-tawārīkh*, 102-3, cf. Togan, *Giriş*, 18.

40. Baih., 628, IA, X, 24. This astrologer of the Seljuqs may, of course, have been an Iranian who had attached himself to the invaders. He is further mentioned in IA, IX, 328, as having given the word for the engagement which led to the defeat of the Ghaznavid general Sübashï near Sarakhs in 428/1037: '[Chaghrï Beg] Dā'ūd had an astrologer called aṣ-Ṣaumaʿī. He ordered Dā'ūd to give battle, guaranteeing him the victory and swearing that if he were mistaken, his life could be forfeit.'

41. *Reisebericht*, § 33, text 15, tr. 28. On the title *Yabghu*, which Kāshgharī says belongs to the leader just below the Qaghan and which the *Mujmal at-tawārīkh*, 421, gives as the title of the ruler of the Oghuz, see Togan, *op. cit.*, Exc. § 33a, 140-1, and Narsh., tr. Frye, with further references. For *Külärkin* and the element *kül* in Turkish onomastic, see Kotwicz in *RO* (1939-49), 185-90.

42. *Reisebericht*, §§ 34, 36, text 15-17, tr. 28-31, cf. on the title *Sübashï*, Exc. § 34a, 141-2. Could *Y.gh.l.z* be meant for the title *Yughrush*, which Kāshgharī says equals *wazīr* (cf. Köprülü, 'Zur Kenntnis der alttürkischen Titulatur', *KCsA*, Ergänzungsband [1938], 337-41)?

43. Thomsen, *ZDMG* (1924), 147, 150, 154-5, 165; *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, 101; I Ḥauq., 389, and Abū Ḥamīd al-Andalusī al-Gharnāṭī, *Tuḥfat al-albāb*, ed. Ferrand, *JA*, CCVII (1925), 233, cf. Barthold, *EI*[1] Art. 'Manghïshlāḳ'; Gard., 85.

44. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 10, 16; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 3. The Qïnïq are also listed by Rashīd ad-Dīn as one of the twenty-four clans of the Oghuz (Houtsma, 'Die Ghuzzenstämme', *WZKM*, II [1888], 226); on this clan see Cahen, 'Les tribus turques d'Asie occidentale pendant la période Seljukide', *WZKM*, LI (1948-52), 179-80. The transcription 'Seljuq' has been adopted here as being the traditional one of European orientalism, which is based on the spelling of such sources contemporary with the coming of the Seljuqs as Baihaqī, Gardīzī and the *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*. However, by the conventions which later arose, the spelling *S.l.j.q* with *qāf* should give *Saljuq* or *Salchuq*. Barthold objected that the form *Seljuq* violated the rules of vowel harmony, and suggested *Seljük* on the basis of the spelling with *kāf* in Kāshgharī, ed. Kilisli

Rif'at Bey, I, 397, and in the *Kitāb-i Dede Qorqut*; and Pelliot has agreed with this (*Œuvres posthumes*, II [Paris 1950], 176-7). L. Rásonyi has concluded that because of Kāshgharī's known care for phonetic differences, his inclusion of the word in the class of palatalised words, i.e. those with front vowels, is significant ('Selçuk adïnïn menşeine dair', *Belleten*, III [1939], 377-84). Nevertheless, the spelling with *qāf* is by far the most widely-attested one in Islamic literature and it seems dangerous wholly to dismiss it, especially when the orthography of early Turkish, particularly in the east, was so variable. A crucial factor is the derivation of the name, as yet unexplained; a likely possibility is an origin from the verb *salmaq* 'attack, charge forward' > *salchuq* 'dashing, charging' (cf. K. H. Menges in *Jnal. of Near Eastern Studies*, X [1951], 268 n. 2).

45. Cahen, 'Le Malik-Nameh et l'histoire des origines Seljukides', *Oriens*, II (1949), 31-65, see also his ch. on the Seljuqs in K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, *A history of the Crusades. I: The first hundred years* (Philadelphia 1955), 135-76; Pritsak, in *Köprülü armağanï*, 397-410, cf. Cahen, 'A propos de quelques articles dans le Köprülü Armağanï', *JA*, CCXLII (1954), 271-5.

46. The vocalisation *Bīghū* or *Paighū* is so frequent in the sources that it has been suggested that we have here a totemistic personal name *Bïghu* 'falcon', and not the title *Yabghu*; cf. Marquart, *Komanen*, 42-3 n. 5; Pelliot, *TP*, XXVII (1930), 16; Pritsak, *op. cit.*, 406-7.

47. Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 1-2; IA, IX, 321-2, tr. in Marquart, *Komanen*, 42-4; Barhebr., tr. 195-6; Mīrkhw., IV, 96-7; Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 42-4; Pritsak, *op. cit.*, 405.

48. Ibn Ḥassūl, *Tafḍīl al-Atrāk*, Arabic text, 49; Barhebr., tr. 195; Dunlop, *History of the Jewish Khazars*, 260; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, 269 ff.

49. 'Utbī, I, 176, 335-6; IA, IX, 322; Gard., 64; Barthold, *A history of the Turkman people*, 101 ff.

50. Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 46 ff.; *idem*, *JA* (1954), 273-5; Pritsak, in *Köprülü armağanï*, 405-7; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 269.

51. 'Aufī, *Jawāmi' al-ḥikāyāt*, text and tr. of relevant part in Marquart, *Komanen*, 40-1; Minorsky, *Marvazī on China, the Turks and India*, text 18, tr. 29-30; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 10; Rāwandī, 86; Jamāl Qarshī, quoted in Togan, *Giriş*, 140.

52. *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 101; Maqd., 274; Baih., 86; Barthold, *EI*[1] Art. 'Kimäk'.

53. *TB*, 51; IA, IX, 346; Pritsak, *op. cit.*, 408; cf. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs*, 88-91 (an early appearance of the expression *Dasht-i Qïpchaq* is in the *Dīwān* of Nāṣir-i Khusrau, cf. Browne, *Lit. hist. of Persia*, II, 227), and Marquart, *Komanen*, 97 ff.

54. Ḥusainī, 2; Bundārī, 5; IA, IX, 322-3; *ṬN*, tr. 118; *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 233; Mīrkhw., IV, 97.

55. Kafesoğlu, 'Doğu Anadoluya ilk Selçuklu akïnï (1015-21) ve tarihî ehemmiyeti', *Köprülü armağanï*, 259-74; Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 50-1; *idem*, *JA* (1954), 275-9.

56. Gard., 84-5; Bundārī, 5; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, 13-14; Rāwandī, 88-9; Ḥusainī, 3-4; IA, IX, 266, 323; *ṬN*, tr. 85-7, 118-20; Shabānkāra'ī, *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 176b-177a; Mīrkhw., IV, 99, 104; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 63-4.

57. Gard., 89-90; Baih., 68-9, 244, 266, 372, 397, 399, 445, 448, 521; IA, IX, 266 ff., 324; Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 56-7; Nāẓim, *op. cit.*, 64-6.

58. Baih., 68, 244, 266, 445, 521; IA, IX, 267; Cahen, *op. cit.*, 57.

59. Baih., 470-1. Joint action of *Seljūqiyān* and *'Irāqiyān* is, however, mentioned in 427/1036 (Baih., 497).

60. Kāshgharī, tr. Atalay, I, 55-7; Cahen, *WZKM* (1948-52), 179-82.

61. Baih., 470.

62. Thomsen, *ZDMG* (1924), 167; *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, 120; Brockelmann, *Mitteltürkischer Wortschatz nach Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī* (Budapest-Leipzig 1928), 67; Togan, *Reisebericht*, § 28, text 13, tr. 25-6; Minorsky, 'Äinallu/Inallu', *RO*, XVII (1951-2), 2-11; Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 57-8.

Chapter VIII

1. Baih., 111-23; Gard., 74. The career of Mas'ūd and the early years of his reign have been treated in detail by R. Gelpke in his doctoral dissertation, *Sulṭān Mas'ūd I. von Ġazna. Die drei ersten Jahre seiner Herrschaft* (421/1030-424/1033) (Munich 1957); the author uses Baihaqī very thoroughly. Dr. J. A. Boyle was kind enough to bring this work to my notice and to lend me his own copy.

2. Gard., 91; Baih., 292; *ṬN*, 14, tr. 93; IA, IX, 261-3, 279.

3. Baih., 80, 217-18; *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 179a.

4. *Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm*, f. 205b; *ṬN*, 14, tr. 92-3. Shabānkāra'ī says that Muḥammad himself was well aware of his inferiority to his brother in wisdom, experience and popularity with the army, and was reluctant to accept the throne on his father's death, but was persuaded by his ambitious counsellors, who hoped to appropriate much of the power for themselves (*Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 182a-b).

5. Baih., 80 ff.; Gard., 92-5; *Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm*, ff. 205b-206a; *ṬN*, 11-12, tr. 88-90; IA, IX, 281-3 (first pages of this numbering); *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 181b-184a, with an especially full account of Muḥammad's Sultanate.

6. *Turkestan*, 293.
7. Baih., 624; Gard., 108; IA, IX, 329-30.
8. Baih., 399-400, 649, 653, 660 ff.
9. *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 185a.
10. Thus Amīr Yūsuf died after one year in captivity and Asïghtigin after three years (Baih., 252, 424).
11. Baih., 13, 52-62, 94; Gard., 93, 96; IA, IX, 282-3 (first pages of this numbering); *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 182a-b, 184b.
12. Baih., 69-70, 244, 247-52; Gard., 93-5; IA, *loc. cit.*
13. Baih., 36-8, 82, 142-4, and 220-37 (=Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 100-13).
14. Baih., 83; *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 183a.
15. Baih., 57, 62-3, 83-92, 285, 316-33, 342-54; *Majma' al-ansāb*, ff. 184a-185a.
16. Baih., 65; Gard., 96; IA, IX, 283 (first page of this numbering); *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, f. 106a; cf. Nazim, *EI*[1] Art. 'al-Maimandī'.
17. Cf. Baih., 86, 237, 316-17.
18. *ibid.*, 263; IA, IX, 207; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 80-5, 192-3; Spuler, *Iran im früh-islamischer Zeit*, 116-18.
19. Baih., 521; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 6; IA, IX, 269, 296-7. Ibn Sīnā's books were sent to Ghazna, where they remained till the city was sacked by 'Alā' ad-Dīn Jahān-Sūz Ghūrī.
20. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 76a-77a, tr. Shafi, 213-15.
21. Baih., 533-4 (=Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 140).
22. Baih., 13, 282-4, 530-1.
23. 'Utbī, II, 76 ff; Jurb., 182-5; Gard., 68-9; IA, IX, 133-5; Mīrkhw., IV, 39-41.
24. Gard., 82-4; Baih., 214-15; Farrukhī, *Dīwān*, 252-3. In *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 176a, the Khan appeals at the meeting to the common Turkish origin of the two rulers as a basis for solidarity.
25. Baih., 445. For 'Alītigin, see Pritsak, 'Die Karachaniden', *Der Islam*, XXXI (1953-4), 30 ff., and *idem*, 'Karachanidische Streitfragen. 2. Wer war 'Alī Tigin?', *Oriens*, III (1950), 216-24.
26. *Chahār maqāla*, 58-65. Browne's Revised Tr. 39-44, cf. *Lit. hist. of Persia*, II, 124-8.
27. Baih., 465, 492, 495.
28. 'Utbī, I, 183-4, II, 251-9; Jurb., 90, 240-1; Gard., 73-4; Baih., 668-79; cf. Sachau, *SBWAW*, LXXIV (1873), 287, 297-300; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 275-9; Nāẓim, *Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, 56-60.
29. Cf. Gard., 81, 105, and Baih., 563, 566, for crossings in this way by Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd.

30. Baih., 86, 317, 320, 323; *Majma' al-ansāb*, f. 183a; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, 291. The sections of Baihaqī bearing on Altuntash, his sons and successors, have been translated into English by S. M. Siddiq in 'The house of Altuntash Khwarazmshah', *IC*, VIII (1934), 313-21, 631-42, IX (1935), 68-79, 234-43.

31. Baih., 355, 403, 684; cf. Sachau, *op. cit.*, 303-9.

32. Baih., 689-90; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 6; IA, IX, 346.

33. Baih., 67-8, 283, 338, 433, 465-7.

34. *ibid.*, 403; Gard., 105; W. Tomaschek, 'Centralasiatische Studien. I. Sogdiana', *SBWAW*, LXXXVII (1877), 111-12; *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 120, 361-3; Markwart, *Wehrot und Arang*, 54-9, 93; Togan, *Giriş*, 23.

35. Baih., 283, 343, 438-9, 445, 643; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 12; IA, IX, 330-1; Mīrkhw., IV, 105.

Chapter IX

1. Baih., 343, 445; IA, IX, 324-5 (cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 297-8, who errs in saying that Ibn al-Athīr is the only source mentioning this); Mīrkhw., IV, 99-100, where 'Alītigin is confusingly called 'the Ilig', although this may in fact have been one of his titles.

2. Baih., 445, 687; IA, IX, 325; Mīrkhw., IV, 100. It is not the intention to give in this chapter a narrative of military events in Khurasan, although there is ample material in the sources for it; Baihaqī's account can conveniently be read in A. de Biberstein-Kazimirsky's detailed résumé prefaced to his edition of the *Dīwān* of Manūchihrī.

3. Baih., 470-4; Mīrkhw., *loc. cit.*

4. Baih., 483-6, 489-92; Gard., 100-2; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 4-5; IA, IX, 325-6; Mīrkhw., *loc. cit.*

5. According to IA, IX, 324, the title 'Inanj Yabghu' had been given to Yūsuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq by 'Alītigin.

6. Mīrkhw., IV, 101; cf. Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 60. The episode is not mentioned by Baihaqī, and it is possible that it fell within the lacuna of some months in our text at p. 403.

7. Baih., 505.

8. *ibid.*, 570.

9. Mīrkhw., IV, 99, 104-5.

10. Baih., 553; Bundārī, 7; IA, IX, 312; Barhebr., tr. 198; cf. Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 62. Ḥusainī and Mīrkhwānd do not mention this incident, perhaps because it did no credit to Chaghrï.

11. Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 8-9; Mīrkhw., IV, 102.

12. Gard., 106-7; IA, IX, 329.

13. In 427/1036 Masʿūd estimated that there were 10,000 Turkmen cavalry in Khurasan and central Persia, and this seems reasonable enough (Baih., 481); the figure of over 30,000 Turkmens plus camp following given as passing through the Lake Urmia region in 435/1043-4 seems rather high (IA, IX, 276). See further, Ch. III, § 6.

14. Baih., 553.

15. *ibid.*, 476-7, 552, 682.

16. *ibid.*, 399-400, 439, 497; *TS*, 364.

17. Cf. Baih., 506-7: panic was caused in the autumn of 428/1036 by a false rumour that Chaghrï and 4000 cavalry had ridden through Ghūr to attack Ghazna.

18. St. Julien, 'Documents historiques sur les Tou-kioue (Turcs)', *JA*, Ser. 6, Vol. III (1864), 547.

19. Baih., 537, 542, 570, 578, 581, 588.

20. Niẓām al-Mulk's chapter, 'On the necessity of keeping stocks of provisions in storehouses' (*SN*, 105), may be based on Ghaznavid precedent. The term *kūtwāl/kütäül* was brought into the Islamic world by the Ghaznavids. Its origin is Indian, from Prakrits *koṭhavāl* 'sheriff', and not Turkish, *pace* W. Bang, *APAW* (1919), No. 5, 60, and J. Németh, *JA*, CCXXXIX (1951), 70.

21. Cf. Baih., 398, on the disturbed state of the Nishapur-Ray road as early as 424/1033, and Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 7, on the state of Khurasan in 428/1037: *qad insaddat aṭ-ṭuruq wa'nqaṭaʿat mawādd al-qawāfil li-tashwīsh al-aṭrāf wa'stīlā' al-umarā' as-Saljūqiyya ʿalā 'n-nawāḥī.*

22. Baih., 577.

23. *ibid.*, 481-6.

24. *ibid.*, 535-6, 538, 543-4; Ḥusainī, *op. cit.*, 6-9; IA, IX, 327-8 (the correct date of the battle, Shaʿbān 429/May 1038, in Baihaqī; the other two sources have Shaʿbān 428).

25. IA, IX, 329.

26. Baih., 372, 440; IA, IX, 267.

27. Baih., 444, 535-6, 577-8.

28. *ibid.*, 609.

29. *ibid.*, 612, 631.

30. *ibid.*, 616-18, 631-2; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 16; Rāwandī, 100; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 9-10; IA, IX, 329. For the actual battle, see the article on it by B. Zakhoder in *Russkii Istoricheskii Zhurnal* (1943) (not accessible to me, but presumably based on Baihaqī's account).

31. See p. 88.

32. Perhaps the Sayyid Zaid b. Muḥammad b. al-Muẓaffar of Baihaq (d. 440/1048-9) mentioned by al-Fārisī, *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 65a.

33. The colour of this banner is not specified, but at the battle of Talkh-Āb near Sarakhs in 430/1039 the three Seljuq commanders each had their own black banner planted on a sand-hill (Baih., 575). Spuler, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 349, is therefore incorrect in saying that the Seljuqs only adopted black banners after they entered Baghdad in 1055.

34. The bow and arrow, weapon *par excellence* of the steppe nomads, was the Oghuz symbol of authority, and the Seljuqs used it for their tamghas. A stylised bow and arrow appears on the coins of Toghrïl and his two successors. When Toghrïl became Sultan, he used a bow and arrow on ceremonial occasions as an emblem of sovereignty (Barhebr., tr. 201, cf. 206; see also Cahen, 'La ṭuġra seljuḳide', *JA*, CCXXXIV (1943-5), 167-72, and O. Turan, 'Eski Türklerde okun hukuki bir sembol olarak kullanïlmasï', *Belleten*, X (1935), 305-18.

35. On the silken cloth called *mulḥam*, see Dozy, *Supplément*, II, 522, and for the cloth of Tawwaj in Fārs, a town famous for linens woven with golden thread, see Freytag, *Lexicon*, I, 204.

36. Because of this profanation, Sūrī was later ordered by the Sultan to break up the throne and all the carpets spread on the dais and give the pieces to the poor; stables constructed by the Seljuqs were also pulled down (Baih., 607).

37. *Tāzīk* is used here, as elsewhere in Baihaqī, in the sense 'Persian citizen or subject', the name used by the Persians to distinguish themselves from their Turkish rulers (Barthold, *EI*[1] Art. 'Tādjīk'). Cf. Biberstein-Kazimirski, *Menoutchehri, poète persan*, 121 n. 2: '*Tāzikān* civils, bourgeois', but he mistranslates, *ibid.*, 115, *rasmhā-yi Tāzīkān* as 'les usages modernes'.

38. Bundārī, 7-8; a similar account in Barhebr., tr. 198, and a brief reference in Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 17.

39. IA, IX, 312, cf. 328, where the date of Toghrïl's entry is wrongly given as Sha'bān 428; Mīrkhwānd, IV, 102; Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 9; *Seljūq-nāma*, 15; Rāwandī, 97.

40. Baih., 68; Mīrkhw., IV, 102; Barhebr., tr. 202.

41. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 104a; *Histoire des Seljoucides du Kermân*, 4.

42. *TB*, 268, 273; cf. also Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 8, where it is said that the Ghaznavid commander 'swept Khurasan clean with the broom of his exactions and did not leave anyone ten stalks of corn'.

43. Mīrkhw., *loc. cit.*, Baih., 608-9; al-Fārisī, *as-Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Naishābūr*, f. 28b.

44. IA, IX, 330.

45. Cf. the second section of his *Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen âge*, especially [51] ff.

46. 'Sur les traces des premiers Akhis', *Köprülü armağanï*, 81-91; cf. also F. Taeschner, *EI*² Art. 'Akhī'.

47. al-Fārisī, *op. cit.*, ff. 108a-b; *TB*, 219; some of his verses in Thaʿālibī, *Tatimmat al-yatīma*, II, 7-8; further references in Bowen, 'The *sar-gudhasht-i sayyidnā . . .*', *JRAS* (1931), 778-9.

48. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 17; Rāwandī, 103; Mīrkhw., IV, 54.

49. al-Fārisī, *op. cit.*, ff. 101b-102a; Bowen, 'Notes on some early Seljuqid Viziers', *BSOAS*, XX (1957), 105-7.

50. His passivity is in part explicable by his advanced age; he died two years later at the age of eighty-six (al-Fārisī, *op. cit.*, f. 74b).

51. *TS*, 367-9.

52. *Oriens* (1949), 61; and in Setton and Baldwin, *A history of the Crusades. I: The first hundred years*, 141.

53. *Seljūq-nāma*, 18; Rāwandī, 98, 104; *Guzīda*, 437; Baih., 607; Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Safar-nāma*, 3; IA, X, 20; Bowen, *BSOAS* (1957), 105-10.

54. Baih., 610; al-Fārisī, *op. cit.*, f. 39a.

55. Mīrkhw., IV, 102. But when the Seljuqs came again to Merv two years later, it resisted them in a seven months' siege (Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 11, IA, IX, 329).

56. Gard., 107; IA, IX, 315-16.

57. Cf. Baih., 560-2, and Gard., 105-6, on the activities at this time in Gūzgān of a notorious *ʿayyār*, one ʿAlī Qunduzī.

58. Baih., 588-9; 650; cf. *Rauḍāt al-jannāt fī auṣāf Harāt*, ff. 97b-98a, 151a.

59. *ibid.*, 470; Cahen, *Oriens* (1949), 58-9.

60. Bundārī, 7-8.

61. Ḥusainī, *Akhbār ad-daula as-Saljūqiyya*, 9; IA, IX, 312; Cahen, *op. cit.*, 62.

62. Mīrkhw., IV, 102.

63. Baih., 490, 628; Bundārī, 8; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Seljūq-nāma*, 18; Rāwandī, 104. It is not certain, *pace* Cahen, *op. cit.*, 59, that the presence of the *dānishmand* of Bukhārā proves a liaison with the indigenous religious classes; it is possible that he had been acquired as a captive.

64. IA, IX, 330; cf. Balādhurī, 263, where the Arab conquerors of Madā'in use the camphor found there as salt for cooking. *Qaṭmāch* must be from the Turkish $\sqrt{}$*qat-* 'add' = a food composed of layers; cf. *tutmāch* in Juwainī tr. Boyle, II, 505 n. 15, 'fresh pastry cut in strips and stewed with meat'.

APPENDIX

A LIST OF THE RULERS IN GHAZNA 963-1099

Governors on behalf of the Sāmānids

Alptigin	351-2/963
Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Alptigin	352-5/963-6
Bilgetigin	355-64/966 to 974-5
Böri or Böritigin	364-6/974-5 to 977
Abū Manṣūr Sebüktigin	366-87/977-97

Independent rulers (Ismāʿīl and Maḥmūd, however, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sāmānids at the beginning of their reigns)

Ismāʿīl	387-8/997-8
Abū'l-Qāsim Maḥmūd	388-421/998-1030
Abū Aḥmad Muḥammad (first reign)	421/1030
Abu Saʿīd Masʿūd	421-32/1030-41
Abū Aḥmad Muḥammad (second reign)	432/1041
Abū'l-Fatḥ Maudūd	432-41/1041-50
Masʿūd II	441/1050
Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī	441/1050
Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd ar-Rashīd	441-4/1050-3
Toghrïl (usurper)	444/1053
Abū Shujāʿ Farrukhzād	444-51/1053-9
Abū'l-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm	451-92/1059-99

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
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
MAP SHOWING THE EXTENT OF THE GHAZNAVID EMPIRE IN 1030 A.D.
(tributary states are shown by dotted lines)



MAP OF KHURASAN, AFGHANISTAN AND TRANSOXANIA TO ILLUSTRATE THE WARFARE WITH THE TURKMENS

Genealogical Table I. THE EARLY GHAZNAVIDS

Note—Full detail is given down to Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd; thereafter, only reigning monarchs are shown.



Genealogical Table II. THE EARLY SELJUQS

